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As an ethnic minority within a religious minority, Malays in Sri Lanka 
present a fascinating and multifaceted case of ethnic identity formation. While 
there has been a considerable amount of historical and linguistic research done 
on Sri Lankan Malay, there is relatively little sociological and anthropological 
research on them. In comparison, the amount of research carried out on the 
larger Moor Muslim community is far greater. This thesis seeks to fill this gap 
in the ethnographic and sociological literature. This study was carried out 
mainly through a qualitative method, employing ethnographic techniques in 
the Western, Southern, Central and Eastern province of Sri Lanka.  
The study reveals that Malays have identified their physical features, 
language, ancestry and religion as the boundary markers of their identity. They 
discount culture as an identity marker because it has lost its originality and 
uniqueness due to the influence of Moors, living in interspersed settlements 
amongst dominant communities and the activities of transnational Islamic 
movements. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence of this study shows that the 
Malay elites and Malay organizations are now in the process of reviving their 
culture as they react to the challenges of assimilation.  
The study further shows that Malay identity in Sri Lanka is both 
primordial as well as constructed: it is primordial based on boundary markers 
such as physical characteristics (race), Malay language, ancestry, religion and 
their self-identification. However, my contention is that primordialism alone is 
not sufficient to explain Malay identity; currently, there is also the process of 
Malay identity construction taking place as the community responds to the 
challenges caused by assimilation, particularly the substitutive acculturation 
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and personal contacts of structural assimilation. Although this is viewed by 
Malays as primordialism, I argue that there is construction of Malay identity 
taking place as the community responds to the challenges assimilation. My 
study reports that the recent years have witnessed Sri Lankan Malay 
organizations identifying the challenges caused by assimilation and then 
responding to such challenges through language revitalization programme,  
religious programmes, and cultural events such as Malay dance, music, 
exhibition of Malay cuisines and costumes. These are instrumental in 
constructing and perpetuating the Malay identity. This, I argue, is the process 
whereby Malay identity is being constructed.    
The findings of this study also show that assimilation of Malays also 
yields pluralism and hybridity as the outcomes of assimilation. Malays have 
become fluent in all the vernacular languages, are familiar with all the cultural 
practices and held in high esteem by all communities. They are viewed as 
honest, brave and integrated people. They consider themselves as Sri Lankans 
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1.1 : Background of the study 
Discourse on thnic identity has gained great importance during recent 
decades because questions concerning ethnic identity have become so 
significant socially, culturally and politically in many of the societies that are 
studied. Although, the concept of ethnic identity had been explored both in 
sociology and anthropology in the last century, it became a more prominent 
discourse only towards the end of 1970s, particularly with growing cultural 
and religious revivalism that posed challenges to nation-states, freed from the 
clutches of colonialism during the latter part of the twentieth century. This 
provided space for discussions on identity in the context of modernity.1 
Countries like Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda and Sudan are classic examples of 
how ethnic conflicts, with ethnicity as the basis, have submerged the people 
into disarray, resulting in innumerable loss of lives, homelessness and 
displacements internally as well as externally.  
In plural societies, due to the influence of other cultures, ethnic 
identities are not static; they shift depending on contexts. Therefore, ethnic 
groups and their members may adopt different identities at different times. 
Individuals and groups who give up their (old) ethnic identities and become 
                                                 
1 H.T.Eriksen, “Ethnicity, class and 1999 Mauritian riots.” In Ethnicity, nationalism, and 
minority rights, ed.  S.May, T.Modood, and J.Squires. (United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 1-2.  
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identified with the larger society are assimilated.2 This assimilation takes place 
either in the absence of identity markers or when there is little desire to 
maintain one’s ethnic identity or culture.3  
Also, an ethnic identity is developed and modified as individuals 
become aware of other groups and of the ethnic differences between 
themselves and others, and attempt to understand the meaning of their 
ethnicity within larger setting.4 As such, new situations may prompt ethnic 
groups to renegotiate their ethnic identities in response to contextual and 
historical changes. Many bicultural individuals experience variation in the 
strength of their identities as they move between ethnic and non-ethnic 
contexts, such as home, school and workplace, and change their language and 
behaviors to suit the contexts. Ethnic identity can also be renegotiated when 
individuals and groups move across national borders as migrants, refugees, 
workers, and other travellers.5   
Ethnic identity may also be fostered through a socialization process 
from childhood by different social agencies such as family, school, neighbors, 
and peers. A change in their ethnic identity may occur with a number of 
influencing factors that include age and generation of ethnic groups. As a 
result of these varying influences of dominant groups, sub-ethnic groups and 
their individual members are likely to be assimilated into the former.  
                                                 
2 J.S. Phinney, “Psychology of Ethnic Identity”, In International Encyclopedia of the Social 
and Behavioral Science, ed. Neil.J. Smelser and Paul. B. Baltes (Oxford: Pergamon press, 
2001), 4822. 
  
3 Phinney, “Psychology of Ethnic Identity,” 4823. 
 
4 Ibid., 4821. 
 
5 Ibid.,4822.  
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Sri Lanka is home to communities that are culturally, ethnically and 
religiously diverse. Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims make the three major 
ethnic communities in Sri Lanka, their ethnicities being defined based on their 
language, territory, history, religion and culture. However, Sri Lanka has only 
recently come out of the civil war that had been ravaging the country for over 
three decades, resulting in the death of over 100,000 people, mostly from the 
minorities, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more internally and 
externally.6 Hence, Sri Lanka has been in the popular discourse and debate 
among scholars. Chauvinistic political ideologies and discriminatory policies 
formulated in favor of the majority community, by various governments, have 
been attributed to the lack of understanding between the majority and minority 
ethnic groups, and the ensuing protracted war in the country. As such, 
Jayadeva Uyangoda (2007)7 notes “group discrimination, limited access to 
public resources, and cultural or ethnic marginalization were indeed the key 
components of minority experience that eventually produced the ethnic 
conflict and the demand for autonomy”.  
“The Sinhala Only Act of 1956”,8 among many other government 
policies, is considered as one of the most serious factors that laid the 
foundation for this protracted war. It signified Sinhalese as the sole official 
language, restricted many government jobs to Sinhala speakers and changed 
university admissions policies, which reduced the number of students from 
                                                 
6 A.R.M. Imthiyas  & M.C.M. Iqbal, “The Displaced Northern Muslims of Sri Lanka: Special 
Problems and their Future.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 46, no.,4.( 2011): 376. 
 
7 Jayadeva Uyangoda, Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics. (Washington: East 
West Centre Washington, 2007), 2. 
 
8 K. N. O. Dharmadasa,”Sri Lanka.” In Language and National Identity in Asia, ed. A. 
Simpson. (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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minority communities accessing higher education. Many in the minority 
communities believe that this Act of 1956 was responsible for bestowing a 
privileged status upon the Sinhalese language, and relegating all other 
languages to the sidelines. The worst affected were the Tamils, who, prior to 
the introduction of this Act, had been gaining greater benefits. The 
introduction of this Act greatly reduced educational opportunities for them, 
and by extension job opportunities.  The 1956 Act heralded the dawn of the 
majoritarian mindset among the Sinhalese politicians, in post independence Sri 
Lanka.  Many feel that the serious polarization along the lines of ethnicity, 
religion and politics, evident today, is due largely to this discriminatory 
language policy of 1956. Peiris (1999)9 aptly states that “Sinhalese and Tamils 
grew up living side by side but were unable to communicate (with each other) 
and the majority of population were attempting to force the minority to 
assimilate.” 
The Mahinda Rajapaksha government, in May 2009, militarily 
decimated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), bringing to an end 
the civil war that had been plaguing the country for more than three decades. 
The end of civil war heralded in a new era of inter-ethnic relations in Sri 
Lanka. With the defeat of the LTTE, the government began to write a new 
chapter on the minorities in Sri Lanka. The President’s victory speech on May 
19, 2009 was deemed provocative and inflammatory. He stated, “we have 
removed the word ‘minorities’ from our vocabulary. No longer are there any 
Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims, Burghers, Malays and any other minorities. There 
are only two kinds of people in this country now. One is the people that love 
                                                 
9 H Peiris, “Language: Barriers That Can Crumble”. Daily News, November 12, 1999. http:// 
www.dailynews.lk/language barriers that can crumble.( accessed March 23, 2011) 
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this country. The other comprises the small groups that have no love for the 
land of their birth. Those who do not love the country are now a lesser 
group.”10 While the speech can be interpreted that all ethnic groups are equally 
important to the president and his government, some scholars and social 
activists felt that this statement from the President was a coded announcement 
of the denial of rights to the minority communities of Sri Lanka. They felt that 
the government intended to continue its war, albeit, in a different form - this 
time the target was not the militant LTTE, but the minority communities 
themselves. Some critics have expressed their concerns that this speech may 
legitimize the continued majoritarian hegemony by the rulers over the 
minorities. According to Qadiri Ismail (2009)11 , this is a clear manifestation 
of a majoritarian mindset.  The President’s speech brought the issue of 
minority politics to the forefront once more, and many, including the Sri 
Lankan Muslims, are pondering anew what it means to be part of a minority 
population. True to the word of the critics, the post war era in Sri Lanka has 
witnessed a massive development in the Sinhala majoritarian hegemonic 
agenda, exemplified in the growth of extreme right wing (Buddhist) religious 
movements like the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) that seek to subdue minorities, 
particularly the Muslims.  
The end of civil war, indeed, does not auger well for the minorities in 
Sri Lanka and shows signs of ethnic tension rearing its ugly head once more. 
Sri Lanka’s minority Muslim community is coming under intense pressure 
                                                 
10 The speech of the president can be watched in this website 
(http://www.president.gov.lk/speech). 
 
11 Q. Ismail, “Critiquing the President's Victory Speech.” Groundview, November 24th , 2009, 
http://groundviews.org/2009/08/20/critiquing-the-presidents-victory-speech-evidence-ofan-
majoritarian-mindset.( accessed July 10, 2010). 
 6 
 
from hard-line Buddhist organizations of monks such as Bodu Bala Sena 
(Buddhist Power Force /Army) and Sinhala Ravaya (Roar of Sinhala), who 
have declared themselves as guardians of Buddhism and the unofficial police 
force to protect Buddhism, and they are allegedly linked to certain powerful 
individuals in the present government led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa. 
These fascist Buddhist movements lash out at the Muslims, demanding an 
outright ban on several Muslim practices including the traditional Muslim 
dress of women, halal dietary practices, and cattle slaughter. The situation 
seems to be spiralling out of control. The virulently strident anti-Muslim 
agenda is gaining currency, with the relentless tragetting of Muslim economy, 
business establishments, and other sectors, all with the tacit approval of the 
government. Some are of the view that the security and the very existence of 
the Sri Lankan Muslims will be at stake if the present trend against Muslims 
remains unchecked.  
The Muslim community in Sri Lanka accounts for approximately 8.3 
percent of the total population, and they are the second largest minority groups 
in the country.12 The Muslim community consists of the Sri Lankan Moors, 
Malays, Borahs, and Memons. Sri Lankan Moors, who are generally referred 
to as Sri Lankan Muslims, were the descendants of Arabs and South Indians 
during 7th century A.D13 or the 9th century14 onwards. They presently 
                                                 
12 Collected from the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka: 2001 
 
13 M.A. Nuhman, Sri Lankan Muslims-Ethnic identity within Cultural Diversity. (Colombo: 
International Centre for Ethnic studies, 2007), 2-3. 
 
14 L.Dewaraja, The Muslims of Sri Lanka: One Thousand Years of Ethnic Harmony 900-1915. 
(Colombo, Sri Lanka: Chamara Printers,1994) 
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constitute almost eight (8) percent15 of the total population in Sri Lanka. They 
were first called ‘Moors’, a pejorative term according to some, by the 
Portuguese and later by the other colonial rulers. Nuhman (2007)16 notes “the 
term Muslim is used to refer to both religion and ethnicity”. However, the 
term Sri Lankan Moor is generally accepted as the term of reference for the 
Non-Malay segment of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka, even though both 
Malays and Moors (Non-Malay) share the same religion, Islam. The Moors of 
Sri Lanka share close linguistic and cultural ties with the Tamil ethnic group. 
Tamil is the common language for both. Borahs and Memons, who are also 
Muslims in terms of religion, are North Indian business communities that 
settled in Sri Lanka during the British rule, and constitute less than 0.5 percent 
of the total Muslim population.17 They speak Gujarati and Urdu for their intra 
group communication.  
Sri Lankan Malays, on the other hand, are largely the descendents of 
the former inhabitants of the Malay Archipelago. They were brought to Sri 
Lanka during the Dutch and British colonial rule from the mid-17th to mid-20th 
century.18 Sri Lankan Malays constitute just 0.3 percent of the total population 
in Sri Lanka,19 numbering about 54,782 at present. Sri Lankan Malays are as 
small as Memons and Borahs communities in Sri Lanka. Malays are highly 
                                                 
15 Collected from the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2001. 
 
16 Nuhman, Sri Lankan Muslims-Ethnic identity within Cultural Diversity, 13. 
 
17 M.A.Nuhuman, “Ethnic Identity, Religious Fundamentalism and Muslim Women in Sri 
Lanka”. Alternative Perspectives: A collection of Essays on Contemporary Muslim Society, 
(Colombo: MWRAF, 1997), 48.  
 
18 B.A.Hussainmiya, Orang Regimen: The Malays of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment. (Malaysia: 
Hakcipta Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1990), 38. 
 
19 Collected from the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2001. 
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concentrated in Colombo, Gampaha, Hambantota, Kandy, Badulla, 
Kurunegala, Trinomalee, and Nuwaraeliya districts in Sri Lanka.20 
Sri Lankan Malays are identified as  Ja Minissu21  by the Sinhalese, as 
Java Manusar22 by the Tamils and Malai karar23 by the Moors.24 Moreover, 
Sri Lankan Malays were categorized as “Malays” by the British colonial rulers 
during 19th century.25 They constituted a heterogeneous group of Easterners in 
terms of ethnic and linguistic background, along with the Bandanese, Bugis, 
Ambaenose, Balinese, Tiodrese, Madurese and Sundanese.26 Despite their 
heterogeneous nature, they were all identified as a single Malay community 
(ethnic identity) through the use of the Malay language.27  
There has been a growing debate in the scholarly circles over the 
ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays: whether they should be considered as 
‘Sri Lankan Malays’ or ‘Sri Lankan Muslims’ as they both share the religion 
of Islam. Sri Lankan Moors prefer themselves to be categorized as Sri Lankan 
Muslims. Sri Lankan Moors have also shown a great interest in subsuming the 
identity of Malays under the blanket category of ‘Muslims’ on the basis of 
Islam being the common religion between them. However, Malays have been 
                                                 
20 Meladi Saldin, “An outline of Past and Present of the Malays in Sri Lanka.” Undergraduate 
diss., University of Kelaniya, 2006. 
 
21 It is a Sinhala language term that denotes the Sri Lankan Malays. 
 
22 It is a Tamil language term that denotes the Sri Lankan Malays. 
 
23 It is also a colloquial Tamil language term that refers to Sri Lankan Malays. 
 






27 B.A.Hussainmiya, “The Malay Identity in Brunei Darussalam and Sri Lanka” In South East 
Asia: A Multidisciplinary Journal 10, (2010): 72. 
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quite disapproving of this. Hence, the contentious debate over the Malay 
identity in Sri Lanka. It warrants further exploration, although there has 
already been a lot of debate among scholars that Sri Lankan Malays are fast 
losing their identity in terms of markers such as culture, language, descent and 
religion due to the process of assimilation into the host communities in the 
country.28 Such further explorations should seek to identify the challenges to 
the Malay identity resulting from such assimilation.   
Since Malays are small in numbers and dispersed widely among other 
ethnic groups such as Sinhalese, Tamils, and Moor in the Western, Central, 
Southern and Eastern part of Sri Lanka, the prospect of integration and 
assimilation of Malays into the host communities is significantly higher, 
compared to other communities in Sri Lanka. It is not the same in the case of 
other minority groups living in Sri Lanka. In the Eastern province, for 
example, Sri Lankan Moors live side by side with other communities, 
particularly the Hindus. Nevertheless, this does not pose any threat to the 
preservation of Moor’s ethnic identity for they make a large concentration 
there.   
Whether or not a minority community manages to resist assimilation 
and preserves its unique identity is contingent upon how it manages to 
preserve and perpetuate its identity in a multi-cultural context. Converserly, an 
extensive form of assimilation may lead to the erasure of distinct social and 
cultural inventory of an ethnic group in a particular context. Scholars like 
                                                 
28 Saybhan Samat, “Future of Sri Lankan Malays bleak,” Melay online, July 05, 
2001.http://melayuonline.com/eng/opinion/read/51/future-of-sri-lankan-malays-bleak, 
(accessed January 10, 2010).  
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Hussainmiya (1990), 29Samat (2001),30 Rifai (2008)31, and Suwarn 
Vajracharya (2009),32 have concluded that Malays have become naturalized 
(assimilated) with other Sri Lankans due to the influence of different factors. 
However, their studies lack empirical evidence to substantiate their arguments 
and some of these studies, except Hussainmiya’s, are not empirically based; 
they are based on website articles from various websites. This study, however, 
attempts to make a scholarly contribution, focusing on ethnic identity 
formation of Malays and the challenges to their ethnic identity due to 
assimilation into the core ethnic groups in the country. This is an area which 
has suffered scholarly neglect for many years. 
 
1.2: Aim of the study  
The primary aim of this study is to examine the ethnic identity 
formation of minority Malays and the challenges to their ethnic identity due to 
assimilation into the core ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Despite the voluminous 
literature devoted to the conceptualization of Malayness, a clear description of 
who or what a Malay is, and what constitutes Malayness remains elusive. The 
term “Malayness” or “Malay” remains a problematic category; it embodies 
many dimensions, and requires further analysis, because the underlying 
                                                 
29 Hussaimiya, Orang Regimen: The Malays of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, 38. 
 
30 Samat,“Future of Sri Lankan Malays bleak.”, 1-2.  
 
31 Sulaiman Rifai, “The Identity Crisis of Sri Lankan Malay Muslims.” Muslimguardian, 
January 05, 2008. http://www. muslimguardian.com/the identity crisis of srilankan malay 
muslims(accessed June 05th, 2011). 
 
32 Suwarn Vajracharya, “Malay Minority of Sri Lanka: Defending Their Identity.” 2009. 
http://www.wako.ac.jp/souken/touzai_b04/tzb0407.html.,(accessed  January 10, 2010). 
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meaning of Malayness differs depending on the context. Thus, exploring the 
conceptualization of Malayness among the Malay immigrants in Sri Lanka 
would further enhance the theoretical framework on Malayness.  
It is common that the moment an immigrant ethnic group arrives in a 
new environment, they are promptly exposed to new conditions including the 
culture and lifestyles of the host community. An ethnic group may 
continuously create or interpret its cultural tradition in the process of 
assimilation with other ethnic groups. The dynamics of the assimilation, 
generally, is such that the minority group will undergo the process of 
acculturation and structural assimilation (integration). In assimilation, the 
nature of contact is that of an asymmetrical process, by which an out-group 
comes to accept the values of the dominant in-group, or at least incorporates 
those values into its own value system, through the “processes of 
interpenetration and fusion”.33 This proposition of Park and Burgess may be 
simple and out-dated, but it provides a useful foundation that frames much of 
the current studies into assimilation. Thus, assimilation is an ongoing and 
complex process that is likely to change with time. For a multi-ethnic society, 
the concept of assimilation needs to be closely examined in the social context.   
Therefore, a study on the ethnic identity formation of Sri Lankan 
minority Malays, with specific focuss on the challenges of the assimilation 
process and its responses in a multicultural society, becomes extremely 
important, especially at a time when critical scholarly debates are taking place 
on the ethnic identity of Malays as well as the challenges of assimilation to 
                                                 
33 R.E. Park, and E.W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press,1924), 735. 
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Malays. Thus, this study is an attempt to examine the ethnic identity of 
minority Malays in Sri Lanka, specifically focusing on how this has been 
affected by the process of assimilation. The question of root causes of 
assimilation is extensively analyzed in the study. By and large, this study 
focuses not only on the identity formation of Malays in Sri Lanka, but also on 
the ethnic identity markers of Sri Lankan Malays; challenges to their ethnicity 
resulting from assimilation; responses of Malay elites and their organizations 
to these challenges; and the outcomes of the assimilation upon Malays. 
 
1.3: Research questions 
In accordance with the primary aim of research, my investigation seeks 
to find answers to the following key research questions pertaining to the ethnic 
identity of Malays and their assimilation into the host communities in Sri 
Lanka.   
1. How is the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays formed?  
2. What are the challenges of assimilation to the ethnicity of the Sri 
Lankan Malays?  
3. What are the responses to such challenges?  
4. What are the outcomes of the assimilation on the Malays in the 
country?  
 
It is assumed that the process of identity formation of Malays takes 
place in the context of Malays themselves identifying the challenges of 
assimilation to their ethnic identity and responding to such challenges. Thus, it 
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is also assumed that there will be outcomes of assimilation to the Sri Lankan 
Malays in the country.     
 
1.4: Rationale of the Study 
The context of Sri Lanka has provided much space for discourses on 
ethnicity and related issues over the years. However, although much has been 
written about ethnicity and ethnic identity of minority Tamils and Sri Lankan 
Moors, both of whom are considered predominant minority ethnic groups in 
Sri Lanka, little has been written about Sri Lankan Malays, who are the second 
largest Muslim minority group in Sri Lanka. The focus and analysis employed 
by Nuhman, Ameer Ali, Imthiyaz, and Mcgilvray, in their scholarly studies, 
concerning the ethnicity of other minority groups such as Tamils and Moors in 
Sri Lanka cannot be applied to the ethnic identity of Malays because the 
aspects and issues pertaining to their ethnicity and identity formation are 
completely different.  
Moreover, despite the fact that many previous studies on Sri Lankan 
Malays focused on the genesis and nature of Malays, their language vitality, 
and their contribution towards the socio-economic development of Sri Lanka 
from the colonial period to post-colonial period, very few studies have focused 
on the issue of ethnic identity. More importantly, none of these scholarly 
studies have focused on the challenges of assimilation or integration to the 
ethnicity of Malays resulting from interaction with the host communities in Sri 
Lanka, or the responses of the Malays to the challenges of assimilation. 
Furthermore, majority of the previous studies are presently outdated as well.  
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While there has been a considerable amount of historical and linguistic 
research on Sri Lankan Malay, little sociological and anthropological research 
has been carried out on them. Thus, this thesis seeks to fill this gap in the 
ethnographic and sociological literature.  
Although an increasing number of articles in newspapers and websites 
appearing regarding the issue of ethnic identity and other challenges facing the 
Sri Lankan Malays, all of them lack the characteristics of scholarly research. 
In other words, those are essays lacking theoretically informed or empirically 
based research works. An ethnographic study of this nature, concerning the 
Malays in Sri Lanka, has long been overdue. Hence, this study seeks to 
address this scholarly neglect by bringing into sharp focus the dynamics of 
identity formation of Malays and the growing trend of assimilation of Malays 
into other dominant ethnic groups, and to fill the lacuna of knowledge 
regarding the ethnicity of Malays in the present context of Sri Lanka.  
This study attempts to shed some light on how Sri Lankan Malays 
identify themselves culturally as a community, what they uphold as significant 
markers of their identity and the extent to which these provide the community 
with meaningful anchorage as it confronts socio-eoncomic challenges and 
political realities impacting on the community. On the whole, this study aims 
at contributing to a better understanding of this minority within Muslim 
minority community of Sri Lanka. 
This is the first time in the history of Malays in Sri Lanka that a non-
Malay from Sri Lankan Moor community engages in a scholarly study 
pertaining to Sri Lankan Malays in the current context of Sri Lanka.  
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1.5: Scope of the study 
This section focuses on the scope of the study by highlighting the 
ethnic setting of Sri Lanka, with special emphasis on Sri Lankan Malays. 
Table 1.5.1: Ethnic setting of Sri Lanka 
Ethnic group Number Percent (%) 
Sinhalese 15,173,820 74.88 
Tamils   2,270,924 11.21 
SL Moor   1,869,820   9.23 
Indian Tamil      842,323   4.16 
Burgher        37,061   0.18 
Malay        40,189   0.20 
Other        29,586   0.14 
Total 20,263,723 100.0 




Table 1.5.2: Malays by district-wise in Sri Lanka 
  Districts Number 
Percentage of the total 
Malay Population (%) 
Colombo 12,463 31.01 
Gampaha 11,658 29.00 
Kalutara      597   1.48 
Kandy   2,062   5.13 
Matale      335    0.83 
Nuwara Eliya      492   1.22 
Galle        79   0.19 
Matara        54   0.13 
Hambantota    8,210 20.42 
Jaffna           5   0.01 
Mannar         10   0.02 
Vavuniya           5   0.01 
Mullaithivu         12   0.02 
Batticaloa         16   0.03 
Ampara       176   0.43 
Trincomalee       364   0.90 
Kurunegala    1,083   2.69 
Puttalam        592   1.47 
Anuradhapura       158   0.39 
Polonnaruwa         46   0.11 
Badulla    1,288   3.20 
Moneragala         46    0.11 
Ratnapura       270    0.67 
Kegalle       168    0.41 
Total  40,189 100.00 
(Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2011) 
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The above tables are a clear illustration of the ethinic distribution of 
the Sri Lankan population and the concentration of the Malays in different 
districts. It appears that the main concentration of Malays is in the Western 
province, with 31.1% in Colombo and 29% in Gampaha, while the Southern 
Province has a significant percentage of Malays in its districts - Hambantota 
(20.42%), Galle (0.19%), and Matara (0.13%). The Central province also has a 
sizeable population of Malays in its districts - Kandy (5.13%), and Matale 
(0.83%), while a smaller percentage of Malays are also living in Ampara 
(0.43%), Batticaloa (0.03%) and Trincomalee (0.90%) districts of the Eastern 
Province. Thus, this study primarily forcuses on those four provinces, namely 
the Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, to explore 
the question of their ethnic identity formation and the challenge of 
assimilation to it. 
The other important reason why these four provinces are selected for 
this study is because of its diverse social, cultural and economic aspects. 
Malays living in various parts of the Western province form a complex picture 
of differing social and economic classes. Malays in Colombo generally 
possess high economic capital. Nevertheless, those Malays in Slave Island, 
which is in the heart of Colombo, are mostly from low socio-economic 
backgrounds. They live in a dense and overcrowded urban setting. (Slave 
Island is where the Portuguese and the Dutch colonizers had kept their Malay 
slaves.) Wattala-Mabole Malays in the Western province are mostly of 
middleclass backgrounds; they are economically stable and many had moved 
to these areas from their former residences in Colombo due to various reasons.  
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Some villages in the Southern Province, such as Kirinda and Malay 
Colony, are considered Malay enclaves.  Kirinda, especially, has a 95% Malay 
population, approximately 75% of whom are fishermen while the rest are 
farmers. Malays in the Malay Colony and Sippikulam are mostly from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds, and they are engaged in farming, small business 
ventures or blue-collar jobs. 
Malays in the Central province are from middle to lower-class socio-
economic backgrounds as they are engaged in blue-collar jobs, and are not 
highly educated. However, some of Matale’s and Kandy’s Malays in the 
Central province, being fluent in English and highly educated, are well-
employed in Colombo.  
The Malays I met in Ampara district and other Eastern province towns 
such as Champa Lane, Ganesh Lane, Saman Pura and Trinco Town belonged 
to the low socio-economic class. They had minimum social and economic 
capital. They are considered the forgotten Malays due to their being remote 
from the larger Sri Lankan Malay communities living in other, mostly, urban 
parts of the country.  During the civil war, there existed great difficulties in 
travel and communication between the war-afflicted North and Eastern 
provinces and the rest of the country. This appears to have exacerbated, if not 
caused, the breakdown of close contacts between these two sets of Malays. 
The ‘forgotten Malays’ have not been able to benefit from any kind of 
philanthropy from the more affluent Malays of the centre, the urban Malays. 
They are presently faced with numerous social and economic challenges, and 
these are making their lives extremely difficult. 
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Malays are scattered all over the country, living side by side with non-
Malays such as Sinhalese (Buddhists), Tamil (Hindus) and Moors (Non-Malay 
Muslims). Concentration of Malays in different districts in Sri Lankan can also 
be gleaned from the following figure 1.5.1.  
Figure 1.5.1: Sri Lankan Malay population in districts  
 
(Source: Publication of Sri Lanka Malay Association, 2008) 
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The areas where I conducted the fieldwork from the four provinces are 
highlighted in circles in the above figure 1.5.1.    
The scope of the present study significantly transcends the previous 
studies as this study engages the question of ethnic identity formation of 
Malays in Sri Lanka; challenges of assimilation to the Malay ethnicity; 
responses of Malay organizations to such challenges of assimilation; and the 
outcomes of assimilation on Malays in the country.  
This study employs some of the important theories pertaining to ethnic 
identity formation and assimilation: primordial and constructivist theory on 
ethnic identity formation; the theory of acculturation and structural 
assimilation (integration); and the theory of cultural pluralism. The second 
chapter of this study deals with literature and theoretical frameworks of such 
theories in a detailed manner.  
 
1.6: Research Methodology 
This study was carried out mainly through a qualitative field research, 
using both bibliographic survey and ethnographic methods in various parts of 
Sri Lanka where Malays are largely concentrated. The first part of the data 
collection was carried out on a bibliographic survey, in which I reviewed all 
the literature available on the subject. Historical materials and official 
documents, such as previously conducted research reports, journals and other 
relevant documents, were also collected from archives.  
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The fieldwork consisted of observation, in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions. It was carried out in four provinces; and the specific areas 
where the fieldwork conducted were highlighted in circles under the section of 
scope of the study under figure 1.5.1. The first component of the fieldwork 
was carried out through ‘observation’ of day to day social interections of 
Malays, and their participation in other social activities such as sports events, 
cultural programmes, and other functions of Malay organizations. The units of 
analysis for such observations were individuals, families and organizations.  
The second component of data collection for the fieldwork was carried 
out based on in-depth interviews, using the semi-structured interview guide. 
This method allows freedom of expressions for the participants, while letting 
the researcher concentrate on specific area. The ‘funneling’ technique used, 
whereby questions are asked in a broad fashion, preceded the more probing 
questions. This allows participants the freedom to respond freely. Interviews 
are viewed as ‘directed conversations’. Interviews were conducted with fifty 
five (55) Malays living in different parts of Sri Lanka.They were chosen 
randomly from the areas where the fieldwork was conducted, and their social 
profiles involving their name, age, gender, profession and educational 
qualifications are attached in the appendixes of this thesis.  
The following categories of informants representing Sri Lankan 
Malays were randomly selected for the interviews: 1) religious leaders, 2) 
professionals, 3) businessmen, 4) retired soldiers, 5) community workers or 
activists, 6) Malay women, 7) Malay youths (students), 8) elderly Malays, and 
9) other blue-collar workers. The selection of different categories of 
informants from Sri Lankan Malays was made to ensure that there is a good 
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representation of views across generations. Interviews were conducted either 
one-to-one or in the presence of others (family members) at their residences, 
work places, or other places convenient to the interviewees. Interviews at their 
residences or home accorded me the added benefit of observing their home 
environment, the family dynamics, interaction among family members, use of 
the language and culture, neighborhood, etc… In addition to the Malay 
informants, fifteen (15) interviews were also conducted with members of non-
Malays such as Sinhalese, Moors and Tamils to examine their perception of 
the Malay community, their ethnic relations, and other assimilation processes 
with Malays. They were chosen randomly from the areas where the fieldwork 
was conducted and based on the geographical intimacy (closer proximity) with 
the Malays in the respective areas. Their social profiles involving their name, 
age, gender, profession and educational qualifications are attached in the 
appendixes of this thesis.  
The interview schedule consisted of questions pertaining to identity 
markers of Malays such as descent, language, culture and religion, ethnic 
integration with other communities, process of assimilation and the challenges 
to the Malay ethnicity due to their assimilation into the wider communities 
The third component of data collection of the field work was the focus 
group discussion (FGDs) with Sri Lankan Malays living in metropolitan cities 
and remote areas, to understand the divergent views and issues of Malays, 
especially regarding their ethnic identity and dynamics of assimilation process. 
For FGDs, two areas were selected based on the concentration of Malays: 
Colombo-Slave Island (Western Province) and Kirinda (Southern Province). 
These are two areas, with major concentration of Malays, representing the 
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urban and rural Malays. A group of between 14 to 15 Malay participants from 
all walks of life were selected for each of these FGDs which were conducted 
in a public place. The themes of the FGDs were the ethnic identity markers of 
Malays, their identity formation, their integration with other communities, the 
role of Malay organizations in perpetuating their identity, and the trend of 
assimilation among Malays and its challenges to their ethnicity. The reason for 
selecting these two provinces for the FGD was because Western and Southern 
Province are constituted with a larger concentration of Malays. 
A descriptive analysis was largely used to analyze the data collected 
during the field work of this study.  
 
1.7: Chapter outline: 
This dissertation has seven chapters. The introduction chapter (01) 
presents the background of the study; aim of the study; research questions; 
rationale of the study; scope of the study; research methodology; and chapter 
outline. 
Chapter two (02) provides an overview of the literature, and discusses 
the conceptual and theoretical framework related to the study. This chapter 
contains four sections. First section reviews the available research and 
scholarly materials on ethnic identity and assimilation in relation to Sri 
Lankan non-Malays such as Tamils, Sinhalese and Moors in general, and Sri 
Lankan Malays in particular. The next section of this chapter scrutinizes the 
available literature on the ethnic identity and assimilation concerning the 
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Malays in Southeast Asia. Third section reviews the literature on the 
conceptual and theoretical approaches on ethnic identity formation, 
assimilation, and pluralism in order to employ these theories to the Sri Lankan 
Malays in the following chapters. The final section of this chapter discusses 
my own theoretical framework of the study.  
Chapter three (03) traces the genesis of Sri Lankan Malays from pre-
colonial to post–colonial periods of Sri Lanka. According to the available 
literature, Malays were brought to Sri Lanka as political exiles, soldiers and 
convicts from the Southeast Asian Archipelago during the Dutch and British 
Colonial occupation of Sri Lanka. This chapter also highlights the Malay 
settlements in different parts of the country and discusses the demographic 
dynamics of Sri Lankan Malays. 
Chapter four (04) deals with the issue of the identity formation of Sri 
Lankan Malays. First section of this chapter discusses the boundary markers of 
Sri Lankan Malays such as physical characteristics, language, religion and 
ancestry, and explores reasons why Malays exclude culture as their boundary 
markers. The second section delves into the identity formation of Sri Lankan 
Malays in terms of theoretical perspective, namely primordialism and 
constructivism. It is discovered that the identity of Sri Lankan Malays is both 
primordial and constructed. However, it is argued that the theory of 
primoridialism does not adequately explain the identity formation of Sri 
Lankan Malays since there is also a process of identity construction taking 
place as Malay elites and their organizations respond to the challenge of 
assimilation. Even though this is viewed as primordialism by the Malays, this 
study argues that it is a process of Malay identity construction. This chapter 
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also explores how the ethnic identity of Malays is constructed through 
language, ancestry, culture, religion, and in contrast to Moorish identity.       
Chapter five (05) explores how acculturation, as a significant 
component of assimilation, poses a challenge to the ethnicity of Malays. It also 
deals with components of acculturation, namely additive and substitutive 
acculturation. It is argued, in this chapter, that although the Malay culture 
becomes additive and substitutive in the present context of Sri Lanka, the 
substitutive acculturation is more deleterious on the cultural stock of Malays 
in the country than the additive acculturation. More importantly, this chapter 
also explores factors contributing to the acculturation process among the 
Malays. As such, many factors related to the acculturation of Sri Lankan 
Malays are extensively discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter six (06) examines the dimension of structural assimilation as a 
challenge to the ethnicity of Malays. The first section of this chapter deals 
with aspects of structural assimilation and ethnicity of Malays, followed by a 
discussion on the impersonal and personal contacts of structural assimilation 
between Malays and Moors, and Malays and Sinhalese. Special attention is 
given, in this section, to the practice of mixed or intermarriages occurring 
between Malays and dominant groups, and an exploration is made on whether 
or not it endangers the Malay ethnicity in the Island. It is discovered that 
personal contacts of structural assimilation, facilitated via intermarriages 
between Malays and non-Malays, do endanger the Malay identity, and lead to 
the languages of other dominant ethnic groups and their culture replacing the 
Malay language and its culture. It is also noted that it endangers the lineage of 
Malays. Thus, in this chapter, it is argued that substitutive acculturation and 
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personal contact of structural assimilation pose a critical challenge to the 
Malay identity.  The second section of this chapter discusses factors 
contributing to the dimension of structural assimilation of Malays.  
Chapter seven (07) examines the responses of Malay organizations to 
the challenge of assimilation to their identity, and the outcomes of 
assimilation. The first section of this chapter focuses on the responses to the 
challenge of assimilation by the Malay elites and their associations or 
organizations. A specific focus is given to the organizational responses of 
certain active Malay organizations, namely Sri Lanka Malay Association 
(SLMA), Conferensi Melayu Sri Lanka (COSLAM), Sri Lanka United Malay 
Organization (SLUMO), Mabola Malay Association and Women’s 
Association of Sri Lankan Malays (WASLAM). It becomes clear that these 
organizations are at the forefront of responding to the challenges of 
assimilation to the Malay identity by undertaking various measures to preserve 
Malay language and revitalize their culture. Proritisation of religious 
programmes by these organisations also form a significant part of their efforts 
in responding to those challenges. The next section of this chapter deals with 
the outcomes to the Malays of their assimilation into other communities in the 
country. It is argued that pluralism and hybridity are the outcomes of 
assimilation.    
Chapter eight (08) presents a summary of the study and the 
significance of its findings. This chapter concludes with recommendations for 








This chapter contains four sections. Firstly, in what follows, I review 
the available research and scholarly materials on ethnic identity and 
assimilation regarding both Sri Lankan Malays as well as non-Malays such as 
Tamils, Sinhalese and Moors, with greater focus on the former. This is done 
with a view to discerning any gaps in those studies. Secondly, I scrutinize the 
available literature on the ethnic identity and assimilation concerning the 
Malays in Southeast Asia. Thirdly, I review the literature on the conceptual 
and theoretical approaches to ethnic identity, assimilation and pluralism in 
order to employ these theories upon the Sri Lankan Malays in the following 
chapters. Finally, I discuss my own theoretical framework of the study.  
 
2.2: Literature Review 
 The following section on ‘Works on Sri Lankans’ deals with relevant 
literature on ethnic identity formation and assimilation of Sri Lankan non-
Malays such as Tamils, Sinhalese and Moors, followed by the Sri Lankan 
Malays with a view to discerning any gaps that may exist in those studies.  
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2.2.1: Works on Sri Lankans 
This section delves first into the literature that deals with the identity 
formation and other aspects related to assimilation of non-Malays such as 
Tamils, Sinhalese and Moors in Sri Lanka, and then the identity formation and 
assimilation of Malays in Sri Lanka. 
2.2.1.1: Sri Lankan Tamils 
Very few studies focus on the construction of the ethnic identity of 
Tamils evolving quite dynamically from the non-violent stage (1947-1976) to 
the violent stage (1976-2010). Of great significance, in this respect, is 
Cheran’s (2009)34 “Pathways of Dissent: Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka”. It 
primarily concentrates on the roots and nature of Tamil nationalism as well as 
the construction of the Tamil ethnic identity and its historical stages of 
transformation. As Cheran aptly points out, “nationalism involves and evolves 
from a fusion of several elements: language, territory and distinctions, from 
contiguous neighbors in ways which sustain a group’s sense of us and them”.35 
In Sri Lanka, the Sinhala political leaders have made systematic efforts to 
politicize the ethnic relations by providing state concessions to the Sinhala 
ethnic nation. The concessions, from the “Sinhala only” language policy in 
1956 to the pro-Sinhala ethnic standardization of education policies in 1972, 
and from the religious policy of establishing state patronage to Buddhism in 
the 1972 Constitution, to the land policy which, as early as 1948, began with 
state colonization of the Tamil land, all contributed to the growth of Tamil 
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nationalism or construction of ethnic identity of Tamils in Sri Lanka.36 In 
other words, he argues that socio-economic, educational and political 
marginalization of Tamils by the Sinhala rulers led to the construction of 
Tamil identity. As such, it is when this construct of Tamil identity (founded on 
Tamil problems in the socio-economic, educational and political spheres) 
subsequently began to respond that it resulted in a protracted war for three 
decades.  
Cheran goes on to articulate that the Tamils, who were victims of 
Sinhala violence, mobilized peacefully and politically under moderate parties 
such as the Federal Party (FP).  However, Sinhalese chauvinism neglected the 
Tamil moderates. More tragically, the Tamils’ peaceful protests were met with 
Sinhalese ruling class’ violent responses.  The aggressive Sinhala response to 
the moderate demands of Tamil nationalism encouraged some Tamils to seek 
violent alternatives to win justice and peace. This is how the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) came into being.  
Thus, this account of Cheran helps us understand the socio-political 
conditions behind the creation of Tamil military movements, particularly the 
LTTE in 1979.37 By and large, the study deals with the construction of Tamil 
identity, which was founded on identifying firstly the problems in the socio-
economic, educational and political spheres, and secondly the responses to 
such problems, initially in a non-violent manner through democratic means, 
and later, when the Tamils’ agitations through democratic means were 
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aggressively repressed by the Sinhala polity, in a violent manner via militant 
movements such as the LTTE. This account of Cheran is relevant to the 
present study because the construction of Malay identity too is rooted in 
identifying the problems of assimilation and then responding to it through 
various means such as promoting the Malay language as well as organizing 
various Malay cultural events. However, what is lacking in Cheran’s account, 
in relation to the present study, is that his account does not deal with 
assimilation as a challenge to Tamils’ ethnicity, but rather it deals with socio-
economic, educational and political marginalization of Tamils as a stimulus to 
the construction of Tamil identity.       
In the same vein, in “Tamil identity and aspirations”, Alfred 
Jeyaratnam Wilson and A. Joseph Chandrakanthan (1998)38 state that the 
Tamils performed exceptionally well in the sphere of education, especially in 
missionary educational system, and flared well in the commercial enterprise 
during the colonial era. However, the Colonial-era dominance of Tamils over 
the Sinhalese disappeared once the British left Sri Lanka, as the post 
independent State of Sri Lanka, dominated by Sinhala ruling class, perceived 
the economic and educational advantages the Tamils had over the Sinhalese as 
jeopardizing the Sinhala language and Buddhist religion in the long run.39  
Thus, Sinhalese resurgence in government and the public sector 
culminated in the 1956 ‘Sinhala Only’ Act that made Sinhala as the official 
language of Sri Lanka, followed by the introduction of ‘Standardization 
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Scheme’ in 1970s in the educational sector, offering communal quota for 
university entrants, preventing the large scale entry of Tamils to universities.40 
As a result of the continuous socio-economic, political and cultural 
suppression, Tamils have constructed a strong Tamil identity, which resulted 
first in peaceful and democratic struggles and later, with the emergence of 
liberation movements such as LTTE, in violent struggles as their democratic 
struggle was constantly and brutally suppressed by the Sinhala rulers.41 Thus, 
the construction of Tamil identity in Sri Lanka was born of diagnosing the 
problems concerning socio-economic, educational and political 
marginalization of Tamils, and then responding to such problems through non-
violent means in the beginning and violent means later. When comparing the 
same scenario with the construction of Malay identity in Sri Lanka, it can be 
observed that the Malay identity is also constructed in a similar manner as the 
construction of Tamil identity. Malay identity is constructed on the basis of 
identifying the challenges of assimilation and then responding to such 
challenges with various measures in order to preserve and perpetuate their 
identity.  
2.2.1.2: Sri Lankan Sinhalese (Buddhists) 
 Gananath Obeyesekere’s (1975)42 account on “Sinhalese Buddhist 
Identity in Ceylon” deals with the revival of Buddhism in the nineteenth 
century with the emergence of a leader, Anagarika Dharmapala, who helped 
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refashion the identity of Sinhalese Buddhists in the country. He explains that 
conversion of the Sinhalese Buddhists into Catholicism and Protestantism by 
the colonialists, during their colonial rule in Sri Lanka, had brought about a 
radical change in the Sinhalese awareness of their ethnic identity. Thus, 
Sinhalese ceased to be an ethnic identity and Buddhism also lost its 
prominence as the national religion in the country.43 Anagarika Dharmapala, 
having perceived the loss of prominence to Buddhism and feeling the 
necessity to regenerate it, revived Sinhalese Buddhist identity by shaping the 
view of members of the alienated Sinhalese intelligentsia living in villages, 
and later on, Sinhalese Buddhists all over the island. What is interesting and 
relevant to the present study is the powerful process through which he aroused 
affirmation of Sinhalese Buddhist identity and consciousness among the 
Sinhalese: He shamed and ridiculed people for adopting the Western ways and 
religious beliefs, thus inducing them to realize their folly. Having reduced 
their self-esteem, he then instigated them to work for its enhancement, by 
recounting the glorious past of the Sinhalese in his speeches and via the 
newspaper he founded, the Sinhala Baudhaya (the Sinhalese Buddhist).44  
Gananath puts his rhetoric in this way: “the present degradation is due 
to evil Western influence on the part of missionaries and colonialists. The 
country, as he perceives it, is a Sinhalese-Buddhist one, and there is hardly a 
place in it for Tamils and Muslims, who are viewed as exploiters. The 
Chiristians are condemned as meat eaters of “low caste”. The country of the 
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Sinhalese should be governed by the Sinhalese.”45 The immediate effect of 
Dharmapala’s teaching was quite dramatic. Those Sinhalese who had 
European-type personal and surnames changed their names to Sinhalese or 
Buddhist names, and Sinhalese women took to Indian saree instead of 
Western dresses, as they were exhorted to wear it. Moreover, as a result of the 
continuous effort of Dharmapala, Buddhist national flag also became very 
popular.  
He also provided a charter for Modern Buddhism, which included two 
basic aspects: 1) this-worldly asceticism, in which he castigated the laziness of 
the Sinhalese, emphasizing the importance of thrift, making a saving, and hard 
work, and 2) a code of lay ethics, placing a great emphasis on personal 
decorum and good manners.46 Thus, due to increasing urbanization, espoused 
by Dharmapala, the new Sinhala Buddhist identity became normative for 
urbanized and educated segments of Sinhala Buddhists. Furthermore, as a 
result of the political power in 1956 that passed into the hands of Sinhala 
Buddhists, it was easy for them to promote Sinhala Buddhist identity and to 
elevate Sri Lanka as the Sinhala Buddhist nation through symbolic acts.47 This 
account of Gananath is relevant to the present study as it deals with how the 
ethnic identity of Sinhala Buddhist was constructed in the mid nineteenth 
century, with the charismatic leadership of Anagarika Dharmapala, who 
realized that Buddhism in Sri Lanka was decaying, and therefore felt called 
upon to revive it. Dharmapala identified the problems or the effects that 
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colonialism had brought about upon the Sinhala Buddhist identity, and, in 
response, he spurred the Sinhalese to respond to it. This account of Gananath 
shows great resemblance to how the identity construction of Sri Lankan 
Malays takes place as well. Dharmapala worked on the psychological 
dimension of Sinhalese Buddhists by first reducing their self-esteem for 
adopting the Western ways, and then providing them with alternative lifestyles 
- indigenous and drawn from Buddhism - which he convinced them to adopt 
feel proud of. The methods employed by the Malay elites and organizations to 
construct their identity is similar.              
2.2.1.3: Sri Lankan Moors 
There has been a lot of debate over the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan 
Moors, since scholars dealing with the identity issue of Sri Lankan Moors 
approach the question of their identity from an altogether different angle. As 
such, a number of theories have been suggested to explain Moors’ identity, 
both positively and negatively. Below are some of the theories postulated in 
this respect: 
i. Theory of hegemony and situationalism 
ii. Non-Tamil identity of Moors 
iii. Constructivist theory 
Qadri Ismail (1995)48 argues that the Moors’ identity was founded 
explicitly on the basis of the hegemonic power of the Southern Moor elite 
seeking to safeguard their economic and other interests as well as to ensure 
                                                 
48 Qadri Ismail, “Unmooring  identity: The antimonies of elite Muslim self-representation.” In  
Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of Identity and History in Modern Sri Lanka, ed.Predeep 
Jeganathan & Qadri Ismail. (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1995).  
 35 
 
their security under the Sinhala nationalism since they were thinly scattered as 
a non-territorial minority in predominant Sinhala areas.49 He further argues 
that Sri Lankan Muslim identity (Moors) has changed from a racial into a 
religious one over the past few decades. He says that “the Sri Lankan Muslim 
social formation ‘lost’ its ethnicity in the post-colonial period, or to be more 
precise, it ‘lost’ its racial/ethnic identity. In the early 20th century going back 
well into the post-colonial period, the Muslim formation was seen to have a 
distinct racial identity (“Moor”); today, it is seen to have an exclusively 
religious identity”.50 He is quite critical about advancing Arab ancestry and 
religion as the identity markers of Moors in Sri Lanka. He argues, quite 
categorically, that the Moors’ identity formation is an ideological construction 
signifying the hegemony of the Southern Moorish political elite. This is an 
interesting study as it argues that Moors’ identity is more situational and only 
a product of the hegemony of the Southern Moorish elites, whose interests lie 
in acquiring economic and political gains from the center.  
Similarly, in “Some Critical Notes on the Non-Tamil Identity of the 
Muslims of Sri Lanka, and on Tamil–Muslim Relations in Relation to Moor 
Identity”, Imthiyas and Hoole (2011)51 attempt to discredit the construction of 
a non-Tamil identity for Muslims (Moors) based on the Islamic faith and Arab 
ancestry; for them it is only a ploy by the Muslim politicians and elites to 
ensure their electoral victory at the elections and to occupy ministerial 
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portfolios. He argues that this attempt of constructing a non-Tamil identity of 
Muslims brings no fruitful results to the Muslims. Rather, he argues, it drives a 
wedge between the Tamils and Muslims, particularly in North and Eastern part 
of Sri Lanka, and the labeling has only deflated the Muslims as a mere 
religious group rather than empowering them as an ethnic group. This line of 
argument by Imthiyaz is somewhat similar to what Qadri Ismail has 
propounded on the Muslim identity: both of them are critical of the situational 
identity of Moors, which, according to them, are founded by employing Arab 
descent and Islam as markers for ethnicity, merely as ploys aiming for mere 
economic and political gains. However, these propositions by Qadri Ismail and 
Imthiyas that the non-Tamil identity of Sri Lankan Muslims is only a construct 
made by hegemonic Muslim elites and politicians have been challenged by 
Nuhman in his account, which is discussed in the following paragraph. These 
two accounts of Moors’ identity have little relevance to the present study, 
because Malay identity in Sri Lanka is not situational, rather it is both 
primordial and constructed. However, from these two accounts, what is 
relevant to the current study is that Sri Lankan Moors have been employing 
Arab ancestry and Islamic religion as markers to define their ethnic identity in 
the country quite successfully.        
 In his account on “Understanding Sri Lankan Muslim Identity” 
Nuhman (2004)52 articulates that, to the Muslims in Sri Lanka, the religion and 
the ethnicity are inseparable features or entities as they perceive the label of 
‘Muslim’ not only as a religious category, but also as an ethnic category. In 
other words, ‘Muslim’ is a category of both religion and ethnicity for Sri 
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Lankan Muslims. He elaborates, in detail, on the process or the factors that 
contributed to the construction of Muslim identity (Moors) on the basis of 
religion; he discusses the colonial, local, regional, national, global, socio-
political and religious factors.53 According to him, social transformation in the 
late 19th century, from a feudal system to capitalism, led to competition 
between communities along ethnic lines, and this subsequently became a 
prominent factor that enhanced the ethnic consciousness of Moor. Thus, the 
ethnic consciousness among the Muslims developed gradually and in parallel 
with Sinhala and Tamil nationalism, from late 19th century, thanks to 
competition for economic and political opportunities. The colonial Britishers’ 
policy of ‘Divide and Rule’, implemented by their alien educational and 
political systems, also played a pivotal role in constructing the ethnic identity 
of Moors.54 The evolving Tamil nationalism, which was strengthened by 
growing Tamil militarism in 1970s and 1980, as well as the real violence 
perpetrated by those Tamil militant movements upon Moors created a sense of 
insecurity in the psyche of the Muslims; all of these subsequently led to the 
delineation of a distinct identity for Moors based on religion.55 Finally, 
Nuhman articulates that the Moors’ attempt in defining and consolidating their 
identity based on religion stems from the fast spreading global influence of 
Islamic revivalism from 1970 onwards. He argues that the Buddhist and Hindu 
revivalist activity in the country has also led to the reinforcement of the 
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Muslim identity.56 Muslim elites like Siddhi Lebbe, Abdul Azeez and Arabi 
Pasha played a significant role in the construction of Muslim identity in the 
country at that time.  
The responses of Moors to the social, cultural, economic and political 
challenges manifested in several ways: 1) Muslim elites propagated a 
religiously oriented ethnic identity for Muslims through publication of a 
newspaper, as this was considered a powerful instrument in the creation of 
ethnic consciousness, 2) Muslim identity was institutionalized by Muslim 
elites via setting up separate social institutions for Muslims such as schools, 
colleges of education, and Arabic madrasas, 3) Muslim personal law was 
introduced with the enactment of Marriage and Divorce Registration 
Ordinance in 1929, 4) Wakf Board was established in 1950s for the 
maintenance of the mosques and charitable trusts, 5) A Muslim unit was set up 
in the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation to broadcast a separate Muslim 
service exclusively for Muslim audience, and 6) Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
(SLMC), a political party dominated by Moors in the Northern and Eastern Sri 
Lanka, was set up along the ethnic lines, and its verbal militancy and religious 
overtones subsequently monopolized the Muslim politics. These are some of 
the Muslim responses to the various challenges they faced, which, in turn, led 
to the construction of the Moorish Muslim identity in the country. By and 
large, Sri Lankan Muslim (Moor) identity was constructed based on religion as 
the community responded to Sinhala and Tamil nationalism in the late 19th 
century. This account is relevant to the present study as it deals with the 
construction of Muslim (Moor) identity and its outcome in the country. This 
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account clearly explicates that the Sri Lankan Moor identity, having rejected 
all other markers of ethnicity such as language, was primarily founded on the 
basis of religion, thus delineating Muslims from Tamils whose distinct relgion 
was Hinduism; in addition to this, what led to the construction of Muslim 
identity was the Muslim responses to social, economic and political challenges 
that Muslims were being subjected to, at the hands of both Sinhala and Tamil 
nationalism in the country.  
Similarly, Malays too are now in the process of constructing their 
identity as they respond to the challenges of assimilation into other cultures 
and communities, including the efforts by the Moors to subsume the Malays. 
In cases of both the Moors and Malays constructing their identities, their elites 
and their organizations play a significant role.  
2.2.1.4: Sri Lankan Malays 
The forgoing section dealt with literature on identity formation and 
aspects related to assimilation of non-Malays in Sri Lanka, and the following 
section deals specifically with literature on the identity formation of Malays in 
Sri Lanka.   
There is an abundance of literature on Malays in general, but they all 
lack strong empirical support. It was the scholarly and praiseworthy 
publication of Hussainmiya (1987, 1990), on the Malay population in Sri 
Lanka, that preceded most of those works. Since the turn of the millennium, 
Sri Lankan Malays have received considerable scholarly attention from B.A 
Hussainmiya, B.D.K. Saldin, Asiff Hussein, Umberto Ansaldo, Scott Paauw, 
Peter Slomanson and Ian Smith.  
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In “Orang Regimen: The Malays of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment”, 
Hussainmiya (1990)57 presents the history of Sri Lankan Malay community 
with special reference to their role as colonial troops in Ceylon Rifle 
Regiment. His study begins with an examination of early Malay contacts with 
Sri Lanka, while the primary focus is on the origin of the community during 
pre-colonial and colonial periods in Sri Lanka. He has comprehensively 
documented the formation, maintenance and disbandment of the Malay Rifle 
Regiment by the British. He concludes that his study can be considered as an 
explication of the effects of the regimental service on the social and cultural 
evolution of Malay community in Sri Lanka. In fact, his account has been a 
great source of information to scholars, engaged in learning about Malays in 
Sri Lanka. This study too benefited immensely from him, in its understanding 
of the historical evolution of the Malays, their regimental contribution to the 
nation building process in Sri Lanka and so on. Although he devotes a few 
pages to the history and structure of Sri Lankan Malays, his account is quite 
limited as its primary focus is the Ceylon Rifle Regiment. The focus of this 
study transcends that of Hussainmiya as this engages the questions of ethnic 
identity formation of Malays, the dynamics of assimilation, responses of 
Malays to the challenge of assimilation, and the outcomes of assimilation upon 
Malays. Hence, this study aims at filling a gap, with a wider focus on issues 
concerning Sri Lankan Malays.  
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Asiff Hussein’s (2007)58 account “ Sarandib: An Ethnological Study of 
the Muslims of Sri Lanka” studies Malays as part of a community that 
consisted of all Muslims in Sri Lanka, such as Moors, Malays, Memons and 
other distinct groups of Indian origin. He presents the Malay language, culture 
and it origin only as a part of a formation of a single Muslim community. Even 
in his other account, “Zeylanica: A Study of the Peoples and Languages of Sri 
Lanka”59, he presents the origin and characteristics of Malays such as their 
origin, common history, language and racial features. In this account, he also 
reports on the intermarriages taking place between Malays and other 
communities in Sri Lanka with statistical data. However, his study does not 
deal with those important questions which this study aims to tackle. The 
accounts of Asiff Hussein, however, are contributory to the present study in 
terms of understanding the historical past of Malays, their language, and 
physical appearance. However, other issues concerning the Sri Lankan 
minority Malays, such as their ethnic identity formation, challenges of 
assimilation and the outcomes of assimilation on Malays, hardly took any 
space in his account. More importantly, the accounts of Asiff Hussein lack 
scholarly approach since it is largely dependent upon secondary sources of 
information. Hence, this study is carried out with the aim of filling that 
scholarly lacuna with regards to Sri Lankan Malays.  
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Bernama (2004)60 traces the history and origin of Malay community in 
Sri Lanka, while highlighting the perseverance of Malays in maintaining their 
language, culture and the heritage of their forefathers. He makes mention of 
Malay’s multi-lingual competency, and bemoans the fact that their political 
voice remains muted due to lack of political representation in parliament. 
Although the work of Bernama offers many insights regarding the issue of 
intermarriages of the Sri Lankan Malays, it also has some limitations in its 
approach and method. Firstly, his account lacks theoretical or empirical based 
information. Secondly, while there are a host of issues facing the Sri Lankan 
Malays at present, he has paid attention only to the issue of intermarriage. The 
present study transends that of Bernama. 
Bernama (2004)61, Asiff Hussein (200762, 200963), Rifai (2008)64, and 
Saybhan (2004),65 have all traced the origin, nature, and cultural richness of 
Malay community in Sri Lanka. In fact, these scholarly works have always 
been a wealthy source of information and support to scholars, engaged in 
studying the Malays in Sri Lanka. Thus, analyses of these works have 
profoundly enriched the focus of this present study. However, their accounts 
suffer from a number of limitations: Firstly, their accounts grant less space for 
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aspects such as the ethnic identity formation, the challenges of assimilation to 
Malay identity and responses of Malays to such challenges. Secondly, these 
essays are devoid of theoretically informed materials. However, this study 
certainly acknowledges the contribution of their accounts with regards to 
understanding the history and cultural richness of Malays. Nevertheless, there 
is still a gap existing in the studies of Malays. This study aims to bridge that 
gap, by examining a variety of facets concerning Malays, including their 
ethnic identity formation, demographic dynamics, trend of assimilation, 
hybridity and pluralism among them, and their organizational activities.  
In his recent article, “The Malay Identity in Brunei Darussalam and Sri 
Lanka”, Hussainmiya (2010)66  presents a fresh take on the status of Malays in 
Brunei and Sri Lanka, which, of course, is helpful for scholars seeking to 
understand the dynamics associated with the conception of Malay identity. He 
basically defines the theoretical term of Malayness as consisting of two 
different dimensions: 1) static dimension, and 2) dynamic dimension. He goes 
on to explain that the former implies an identity, defined by the authority in 
Brunei, with a constitutional guarantee; and the latter implies a pragmatically 
defined identity (self-identity) of Malays, as is witnessed in linguistic and 
cultural groupings in Sri Lanka. Although he traces the history of Brunei in 
relation to Malay identity, based on Malay language and culture, largely 
safeguarded by the Brunei constitution, his elucidation on the Sri Lankan 
Malay identity leaves room for debate in academic circles. In his perspective, 
global and local developments in socio-economic spheres harness assimilation 
of younger generation of Malays, while the older generation of Malays is 
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immune to it.67 However, according to him, Malays have been able to preserve 
some aspects of their ethnic identity, and have a strong desire to cling onto the 
vestige of Malay identity and survive as a unique and separate entity. He also 
discusses some of the challenges facing Malays in the contexts of 
intermarriages with Sri Lankan Moor, and the lack of Malay political 
representation in Parliament after 1965. He posits that Malays have the 
potential to revive their language, culture and tradition by maintaining links 
with the Malay world, as well as to sustain their ethnic identity for many more 
years to come, with support from the government of Sri Lanka. His account 
emphasizes the fact that Malays are conscious of their ethnic identity, and that 
they continue to take concrete steps to preserve it, without leaving room for its 
dilution or subsuming of it by the dominant communities such as Sinhalese, 
Moors, and Tamils. Although this study of Hussainmiya has contributed 
significantly to the present study in its understanding of the ethnic identity of 
Malays in Brunei and Sri Lanka, and the current debates associated with the 
Malay ethnic identity, his account also suffers from some drawbacks. Strictly 
speaking, his account has not given enough attention to the formation of 
Malay identity, challenges to their identity due to assimilation, responses of 
Malays through their organizational activities to such challenges, and the 
outcomes of assimilation. The present study, however, addresses all these 
issues in great detail.          
Interestingly, Suwarn Vajracharya’s (2009)68 article, “Malay Minority 
of Sri Lanka: Defending Their Identity”, Saybhan’s (2001)69 article, “The 
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Future of Sri Lankan Malays is Bleak,” and Rifai’s article (2008)70, “The 
Identity Crisis of Sri Lankan Malay Muslims” – all of the state that the ethnic 
identity of Sri Lankan Malays is in great danger at present, with their culture 
and language being subsumed by the culture and lifestyle of majority 
communities in the country. They further note that the Malays are confronted 
with many issues: threat to their language, acculturation, intermarriages, lack 
of sufficient housing, lack of political representation in parliament, 
unemployment, and lack of religious exposure. Rifai (2008) attributes many 
reasons to the intermarriages and acculturation, occurring among Malays, 
some of which are: (1) high level of interactions with Sinhalese due to lifestyle 
choices and work environments, (2) adoption of Sinhala language as the home 
language, and (3) a growing inclination to western lifestyle.  
Saybhan (2001) considers the following to be reasons for the loss of 
identity for the minority Malays at the present Sri Lankan context: (1) lack of 
religiosity among Malays, since religious sermons are conducted primarily in 
Tamil and to some extend in Sinhala language, (2) dominance of Sinhala 
language, and (3) ignorance by the younger Malay generation of the bravery 
and religiosity of its forefathers. Meanwhile, in “Sri Lankan Malays, a 
Discarded Ethnic Group – Why?” Saybhan (2004)71 traces the origin and 
history of Malays in Sri Lanka, and recounts their cultural and religious 
richness in the past. In addition, while critiquing the failure of successive 
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governments to nominate anyone from Malays as MPs after 1950s and 1960s, 
he proposes for the Malays to form a new political party in order to have 
Malay members elected to the parliament with the support of Sinhalese. As 
these works reflect the passion they have for the community, especially in 
terms of preserving their ethnic identity, much can be learned from them. 
Indeed, they have provided enough inputs to this study. Although the 
aforementioned articles are interesting, giving deep insights into the plight of 
Malays, and have enormously enriched the present study, they lack 
theoretically informed or empirically based research works. Therefore, this 
study sets out to redress such weaknesses, as it examines many significant 
issues pertaining to Sri Lankan Malays including their identity formation, the 
challenges of assimilation to Malay identity, the responses of Malays to such 
challenges, and the outcomes of assimilation upon Malays. 
Suwarn Vajracharya (2009)72, in his account “Malay Minority of Sri 
Lanka: Defending Their Identity”, engages in the most interesting debate 
regarding the question of ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays. He asserts that, 
due to there being a shared religion between them and the Moors (which is 
Islam), a number of people argue that Malays should be considered as 
Muslims in Sri Lanka in terms of their ethnicity; not as Malays. However, 
Suwarn Vajracharya, strongly confronts this claim: Malays need not be 
constituted as Muslims just because share the religion of Islam with Sri 
Lankan Moor.  For him, religion is not a strong enough identity marker to 
categorize all Malays in Sri Lanka into a single, common group. He cites 
much evidence in support of his contention that not all Malay immigrants who 
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came to Sri Lanka from Indonesian archipelago during the Dutch colonial 
period during 17th century were Muslims. According to him, a lot of them 
were actually reverts due to the influence of Moors who were already settled 
in Sri Lanka during the 7th Century73. He concludes that Malays have clung 
onto Malay language, at least in its colloquial form, and Malay culture, and 
that this has not prevented them from making significant contribution to the 
nation building process in many ways. His work, while offering many insights 
that are helpful to the present study, exhibits many weaknesses too. Although 
his account reflects the debates revolving around the identity of Malays, the 
trend of assimilation, and other challenges facing Sri Lankan Malays, it has 
failed to take into account the issue of identity formation of Sri Lankan 
Malays, the challenges of assimilation to Malay identity, and outcomes of 
assimilation on Malays. His article has limiations: it is devoid of theoretically 
informed materials. Such scholarly neglect will be addressed in this study.  
Saldin (2000,74 2001,75200776) advocates that local Malays should 
adopt the Standard Malay language as it is spoken in Indonesia or Malaysia 
while also retaining the colloquial form as it is spoken by Malays in Sri Lanka. 
Such a move, he avers, would go a long way in helping the local Malay 
community preserve its distinct linguistic identity, while at the same maintain 
close relations with the rest of the Malay world and keep abreast with 
developments there. A close examination of Saldin’s writing reveals that he 
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believes that the Sri Lankan Malays are “indifferent” to the plight of their 
language, and that this perceived ‘indifference’ is endangering the language 
and other questions pertaining to their identity. He cites the cases of regional 
Malay groups in both Malaysia and Indonesia, such as the Sundanese and 
Balinese, who continue to speak their regional dialects while, at the same time, 
adopting the Standard Malay for writing purposes and for conversing with 
other Malay-speaking groups. It is this model, he says, that Sri Lankan Malays 
should adopt regarding the Malay language. Given the account of Saldin, one 
can posit easily that this is only an expression of the need to preserve the 
purity of the Malay language by standardizing it so that the Malay language 
continues into the future as the common language for all Malays, irrespective 
of where they live. He is an expert in the linguistics of Malay language and, 
therefore, a competent person to write about it. He suggests that since local 
Malays are indifferent to the deterioration, rather the deviation, of Malay 
language in Sri Lanka from the ‘ideal’ way it is used in predominantly Malay 
nations, there is a possible danger that Sri Lankan Malay language would one 
day cease to resemble the Malay language spoken in predominantly Malay 
nations, thus paving the way for the possible assimilation of the Sri Lankan 
Malays into the wider community in Sri Lanka. As language is a decisive 
marker of identity of ethnic group, this study can be taken as a source of 
insight into the current study.  
However, it has a number of weaknesses in terms of its approaches and 
analyses: it is possible for ethnic groups to survive using other ethnicity 
markers for language is not the only marker available for such groups. It is 
important to bear in mind that the language of Sri Lankan Malays has actually 
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evolved in a unique manner, though Saldin and other elites might believe that 
it is just a corruption of the language. Some people refer to this uniquely 
evolved Malay, spoken by Sri Lankan Malays, as colloquial Malay or Creole. 
Hence, it is a weak argument to say that their ethnic identity will be 
endangered if the Malays in Sri Lanka did not stick strictly to the Malay, 
spoken in Malaysia for example. Secondly, instead of exploring other possible 
markers of Malays such as ancestry, culture and so on, his account over-
emphasizes the language marker. Thirdly, his account fails to concentrate on 
other important issues of Malays such as ethnic identity formation, challenges 
of assimilation to their identity and so on. This study significantly fills that 
lacuna.  
Lim and Ansalado (2007)77 state that the multilingual nature of Malays 
in Sri Lanka is a marker itself: they note that the potential shift from Sri 
Lankan Malay (SLM) to Standard Malay (SM) would only amount to the loss 
of language diversity and forsaking of a unique identity, and that such a shift 
“does not make a qualitative difference to the Malays’ multilingual repertoire, 
nor to the identity they have”78. They suggest that this shift should be viewed 
as a positive agency on the part of the community, since language is a semiotic 
resource; it is not a threat for the reconstruction of ethnic identities, and they 
feel comfortable in aligning themselves with an assumed global “Malay” 
identity.Saldin gives more weight to Standard Malay (SM) than Sri Lankan 
Malay (SLM), especially to its written form, for he believes that this is crucial 
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if Sri Lankan Malays are to maintain links with and gain benefits from the 
Malay world. Lim and Ansaldo do not agree with him a great deal in this 
regard, for they suggest that a shift from SM to SLM be viewed as something 
positive, and not critiqued as forsaking of their identity.  
To this study, their works have been a source of inspiration as they 
focus on the vitality of Malay language, which is a powerful marker in 
delineating the identity of Sri Lankan Malays. However, their works suffer 
from a number of shortcomings as far as this study is concerned. It is clear that 
Sri Lankan Malay (SLM) has evolved and assumed a distinctive form.  
Nevertheless, what is spoken by the Sri Lankan Malays is Malay Language, 
too; it is not a mutation into an altogether new language. Sri Lankan Malays 
forsaking their own ‘dialect’ and adopting in its place the Standard Malay 
would be tantamount compromising the unique identity of Sri Lankan Malays, 
in spite of whatever other benefits such adoption may bring. Moreover, the 
primary focus in their accounts is on the use of Malay language, and their 
works did not devote enough attention to other issues facing the Sri Lankan 
Malays, such as ethnic identity formation, challenges of assimilation to their 
ethnicity, responses of Malays to such challenges and the outcomes of 
assimilation on Malays. This study, however, engages those aspects in great 
details.  
Ansaldo (2008)79, in another of his illustrious study on the vitality of 
Sri Lankan Malay language, quite critically, revisits the two basic assumptions 
made in relation to Malay language: 1) intermarriage 2) creolization in the 
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evolution of Sri Lankan Malay. His final conclusion is that Sri Lankan Malay 
can be categorized, based on historical and structural analysis, as a mixed 
language. He contends that there is no concrete evidence to prove that the 
language evolved due to intermarriages with Tamil speaking Moors. He 
admits that there is a natural bond between Malays and Sri Lankan Moor for 
religious reason, but it does not mean that this bond led to any sort of 
influence by Tamil language in the evolution of Sri Lankan Malay language, a 
point that has attracted a lot of debate and discussion among scholars. Sri 
Lankan Malay (SLM) has, in fact, absorbed a number of words from Sinhala 
and Tamil languages. Influence of Tamil or Sinhala for that matter, on Malay 
language, cannot be easily dismissed; it does exist. Ansaldo also makes a bold 
assertion that there is no historical data to validate the argument that 
intermarriages between Sri Lankan Moors and Malays are widespread. 
However, scholars like Hussainmiya, Asiff Hussein and Saybhan hold that 
intermarriages between Sri Lankan Malays and other communities are 
widespread, and they have backed up their claim with statistical data. 
Although there are many insights that can be learned from the study of 
Ansaldo, it too leaves room for the kind of study we are currently undertaking. 
He has not addressed those pressing issues, which Sri Lankan Malays are 
facing today, such as identity formation of Malays, the challenges of 
assimilation to their identity and the responses of Malays to such challenges. 




2.2.2: Works on Southeast Asian Malays 
This section focuses on literature relevant to ethnic identity formation 
and aspects related to assimilation of Malays in Southeast Asia.  
2.2.2.1: Works on Constructivism 
In “A History of an Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea and 
Practice of ‘Malayness’ in Malaysia Reconsidered”, Shamsul (2001)80 focuses 
on the critique of ethnicity theories based on primordialism, propounded by 
Malaysian historiographers in their effort to explain the identity formation of 
Malays - the idea that ethnic traits of Malays in Malaysia are innate both in the 
individual and the ethnic group as a social group. He proposes that Malay 
ethnicity is not something innate; rather a construction as a result of 
intersecting historical, cultural and social factors at a particular moment in 
history. He further argues that Malayness has been constructed by a colonial 
historiography and subsequently adopted uncritically by most historians in 
post-colonial Malaysia - both Malays and non-Malays. What is significant and 
more relevant to the present study is his analysis of the constructed formation 
of the identity of Malayness. He clearly demonstrates that religion (Islam), 
language, and royalty were the identity markers employed by the colonial 
scholars to define the Malay identity during the colonial period, and he 
bemoans the fact that these critera are adopted in the post-colonial period too, 
quite uncritically, by politicians and bureaucrats, in the form of bumiputra, 
which expanded the scope of Malayness in the framework of socio-economic 
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engineering programme. He further illustrates that the ‘enumerative modality’, 
employed by the British to categorize the indigenous society by means of a 
census - on the basis of race, ethnic groups, culture and language - was of 
great use for the colonialists to construct the identity of Malayness. The same 
is the scenario with Malays in Sri Lanka, as they too were labeled as Malays 
and categorized as a distinct ethnic group in the census by the British rulers in 
17th and 18th centuries. In his findings on the social process of constructed 
formation of ethnic identity, Shamsul argues that the ‘Malay Reservation 
Enactment in 1913’, which was introduced by the Colonialists, supported the 
furthering of the construction of ‘Malay race’. The enactment defined who a 
Malay was, in terms of the categorization of each state in Malaysia. He further 
illustrates that the creation of Chinese, Malay, Tamil and English schools, 
which divided pupils along the lines of their ethnicities, necessarily used 
language and cultural practices as markers. By and large, his discussion of 
Malay or Malayness explicates that the Malay identity is an ‘authority defined 
construct’. This study is very useful and relevant to the present study as it 
analyzes the processes involved in forming a constructed identity. However, 
what is lacking in his account is that it does not deal with assimilation as an 
impetus to the constructed identity formation of Malays in Malaysia.    
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied’s (2010)81 account on “Ethnic 
Resurgence, Minority Communities and State policies in a Network Society: 
The Dynamics of Malay Identity Formation in Postcolonial Singapore” 
demonstrates that the global, regional, and local developments, including 
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reaction to state policies, resulted in the construction of ethnic identity of 
Malays in Singapore. In his analysis of the global and regional developments 
that led to the constructed Malay identity formation, he states that the 
following played a prominent role: the sponsorship of transnational 
movements by the Persian Gulf states; proliferation of alternative news 
sources that aided in disseminating information on conflicts in Palestine, and 
other problems that threatened the foundations of Muslim societies (Ummah); 
and the fast spread of dawah 82 activities. He further cites the following as 
having heightened the ethnic resurgence and identity formation of Malays in 
Singapore in 1980s: “the social, economic, educational and political 
marginalization of Malays on the domestic front,”83; the visit of Israeli 
President Herzog in the midst of a worldwide Muslim denunciation of the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine; and political rhetoric of certain Singapore 
politicians questioning Malays’ loyalty to Singapore.  As such, the attempt by 
the Singaporean state to establish a single official definition of the Malay 
identity by excluding Islam as a significant marker, in response to local, 
regional and global developments, has also heightened the Malay 
consciousness in Singapore.  
This account of Khairudein is much relevant to the present study as it 
deals with the question of how the State’s attempt to define Malay identity, in 
reaction to the resurgence of Islam, contributed to the construction of ethnic 
identity for Malays in Singapore.  In short, both these studies of Shamsul and 
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Khairudein unpack the realities surrounding the formation of Malay identity in 
Malaysia and Singapore, which is authority-defined. Furthermore, they also 
accept the fact that the historical, socio-cultural, local and global factors too 
played a pivotal role in constructing the Malay identity in Malaysia and 
Singapore. Khairudein makes particular mention of how Malay identity was 
reinforced in the 1980s, following attempts by the State of Singapore to define 
Malay identity by excluding Islam as a marker of their ethnicity.  
 In the same vein, Sharifah Alwiyah Aljunied’s (1990)84 study on 
“Minority Dilemmas: The Malay Community in Singapore” and Nurliza 
Yusof’s (1986)85 study on “Being Malay in Singapore” also demonstrate the 
formation of constructed ethnic identity for Malays in Singapore. Both their 
accounts illustrate that various local, regional and global developments gave 
rise to their ethnic identity. In particular, the Islamic resurgence in the 1980s, 
influence of Islamic transnational organizations, and attempts by the 
government to marginalize Malays politically, educationally and economically 
are also cited as factors that contributed to the constructed formation of ethnic 
identity of Malays. Sharifah accepts the fact that Islam and Malay culture 
(adat) play a vital role in asserting the ethnic identity of Malays in Singapore, 
following realization by masses that Islam has the potential to provide 
solutions to such marginalization. Nurliza too highlights that the politically 
motivated exclusion of Malays from sensitive units in the military, promotion 
of Chinese labels in schools and housing schemes, and giving priority to 
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Confucianism and Mandarin language have all contributed, quite significantly, 
to the constructed formation of Malay identity, which has as its base the 
religion of Islam, language and culture. These studies to a large extent fall in 
line with the previous account of Khairudin Aljunied since both of them focus 
on the interplay of local, regional and global development on the ethnic 
identity of Malays in Singapore. However, these studies have not dealt with 
the question of assimilation as a challenge or an impetus to the constructed 
formation of Malay identity. 
In her studies, entitled “The Singapore Dilemma: the Political and 
Educational Marginality of the Malay Community”, Lily Zubaidah Rahim 
narrates that the continued economic, educational and political marginalization 
of the minority Malays in Singapore attributed to the “cultural deficit” thesis 
that accorded them an inferior status which, in turn, contributed to the 
construction of Malay identity in Singapore based on key identity markers 
such as Islam, Malay language and culture. This cultural deficit argument, 
according to her, has colonial roots, and has simply been reinvigorated by the 
post independent rulers of Singapore when they attempted to portray Malays 
as lazy, dull and as suffering from an identity crisis.86 Furthermore, her study 
reveals that the dominant cultural deficit argument has helped perpetuate the 
prejudice and stereotyping of Malays in the eyes of other communities in 
Singapore. Lily, subscribes to the transnational view that Malays in Singapore 
are part of a Pan-Malay regional identity (Nusantara or Alam Melayu), while 
at the same time asserting that Malays in Singapore are indigenous people of 
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the island.87  She also argues that, when Islam becomes a dominant and 
definitive identity marker for the Malays in Southeast Asia, it also inevitably 
reinforces the idea that the Malays are a minority, different from others in 
Singapore, the consequence of which is the social, economic and educational 
marginalization of Malays. Defining of Malay identity in Singapore, using the 
religion of Islam, language and culture as markers of their identity, has lumped 
them together as a backward minority, causing a vicious cycle of further 
marginalization by the polity. This cultural thesis argument, attributed to the 
social, economical and educational marginalization of Malays, galvanized the 
construction of their ethnic identity. 
What in Lily’s view is a cultural thesis argument, which is attributed to 
Malays’ socio-economic and educational marginalization culminating in 
consolidation of their ethnic identity in Singapore, in our view, is constructed 
formation of the ethnic identity of Singaporean Malays. Unlike previous 
studies of Khairudin, Sharifah and Nurliza on the constructed formation of 
ethnic identity of Malays in Singapore, which emphasized on the interplay of 
local, regional and global factors on the ethnic identity of Malays, Lily is 
consistent in maintaining that the ethnic identity of Malays is asserted solely 
because of the cultural thesis argument of Singapore elites and the State 
against Malays. These studies have certainly given great insight into how 
various factors gave rise to the constructed formation of ethnic identity of 
Malays in Singapore. However, the present study departs from the line of 
inquiry followed in their accounts, since it engages in the questions of ethnic 
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identity formation of Sri Lankan Malays, the challenges of assimilation to 
their identity, and the responses of Malays to such challenges.    
The forgoing section discussed the primordial and constructed 
formation of Malayness in Southeast Asia, particularly Malays in Singapore 
and Malaysia. The following section discusses the literature on assimilation.   
2.2.2.2: Works on assimilation 
The preceding section focuses on studies relevant to ethnicity and 
assimilation aspects of Malays in South Asia. The following studies of Tong, 
who has specifically dealt with ethnicity and assimilation aspects of Chinese 
in Thailand and Philippines, have much relevance to the focus of the present 
study. His studies and their contexts are extensively discussed in the following 
section. 
Tong’s study (2010)88 has much more relevance to the current study 
though his primary focus is the Chinese identity in Southeast Asian countries. 
Tong debunks those studies that suggest that the Chinese in Thailand are 
willing to assimilate into the Thai society, by providing a wealth of empirical 
data gathered from field works. He establishes that previous studies simply 
overstated the occurrence of Chinese assimilation, showing that the data 
gathered from contemporary Thailand shows that the Chinese continue to exist 
as a separate community. His study of the Chinese in Thailand clearly 
demonstrates that ethnic identity must be viewed as center-peripheral identity. 
Most Chinese in Thailand emphasize the importance of primordial 
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characteristics, such as descent and bloodline, in defining their ethnic identity 
in the center. However, the instrumental form of ethnicity emerges (situational 
identity) in peripheries, especially in public spaces, where transactions occur 
between the Chinese and the Thais. The Chinese in Thailand are bilingual, 
using Thai in certain social situations where they interact with Thais, attend 
Thai schools, or join Thai associations, while adopting Chinese language in 
others circumstances, such as within their homes or when interacting with 
other Chinese. Thus, he avers, that the Chinese maintain their identity and 
differentiate themselves from the Thais. This situation led him to articulate 
that the Chinese in Thailand cross ethnic boundaries, and maintain a bicultural 
or dual identity.  
Tong’s study89 of the Chinese identity in the Philippines, in the same 
account, is more significant and relevant to our current study, as it dwells on 
the assimilation and hybridity of the Chinese identity. In the Philippines, 
according to Tong, the Chinese converts to Christianity appear to be well 
integrated into the Filipino society, as a result of the government policy of 
mass naturalization. He argues, however, that a nuanced understanding of the 
Chinese identity and ethnic relations, shows that many remain predominantly 
Chinese based on the primordial attributes such as bloodline and lineage. 
Thus, he notes that “there is also a strong desire to maintain the Chinese 
language and education as well as emphasizing the importance of traditional 
cultural values”.90 According to him, extensive years of peaceful co-existence 
of the Chinese in Filipino society have resulted only in a certain degree of 
                                                 





acculturation. In the realm of religion, for example, there is an intermixing of 
traditional Chinese Taoist and Buddhist practices with Christian beliefs and 
rituals. His fieldwork indicates that many of these Chinese practice 
Christianity and attending Masses while, at the same time, are also engaged in 
traditional Chinese customs, such as ancestor-worship, burning of joss sticks, 
and observance of Qing Ming festival. Furthermore, he argues that the 
Chinese identity in the Philippines is racially primordial, but culturally 
hybridized. In other words, the ethnic identification of the Chinese is 
primordial, and is based on blood and descent. Culturally, however, being 
Chinese is hybrid in that most of the Chinese in the Philippines, especially the 
younger generation, claim that they are both Chinese, based on ethnic identity 
and Filipinos, based on nationality.  
Although Tong’s accounts comprise of many studies of the Chinese 
ethnic identity in many Southeast Asian countries, I have chosen just two that 
deal with the Chinese ethnic identity in Thailand and the Philippines, as they 
are relevant and offer significantly helpful insights to our present study on 
ethnic identity of minority Malays in Sri Lanka. The proposition that dual / 
bicultural identity exists among the Chinese in the Thai context - a racially 
primordial, but culturally hybridized ethnic identity – is one of the most 
significant insights that can be extracted from his account. However, it 
exhibits some limitations too, given the focus of this study: Tong has failed to 
focus on the responses of the Chinese to the challenges of assimilation to their 
identity, and their reactions to them through organizational activities. The 
present study is unique in that it covers a whole range of issues spanning from 
ethnic identity formation of Sri Lankan Malays, to the challenges of 
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assimilation to Malay identity, to the responses of Malays to such challenges, 
and the outcomes of assimilation.  
In Summary, all previous studies on Sri Lankan Malays fall short of 
three basic dimensions: Firstly, although a significant number of previous 
discourses have focused on Sri Lankan Malays, most of them lack the 
characteristics of scholarly standards, and therefore cannot be considered to be 
empirically sound. Secondly, the thesis of this study, such as the identity 
formation of Malays, the challenges of assimilation to Malay identity, 
responses of Malay organizations to such challenges, and the outcomes of 
assimilation, has suffered a crucial academic neglect in previous scholarly 
works. Thirdly, many of the previous discourses on Sri Lankan Malays are 
outdated and tend to focus on the historical origin and nature of Malays in Sri 
Lanka, their regimental contribution, and the significance of Sri Lankan Malay 
language. Hence, this study attempts to fill such gaps by exploring the identity 
formation of Malays, the challenges of assimilation to their ethnicity, and the 
outcomes of assimilation on Malays.  
Having focused on the review of literature relevant to the study, in the 
next section, I deal with the conceptual and theoretical perspective on ethnic 




2.3: The general conceptual and theoretical framework on ethnic 
identity  
While the preceding section deals with a review of literature in relation 
to ethnic identity and assimilation of Malays in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, 
the following section discusses the theoretical framework on ethnic identity, 
assimilation and pluralism.   
2.3.1: Ethnic groups and ethnic identity 
The term ethnic, which derives from the ancient Greek ethnos referring 
to human collectives living and acting together, is typically translated today as 
‘people’ or ‘nation’.91 This concept has passed into everyday discourse and 
become central to the politics of groups differentiation in culturally diverse 
social democracies in the present world. Besides, this term is often conflated 
with race, and therefore, this study wishes to clearly distinguish and 
differentiate between these two. Race refers to outward physical attributes 
such as the color of the skin, whereas ethnic group comprises of cultural traits, 
and is a factor of identity for whoever shares in these traits (irrespective of 
whether they belong to the same race or not).92  Thus, it is clear that while the 
race is related to physical attributes of human beings, ethnic (group) 
represents the cultural traits. Ethnic groups, ethnicity and ethnic identity are 
frequently used interchangeably in social sciences. However, while ethnic 
group can be thought of as a subgroup within a larger group that claims to 
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have a number of common traits, ethnicity or ethnic identity is a dynamic, 
multi-dimensional construct that refers to one’s sense of self, as a member of 
an ethnic group.93 This makes it clear that ethnicity or ethnic identity is a sense 
of feeling of belonging to an ethnic group. This study would first engage in a 
discussion of the several definitions of ‘ethnic group’ that has led to the 
production of an agreed upon definition. In doing so, the basic objective of this 
attempt is not only to show the controversial nature of the phenomenon, but also, 
by posing some contrasting definitions, to identify common and basic traits of 
ethnic group amidst these differences.  
Among the first to bring the term "ethnic group" into social sciences 
was the German sociologist Max Weber who defined it as: 
Those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common 
descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, 
or because of memories of colonization and migration. This belief is 
important for the propagation of group formation. It does not matter 
whether or not blood relationship actually exists.94 
In this definition, Weber designates ethnic group as collectives 
characterized by religious, cultural, historical and racial traits; he also 
emphasizes on the ‘subjective belief’, which carries psychological connotation 
of groups. His contention led to the conclusion that ethnic identity is not 
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necessarily a genetic phenomenon, but a result of the subjective belief that all 
those belonging to an ethnic group have certain commonalities among them.  
Other scholars such as Saw (2007)95, Eng ( 1995),96 William (2001),97 
Yinger (1995),98 and Phinney( 2001)99 delineate ethnic groups ‘as the 
characterization of several traits such as common origin (descent), language, 
values, culture, religion, literature, family pattern and so on’. These are     
emotions and sentiments which give members an exclusive sense of identity 
and bind members together as collectives. This can also be considered as 
ethnic identity markers that designate ethnic groups in a plural society. 
However, the conceptualization of Yinger and Fredrick Barth on the ethnic 
groups brings a new dimension, which different from that mentioned by those 
scholars. Yinger (1996) noted: 
An ethnic group is a segment of a larger society whose members are 
thought, by themselves or others, to have a common origin and to share 
important segments of a common culture and who, in addition, 
participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture 
are significant ingredients.100 
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Despite the fact that this definition of Yinger may seem inter-related 
with the aforementioned discussion of other scholars on the ethnic groups, 
there is a significant difference in terms of the contents of the definition. Here, 
he focuses not only on self-identification, but also on identification by others 
as being different ethnic groups in terms of ethnic identity markers, and them 
taking part in shared activities that are within the parameter of their origin and 
culture. As such, in the discussion of Yinger, ethnic groups are distinguishable 
culturally; they are identified by others and by themselves as being different; 
and as individuals they join in activities and share beliefs and aspirations that 
represent their distinctiveness.  
Besides, Barth’s contention on ethnic groups is founded on further 
illustrations of what Yinger had to say in terms of ethnic groups. Barth’s 
(1969) influential work on ethnic groups has been instrumental in spreading 
the usage of the term in social sciences in the 1980s and 1990s. While 
stressing the constructed nature of ethnic identity, he shifted the 
anthropological notion of cultures as bounded entities of ethnicity, which is 
how the primordialists perceive it, to a focus on the interface between groups, 
that is, interconnectedness of ethnic identities. In this line of thinking, he 
noted:  
Categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of 
mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of 
exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are 
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maintained despite changing participation and membership in the 
course of individual life histories.101 
The point that Barth makes here is that ethnic groups are a byproduct 
of specific kind of inter-group interactions. This could clearly be manifested in 
the following definition of Barth on ethnic groups: “Ethnic groups have been 
defined by their culture, pattern of values, social customs, language usage, and 
rules of social interactions that group members share and have a membership 
which identifies itself, and is identified by others”.102 In this definition, Barth 
stresses, in addition to identity markers, self-identification and identification 
by others as different ethnic groups, as the prominent features that designate 
ethnicity to individuals or members of an ethnic group.   
Having discussed the conceptual framework on the ethnic groups and 
ethnicity, let us focus on the theories of ethnic identity relevant to the study.  
2.3.2: Theories of Ethnic Identity 
Theories on ethnic identity formation comprise of three approaches: 
primordial, situational and constructivist. These theories offer some insights 
into how ethnic identity of any minority groups is formed in a given context. 
As such, these theories will be employed to study the identity formation of Sri 
Lankan Malays in the following chapters.   
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2.3.2.1: Primordial perspective on ethnic identity 
This is a dominant theory held by social scientists regarding ethnicity 
or ethnic identity. Geertz was among the first to popularize the term of 
primordialism. Andrew (2001),103 Gap (1999),104 Davidson (2008),105 Jenkin 
(2001),106  Williams (2001) 107 and Mackay (1982)108  have all noted that 
ethnicity is inherently acquired by birth, and further emphasized that it is 
rooted in the ties associated with kinship, language, religion, culture and 
biological heritage. These characteristics are seen by the actors to be ineffable, 
obligatory, immutable109 and irrational.110 In primordialism, a group’s or a 
person’s claim to ethnic identity is rooted in the allure of affective attachments 
of primordial markers.111 Thus, people often believe that certain social 
categories are natural, inevitable, and unchanging facts about the social world. 
They believe that particular social categories are fixed by human nature rather 
than by social convention and practice. This is what is referred to as 
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primordialism. In primordialists’ view, group membership remains fixed over 
a lifetime and it is passed down intact across generations.112 Moreover, 
primordialsm gives an emotional appeal for the human beings to identify with 
or cling to a certain group.113 What this theory explains, in short, is that ethnic 
groups remain the same, regardless of whatever happens in the surroundings. 
All of these points suggest the ‘given and frozen’ characteristics of the 
primordial ethnicity.  
However, this notion of ethnic identity can be critiqued on many 
fronts: Firstly, this theory which is based on given, irrational and immutable 
aspects is basically flawed. In the contemporary world, ethnic boundaries are 
fluid and flux in different contexts due to growing influence of modernization 
and globalization on individuals and groups. As such, inherent characteristics 
of ethnic groups are challenged in the face of modernization and globalization 
in the contemporary world. Secondly, a deeply rooted social division in terms 
of elements such as race, language and religion can automatically translate 
into polical conflict and violence among various communities in a country.114 
As the theory argues that inherent elements are fundamental aspects of 
asserting one’s identity, it is very likely to trigger ethnic tension among 
various ethnic groups, on the basis of inherent characteristics such as religion, 
language and so on. Hence, Jenkin argues that “the ideology of primordialism 
naturalizes ethnic groups and justifies chauvinistic ethnic sentiments and 
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genocides as a cause of the contemporary conflict.”115 Sri Lanka is a classic 
example to this phenomenon of primordialism since its history witnessed a 
brutal civil war, which lasted for about three decades, between the government 
forces and Tamil rebel groups. The source of the conflict is attributable to the 
emphasis placed on primordial attributes such as language, religion, culture 
and so on. 
2.3.2.2: Situational perspective on ethnic identity 
Anthropologist Edmund Leech was the forerunner of this situational 
theory on ethnic identity. This theory implies that ethnicity shifts across time 
and space in search for material benefits such as power, wealth and status. 
While primoridialism is rooted in the allure of affective attachments based on 
inherent characteristics acquired by birth, situationalism is just opportunistic 
manipulation of ethnicity for collective political and economic gain.116 
Williams (2001)117, Davidson (2008),118 Varshney (2001),119 Cohen (1978)120  
and Andrew (2001),121 have asserted that ethnicity, according to this theory, is 
changeable or fluid, and driven by consideration of advantages in the pursuit 
of immediate interest, especially political interest, by elites of the group. It is 
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clear that this theory views ethnicity as a tool used by certain people for 
manipulation in maximizing their interests. This theory too draws several 
criticisms for it permits manipulation by vested interests. Firstly, one can ask: 
if individuals were to freely oscillate between ethnicities to maximize their 
material benefits, what is the point of having the passion that ethnicity seems 
to arouse in its adherents?122 Secondly, if the material benefits of only the 
elites are accomplished using ethnicity as a tool, then why would the adherents 
(members of ethnic groups) listen and follow the elites in the future? Finally, 
worst of all, this theory has serious ramifications for nations with large ethnic 
divergences such as Sri Lanka and India since it has the potential for fuelling 
ethnic sentiments among various communities. 
2.3.2.3: Constructivist perspective on ethnic identity 
J.S Furnival, Clifford Geertz, Benedict Anderson and Barth are 
considered to be the pioneers of the constructivist paradigm of ethnicity. Barth 
argues that it is not the culture that specifically designates ethnicity, but social 
interaction through internal self-ascription and external ascription of others.123 
Barth was firm in his exposition that ethnicity was a byproduct of social 
interaction, and his proposal rules out the possibility of there being an 
objective way to designate ethnicity as well as the use of culture as a critical 
factor in the study of ethnicity. His conception of ethnic identity was different 
from the othe two conceptions, namely the primordialist and the 
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situationalist.124 According to this conception, identity is constructed and 
transmitted through social action and interaction, and not genetically inherited.  
Despite the fact that Barth pointed out that all ethnic groups have their 
own overt signals (apparent features) together with basic value orientations 
(standards of morality and excellence by which performance is judged), he 
considered that the critical features that defined ethnicity were self-ascription 
and ascription by others,125 and that there was “no simple one to one 
relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences.126 
This clearly illustrates how Barth gives preference to social interactions and 
perception of the groups as ethnic markers rather than the culture that 
encapsulates the society. For Barth, it was “ethnic boundary that defines the 
group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses”127.  Barth’s conceptualization of 
ethnic identity formation is different, since he argues that ethnicity is a 
constructed formation as a result of social interaction, and not an assigned or 
given formation from birth. He also directed the attention to processes of 
boundary maintenance, and argued that “members of all ethnic groups in a 
poly-ethnic society could act to maintain dichotomies and differences”128 
There are several key features that can be extracted from the 
alternative framework on ethnicity developed by Barth. First, the analysis of 
ethnicity starts from definition of the situation held by social actors. Second, 
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the ethnic boundaries are maintained or changed in the interaction between 
‘us’ and ‘them’, which takes place across boundaries. Third, the ethnicity of 
actors is not necessarily fixed; it is constructed by the situation. Fourth, ethnic 
identity depends on self-ascription by members of the ethnic group, and by 
outsiders with whom they interact. Fifth, ethnicity is not a matter of ‘real’ 
cultural differentiation; rather, the differences are in the eye of beholder; the 
‘cultural stuff’ which had been hitherto believed to determine group 
identification, however, in his understanding, is irrelevant in determining 
one’s ethnic identity. Finally, ecological issues are influential in producing and 
reproducing ethnic identity: economic competition for scarce resources,129  for 
instance, plays a significant role in the generation of ethnicity. 
Despite the significant contribution of Barth on ethnicity, it has some 
drawbacks, too. First, although Barth did his field works on ethnicity in 
Southeast Asia and Middle East, his observations cannot be applied to all 
nations and groups,130 because interpretation on ethnic identity may differ 
from contexts to contexts. For instance, a person’s superordinate identity 
cannot be designated on the basis of ethnic differences, for it can be political 
in a nation-state context. This was the case in Sri Lanka in the beginning of 
20th century. Many freedom fighters of the country thought of themselves as 
Ceylonese, which is regarded as Sri Lanka now, regardless of their ethnic 
differences as Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim or Malays when struggling to achieve 
their independence from the British colonialism. Second, his theory on 
ethnicity failed to concentrate on the other theoretical aspects, such as social 
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stratification and class, since income and education also play significant roles 
in designating one’s ethnic identity. Third, he failed to take into account the 
power of the state in determining ethnicity which is instrumental in 
categorizing or classifying ethnic groups in a country.131 Finally, he did not 
deal with the people in the pre-modern period to know their dynamics of 
ethnic identity.132    
Fearon and Laitin (2000)133 suggest that there are three processes 
associated with construction of ethnic identity: social and economic processes 
as agents of construction; social construction by discourse; and individuals as 
agents of construction.  
1) Social and economic processes as agents of construction 
The literature on nationalism associated with Ernest Gellner, Benedict 
Anderson and others represents perhaps the best developed ‘‘case study’’ of 
the social construction of an identity - namely, the national identity. These 
authors reject the primordialist view of nations as historically immanent, 
arguing instead that the idea of nationality became compelling to people only 
in the modern period as a result of economic and attendant social changes. For 
these authors, national identities are the local, political and psychological 
consequences of macro historical forces. For instance, Gellner argues that by 
making upward mobility possible for the literate and school-educated, 
economic modernization politicized facets of culture that were politically 
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irrelevant in the pre-modern period. National identities arise when people 
realize that how they communicate determines their life chances.134 Anderson 
adds the idea that boundaries of national identities have been shaped as an 
almost accidental by product of “print capitalism”, the creation of vernacular 
reading communities by booksellers seeking markets beyond a defunct Latin 
and the limited spread of local dialects.135   
An ethnic group emerges as a politically motivated social force under 
certain socio-historical conditions. The group’s numerical strength, territorial 
concentration, cultural consolidation, and economic footing are essential for 
the mobilization of an ethnic group and the group should be in a process of 
transformation, competing with other such ethnic groups for its survival and 
development. More importantly, there should be intellectually and 
economically developed elites, with political ambition within the group.136 As 
Brass (1991) has pointed out,  
Ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elites in 
modernizing and post industrial societies that are undergoing dramatic 
social change. This process invariably involves competition and 
conflict for political power, economic benefits, and social status 
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between competing elites, classes and leadership groups, both within 
and among different ethnic categories.137  
The aforementioned point is aptly posited by the other proponents of 
constructivist theory of identity as well. They argue that macro-historical, 
economic, social processes are crucial factors in the construction of social 
identities.138 The role of social, economic and political aspects in the 
construction of identity is clearly noted by constructivist theorists like 
Kanchan Chandra, who avers that “changes in the identity can be a product of 
the very political and economic phenomena”.139 Nagel also observes that  
Ethnicity is the product of actions undertaken by ethnic groups as they 
shape and reshape their self-definition and culture. However, ethnicity 
is also constructed by external social, economic and political processes 
and actors as they shape and reshape ethnic categories and definitions. 
Ethnic identity is the result of a dialectical process, involving internal 
and external opinions and processes, as well as the individual’s self-
identification and outsiders’ ethnic designations.140 
The above definition too underlines not only the internal processes, but 
also the external processes of social, economic, political aspects involved in 
the construction of ethnic identity. Thus, it can be noted that historical, 
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economic and socio-political factors are significant in the construction of 
ethnic identity.  
Furthermore, ethnic identity is a dynamic construct that evolves and 
changes in response to developmental and contextual factors. It is shown in 
researches that ethnic identity changes in response to changing social and 
contextual factors over time, and that there can be considerable variation in the 
images that individual construct of the beliefs, behaviors, values and norms 
that characterize their groups, together with their understanding of how these 
features are reflected in themselves.141 In the same vein, what is noteworthy in 
terms of the current study is that the ethnicity of Malays, just like other 
ethnicities, is constructed in response to challenges of acculturation and 
structural assimilation of Malays into other communities and as a reaction to 
attempts by Moors to subsume their identity under the umbrella category of 
(Islamic) religion. This is further illustrated with concrete empirical evidence 
in chapter four, which is about the ethnic identity formation of Sri Lankan 
Malays. 
2) Social construction by discourse 
Social construction by discourse rests with supra-individual things like 
discursive formations, either symbolic or cultural systems that have their own 
logic or agency. In these analyses, individuals are pawns or products of 
discourses that exist, and move independently of the actions of any particular 
individual. The proposition here is that one can analyze and discern the logic 
of the discourse or the symbolic system that constructs individuals and groups, 
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and make predictions as to the likelihood of a range of practices, including 
violence. This symbolic approach to identity suggests that the development of 
discursive formations can set one group in opposition to another, or predispose 
them to see the other as a threat, or a natural subject for violence, independent 
of any more material basis for hostility.142 The discursive formation of Sinhala 
myth of Vijaya, which is the driving force behind the construction of Sinhala 
Buddhist identity in Sri Lanka, is a good example for this category.  
3) Individuals as agents of construction 
This is regarded as ethnic identities/categories constructed by the 
actions of individuals seeking various ends. It is assumed that ethnic violence 
occurs when political elites construct antagonistic ethnic identities in order to 
strengthen their hold on power.143 Here, it explains that the elites are the ones 
who foment ethnic violence to consolidate or acquire power and political 
support. This process itself has the effect of constructing more antagonistic 
identities that favors more violence. Varshney (2001) illustrates that 
“constructivist emphasis is on the construction of group categories by the 
knowledge-elite, its promotion by centers of power and its effects on the 
people.”144 He goes on to argue that the Census is a modern instrument of 
categorization for the Colonialists and post-independent rulers to divide 
people not only on grounds of nationality, but also on racial lines to 
construct/create ethnicity.  
                                                 
142 Fearon, and Laitin, “Violence and social construction of ethnic identity,” 852-853. 
 
143 Ibid., 853. 
 
144 Varshney, “Ethnic conflicts and Ancient Hatrads,” 4812. 
 78 
 
 Davidson (2008)145  and Varshney (2001)146 went further, illustrating 
that ethnic identity and ethnic cleavages were the result of colonial power’s 
deliberate work to create and sustain their colonial grip, and said that such 
divisions have endured and will last for a long time. Varshney cites empirical 
evidences to support his claim, arguing that in the Indian context, primordial 
antagonism between Hindus and Muslims became the ‘master narrative’ even 
though there was enough evidence of Hindu-Muslim co-existence for many 
centuries before the arrival of the colonialists. As such, primordial antagonism 
between Hindus and Muslims was constructed and promoted by the British, 
because it suited them to split India along religious lines.147 Thus, the role of 
colonialism and post-colonial states in the process of ethnic identity 
construction is highlighted. Even for Furnivall, plural societies did not arise 
out of the timeless ethnic essence or out of the aggregation of the choices 
made by individuals. Rather, it was shaped under the forces of colonial policy, 
which encouraged economic and social segregation for the sake of restraining 
the anti colonialist sentiment, and cost-effective rule. Thus, over time finer 
distinctions of “Chinese”, “Indian”, “native” and so on grew, and attendant 
identities gained currency.148  
All of these discussions suggest that constructed formation of ethnic 
identity entails some basic elements, which are: 1) identity constructed due to 
interaction between ethnic groups (self-ascription and ascription by others), 2) 
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ethnicity constructed in response to socio-economic and political challenges or 
marginalizations that minority ethnic groups are subjected to in the hands of 
majority groups, 3) ethnic categorization as a by-product of deliberate divisive 
actions by colonial rulers, first, and then blind imitation by post-colonial rulers 
in now independent countries. (As noted before, ethnic cleavages between 
groups were fostered by the colonial rulers as it suited them to split the 
communities as per their well known policy of Divide and Rule for the sake of 
their survival in those countries; the Colonialists and post-colonial rulers aptly 
made use of the Census as a crucial instrument in creating/constructing the 
ethnicity), 4) ethnicity constructed by the learned and affluent elites in a 
society. Nevertheless, this theory on ethnic identity triggers many criticisms. 
One of the drawbacks that one notices in this theory is that the colonial and 
post-colonial categorization of ethnic identity by the state might be done with 
an ulterior motive or for self-interest, serving the interest of the colonial or 
state power, which may have serious consequences, for those newly 
constructed groups can potentially be disposed to violence against each other. 
Other important drawback is that people who are categorized as elites in the 
community may only seek their own interests at great cost to the ethnic groups 
by exploiting volatile situations that may exist.   
The theories on ethnic identity will be employed in chapter four to 
explore the identity formation of Sri Lankan Malays.    
 80 
 
2.4: Theories of assimilation 
Although “assimilation” is somewhat ambiguous in its meaning, and 
has been regarded negatively in the social sciences and courted some 
controversies, it has become a dominant phenomenon in modern societies. For 
most social scientists, assimilation is a promising characteristic of social 
process as it is largely unintended and often invisible. However, Brubaker 
(2004) underlines that assimilation can be a deliberate, self-conscious and 
poignant activity.149 It occurs when two or more societies, ethnic groups or 
smaller groups meet in a way that melts down the boundaries. Moreover, it 
begins to take shape in the form of interactions and cultural exchanges, 
eventually leading to the thorough blending of groups.  
Once a new ethnic group (immigrant) arrives in any new environment, 
it undergoes some sort of adjustment or assimilation. Adult immigrants retain 
a strong identity with their culture of origin, without identifying strongly as 
members of the larger, new society. On the other hand, children who migrate 
at a younger age are vulnerable to assimilation, a lot more than their parents 
are, for they would show no inhibition in identifying with the cultural 
elements of both their ethnic group and the larger new society. Since the 
minority ethnic groups are weaker in terms of power and number, they have 
less space to perpetuate their ethnic identity. Also the process of assimilation 
is facilitated by education, by enforcing conformity upon the immigrants to the 
linguistic and other prevalent cultural norms that are valued within the 
dominant host community. 
                                                 




To better understand the concept of assimilation, it is necessary to 
focus our attention on the conceptualization of assimilation, defined by 
various scholars on different dimensions.  Yinger (1994) defines it as follows: 
Assimilation is the blending into one of formerly distinguishable sociocultural 
groups.150   
Absorption of alien ethnic groups living within a larger ethnic 
community is referred to ethnic assimilation;151 Individuals and groups who 
give up their ethnic identity and become identified with the larger society are 
assimilated. In this process, the identity markers are either absent or there is 
little desire to maintain one’s ethnic culture.152 Park’s definition on 
assimilation is quite explicit compared to others: it is a  
a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons or groups 
acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of another person or 
groups, and by sharing their experience and history are incorporated 
with them in a common cultural life.153  
This typology may be simple and outdated, but it provides a useful 
foundation for much of the current research into assimilation. All of these 
conceptualizations by various scholars suggest that assimilation itself refers to 
minority ethnic groups blending into the larger or dominant ethnic groups in 
multi-ethnic settings. In this process, the culture and other traits of minority 
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groups may perhaps disappear as a result of merging with the larger and more 
dominant groups. Even though it takes place in a gradual manner, it has the 
potential to eventually eliminate, totally, the unique identity of a minority 
group in a plural context. Nevertheless, it is possible that some minority 
groups may undergo partial assimilation, and be able to preserve their culture 
and identity in some respects. This scenario is also quite common in a plural 
society, because ethnic groups in the modern society are continuously 
demanding equal rights, and are on the search for privileges for their survival.  
The positive features of assimilation are: as it dilutes the salient 
features of ethnic groups, it diminishes the level of discrimination and 
promotes greater equality; it provides greater access to individual freedom; 
and it provides space for a more flexible society.154 These key positive 
features of assimilation serve to blend various ethnic communities into a 
monolithic society, thus denying space for conflict or misunderstanding 
among ethnic groups.  
Assimilation can take place only when there are more than one ethnic 
groups coexisting in a society, which is more or less the norm in the modern 
world unlike in the past. It is important to examine factors that contribute to 
the assimilation process in the modern world. Yinger (1994)155 listed the 
following factors as the causes of assimilation of minority ethnic groups: 
 Small group (relative to total population), 
 Residentially scattered (by region and community), 
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 Longtime residents (low percentage of newcomers), 
 Return to homeland difficult and infrequent (not easy to return to their 
homeland), 
 Speak the language of the majority, 
 Share one of the majority religions, 
 Same race as the majority’s or dominant group’s, 
 Entered voluntarily (in the real nature of the initial contact between 
groups), 
 came from a society culturally similar to the receiving society,  
 Repelled by political and economic developments in homeland, 
 Diverse in class and occupation, 
 High average level of education, 
 Experience little discrimination, 
 Targets of little prejudice, 
 Resident in an open class society, 
 Unequal sex ratio, 
 Live in an expanding economy, 
 Strong outside threats to total society, 
 Little shared memory of former statehood, both historical and 
mythical, and 




On the other hand, Gordon (1978)156 outlined that absence of 
prejudice, absence of discrimination, and absence of value and power 
conflicts are the causes of assimilation. The most significant feature 
regarding the observations of these two scholars is that some of the factors of 
assimilation, which they have listed, interrelate to each other. Of these, 
absence of discrimination and prejudice are really significant. Yinger (1994) 
outlines the concept and causes of assimilation more clearly than Gordon 
(1978), as Yinger gets little distracted as he covers a whole range of issues in 
terms of the causes of assimilation of minority into dominant ethnic groups in 
a multi-cultural society.  
 Another significant contribution to classic assimilation research is 
Milton Gordon’s (1964)157 identification of the different types of assimilation. 
He classifies assimilation into two components: acculturation, and structural 
assimilation (integration).  
 The next section is a discussion on those two components of 
assimilation.  
2.4.1: Acculturation  
The influence of acculturation can go to the extent of making values 
and norms of an ethnic group similar to that of the general population. Smaller 
ethnic groups, lacking power in terms of politics and economics, are more 
vulnerable to be absorbed into the patterns of culture of the larger community 
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or the dominant group.  As such, smaller ethnic groups are relatively more 
easily affected, in terms of their culture, under the cultural influence of the 
dominant groups in a plural society. Theory of acculturation refers to a change 
in the culture of minority ethnic groups towards cultural similarity by adopting 
the culture of the host community. 158 Thus, acculturation occurs when one 
absorbs the culture, belief and behavior patterns of host community.  
Once an extensive acculturation has occurred, it is extremely difficult 
to distinguish members of formerly distinct groups on the basis of culture. In 
fact, acculturation may eventually lead to assimilation where distinction 
between two communities becomes almost nonexistent.  
In addition, the pace in which and the point in time when cultural 
transfer takes places vary widely between ethnic groups. New behavior can be 
more easily learned by the younger generation of minority ethnic groups that 
are exposed to the new culture of the dominant group, through the agencies of 
socialization such as schools, neighbors, peers and media, unlike their older 
generation who, in the absence (or near absence) of those agencies, may be 
able to retain their culture and identity quite significantly.  
Acculturation can either be additive or substitutive. While adding 
values, norms and styles to the existing dominant culture is considered as 
additive acculturation, giving up some elements of one’s culture, or replacing 
them with something else from another culture is considered as substitutive 
acculturation.159 Generally, members in a group learn the culture as well as 
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various aspects of the dominant groups and try to adopt them to suit both the 
dominant culture and the ethnic subculture. 
Additive culture is seen by many scholars as a mechanism to promote 
appreciation and interdependence, and a technique employed to interact 
intimately with people from other cultures.  It should be elucidated here that 
should the dominant groups pressurize the minority groups to adopt its cultural 
elements, there is a real danger of it inadvertently halting acculturation among 
ethnic groups.  
2.4.2: Structural assimilation (integration) 
The structural assimilation (integration), which is an integral part of 
assimilation, occurs when the ethnic minority immigrants and / or their 
descendants in later generations enter into and become integrated into the 
formal social, political, economic and cultural institutions of the host country 
(secondary relationships) and develop numerous long lasting personal 
friendships with members of the majority group (primary relationships).160 
Thus, it can vary from impersonal contacts within economic and political 
institutions to personal contacts within neighborhoods, friendship circles and 
marriages.161  
The two components of assimilation (acculturation and integration) are 
really significant as it has far reaching implications for the minority ethnic 
group of immigrants in a country. While acculturation refers to the cultural 
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dimensions of the minority ethnic group, structural assimilation refers to 
social, political, economic and personal dimension of the minority ethnic 
group in societies dominated by the majority.  
Gordon (1964)162 identifies three possible outcomes of assimilation: 
1) “Melting pot” ideal, where a new culture comes into existence by 
incorporating elements from all groups that live together and feely 
interact among them.  
2) “Anglo conformity”, when a minority group is taught that the norm, 
values and institutions of majority groups are superior and that they 
should adopt them in order to be accepted.  
3) “Cultural pluralism”, when different ethnic groups keep their unique 
culture and behavior while still sharing common national value and 
goals.   
Critiques of the theory of assimilation fall into different categories. 
Sometimes the process of assimilation may agitate the resilience of ethnicity, 
hatling the process of assimilation. First, it is often the case that later 
generations tend to be less assimilated; they assert their uniqueness by 
reviving their old cultural traditions by means of rediscovering and redefining 
them. Second, while advancing their rapid economic and occupational 
benefits, ethnic groups may wish to consciously maintain their traditional 
ethnic values, norms and behavior. Third, whether or not a minority or an 
immigrant group becomes assimilated into a larger group ultimately depends 
on the extent to which the minority ethnic group accepts the fundamental 
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norms and values of the mainstream or core group, and / or to what extent 
members of the mainstream group accept those from the minority into their 
interpersonal ranks. 
Application of these theories in the context of Sri Lankan Malays will 
extensively be taken up in chapter five and six for discussion to gauge as to 
what extent they are acculturated and integrated with core groups / host 
communities. While chapter five of the study discusses the theory on 
acculturation, chapter six discusses structural assimilation in relation to Sri 
Lankan Malays based on the findings. 
 
2.5: Theory of cultural pluralism 
 Gordon (1964)163 illustrates that one of the outcomes of assimilation of 
minority ethnic groups into the host community is cultural pluralism, which is 
all about different ethnic groups perpetuating their unique culture and 
behavior, while still sharing common national values and goals. A well-known 
anthropologist on cultural pluralism, J.S Furnival, holds the same view as 
Gordon. Furnival, however, aptly notes that different ethnic groups ‘mix but 
don’t combine’.164 Furnival (1946) argued that Southeast Asia, towards the 
end of colonial rule, had the “three social orders - the native, the Chinese and 
the Europeans - living side by side, but separately.” To Furnival, a plural 
society “comprises two or more elements of social orders which live side by 
side, yet mingling in one political unit.” The idea of plural society is still 
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widely used today to explain ethnic relations in Southeast Asia and South 
Asia. Like other theories, Furnival’s plural theories are also critiqued for being 
too rigid, with strict compartmentalization of groups along ethnic and racial 
lines, and placing too much emphasis on the polarization of ethnic groups 
living in a single society. Moreover, it does not account for relations of power, 
interracial marriages, or acculturation.  
Malik (1998)165 notes that “each group holds by its own religion, its 
own culture, language, its ideas and ways. The result was a ‘plural society’, 
with different sections of the society living side by side but separately within 
the same political unit”. As such, this theory implies that an ethnic group in a 
plural society can preserve its own identity, religion and culture, while sharing 
the national values and culture, and also living in close relationship with other 
ethnic groups in a country. 
Since the late 1970s, the term ‘pluralism’ seems to have been 
superseded by the label ‘multiculturalism’ in many places. Pluralism or 
multiculturalism which serves to describe the condition of different ethnic 
compartments of society living together, yet separately within an overarching 
political unity, is thus marked by an idealized tolerance of ethnic differences. 
Such model ensures the promise of diversity and, at the same time, equality 
and recognition of minorities’ rights.  
In addition, it is to be noted that the theory of pluralism and hybridity 
as outcomes of assimilation of Sri Lankan Malays will be discussed in chapter 
seven of this study in great detail. 
                                                 




2.6: Theoretical framework of the study 
 In this section, I am attempting to discuss my own theoretical 
framework employed in this study. This study employs primoridialist and 
constructivist theories of ethnic identity to study the identity of Sri Lankan 
Malays. I don’t consider the theory of situationalism to be relevant to this 
study, for Sri Lankan Malays are not seen to be switching their identity for 
their personal gains from time to time or place to place in the country. While 
assimilation is identified as a challenge to the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan 
Malays, pluralism is considered as an outcome of assimilation. Most 
importantly, challenges of assimilation are looked at as catalyzing the identity 
construction of Sri Lankan Malays, since Malays, on identifying the 
challenges of assimilation, are attempting to negotiate their ethnic identity. 
Thus, primordialism and constructivism, as theories of ethnic identity, are 
employed in this study; assimilation, which is considered as a part of 
constructivist theory, is also employed in this study, while pluralism is 
considered as an outcome of the assimilation. Thus, these are the theoretical 
frameworks of this study. Let us now discuss these theories in detail.      
 I discover from the empirical evidence of this study that the ethnic 
identity of Sri Lankan Malays is primordial since they perceive their identity 
as innate and fixed. They consider as primordial markers of their ethnicity 
their descent-based attributes such as the Malay language, the traceability of 
their ancestry/lineage to Malay Archipelago and their physical attributes, 
excluding Malay culture and religion. This is the same argument advanced by 
primordial theorist of ethnic identity. Kanchan Chandra argues that in 
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primoridialism, group membership remains fixed over a lifetime and it is 
passed down intact across generations, 166 and Davidson views that a group’s 
or a person’s claim to ethnic identity is rooted in the allure of affective 
attachments of primordial markers.167 Hence, it is evident that the ethnic 
identity of Sri Lankan Malays is primordial. However, primordialism alone is 
not sufficient to examine the identity formation of Malays in Sri Lanka. 
Construction of Malay identity in Sri Lanka is still ongoing as challenges of 
assimilation are being identified and responded to, in an effort to perpetuate 
their identity. Even though they deem it in primordial terms, my own 
observation is that it is just construction of Malay identity. 
As I noted on ‘Constructivist Approach on Ethnic Identity’, the 
constructivist theorists are of the view that identity of an ethnic group is 
constructed due to a number of factors: 1) interaction between ethnic groups, 
self-ascription and ascription by others, 2) responding to socio-economic and 
political challenges, or marginalizations of minority ethnic groups at the hands 
of majority groups, 3) as a by-product of colonial and post-colonial rule, and 
4) the concerted efforts of the learned and affluent elites in the ethnic groups. 
While this is what the constructivist theorists illustrate, what I am attempting 
to show in this study is that Sri Lankan Malay identity is being constructed in 
the context of identifying and responding to the challenges, confronting the 
Malay community. 
To put it differently, the ethnic identity of the Malays in Sri Lanka is 
something that is born of the process that takes place in the context of 
                                                 
166 Chandra, “Introduction,” 03. 
 
167 Davidson, “The Political Study of Ethnicity in Southeast Asia,” 205. 
 92 
 
identifying the challenges of assimilation and responding to such challenges. 
Nagel underlines that not only the internal processes but the external processes 
too, such as social, economical as well as political aspects, are associated with 
the construction of ethnic identity.168 Phinney emphasizes that ethnic identity 
is a dynamic construct that evolves and changes in response to social, 
developmental and contextual factors.169 In the same manner, construction of 
Sri Lankan Malay identity implies the presence of the process of identity 
formation in the context of the challenges and responding to such challenges 
confronting the Malay community. However, unlike the constructivists 
theorists who have placed much emphasis on the social, economic and 
political aspects of challenges to the construction of ethnic identity, my 
theoretical framework specifically deals with how assimilation, characterized 
by both acculturation and structural assimilation, becomes part of the process 
of identity construction of Malays in Sri Lanka. Constructivist theories do 
not specifically deal with the challenges of assimilation to the construction of 
identity. They generally deal with other broader questions that involve 
challenges in the economic, political and social spheres that are not 
specifically related to assimilation. Their focus on the challenges, in the social, 
economic and political spheres, to the construction of ethnic identity excludes 
assimilation. My theoretical framework specifically deals with assimilation as 
a major challenge to the identity construction of Sri Lankan Malays.   
Empirical studies on Sri Lankan Tamils and Moors, which I have 
discussed earlier, suggest that the identity of both Tamils and Moors is 
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constructed in response to social, political and economical challenges in the 
Sri Lankan context. For instance, Cheran’s account articulates that the 
introduction of the “Sinhala only” language policy in 1956; the pro-Sinhala 
ethnic standardization education policies in 1972; the religious policy 
establishing State patronage for Buddhism in the 1972 Constitution; and the 
land policy which, as early as 1948, began with the State colonization of the 
Tamil land all contributed to the growth of Tamil nationalism or construction 
of ethnic identity of Tamils in Sri Lanka.170 This shows that the historical, 
socio-economic, educational and political marginalizations of Tamils by the 
Sinhala rulers led to the construction of Tamil identity. As a result of such 
marginalizations, Tamils responded initially in a non-violent manner using 
democratic means, and later in a violent manner by resorting to armed struggle 
which resulted in a protracted war for 3 decades. Thus, the construction of 
Tamil identity took place due to identifying the problems in the socio-
economic, educational and political sphere, and then responding to such 
problems, initially in non-violent and later in violent manners.  
In the same manner, Nuhman illustrates that the Muslim identity 
(Moors) too is constructed, on the basis of religion, in response to various 
colonial, local, regional, national and global, and socio-political and religious 
challenges or factors.171 He points out that Muslim identity is constructed as a 
reaction, and in response to the hegemony of Tamil and Sinhala nationalism in 
the country. The various challenges, which Muslims encountered, led to them 
responding in various manners: 1) they published a newspaper to foster ethnic 
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consciousness, 2) Schools, Arabic Colleges, and Colleges of Education were 
set up in order to cater for religious and academic needs of Muslims, 3) 
Muslim personal law and Wafk Board were established, and 4) a Muslim 
political party emerged claiming to be the sole voice of Muslims in North and 
Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. In short, the identity of Sri Lankan Muslims 
(Moors) was constructed as a result of identifying the social, economical and 
political challenges they faced, and then responding to such challenges. I see 
the same process taking place in the identity construction of Malays. However, 
I conclude that the actual challenges for Malays are different from what was 
identified in previous studies. While empirical studies on Moor and Tamil 
identity show that their identities were constructed in response to social, 
economic and political challenges that they faced, I argue in this study that 
Malay identity is constructed as a result of identifying the challenge of 
acculturation and structural assimilation, and then responding to such 
challenges. Thus, the process of Malay identity construction takes place when 
Malays identify the challenges of assimilation and then they, specifically the 
Malay elites and organizations in the country, respond to such challenges 
through various social and cultural programmes, with the intention of 
revitalizing their identity.  
Assimilation (characterized by both acculturation and structural 
assimilation) as a challenge to Malay ethnicity in Sri Lanka is discussed in 
both chapter five (05) and six (06). Assimilation endangers the Malay 
language, culture, ancestry as well as their religion, causing a great deal of 
challenges to the Malay ethnicity. Such challenges are responded to with 
various measures consciously undertaken by the Malay elites and their 
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organizations, which then sets in motion the process of identity construction 
for Malays in Sri Lanka. 
 As discussed earlier, empirical studies show that the outcomes of 
assimilation fall under three categories: 1) melting pot 2) Anglo conformity, 
and 3) cultural pluralism.172 This study argues that pluralism among Malays in 
Sri Lanka is the byproduct of their assimilation into other communities. 
Assimilation of Malays into other communities, I argue, brings about positive 
outcomes such as pluralism and hybridity among them. This is quite 
extensively discussed in chapter seven (07) of this study.  
The forgoing section has dealt with the theoretical frameworks of the 
study such as primordialism, constructivism, assimilation and pluralism. These 
theories are applied to the identity question of Sri Lankan Malays, and 
substantial empirical evidences are provided in its support. Chapter (04) of this 
study, which is on ethnic identity of minority Malays, employs the theory of 
primordialism and constructivism to explore the formation of Malay ethnicity 
in Sri Lanka. Both chapter five (5) and six (6) deal with the theory of 
acculturation and structural assimilation respectively, while chapter seven (07) 
discusses cultural pluralism and hybridity as the outcomes of assimilation.  
                                                 




In summary, this chapter focused on literature on ethnic identity and 
assimilation in relation to Sri Lankan non-Malays as well as Malays, followed 
by a discussion on the same aspects in relation to Malays in Southeast Asia. It 
then proceeded to a discussion on the general conceptual and theoretical 
framework on ethnic identity, assimilation and pluralism, and how these 
theories are employed in relation to Sri Lankan Malays. Finally, I discussed 
my own theoretical framework of the study. 
The next chapter is a discussion on the genesis of Sri Lankan Malays 




GENESIS OF SRI LANKAN MALAYS AND THEIR 
SETTLEMENTS IN THE COUNTRY 
 
3.1: Introduction 
It is important to trace the genesis of Sri Lankan Malays before 
proceeding to a discussion on their ethnic identity and the challenges of 
assimilation to it. Hence, this chapter presents the historical evolution of Sri 
Lankan Malays from pre-colonial to post-colonial periods in Sri Lanka. An 
attempt has also been made in this section to record an account of Malay 
settlements in different parts of the country as well as the history surrounding 
such settlements, so that readers can visualise the present demographic trend 
of the Malays in Sri Lanka. 
 
3.2: Genesis of Sri Lankan Malays 
It is well known that Malays are not indigenous to Sri Lanka. 
However, there is no unanimity among scholars regarding their origin as a 
distinct ethnic group within the multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-
cultural Sri Lanka. Scholars differ in their views concerning the earliest date 
of their arrival in Sri Lanka. Tracing their historical background in order to 
locate their origin is pertinent since culture is interwoven with history.   
This section provides a brief outline of the history of the Malays in Sri 
Lanka for different periods, and analyzes the socio-historical settings in each 
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period. The first date of arrival of Malays in significant numbers in Ceylon is 
recorded as the 17th century. However, contacts between the island of Ceylon, 
now referred to as Sri Lanka, and the South East Asian Archipelago (SEAA) 
predate this by many centuries. We can divide the history of Malays in Sri 
Lankans as follows:  
 Malays in Sri Lanka during the pre-colonial period. 
 
 Malays in Sri Lanka during the colonial period. 
 
o Malays during the Portuguese occupation of Sri Lanka (1505 – 
1656) 
 
o Malays during the Dutch occupation of Sri Lanka (1656-1796) 
 
o Malays during the British occupation of Sri Lanka (1796-1948)  
 
 Malays in Sri Lanka during the post-colonial period.  
 
3.2.1: Malays in Sri Lanka during the pre-colonial period 
More recent literature from the 15th century suggests that the South 
East Asian Archipelago (SEAA) was renowned for spices, perfume and other 
commodities, and had significant economic, religious and cultural relations 
with ancient Sri Lanka.173 Though this might have led to some sort of business 
contacts between Sri Lanka and the SEA, certain political developments seem 
to have prevented this initial contact from developing into a real and strong 
relationship between ancient Sri Lanka and SEAA. The first written reference 
to people of Malay origin settling in Sri Lanka dates back to the 13th century – 
                                                 
173 S. De Silva Jayasuriya, “Unique Malay: Sri Lankan Malay Creole.” NUSA 50, (2002): 11. 
 99 
 
the Culavamsa (a historical record of the kings of Sri Lanka, written in Pali, 
covering the period from the 4th century to 1815) records the invasion of 
Ceylon by the Javaka Prince, Chandrabanu, a Buddhist king of Tambralinga, a 
petty kingdom in the Malay Peninsula, during the reign of King Parakrama 
Bahu II i.e. 1247 AD. This attempt to invade Sri Lanka in 1247 brought an end 
to the fledgling relationship involving exchange of goods and religion between 
Sri Lanka and SEA.174 Chandrabhanu of Tambralinga attacked the 
Polonnaruwa kingdom in North Central Sri Lanka. He was defeated and 
withdrew to the Jaffna peninsula, where he succeeded in securing the throne 
for himself. Later, he made another failed attempt to invade Polonnaruwa. 
This resulted in his death, ending the short Malay ‘intermezzo’ on the island. 
Sources state that during the intervening period (between these two invasions), 
the Malay King appears to have gained control of the northern part of Sri 
Lanka and become the ruler of Jaffna. Names of places such as Caavakacceeri 
(Javaka-settlement) and Caavakotte (Javaka Fort), still found in Jaffna, are 
testament to this view.175  However, there is no link between this invasion and 
the present day Malay communities.176 The Javakas or Malays who had 
domiciled in this island during those early times, including those who arrived 
with the invader Prince Chandrabahu, would undoubtedly have been 
assimilated into the indigenous population of Sri Lanka. The Portuguese 
invasion, the first foreign colonial invasion, made a much bigger impact on Sri 
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Lankan society, and this will be taken up for discussion in the following 
sections. 
3.2.2: Malays in Sri Lanka during the colonial period 
The genesis of Sri Lankan Malay can be traced back to the colonial 
period that exploited Sri Lanka for more than three centuries. The following 
sub-section on colonial rule will illustrate the historical origin of the Malays 
more precisely. 
 3.2.2.1: Malays during the Portuguese occupation in Sri Lanka 
(1505 – 1656) 
Driven by a desire for the lucrative spice trade, the Portuguese sent out 
expeditions to secure a base in the South East Asia. In 1511, the Portuguese 
gained hold of Malacca in the Malaysian peninsula. By that time, Islam had 
made considerable inroads into South East Asia and largely replaced 
Buddhism as the predominant religion. Sri Lanka, lying in the Portuguese 
route from the Cape to the SEA, became a Portuguese base. In 1518 they 
established a fort in Colombo. Within the next couple of decades, they gained 
control of the coast but could not penetrate the central highlands, where the 
Kandyan king would withstand European onslaught until the 19th century.  
Portuguese were ardently evangelical and engaged in a relentless 
proselytization campaign to Christianize the locals. They had deep contempt 
for all other religions, especially Islam, and they expelled the Muslims from 
the kotte kingdom.177 Hussainmiya (1990)178 therefore questions the 
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widespread narrative that the Portuguese brought Muslim soldiers from the 
SEA to fight for them. Bichsel-Stettler (1989)179 also accepts the fact that 
there is no historical evidence of a sizeable Malay community in Sri Lanka 
and doubts that the Portuguese would have tolerated the spread of Malays in 
Sri Lanka. However, Powell (1973)180 mentions that some Javas and Kaffirs 
(Africans) fought for the Sinhalese king Raju in 1587, and states that Javas 
had deserted from the Portuguese, indicating that some Malays were already 
found in the Portuguese forces. Some Malays had actually already domiciled 
in Sri Lanka, before the official capitulation of the Portuguese in 1658, is 
evidenced by the Minutes of the Council dated 08th September 1660, which 
states: 
Whereas the Javanese soldiers, 28 in number have now for some time 
past suffered themselves to be instructed in the Christian doctrine, have 
made public profession thereof, accepted Holy Baptism, and have 
solemnly married according to Christian rites; also seeing that they 
have procreated children and further have elected to dwell in this land 
and to serve the Honorable company most respectfully and obediently; 
so has the Superintendent proposed, (and they with the greatest delight 
accepted), to select a place within the watches of this city, a fertile 
spot, in order to settle them there with the families, and to found there 
a village, according to the limits and ordinances that shall be appointed 
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for them; further that they shall cultivate rice there according to their 
natural skill, but nevertheless that they shall always continue in the 
military service, therefore, a general increase is hereby granted to them 
and their wages have accordingly been raised.…181  
The above quote is a clear illustration of the existence of Malays 
during the Portuguese colonial period in Sri Lanka and their involvement in 
the Portuguese military services at that time. In addition, it is noted that the 
Department of National Museum in Colombo has confirmed that they have 
Malay daggers (Kris knives), their origin traceable to the Portuguese period.182 
This can, however, be disputed. When I paid a visit to the Department of 
National Museum in Colombo, I inquired from the officials about the period to 
which the said daggers stored in the Museum belonged.  They told me that 
they had no idea of the exact period.  I also observed that the pictures of the 
daggers showcased in the Museum, unlike other items in display, did not 
indicate its historical origin or its date of arrival at the Museum. The figure 
3.2.1.1.1 shows the Malay daggers exhibited in the Department of National 
Museum in Colombo. 
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Many of my respondents replied negatively to my suggestion that their 
historical origin can be linked to the period of Portuguese occupation in Sri 
Lanka. They contended that their existence in Sri Lanka began with the Dutch 
occupation. One of my respondents, Samad, a retired government servant from 
the Central province, notes:  
“If there had been a few Javanese left during the Portuguese period, 
they would have been absorbed into the dominant communities as the 
Javanese of that time were mostly Buddhists or Hindus.”   
  Besides, no systematic scholarly study had ever documented the Malay 
settlement and their demography in Sri Lanka before the arrival of the Dutch. 
Chandrabhahu’s invasion during the pre-colonial period was a short-lived one; 
it would not have given birth to a Malay community in Ceylon. If there had 
been any Malays left in old Ceylon following Chandrabhanu’s invasion and 
during the later Portuguese occupation of Sri Lanka, they would certainly have 
been numerically inferior, and therefore, would have been absorbed into the 
dominant Sinhala Buddhist community. 
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3.2.2.2: Malays during the Dutch occupation of Sri Lanka (1656-
1796) 
The Dutch took control of the coastal areas of Sri Lanka in the 17th 
century and projected their power in the Indian Ocean. By 1656, they managed 
to oust the Portuguese from Ceylon with the assistance of the Kandyan King, 
and the latter, however, had to barter the Portuguese occupation of the 
coastline for the Dutch occupation of the coastline, having realized the painful 
fact that his ‘allies’ had come to stay in Ceylon.183 It was, actually, during 
these one and a half centuries of Dutch occupation that Malays from the 
Malay and Indonesian region were brought to the island. 
The Dutch had colonized the South East Asian Archipelago long 
before they got hold of Sri Lanka and had come to know about its excellent 
soldiers, whom they subsequently recruited into their military service. These 
troops were already fighting on the Dutch side during the war with the 
Portuguese.184 They were mainly recruited in Batavia (Jakarta). At that time, 
Batavia was a port city with many different peoples mingling there. There are 
records of the following ethnic groups serving in the military: Ambonese, 
Bandanese, Balinese, Buginese, Javanese, Madurese and Malays.185 These 
“Neo-Indonesians”, as Hussainmiya (1987)186 calls them, formed the base for 
the Malay society in Sri Lanka. They were likely to have developed a group 
                                                 
183 De Silva, A history of Sri Lanka, 133. 
 
184 Hussainmiya, Orang Rejimen: The Malays of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, 44. 
 
185 Bichsel-Stettler, “Aspects of the Sri Lanka Malay Community and Its Language,” 6-7.  
 
186 B.A. Hussainmiya, Lost Cousins: The Malays of Sri Lanka ( Kebangsaan: Universiti 
Kebangsaan, 1987), 57. 
 105 
 
identity in Batavia while waiting to be sent to the battlefield.187 Obviously, this 
identity and cohesion would have been further strengthened in the unknown 
foreign country. It is to be noted that most of the nationalities present in 
Batavia were Muslims, though some Hindus and Christians too were present 
among them.188   
Later, these troops constituted an integral part of the Dutch military in 
Sri Lanka. There were garrisons in the main coastal towns of Colombo, Galle, 
Chilaw and Trincomalee. Hussainmiya (1987) 189 reports that the Dutch 
referred to these Eastern troops as Oosterlingen (Easterlings) or Javaans 
(Javanese) which is a more appropriate name than ‘Malay’, which the British 
authorities would later choose as a generic term. Actually, the majority of the 
immigrants was not Malay, and was definitely not from the Malaysian 
peninsula. The presence of Malay troops in the Dutch army was highly 
regarded, as can be seen from the fact that “about two thirds of the fighting 
troops were Malays” in 1764,190 a year in which the absolute number of Malay 
soldiers also reached a record high of 2500.191 In 1765, the Dutch Governor 
Wilhelm Flack ordered a detachment of Malays under the leadership of 
Caption Baba Lye from Batavia:  
... The Dutch government in Sri Lanka had always a regiment of 
Malays in their service. That corps for a considerable period of time 
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formed the strength of their garrisons, and were the only troops which 
kept up discipline or displayed any sort of bravery in the field....192  
Malay soldiers were also said to have taken part in the wars against the 
Kandyan Kingdom. It should also be mentioned here that there were Malays 
who fought as mercenaries for the Kandyan kings as well.193 
Beside the soldiers, who represented numerically the most superior 
group, some other groups from the South East Asian Archipelago were also 
brought into Sri Lanka: exiles from rebellious provinces, convicts and slaves. 
In order to stay in control of the islands of the SEAA, the Dutch deported the 
rebellious local rulers, princes, chief and dignitaries to South Africa and Sri 
Lanka. Sri Lanka was preferred because it was closer to the SEAA, which 
resulted in lower transportation costs.  
Since the Dutch had first taken possession of the former Portuguese 
colonies in the Moluccas and the Lesser Sunda Islands, the first exiles came 
from these places. In the late 17th century, with the war of succession in Java, 
the Dutch deported some exiles including some Javanese princes to Sri Lanka 
from the Moluccas, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Bacan, Tidore, Timor, Madura 
and Sumatra.194 One of the most famous of these exiles could be considered as 
Pangearan Adipati Amangkurat III also known as 'Susunan Mas'.195 In 1723 
consequent to a rebellion against the Dutch rule, a Javanese prince and his 
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chiefs, numbering forty four persons, were banished to Sri Lanka. Later, in 
1745, the first minister of the Court of Java, Danurjo, was also banished to Sri 
Lanka.196  
Most of the exiles had their families with them when deported or they 
joined them later, and many of the younger members of these families were 
born on the island. Hussainmiya (1990)197 gives 200 as a likely number for the 
exiles out of the total population of Malays numbering almost 2000 at the end 
of the 18th century, which is about 10% of the Malay population at the time. 
Most of the exiles lived in the four main coastal towns of Colombo, Galle, 
Trincomalee and Jaffna. 
Convicts from the South East Asian Archipelago were brought into 
Ceylon, “serving sentences according to the degree of their crime ranging 
from being kept in chains to the permission to engage in handicraft”.198 It was 
very difficult to locate the provenance of the convicts. In 1782, the Dutch 
issued an edict that those deportees who had been taken into the service of the 
company should remain in Sri Lanka, and minor offenders be allowed to join 
the ranks of the military. In 1751, there were 131 convicts serving their 
sentence. The number of convicts having joined the army is unclear. Other 
convicts were set free and were allowed to settle in Ceylon.199 This is a clear 
indication of how ex-convicts came to form the early Malay population. 
Besides, slaves and servants were also brought in, mainly from the Moluccas 
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and Lesser Sunda islands, to serve the aristocratic exiles and the Dutch. Some 
of them, though they were not numerically higher, joined the army, like the 
convicts had done.200  
To summarize: during the Dutch period, there were two main groups. 
First there was the group of prestigious exiles from the Moluccas and the 
Lesser Sunda Islands, which constituted about 10% of the Malay population. 
Second, there were the soldiers, who came from diverse ethnic backgrounds. 
These soldiers formed the most important group, and are likely to have 
absorbed the smaller groups of the slaves and convicts, for an opportunity was 
granted to the latter to join the rank of the soldiers and thereby raise their 
social status. It should also be noted that, in the 18th century, they had firmly 
constituted their identity as ‘Sri Lankan Malays’, with strong roots in 
Batavia.201 
3.2.2.3: Malays during the British occupation of Sri Lankan (1796-
1948) 
Having defeated the Dutch, the British established their reign in Sri 
Lanka and became its third colonial rulers in 1796. The British referred to the 
‘Easterners’ as Malays, because of their language, rather than their ethnic 
origin.202 Being fierce and loyal fighters, the Malay soldiers earned the respect 
of the British. The circumstances under which the Malays in the military 
service of the Dutch came to serve the British have been stated thus:   
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After the capture of Colombo, the Malays for the first time, during our 
long intercourse with India entered into our service. The Regiment 
stationed there in the service of the Dutch was brought over to the 
British, and the command given to Caption Whitlie by one of the East 
India Company’s officers. By this assiduous exertions and judicious 
conduct in the management of them during a considerable time, the 
corps was brought to a very excellent state of discipline and was much 
attached to our Government.203 
In short, the British made use of their military service in a number of 
battles they fought on the domestic front. Governor Frederick North (1796-
1805), the first British governor of Ceylon, was sympathetic to the Malays and 
valued their military skills highly. He created a regiment of Malays, which had 
several names during its existence such as Malay Corps, His Majesty’s Malay 
Regiment, the First Regiment, and finally the Ceylon Rifle Regiment. At that 
time, the British regarded the Malays as an exclusive soldier class. Even 
civilian Malays were conscripted later.204  The Regiment became the mainstay 
of the Malays. Younger boys could serve as half-pay boys, a name which 
indicated that they earned exactly half the wage of an older soldier.205 
Hussainmiya (1990)206 indicates that about 75% of the Malay population 
served in the Regiment during that period. From 1802 onwards, retired Malays 
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were sent to the South and given land for them to settle down, first in 
Hambantota, later in Kirinda and Palatupana.207 
The British were dependent on the Malays for their supply of native 
soldiers, because other natives such the Sinhalese and Tamils proved to be 
poor soldiers.208 Since most of the able-bodied Malays were recruited to the 
army, there were not many civilian Malays left.209 The total number of armed 
Malays in January of 1800 (before recruitment from abroad started) was 1000, 
and 1200 in 1801.210 Nevertheless, since their number could not meet the 
needs of the British, overseas recruitment was kick-started and companies 
formed in Hambantota and Tangalle.211 Recruitment from Penang in Malaysia 
started in 1800. This was the first time that Malays from the Malaysian 
Peninsula came to Ceylon. These new recruits were allowed to bring in their 
wives and children.212 This recruitment policy gave new life to the community 
of Malays remaining in Ceylon, with a total of 172 new recruits in the years 
1801 and 1803.213 
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The exiled princes were not recruited but given an allowance because 
Governor North considered them as significant players for the social cohesion 
of the Malay population, especially for the spiritual and cultural leadership.214  
When the British attacked Kandy in 1803, many Malays deserted the 
British and joined the Kandyan king, who was fraternizing with the Malays 
who had already deserted the Dutch. According to Codrington (1926)215 the 
number of deserters was 450 out of a total 700 Malay soldiers. Generally, the 
deserters and runaway slaves were held in high esteem by the Kandyan 
king.216 The British could not prevent desertions to Kandy either.217  It is 
notable here that the Kandyan King had a Malay Regiment for the defense of 
the Kingdom, under the leadership of Captain Muhandiram (also known as the 
Ja Muhandiram) who was said to be a favorite of the king and a popular figure 
in the Kandyan Court.218 
Due to a high number of desertions, the Regiment had only 600 men at 
the end of the Kandyan war, compared to 1400 at the end of the Dutch reign 
(prior to the Kandyan war).219 Governor North left the Island in 1805, shortly 
after the Kandyan war, and was replaced by Governor Maitland, who was 
aware of the Malay desertions. He attributed the defeat of the British to the 
desertion of Malays. Hence, he wanted to get rid of the Malay soldiers as soon 
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as possible. His plan was to abolish the whole regiment, but he failed even in 
dissolving the invalid Malays’ company which he said was expensive and 
unserviceable.220  His resentment of the Malays was so intense that he 
deported some of political exiles, depriving the Malays of their cultural and 
spiritual leaders.221   
The next governor, Robert Brownrigg, held the Malays in high esteem. 
One of his first actions as the governor was to recruit some 150 Malays that 
Maitland had not cared to draft. Having realized that the number of Malay 
soldiers was very low, as a consequence of his predecessor’s policy, he started 
a recruiting mission in Java and recruited 412 soldiers in 1811, who were 
accompanied by 204 women and 208 children. On the next military campaign 
against Kandy, he counted on his Malay Regiment to win the war, a hope 
which was successfully realized.222  
Under Governor Brownrigg, the Regiment achieved greater vibrancy; a 
Royal Military School was founded where the Malays were taught literacy, 
Malay language and religion.223  
In 1816, the British protectorate over Indonesia ended, and recruiting 
from Java was no longer possible. The recruitment would subsequently be 
done from the Malaysian peninsula. 
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After the complete conquest of Ceylon by the British in 1815, the 
Malay Regiment enjoyed a high status. In 1827, the Ceylon Rifle Regiment 
(CRR) was founded. Despite change in name, the conditions remained pretty 
much the same for the Malay soldiers in service. But following the formation 
of CRR, there was a shortage of recruits from the local Malays.224The Malays 
seem to have changed their attitude towards military career. An important 
aspect was the reduction of pay. At the same time, due to growth in economy, 
there were better opportunities coming up in terms of employment in other 
professions, such as in the government, police and plantations. So the military 
no longer had a monopoly on the Malay work force. Failing to attract local 
Malays, the British again tried to recruit from abroad and opened a recruiting 
station in Penang in 1833. This station proved successful in the beginning, but 
this would soon change. The recruiting station shifted to Singapore in 1840, 
was stopped in 1842, revived in 1845, and finally abandoned in 1848 due to its 
meager success. 
The Malays recruited during this period were said to be of “low 
quality” compared to the native Malays and the recruits from Java in 1813 and 
1816, and rarely could they secure higher ranks.225 During the time of CRR, 
Sri Lanka saw a small but steady influx from the Malay peninsula of about 50 
recruits a year. This influx is, thus, an order of magnitude much lower than the 
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412 soldiers recruited in 1811 alone. Hussainmiya states “by the 1850s it 
became relatively difficult to find Malays willing to serve in the CRR”.226  
In 1848, the Regiment was engaged against a rebellion. This was its 
last military action. The regiment continued to shrink. In 1849 the Regiment 
was short of 483 men, in 1851, number of companies were reduced from 22 to 
18, and in 1854, to 14, of which 11 were Malay. In 1865, the detachments in 
Hambantota, Badulla, Kurunegala and Jaffna were withdrawn.227 The police 
department took over some of the duties from the CRR and many Malays 
switched over. From 1870 onwards, the Malay element was dominant in the 
police.228  
With no warfare whatsoever in 25 years, it did not make sense to 
finance the CRR any further and the Regiment was disbanded in 1873, leaving 
the remaining 700 Malays to take up new occupations.229  300 of them are 
known to have joined the police. Few soldiers discharged from service went 
back to the SEAA; most Malays stayed in Ceylon.230  
The disbandment of the Regiment had made a great impact upon the 
Malays, leaving them to secure jobs in the police and other departments. 
Saldin (2003)231 reports that the occupations they worked for include: jail 
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guards, prison overseers, firemen, overseers in the inland tea plantations, 
railway workers and workers in private business establishments.  
To sum up, during the time of the British, the military service of the 
Malays was continually sought after, creating a number of regiments operating 
under several names: Malay Corps, His Majesty’s Malay Regiment, the First 
Regiment, and finally the Ceylon Rifle Regiment. During the time of the 
Regiment, the Malays saw a significant portion of their fellow men leave. The 
aristocrats were sent back in 1808. Governor Maitland stopped recruiting 
Malays to the military, as a result of which the number of enlisted Malays 
plunge to 800. His successor, Governor Brownrigg, wanted a strong Malay 
Regiment and began a massive recruitment drive, first in Java, and after the 
British had lost Java, in Penang and Singapore. Until 1819, 1016 new recruits 
had joined the ranks of the Sri Lanka Malays, evenly from Java and the Malay 
Peninsula. It was becoming increasingly difficult to find new recruits in the 
East. The number of soldiers dwindled. Without any belligerent activity for 25 
years, the Ceylon Rifle Regiment was disbanded. While this did not, for a lot 
of Malays, entail a return home to the the SEAA, it put an end to the arrival of 
“fresh blood” to Ceylon. This effectively closed the space for new Malays. 
With the disbandment of the regiment, there had been a slow deterioration of 
social cohesion among the Malays as they had to choose other jobs in different 
sectors such as police, railway, plantation and so forth.  
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3.2.3: Malays in Sri Lankan during the post-colonial period 
Turn of the century saw the rise of the independence movement as well 
as the rise of communalism among different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka232. 
Every community was seriously concerned about its stake in Sri Lanka. The 
Malay community was not an exception. It, too, formed an association in 
Colombo for the first time in 1922,233 the All Ceylon Malay Association 
(ACMA), which spread to other parts with Malay population.234 
To resist being subsumed into the larger “Muslim” group, the Malays 
demanded representation in parliament.235They even denied having any links 
with the Moors at all.236 From 1924 to 1965, the Malays had a deputy in 
parliament who was not elected by the people through votes, but rather 
appointed by the government to represent the minority of the Malays, 
strengthening their ethnic cohesion. That Malay representative was TB Jayah, 
whose legacy is still celebrated today. TB Jayah was also part of the 
delegation negotiating the terms of independence with the British, obtained in 
1948.237 
From the 1960s onwards, the ACMA played a passive role in 
perpetuating the identity of Malays.238 The ethnic tensions between Tamils 
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and Sinhalese led to the outbreak of open civil war in the 1980s, which in turn 
led to a rise of ethnic consciousness in the other groups and culminated in the 
creation of the SLAMAC (Sri Lankan Malay Confederation) on 18 August 
1985.239  
The establishment of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in 1981, 
which was mainly supported by Moors, was somewhat instrumental in 
weakening the Malay consciousness, since SLMC attempted to subsume the 
Malays under the broader ethnic group of “Muslims”. This makes 
parliamentary representation of Malays happening in the future unlikely, since 
the ethnic group of “Muslims” is already represented in parliament via the 
SLMC. But the SLMC’s parliamentary members are exclusively Moors and 
the interests of the Moors very often diverge from that of the Malays. The 
political slogan that ‘we are all Muslims’ by the Moors irritated the Malay 
community, as it believed that this almost obliterated its chances of ever 
having parliamentary representation. They believe that the Moors cannot 
speak on their behalf, though they are both Muslims in terms of religion.240 
The one who represented the Malay community in parliament in 1989 was 
MH Amith, who was appointed as an MP by the United National Party (UNP) 
under its National List. Thereafter, there was a massive political vacuum for 
Malays in Sri Lankan politics.  
To sum up, Malays were accommodated as representatives in the 
legislative council as a separate ethnic group following independence of Sri 
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Lanka from Britain. However, with the emergence of the Sri Lankan Muslim 
congress as a dominant Muslim political party subsuming the identity of 
Malays under the umbrella term of ‘Sri Lankan Muslims’, fresh opportunities 
for such independent Malay representation or participation in politics and 
addressing their unique concerns was smothered. This has become a hot topic 
of debates and discussions in the scholarly circles, specializing on the ethnic 
identity of Moors and Malays.    
 
3.3: Malay Settlements and their present demographic trends 
The following section deals with the Malay settlements in different 
parts of Sri Lanka from a historical perspective. 
3.3.1: Historical Malay Settlements in Sri Lanka 
The Malays, like the Moors, preferred to live in urban areas in close 
proximity to the center of colonial power, as they were predominantly 
soldiers. Moreover, colonial powers too wanted to keep the exiles closer to the 
centre so that they can keep watch over them. The 2001 Census241 for instance 
shows 11,149 Malays living in Colombo Municipality alone, whilst the 1946 
Census242 reveals that as many as 10,802 Malays, out of a grant total of 22,508 
at that time, were concentrated in Slave Island, Wekanda and Maligakande of 
Colombo Municipality area.   
Among the most prominent Malay settlements, Slave Island in 
Colombo, Mabola, Hunupitiya, Gongitota, Enderamulla, Akbar Town, 
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Wattala, Mattegoda, Rukmalgama, Kottawa and Kehelwatta in the Western 
province are really significant. Other areas where there are substantial Malay 
settlements are: Bolana Malay Colony off Ambalantota, Badagiriya, 
Chippikola, Kirinda, Hambantota Town in Hambantota District, Chinakotuwa 
in Galle District in the Southern Province, Nilaweli, China Bay, Champa 
Lane, Ganesh Lane, Ganasa pura, and Dyke Street in the heart of Trincomalee 
Town in Trincomalee District, some parts of  Ampara District in the Eastern 
Province, Kandy , Matale, Nawalapitiya in the Central province, Puttalam in 
North Western province , Kurunagala in North Western province, and Badulla 
and Bandarawela in the Uva province. 
The majority of the major Malay settlements seem to have originated 
from the Malay regiments, functional in the Colonial period. The Malay 
soldiers stationed in the above mentioned areas seem to have settled down 
there with their families, thus giving rise to these settlements. One such major 
settlement is Slave Island in Colombo, which still has a sizable Malay 
population. Popular names such as ‘Malay Street’ and ‘Java Lane’ indicate the 
presence of heavy concentration of Malays in those areas. 
After the British had vanquished the Dutch and later the Kandyans, the 
main Malay settlements were found in Colombo and Kandy. It is the Kandyan 
king who had settled Malay soldiers in Kandy, where they rendered their 
service to him following desertion form British army. The Kandyan king 
offered Malay soldiers lands and money, encouraging them to desert the 
British.243  The Malay soldiers of Ceylon Rifle Regiment had their quarters 
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situated on Bogambara hill in Kandy, and had their own mosque, which was 
attended mainly by military personnel during the British colonial period.244  
The first non-military settlement was established in Hambantota as far 
back as 1802 to work the saltern in the Mahagampattu region.245 Retired 
Malays were also given land for cultivation there. Establishment of this colony 
was followed shortly by Kirinda and Palatupana, which were not far away. 
Apart from Colombo, Kandy and Hambantota, Malay settlements in 
other upcountry districts such as Badulla and Bandarawela too seem to have 
been established with Malays finding employment in the plantation sector, and 
the disbanded or retired soldiers of the Malay garrison stationing themselves 
in Kandy.246 Following the 1848 rebellion, special detachments were set up in 
Kurunegala and Matale. In 1860, there were five companies in Colombo, three 
in Kandy, two in Galle, two in Trincomalee, and one in Badulla. The Sepoy 
Company was in Jaffna. In addition, detachments of soldiers from Colombo, 
Kandy and Galle were sent to Puttalam, Kurunegala, Hambantota and Chilaw. 
In 1865, the Military Commission recommended the closing of all CRR 
stations for reasons of economy, except those of Colombo, Kandy, Galle and 
Trincomalee.247  
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 The former Malay populations of Kalpitiya in Puttalam district seem 
to have been absorbed by the Moor population in the surrounding.248 A 
considerable settlement of Malays has also been found in Trincomalee though 
their number seems to have dwindled over the years, largely due to migration 
to other areas. Substantial concentrations are still found in China Bay, Dyke 
Street in Trincomalee Town, Champa Lane, Ganesh Lane and Ganesha Pura. 
The Malay settlements in Trincomale would have originated from the Malay 
garrison stationed there during the Colonial times.249 A sizeable number of 
Malay families in Trincomale town and its environs may also be able to trace 
the origin of their settlement to the Malay-dominated Naval Police, once 
quartered here. Following the disbandment of the Naval Police force forty 
years ago, its members internally migrated to other areas. Indeed, there were 
Malays living in Kinniya in the Trincomalee District. However, they have 
fully assimilated with Moors through intermarriages over the years and they 
are no more able to speak Malay language; their tongue now is Tamil, the 
mother tongue of the Moors.250 
Malays in Ampara district, according to them,251 were brought to work 
in the Galoya Development Board, specifically in the Sugar industry in 1940s 
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from various parts of country. Almost 120 Malay families were brought here 
for such purposes and they were allocated with 24 acres of land to settle. 
However, they maintain that there are only 70 to 80 families living now in 
different parts of Ampara districts, namely Tissapura, Gemunupura, Vijitha 
Pura, Jayanthipura and Navagampura. Even though the Malays there maintain 
that their number in Ampara district are more than 500, the Census of 
population and statistics indicates otherwise, which will be discussed in the 
next section.          
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3.3.2: The present demographic dynamics of Sri Lankan Malays 
The following table shows the Malay demographic trend from 1881 to 
2011, which has caused a lot of debates and controversies among scholars and 
social activists, primarily those from the Malay community in Sri Lanka.  
Table 3.3.2.1: Historical Malay population in Sri Lanka 
Year Population Increase of population 
in Percentage (%) 
1881 8,900 —     
1891 10,100 +13.5% 
1901 11,900 +17.8% 
1911 13,000 +9.2% 
1921 13,400 +3.1% 
1931 16,000 +19.4% 
1946 22,500 +40.6% 
1953 25,400 +12.9% 
1963 33,400 +31.5% 
1971 43,500 +30.2% 
1981 47,000 +8.0% 
1989  48,000 +2.1% 
2001 54,782 +14.1% 
2011 40,189 −26.7% 
 (Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 2011) 
The above table shows an increase of Malay population in Sri Lanka 
from 1881 up to 2001. However, there was a dramatic drop (of -26.6%) in the 
total number of SL Malays in the 2011 census compared to the 2001 census 
(+14.1%)  which shows the number of SL Malays at 54,782. Population of any 
ethnic group tends to increase as time passes. However, the statistics on Sri 
Lankan Malay population shows otherwise. Moreover, the 2001 Census did 
not include the Northern and Eastern part of Sri Lanka due to the intense civil 
war. This makes it harder to make accurate calculations of the exact number of 
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Malays in the 2001 as well as their population growth from the preceding 
census. Some are of the view that had the Census properly been conducted in 
the whole country including the Northern and Eastern province in 2001, the 
numbers of Malay population would have been shown to be higher, a lot more 
than the 54,782 shown in the 2001 census.  This is a view shared by everyone 
I spoke to during my field work. Rajudeen Salley, a counselor and social 
worker, avers:  
“Population growth generally shows an increase in any country, except 
in case of Sri Lankan Malays. This isn’t real, but distortion of the 
reality due to errors in how the census is conducted in Sri Lanka. The 
question asked from us by questioners conducting the census is: ‘Oya 
Muslimtha?’, to which the natural response of Malays is ‘yes’, for 
Malays are Muslims too. The question is wrong since it means ‘Are 
you a Muslim?’, which is vague. The right question to be asked would 
be: ‘Are you a Malay or Moor?’ This inadvertently inflates the number 
of Moors Sri Lanka, while also, incorrectly, showing the number of 
Malays to be less than what it actually is”  
Nazeera Amit, retired teacher from Hambantota also shares the same 
view:  
 
“The question should be posed based on our ethnicity: whether we are 
Moors or Malays? This mistake is not normally made when questions 
are posed to members of other ethnicities, for they ask from them the 
right question: “Are you a Sinhalese, Hindu or Burgher?” So, the 
enumerators should be enlightened on such finer distinctions existing 
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between ethnic groups during their training, prior to sending them for 
census taking.”   
The above responses from those interviewed in this study suggest that 
there has indeed been a miscalculation; Malays have been inadvertently 
lumped together with Moors in the Census due to the religion being common 
to both the Malays and Moors. Since enumerators lack training and are not 
aware of such finer distinctions existing between Malays and Muslims 
(Moors), it is plausible that the actual number of Malays is incorrectly 
reported as being low in surveys. This miscalculation of Malay population in 
the Census occurs, because both Moors and Malays share the same religion, 
and therefore are Muslims. At the time of answering the census questions, we 
cannot expect ordinary Malays to realise the mistake in the question and to 
correct them. So it is very clear how Malays would end up being categorized 
under the Moor column (Yonaka) in the statistics of Census, for to an 
untrained census-taker, ‘Moor’ and ‘Muslim’ are interchangeable.     
 Illustrating the reason for this confusion, T.K Samad, a retired post 
office worker from Nawalapitiya observes that:  
“Time required for filling in those big forms is another reason causing 
distortion of facts. Since the forms are too big, it requires a lot of time 
to fill in. The questioners in their haste take short cuts, ask their own 
questions and fill in as they please. It is common to be asked whether 
we are Muslims or not, and when we say ‘yes, we are!’, we are placed 
under the Moor-column.”  
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In the above excerpt, Samad attributes the confusion to the time factor 
involved in filling in the census forms. Since it is obviously a long and big 
form, enumerators tend to take short cuts and ask their own questions which 
they believe are adequate to elicit the intended data for the survey.  
Sometimes, this happens due to the questioner’s naïve desire to make it easy 
for the public he is collecting data from. Many of my respondents dismissed 
the validity of the present figures of Malay population in census records. One 
of my respondents, Muan Ameen, vice present of COSLAM, a dynamic Malay 
organization, argues that their numbers could be as many as 134,000 in Sri 
Lanka. He notes that:  
“Just have a look at my family unit! When the count showed 60,000 
Malays, my family consisted of only 2. Now after 35 years, it has 
grown to 6 (daughters and grant children). You just do the simple 
arithmetical calculation and visualize the increase across the country 
over the intervening years. My estimate is that there are as many as 
134, 000 Malays.”   
 The above excerpt of Muan Ameen also disputes the claim of Census 
that downsizes the number of Malay population in Sri Lanka. His contention 
also clearly suggests that the calculation according to the Census is indeed 
problematic; he argues that the number of Malay population could be as high 
as 134,000 at present.   
The number of Malays living in Ampara according to the 2011252 
Census is 176. However, during my field works in Ampara, people told me 
                                                 
252 Collected from the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2011. 
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that there were as many as 500 Malays living in the centre of Ampara District, 
and that the number of families living in the peripheries alone could be well 
above 176. This view is also shared by Mrs Ramola Rasool,253 who, as a 
researcher on Malay language, did her field works in the Trincomalee district. 
She found the locals to be sceptical of the figures shown in census showing a 
low count of Malay population (only 364254). Malays living there believe their 
numbers to be at least two times higher than what was shown in the official 
Census. This indicates that the official calculation in the Census of population 
is problematic. 
 The Census, while showing the Malays to be fast declining, shows the 
Moorish population to be growing exponentially. The total number of Moors 
was 1,339,331 (7.2%) in 2001 Census255 while Malays were 54,782 (0.3%) in 
the same year. However, the numbers of Moors have dramatically risen to 
1,869,820 (9.2 %), while the numbers of Malays have dwindled to 40,189 
(0.2%) in 2011 Census.256 It could be presumed that the dramatic increase of 
the Sri Lankan Moors, against a sharp decline of Malays, is not real. There 
could indeed have been a confusion and miscalculation due the religion being 
common to both the Malays and Muslims.          
The figures cited by Muan Ameen could be an overestimation. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible that the census does not correctly reflect the actual 
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number of Malays. Therefore the debates and discussions among scholars and 
social activists in this regard are not without a reason.  
Some of my respondents had divergent ideas regarding the drastic drop 
of Malay population in Sri Lanka. Mr Gaffoor, an office-bearer of Kandy 
Malay Association, is of the following view: 
“As you know, the Malays were also the worst affected community in 
the Southern Part of Sri Lanka when the Tsunami waves struck in 
2004. It took a toll of almost 2000 Malays. Some Malays went abroad 
in search of greener pastures and have settled there, especially after 
1956 Sinhala Only Act. On top of this, those who got married to Moors 
are considered and categorized as Moors and not as Malays.”    
The above excerpts demonstrate the sharp drop of Malay population 
could be attributed to the followings: 1) the Tsunami claimed the lives of a 
significant number of Malays, especially in the coastal regions such as 
Hambantota and Kirinda, 2) a lot of the English educated and English 
speaking Malays, according to him and some other Malay respondents, 
migrated to English speaking countries and settled there following the 
introduction of 1956 Sinhala Only Act, as this act had a direct impact upon 
livelihood of some Malays. (It compelled them to master the Sinhala language 
to get promotion or confirmation in their government posts) 3) Malays 
marrying Moors are categorized as Moors. Thus, those who are Malay by 
birth, by virtue of being married to Moors, are considered as Moors and 
recorded as such when collecting data for census. Thus, these are some valid 
points that offer a plausible explanation to the sharp decline of Malay 
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population in the country.  In addition, Brigediar Boharan, a retired army 
commander, has a different view with regard to the ongoing dispute:   
“No point in having so many children. It is better to have a smaller 
family than a bigger family. We need to focus on the quality of 
upbringing - the smaller the number of children, the better the quality 
of life for us, including greater opportunities for better education.” 
What he implies here is that birth control is being adopted for practical 
reasons: the smaller the number of individuals in Malay families, the greater 
the share for these individuals from the family resources. The point he is 
illustrating is that a growth in number of Malays cannot be expected unless the 
fortunes of Malays change. ie an increase happens in resources available for 
disposal to the Malays. He is implying the need to look at the economic 
strength of the Malays to explain the increase or decrease of Malay 
population.     
Thus, beyond these peripheral factors, the sharp drop in Sri Lankan 
Malays is quite strongly attributed to miscalculation.  
 
3.4: Summary   
To sum up, chapter (03) delves into the genesis of Malay population in 
Sri Lanka with specific references to pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
periods. Then, it discusses the Malay settlements across the country and the 
contentious debates over the recent demographic trend of Malays. It is shown 
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that the number of Malay population shown in the statistics of census is not 
quite accurate due to inadvertent miscalculations.  
Having discussed the background information associated with Malays 
in Sri Lanka, we can now move on to examining the core issue of ethnic 
identity formation of Malays in the present Sri Lankan context. Hence, the 
next chapter will have an in-depth discussion and analysis on the core issues, 








Sri Lankan Malays have had an extraordinarily harmonious 
coexistence with their fellow countrymen from colonial period to the present, 
and are credited for this by all. The multilingual capability of Malays; their 
strong contribution to the country, especially in the field of security and 
defence; their easy going nature; and the flexible attitude they adopt towards 
all other communities such as the Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors and Burgers have 
all left a lasting and positive impression among all Sri Lankans. Yet, the 
Malays, living as a minority within a minority, are beset with a number of 
challenges in the social, economic and political arena. Recent years have seen 
an upsurge in debates in academic circles over their ethnic identity. Malays 
sharing the religion of Islam with Moors in Sri Lanka is viewed as a possible 
cause for the subsuming of Malays into the wider Muslim Moorish 
community. Some argue that the Sri Lankan Malays should be regarded as 
Muslims, just like the Moors in the country, for they follow the same religion. 
Others hold that assuming such a broader identity would considerably 
endanger their distinctive identity by making them become integrated into the 
Moors community. Hence, it is pertinent to explore the ethnic identity of Sri 
Lankan Malays, particularly their boundary markers and their identity 
formation. As such, this is an attempt in examining the boundary markers of 
Malay ethnicity and their identity formation in the country. 
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The first section of this chapter discusses the ethnic identity markers of 
Sri Lankan Malays, and deals with debates over their ethnic identity. The 
second section, then, delves into their identity formation from primordialist 
and constructivist theoretical perspectives.  
 
4.2: Ethnic identity markers of Sri Lankan Malays 
The term “Malay” has been a contentious category in literature as it 
carries a plurality of understandings based on the religious, legal, linguistic, 
ancestral and cultural markers or connotation depending on the context in 
which it is used. At times, two or more such traits are combined together as 
identity markers in certain contexts, in the categorization of Malays. Malay is, 
in fact, a common term used in the Malay world (South East Asia) to represent 
people who live in the Malaysian Peninsula as well as the adjoining areas of 
the archipelago. Milner (2008)257 notes “speaking Malay as a first language 
and professing Islam would be widely accepted as “Malay” in the Malay 
World”. His definition of Malay is in conformity with how the Malaysian 
constitution defines a Malay. According to the Malaysian constitution, “A 
Malay is a person who professes Islam by religion, habitually speaks the 
Malay language, conforms to Malay (adat) custom and is a Malaysian 
citizen.”258 (This also underlines that the Malay identity in Malaysia has a 
legal guarantee based on the constitution.) 
                                                 
257 Anthony Milner, The Malays. (United Kingdom: Blackwell Publication, 2008), 05. 
 
258 The Federal constitution of Malaysia’s definition of Malay in its article 160 (2). 
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Yet, the same definition cannot be applied to other national contexts. 
The term Malay, according to the Brunei constitution, comprises of seven 
indigenous races,  namely Belait, Bisaya, Dusun, Kedayan, Murut, Tutong and 
Brunei Malays.259 But religious or linguistic marker cannot be applied to 
identify Malays in Brunei since the Malay community there consists of 
different indigenous communities using different languages and professing 
various religions. The fact that Malay language and culture in Brunei is given 
greater prominence does not alter the definition of Malay. Malay ethnicity in 
the context of Brunei, like in Malaysia, does carry a legal and constitutional 
guarantee. Thus, Malay ethnicity in Malaysia and Brunei is considered as an 
authority-defined phenomenon.260  
Malay ethnicity in Singapore, unlike in Malaysia and Brunei, is 
defined differently as Singapore places some emphasis on the psychological 
dimension of the society, too. The Report of the Select Committee on the 
Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill of 1988 of Singapore states that “a 
Malay is any person, whether of the Malay race or otherwise, who considers 
himself to be a member of the Malay community and who is generally 
accepted as a member of the Malay community by the community.”261 This 
definition assenting to the authority of the community to determine the 
identity of persons causes, given the multi-racial context of Singaporean 
society, a lot of debates in the academic discourses.  
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261 The Report of the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill(Bill 
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As we have already focused on the Malay ethnicity in different parts of 
Southeast Asia, let us now focus on the Malay ethnicity and its boundary 
markers in Sri Lanka.  
Based on ancestry, the Malays in Sri Lanka may be more appropriately 
called ‘Indonesian’ or ‘Javanese’ than ‘Malay’ or ‘Malaysian’. It is important 
to note that Malays in Sri Lanka are already referred to as ‘Java people’262 by 
the locals, reflecting their Javanese genesis. Yet, in the official documents of 
the state and when collecting statistical data, the immigrants from Eastern 
nations have been popularly identified as ‘Malays’.  
It was the Dutch who brought to Sri Lanka the Eastern nationalities 
comprising all major ethnic groups from Indonesia including the Javanese, 
Bandanese, Bugis, Amboinese, Minangkabaus, Balinease, Tidorese, 
Madurese, Sundanese and Malays. These heterogeneous (sub-ethnic) groups 
of Malays, drawn from such varied eastern races, had shed all their differences 
in their identities long before they arrived in Sri Lanka, when they were first 
brought into the city of Batavia (currently known as Jakarta), where they 
formed their own kampongs during the Dutch colonial administration. 
Through the use of Malay language, which is the common language of all 
these ‘Malays’ in Sri Lanka, the singularity of their identity has been further 
solidified.263 
This assertion is fully substantiated: according to the available 
empirical evidences, the above argument is correct. Almost all of my 
                                                 





respondents noted that there are absolutely no sub-ethnic differences among 
the present day Malays in Sri Lanka, and they all feel proud of their 
Malayness in the Sri Lanka. Some of my young Malay respondents were taken 
aback when I queried whether they had such sub-ethnic groups among Sri 
Lankan Malays; the young Malays responded by saying that they had never 
heard of such differentiation.     
Despite the fact that Malay ethnicity in Sri Lanka has drawn little 
attention of scholars, Hussainmiya (2010)264argues that Sri Lankan Malay 
ethnicity is based either on self-identified category or it is pragmatically-
defined. A more nuanced understanding of Sri Lankan Malay ethnicity can be 
gained by using the empirical data from this study to analyze the perspectives 
of Hussainmiya. 
Following the scholarly work of Fredrick Barth (1969)265 on ethnicity, 
studies on ethnicity in Anthropology and sociology have become more 
prominent. He argues that ethnic identity depends on self-ascription by 
members of the ethnic group and by the outsiders with whom they interact. 
This could clearly be manifested in the following definition of Barth on ethnic 
groups: “Ethnic groups have been defined by their culture, pattern of values, 
social customs, language usage and rules of social interactions that group 
members share and have a membership which identifies itself, and is identified 
by others.”266 In this definition, Barth contends that in addition to various 
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identity markers, self-identification and identification by others as a different 
ethnic group based on essential or primordial markers are important.   
Sri Lankan Malays identify themselves as ‘Malays’ based on Malay 
language and some other identity markers; they are also identified as Ja 
Minissu267 by the Sinhalese, as Java Manusar268 by the Tamils and Malai 
karar269 by the Moors.270 In addition, they have also popularly been 
recognized as Malays in government documents, such as the statistical 
category of Sri Lanka. This underscores the distinct feature of their Malay 
ethnicity in Sri Lanka which falls in line with the characteristics of ethnicity 
outlined by Fredrick Barth, (according to whom self-identification and 
identification by others is necessary for consolidating the ethnicity of a 
minority group). Sri Lankan Malays have identified themselves as a unique 
ethnic group, while also being recognized as Malays by all other ethnic groups 
existing in Sri Lanka.     
The argument that Malays have a distinct ethnicity, different from 
others in Sri Lanka, would be inadequate without exploring those identity 
markers / boundary markers of Malays that are considered unique in the Sri 
Lankan context. Thus, the following section sheds light on such identity 
markers in order to explore as to how Sri Lankan Malays define their 
boundaries in terms of their ethnicity.   
                                                 
267 It is a Sinhala language term that denotes the Sri Lankan Malays. 
 
268 It is a Tamil language term that denotes the Sri Lankan Malays. 
 
269 It is also a colloquial Tamil language term that refers to Sri Lankan Malays. 
 
270 Hussainmiya, Orang Regimen: The Malays of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, 7. 
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4.2.1: Physical Characteristics 
Among the racial characters, found among typical Sri Lankan Malays, 
are the epicanthic fold of the upper eyelid which gives the impression of 
slanted eyes, flat and squat nose, high cheekbones, yellow-brownish skin, 
straight hair and scarcity of body and facial hair.271 The early observations of 
Malays by the European writers reflect that Malays had been able to preserve 
some of their original racial features. Robert Percival’s observation of early 
Malays in Sri Lanka vividly captures the physical traits the Malays possessed:  
They are of a light brown or yellow colour, which approaches nearer to 
a copper hue in their old age, or when they are much exposed to the 
sun. Their forehead is broad and flat; their eyes small, black, and very 
deep sunk; their nose flattish, broad towards the nostrils, with a sort of 
curve at the extremity approaching the lip.272  
The physical Anthropology of Ceylon (1961)273, which measured 35 
Malays from Hambantota, found that the Malays had the highest mean 
cephalic index of 82.41, a nose breadth of 36.84, making them the most broad-
nosed ethnic group, as compared to Sinhalese, Tamils, and Moors in Sri 
Lanka.    
Nevertheless, it is also true that the typical Malay (physical) features of 
a sizable portion of the Malays in Sri Lanka have been modified due to 
intermarriage with Moors with whom they share the religion of Islam, as well 
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as others. Such intermarriages had become a common practice in the early part 
of the 19th century. Thus, it is particularly difficult to distinguish Malay from a 
Tamil speaking Moor-Muslim.274 Robert Percival remarked on the appearance 
of Malays and how those aspects began to change: 
Although they (Malays) intermarry with the Moors and other castes 
particularly in Ceylon and by this means acquire a much darker colour 
than is natural to a Malay, still their characteristic features are so 
strikingly predominant that they cannot be mistaken.275 
Percival’s perception of Sri Lankan Malays is further supported with 
the statement of the late Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman with 
regard to Malays in Sri Lanka. 
[T]his is also the case with Ceylon. The only difference is that their 
(Malay) features have changed. They look more like Indians (the 
Kelings) than Malays and their language is strongly influenced by the 
Indian dialect. What is more? They have lost touch with the Malay 
adat and custom, but still they call themselves Malays...276 
These excerpts go to show that different people have had different 
impressions about Sri Lankan Malay’s appearance. While Percival could have 
observed Malays of a more Indonesian type with their typical features that are 
so predominant in the 19th century, Tunku Abdul Rahman could have met 
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Malays of a more Indian type with features looking like Indians in the 20th 
century.  
The most striking boundary marker I noticed among the Malays, whom 
I interviewed for this study during my field works, was their physical 
appearance. The majority of them, with the exception of Malays who have 
intermarried with others (primarily with Moors), contended that their physical 
appearance is one of the key markers that make them distinct and 
distinguishable from others in Sri Lanka. Below are some illustrations of 
Malays by Malay themselves, which prove that physical characteristic is the 
primary marker of ethnicity of Malays in Sri Lanka.  
Nafeel Dulapandan from Champa lane in Trincoamlee notes:  
“Physical features are absolutely imperative in recognizing Malays. 
Malays’ skin is fair in colour; their nose is flat; and their faces 
resemble that of Indonesians or Malaysians.”  
Jamal Mohamed, the president of Mabola Malay Association said 
something similar:  
“Malays can easily be identified from the look of their face, fair 
complexion and their Malaysian or Indonesian look.” 
Rahman, a businessman and vice president of SLAMAC avers:  
“We are born and bred in Sri Lanka as Malays. We possess several 
distinct physical features that distinguish us from others: Fairer skin 
complexion, facial features resembling that of Indonesians and 
Malaysians, and flat noses.”  
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Marjaana, a teacher from Hambantota asserts:  
“Our bodily characteristics are similar to those of Indonesians and 
Malaysians; we have flat noses and round faces.” 
Umar Jaya from Colombo, a retired manager of John Keels, a private 
company, says:  
“I am proud to be a Malay in Sri Lanka. Physical appearance is 
something from which one could identify a Malay. Malays are 
generally fair in color and have flat noses.”  
The above excerpts offer a clear view of how Malays in Sri Lanka see 
themselves in terms of their physical characteristics: lack of bodily hair, flat 
nose, round face, and fairer skin complexion. These bodily characteristics, in 
their view, mark them out as a distinct group in the country. Thus, the physical 
characteristics play a significant role as a primary identity marker of the 
Malays in the country.    
The same view is also shared by the Malay youth. Mona Packeer Ali, 
the vice president of youth wing of SLMA contends:  
“When we say we are Malays, people instantly recognize us. Our 
physical appearance such as our fair skin colour and flat nose 
distinguish us from others. If one is dark, we are suspicious of his/her 
ethnicity.”       
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Baby Master, a school teacher from Sammanthurai,277 also subscribed 
to the above view of physical features playing an important role in 
consolidating the ethnicity of Malays. He said, 
“What makes us unique from others is our fairer skin color and the 
round shape of our faces.” 
Most of the Malay respondents I interviewed, or met in focus group 
discussions, or others who I just happen to observe in areas where I went for 
my field work, all had more or less the same physical appearance. They 
resemble those Malays living in the Malay world, especially in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Singapore. Of those Malays I met, only few were dark-skinned 
and looked more like Moors, which was a consequence of their parents having 
intermarried and integrated into Moor community. Even though it is widely 
believed that Malays in Kinniya, a village in Trincomalee district, were fully 
assimilated with Moors a long time ago, some of the Malay respondents that I 
met in Kinniya for my interviews did not look any different to the Malays in 
the rest of the country; they still had thse unique Malay features, which closely 
resembled the features of Malays living in parts of the Malay world such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia. While majority of the respondents unanimously 
agreed that physical appearance was an indispensable characteristic of their 
identity in Sri Lanka, Tuan Sahabdeen from Trincomalee, a retired air force 
personnel, had a different perspective:  
                                                 
277 Sammanthura is a village in Ampara District. He married a Moor partner a long time ago 
and settled there, despite he was born and bred in Hambantota  
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“Neither colour nor the general appearance of Malays in Sri Lanka 
remains a distinguishing mark for Malays anymore, due to their 
intermarriages with non Malays.”  
This excerpt of Tuan Sahabdeen has to be gauged in terms of the 
context he lives in. He lives with Moors and Tamils side by side in 
Trincomalee town, where intermarriages between Malays and non-Malays are 
not uncommon. If his impressions were correct, it would be correct only with 
regard to the Malays in Trincomalee, where intermarriages are quite rampant, 
as we have emphasized before.    
 Kartini Mohamed, a former president of Sri Lanka Malay Association 
(SLMA), had a slightly different view from other respondents: 
“While Sri Lankan Malays have small noses, those in Java and other 
provinces of Indonesia have sharp noses.” 
She is, in fact, delineating subtle differences in physical features 
between the ‘original’ Malays, who descended from Java or other Indonesian 
provinces, and other Malays who were born in Sri Lanka in the later centuries. 
Except a tiny minority, the majority of my respondents emphasized physical 
features as the primary marker that designates the ethnic identity of Malays.  
Sri Lankan Malays are also equally conscious of other boundary 
markers that distinguish and differentiate their unique ethnicity from 
Sinhalese, Tamil and Moors in Sri Lanka. The following sub-section deals 
with such identity markers of Sri Lankan Malays in great detail.   
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4.2.2: Malay language 
Among all identity markers, the Malay language, remains the most 
potent symbol of the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays. This language, 
which belongs to the Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian language group, 
includes dialects such as Achenese, Javenese and Sundanese found in the 
various islands that make up the Indonesian archipelago.278 Sri Lankan 
Malay (also known as Sri Lankan Creole Malay), which is somewhat different 
from the standard Malay language of Indonesia (Bahasa Indonesia) and 
Malaysia (Bahasa Malaysia), is also from the Austronesian language family. It 
is formed through a unique mixture of Sinhala and Tamil with Malay. 
Hussainmiya (1987)279 believes the local Malay language to have its origin in 
a colloquial dialect known as Batavian Malay (Omong Jakarta). During the 
Dutch occupation of Batavia in Indonesia (present day Jakarta), people of 
different East Indian nationalities were enlisted for military service and 
domiciled there. The "Batavia dialect (Malay)", which is a form of simple 
spoken Malay, evolved as the main medium of communication for these 
Batavian residents.280 Since the majority of Malays were brought to Sri Lanka 
from this area, they spoke the "Batavia dialect", which later got mixed with the 
local languages. Hussainmiya (1987) reiterates that this Malay pidgin, spoken 
in Sri Lanka, is a mixture of the Malay dialect, spoken by the early Malay 
soldiers, and other local languages, especially Tamil and Sinhalese which were 
the language of the Moors and the Buddhists respectively. As such, Sri 
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Lankan Malay, which is only a spoken dialect today, is different from the 
standard Malay; it has evolved to become significantly different from other 
dialects of Malay due to its long and intimate contact with the dominant local 
languages - Sinhalese and Tamils. Many Malay and Sinhala words do share a 
common origin with Sanskrit. Malay language, like Sinhala, has a strong 
influence from Sanskrit since Java and Sumatra had Buddhist and Hindu 
empires respectively in the past.281 The following few examples in the table 
would suffice to illustrate the point. 
Table 4.2.2.1: Influence of Sanskrit language on Malay and Sinhala 
language 
  Sanskrit    Sinhala    Malay   English 
   Agama    Agama    Agama / Igama    - religion 
   Bhasha    Bhashawa    Bahasa    - language 
   Bhumi    Bhumi    Bhumi    - earth 
   Devi    Devi    Devi    - goddess 
   Dosa    Dosa    Dosa    - sin 
   Grahna    Grahna    Grahna    - eclipse 
   Guna    Guna    Guna    - use/benefit 
   Guru    Guru    Guru    - teacher 
   Jeeva    Jeevita    Jeeva    - life 
   Labha    Laba    Laba    - profit 
   Manusya    Manusyaya    Manusia    - human being 
   Puja    Puja    Puja    - worship 
   Mukha    Muhuna    Muka    - face 
   Pustaka    Pustaka    Pustaka    - book 
   Sadhu    Saadu    Saadu    - priest 
                                                 
281 Vajracharya, “ Malay Minority of Sri Lanka: Defending Their Identity,” 03. 
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   Senapathi    Senapathi    Senapathy    - army commander 
   Sisya    Sisyaya    Siswa    - student/pupil 
   Sundari    Sundari    Sundari    - pleasant 
   Swarga    Swarga    Swarga    - paradise/heaven 
 
Above are some Malay words which have entered into the lexicon of 
the Sinhala language from Sanskrit. Though the borrowing of words from 
Sanskrit by Malay language is very much limited, the influence of Sinhala 
grammar on local Malay is quite tangible. Hussainmiya (1987)282 attributes the 
grammatical differences between Standard and Local Malay to the influence 
of the Tamil, spoken by the Moors, with whom Malays have had the most 
intense social intercourse and entered into intermarriages from as far back as 
the late Dutch or the early British period. The impact of Sonaka Tamil on local 
Malay is not too difficult to notice. The influence of Tamil was so pervasive 
that it affected not just the grammar of Malay language, but made the Malays 
to adopt a number of Tamil words too in preference to Malay words.283  
The following table is a clear illustration of this:  
Table 4.2.2.2: Influence of Tamil on Malay language 
Tamil English Sri Lankan Malay 
kusni   Kitchen Dapur 
mami   Aunt Bibi 
nondi   Lame Pincang 
Wauwal Bat Kelawar 
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In the 19th century, Sri Lankan Malay was written in Gundul alphabet, 
which was based on the Arabic alphabet, or in Jawi script which was derived 
from Arabic script. Present day Sri Lankan Malays do not have a script of 
their own. They use Sinhala, Tamil and English scripts for writing. Adoption 
of foreign script for writing Malay was in fact promoted by some Malay 
organizations in Sri Lanka. It appears that it was this adoption of foreign 
scripts that saved the Malay langauge from becoming extinct.  
When we link the history of Malays in Sri Lanka to the arrival of the 
Dutch, they have over three centuries of continued stay in this country. Over 
these three long centuries they have remarkably continued to preserve their 
language. Malay as a language has been standardized in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Brunei and Singapore and it is called the Standard Malay (called Bahasa 
Kumpulan or Baku). Part of this standardization was the adoption of the 
Roman script and abandoning of the unvowelized Arab script (called Gundul). 
No such standardization has taken place here in Sri Lanka, the primary reason 
for this being that the number of Malays living in Sri Lanka is much smaller, 
and they are spread throughout the island and interspersed with the speakers of 
Sinhala and Tamil languages. Sri Lankan Malay varies so greatly from the 
Standard Malay in many aspects that the Standard Malay and the Sri Lanka 
Malay are mutually unintelligible.  
Another reason for the decline, rather the increasing mutation, of 
Malay language is the non availability of formal educational institutions to 
teach Malay language. Malays are compelled, by circumstances, to persue 
their education in Sinhala, English or Tamil medium schools, which 
inadvertently paves the way for the decline of Malay language. The adoption 
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of Sinhala and Tamil by the Malays has been facilitated not only by education 
in the Sinhala and Tamil vernacular, but also by widespread intermarriages 
with the Sinhalese, Tamils and Moors. It is reported that the younger 
generation of Malays speaks Malay only in areas like Kandy, Badulla, 
Gampaha, Wattala, Ja-Ela, Kirinda, Hambantota and Slave Island, which are 
the only places where sizable concentration of Malays are present. In other 
areas, it is largely confined to the older generation of the Malays.284 
Nevertheless, there is a lot of conscious effort undertaken by Malay elites and 
Malay organizations, as well as the Malaysian High Commission in Sri Lanka, 
to revive the language and save it from total extinction.   
Almost all of my respondents agreed that the Malay language, just like 
their physical traits, is a key marker of their ethnic identity that distinguishes 
them from others in Sri Lanka. The majority of them are of the view that it 
needs to be revived and perpetuated so that they can continue to exist as a 
distinct ethnic group. Without such conscious efforts to preserve their identity, 
they fear very strongly that they would be subsumed by other communities, 
especially the Sri Lankan Moors. The following table is a representation of the 
inter-generational perspective of Malays living in urban and rural areas on 
Malay language. 
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The above excerpts of the Malay respondents drawn from both urban 
and rural areas, representing older and younger generation, show that Malay 
language is recognized by the Malays as an important marker of their identity. 
It shows that the older generation, of both urban and rural areas, contents that 
the Sri Lankan Malay language continues to be in use for their inter-personal 
communication and that they feel really contend about it. The table also shows 
that the younger generation from rural areas concurs that they continue to use 
Sri Lankan Malay language for their inter-personal communication, whereas 
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the younger generation from urban area do not use Malay language as much 
due to local circumstances which compel them to use the vernacular 
languages. Thus, it is clear that the use of Malay language among Malay 
younger generation in urban areas wholly is confined to their domestic usage.  
This difference, in terms of the usage of the Malay language between 
the younger generation of Malays in urban and rural area, is mainly 
attributable to the contexts they live and grow up. The younger Malays of rural 
areas such the Malay enclave of Kirinda, being less exposed to other dominant 
cultures and vernacular languages, are in a better position to perpetuate the 
Malay language. However, the significance of Malay language is relatively 
less among the urban Malays of younger generation, compared to rural Malays 
of younger generation, mainly because of their exposure to the educational 
system in vernacular languages, interspersed settlement with dominant 
communities, and the effects of modernization and urbanization in the urban 
areas. 
The references in the table underline the fact that Malay language is 
considered a primary boundary marker of the ethnicity of Sri Lankan Malays. 
Recent years have also seen a lot of arguments and debates in scholarly circles 
on the question of the Malay language spoken by the Sri Lankan Malays. The 
following section deals with the contestations between the supporters of Sri 
Lankan Malay and Standard Malay. 
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4.2.2.1: Contestation between Sri Lankan Malay (SLM) and 
Standard Malay (SM)   
There have been a lot of debates among scholars over what should be 
the standard language for Malays in Sri Lanka: should it be the Malay 
language as is spoken by them in Sri Lanka or the Standard Malay language 
spoken by Malays in the Malay world?  What would be the fate of the Sri 
Lankan Malay that is currently spoken in Sri Lanka, in the event of adopting 
the Standard Malay language from the Malay world? The argument of those 
who are against the use of Sri Lankan Malay (SLM) is that there is no future 
prospect in pursuing this colloquial Malay language. According to them, 
prosperity of the community lies in them learning the Standard Malay spoken 
in the Malay world, instead of the SLM. Those who oppose this proposition 
argue that learning the Standard Malay would only lead to the extinction of the 
Sri Lankan Malays as a unique ethnic groups, for that would lead to them 
being subsumed by the Malays in the Malay world this time, instead of the 
Moors in Sri Lanka. The other important argument put forward against the 
promotion of Standard Malay is that there is neither commercial value nor 
other social benefits available for mastering it. 
Reactions of my Malay respondents to the question of their ethnic 
identity also reflect the divergent views held in scholarly circles. BDK Saldin, 
a well-known writer and an expert in Malay language, is at the forefront of 
promoting Standard Malay as it is spoken in Indonesia and Malaysia:  
“Grammar is an important component of the language. Let us speak Sri 
Lanka Malay (SLM), but we need to enhance of Standard Malay (SM). 
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While speaking Sri Lanka Malay (SLM), in parallel, we have to be 
conscious of the Standard Malay (SM) as well. Such a move would 
contribute to help preserve the distinct linguistic identity of local 
Malay community and it will help us to maintain close relations with 
the Malay world to know the development in the language. This 
message has to be properly communicated to the urban and rural 
people, may be, in Sinhala language as SL Malays are familiar in the 
language. Most importantly, in urban areas, more Malays are 
comfortable in conversing in English language than Malay, but in rural 
areas, case is otherwise as rural Malays still stick to Sri Lankan Malay 
while coping up with other languages such as Sinhala and Tamil.”  
He makes the point that while speaking the Sri Lankan Malay language 
for inter-personal communication, one has to also simultaneously learn, or at 
least become aware of the grammar in the Standard Malay. This is not only a 
surer way to preserve SLM, but also a means to building and preserving 
relationship with the Malay world. There is another important point that can 
be gleaned from his response: Malays living in urban areas like Colombo and 
Gampaha are fast losing their attachment to Malay language as they give 
priority to Sinhala and English, while the rural Malays remain steadfast in 
using the Sri Lankan Malay. This is despite the fact that the rural Malays too 
use other languages for their inter-personal communication. The argument for 
learning SM cannot be wholly dismissed. Learning the SM would greatly 
benefit Sri Lanka Malays seeking a scholarship or other opportunities for 
pursuing higher studies in Malay speaking countries. As for Sri Lankan 
Malay, it is of value to not just those seeking education in the Malay world, 
 153 
 
but to all segments of Malay community in the country, too. It is possible to 
preserve the unique Malay ethnic identity by simply promoting the SLM.     
The idea of promoting the SM is not very popular with the rural 
Malays. For instance, many of the rural Malays living in Kirinda and 
Ambalantota in Hambantota District, whom I had interviewed during my field 
works, are comfortable with using Sri Lankan Malay. In one of the focus 
group discussion (FGD) in Kirinda, participants including men, women, youth 
and students came up with the following responses:    
Riyas: “The language we speak (Sri Lankan Malay) distinguishes us 
from others in our area and we hardly know anything about the 
propagation of Standard Malay.” 
Mohaideen: “Our people are highly competent in the regular Sri 
Lankan Malay language, which has borrowed a lot from Tamil and 
Sinhala. Our children find it difficult to persue their education in Tamil 
medium since they were brought up in Malay speaking environments, 
and hence their competency in Tamil language is poorer.” 
Rinosa: “Because of the language that we speak (Sri Lankan Malay), 
our students have been able to take part in language competition (Hari 
Bahasa Melayu) conducted by the COSLAM every year. We are 
unfamiliar with other types of Malays such as Standard Malays.”  
These responses underline the fact that Kirinda Malays (which is a 
rural area) are familiar with only the Sri Lankan Malay and they continue to 
use it for their inter-personal communication, and are unaware of the 
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propagation of Standard Malay by some elites and professionals. This is 
indicative of the fact that it would be very difficult to replace the SLM, which 
is a part of Sri Lankan Malay identity.  
In addition, when I talked to the Malays living in rural areas of 
Trincomalee and Ampara districts in order to understand whether they knew 
anything about the Standard Malay being propagated, they reacted with 
surprise. They said that they had not heard of it. They are comfortable 
speaking Sri Lankan Malay, and feel no need to replace it with Standard 
Malay. Hence their sense of identity is clearly based on Sri Lankan Malay. 
Talking about the Malay language used by students in Kirinda Maha 
Vidiyalaya, the principal of the school, Alamudeen noted:  
“Almost all the students from grade 1 to 11 converse in Malay 
language during school hours though their medium of instruction is 
Tamil. Some students even tend to intersperse their answers with a lot 
of Malay words, to questions that obviously are in Tamil. For instance, 
in answering the question of ‘what is parrot’s color?,’ they would 
begin their answer:  ‘Kili ejo color … ’. (Kili, which is a Tamil word 
for parrot, is the only Tamil word here).” 
This statement also emphasizes two facts: that Malay students in 
Kirinda are very fluent in Sri Lanka Malay language, and the influence of 
Tamil language upon the Malay language is so widespread among the rural 
Malays there. However, it is sad that non-availability of Malay medium 
schools in Kirinda as well as their lack of competency in Tamil, due to them 
using the Malay language so extensively, is somewhat hampering their 
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education.  In fact, there is no Malay medium school anywhere in the country. 
Medium of instruction being other than Malay is more of a problem to the 
rural Malays than it is to the urban Malays.  
Prospects for reviving Malay language in the rural area is a lot higher 
than in urban areas. This is a significant difference between urban and rural 
Malay youth in terms of the perpetuation of Malay language.   
BDK Saldin promotes the Standard Malay. However, my Malay 
respondents from every srata of society, living primarily in urban areas, have 
expressed views that contradict that of BDK on the use of the language and 
their ethnic identity. In responding to the debates surrounding the Sri Lankan 
Malay Langauge, Ramola, a researcher on Malay language and an academic 
from Kelaniya University of Sri Lanka contends:  
“Standard Malay (SM) is advocated by a small minority of highly 
influential personalities (elites) as they come from urban sectors with a 
relatively high economic power, excellent education and high social 
status. In fact, this situation is mostly confined to the urban areas. The 
further you go from the centre of towns, the less people care about SM. 
Local people prefer Sri Lankan Malay (SLM) which is quite unique. 
SLM has deviated from Indonesian and Malaysian Malay, as it has 
borrowed a lot from local vernacular languages, namely Tamil and 
Sinhala. No European language has lent anything to SML.” 
 The above excerpt clearly shows that the propagation of Standard 
Malay (SM) is restricted to the urban literate Malays with high social status, 
and it has no bearing upon the rural Malays since they are familiar only with 
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Sri Lankan Malay (SLM). Thus, it can safely be posited that the propagation 
of Standard Malay among the Sri Lankan Malays by the urban educated 
Malays has something to do with their (the urban Malays’) ideology.  
The same point regarding the SLM Vs. SM debates has also been 
noted by Hussainmiya, an academic and a prominent researcher on Sri Lankan 
Malay community:  
“You can’t artificially impose language. Debate on Sri Lankan Malay 
(SLM) and Standard Malay (SM) is an ideological issue. People who 
are lurking for greener pastures in Malaya or have some connections 
with Malaya have been trying to revive the language as standardized to 
be a part of Malay (SM). This is especially (so) among the elites of 
Malays, not necessarily relevant to the bottom line or grass root level 
Malays in SL. You should use your local languages. Language is lively 
or dynamic. Malay is spoken by 150 million people in the world. If 
you become fluent in it, there is a possibility for greener pastures 
(professional achievement) as long as one gets promoted for speaking 
Standard English if she/he gets mastery in it. Malay world don’t give 
any opportunities to Malays in Sri Lanka for speaking Malay. It 
facilitates (fluency in Malay) to move around in Malay world.”    
As we discussed above, the views of those two academics underscore 
the fact that promotion of Standard Malay is solely an ideological issue. It is 
only those, who vie for greener pastures or have some connection with Malay 
world, who show any interest in reviving the language by standardizing it, 
while it does not interest any of the rural Malays and the grassroots in urban 
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areas.  The latter two categories remain aloof to the propagation of SM. It 
appears, therefore, that the propagation of Standard Malay is largely confined 
to the urban, educated people with higher social status. This is highlighted by 
Hussainmiya as an ideological move by certain section of the society. The 
other important point that Hussinmiya emphasizes here is that getting mastery 
in Malay language in Sri Lanka, does not necessarily guarantee better 
opportunities in the Malay world.  
The same point has also been made, slightly differently, by TK Samad, 
a retired Post Master from Nawalapitiya in the Central Province: 
“There is no dispute about the importance of perpetuating our ethnic 
identity through the unique language (SLM) that we speak across Sri 
Lanka. Language distinguishes one ethnic group from another, and the 
survival of the community depends upon the language. Language can 
survive so long as the members of the community continue to use it. 
Otherwise, it would cease to exist. If our Sri Lankan Malay language is 
endangered, then the survival of our community as a unique ethnic 
entity in the longer run will be at stake too. As for learning the 
Standard Malay… well, if the Malay world opens its doors to us by at 
least providing employment opportunities or scholarships for education 
or other opportunities in their countries, then, no doubt, enthusiasm to 
learn the Standard Malay would be aroused in the younger generation.”   
 The above reference clearly demonstrates that the perpetuation of 
Malay ethnicity depends on the successful promotion of Sri Lankan Malay; 
not the Standard Malay as some urban Malays are urging. While reiterating 
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the significance of Malay language as a key marker of Sri Lankan Malay, 
which helps distinguish them from others, they point out that lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of Sri Lankan Malays to learn the Standard Malay 
could squarely be attributed to the lack of any material value and employment 
opportunities learning that language brings, both in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. 
Hence this can only be addressed if these concerns are addressed by the parties 
concerned.  
Honeida Packeer, a retired government servant and the president of 
WASLAM (Women’s Malay Association) also lists the reason why the 
younger generation of Malays shows little enthusiasm for learning Malay 
language.   
“Sri Lankan Malay not only resembles the Indonesian Malay more 
closely than the Malaysian Malay, but also has a unique flavor of 
Tamil and Sinhala. The 20th century saw a decline in the usage of Sri 
Lankan Malay due to a number of reasons: 1) absence of commercial 
benefits in learning SLM, 2) absence of Malay medium schools, which 
forced Malays to pursue their education in other languages such as 
Sinhala, Tamil or English, 3) job prospects being higher for those who 
are eloquent in English language, in addition to it being fashionable to 
master English, and 4) most of the Malay parents in urban areas 
speaking with their children in Sinhala or English language in order to 
make them competent in their medium of studies. There is no reason to 
believe that promoting Standard Malay among the younger generation 
would bring for those mastering it any commercial benefit or job 
opportunity in Sri Lanka or the Malay world.”  
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She points out the fact that there is no incentive for the younger 
generation to learn the Standard Malay since the prospect for job 
opportunities, if it accorded any at all, is very dim. Her points actually add 
strength to the argument that it is through promoting SLM that the ethnicity of 
Malays in the county can be preserved. 
Rahman, an urban Malay, also accepts the fact that learning Malay 
language for the younger generation is not in vogue: 
“Sri Lankan Malay has been adopted as the domestic language in many 
Malay homes today. Yet, these days we speak little Malay and more 
English at home, which is the medium of education for our kids. 
However, with the older generation (our parents and grandparents), we 
are mostly interacting in Sri Lankan Malay.”  
 Sri Lankan Malay Language (SLM) is less popular with the younger 
generation, for the medium of instruction for them in schools is English or 
other vernacular languages such as Sinhala or Tamil.  This compels parents to 
communicate with their kids in other than Malay. Unless active and urgent 
steps are taken by parents to promote Sri Lankan Malay language among the 
younger generation, it will inevitably result in the erosion of Malay language, 
and consequently the ethnicity itself of Malays in the country in the future.   
To sum up, it is the Sri Lankan Malay, which many of the Malays 
consider to be the primary markers of their ethnicity; it is the SLM that is 
prioritized by the majority of Malays living in Sri Lanka, more specifically 
those living in the rural areas. This contention is endorsed by some of the 
learned Malays, too. They do not generally believe that mastering the Standard 
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Malay is the best way to perpetuating their ethnicity in this little island. 
Promotion of Standard Malay by some highly influential Malay professionals 
or elites is viewed with skepticism and believed to have ideological 
motivations. Sri Lankan Malays are really conscious of their language (SLM) 
which is spoken by the majority of them in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, the 
majority of Malay youth in urban areas have shown little inclination or interest 
in learning Malay language, owing to the fact that their medium of instruction 
at school is Sinhala, Tamil or English. Though the Malay language has far 
greater currency in the older generation of Malays in the urban areas, they do 
not seem to be encouraging the younger generation to speak it at home, 
believing that doing so would cause problems to their education. As for the 
rural Malays they are still perpetuating the Malay language while continuing 
to pursue their education in vernacular languages. This is because the rural 




Sri Lankan Malays feel elated at being able to trace their origin to 
Indonesia and Malaysia, both of whom trace their ancestry with the Malay 
Nusantara region in the East. Yet, the Indonesian element has been pre-
eminent among the very early migrants of Sri Lankan Malays.285 Sri Lankan 
Malays have such a strong emotional link with countries of their origin in the 
East that they continue to regard themselves as members of an exclusive racial 
                                                 
285 Hussainmiya, “The Malay Identity in Brunei Darussalam and Sri Lanka,” 73. 
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community. The affinity they continue to feel for their cousins in the Malay 
world is very strong.286 
The origin of Malays in Sri Lanka, traceable to Southeast Asian 
archipelago, is considered as another significant marker of Malay ethnicity in 
Sri Lanka. However, the empirical evidence collected for this study shows a 
divergence of views regarding Sri Lankan Malays using their Southeast Asian 
ancestry as an identity marker. Talking about the ancestry or lineage of 
Malays, Mowlavi Musni Ameer, the Imam of Wekanda Jummah Mosque, 
from Colombo noted:  
“The younger generation is not conscious of their ancestry descending 
from Java or Malaysia (SEA). Even the parents don’t seem to remind 
them.” 
The same view has also been expressed by Nazurdeen from Slave 
Island: 
 
“The present younger generation of Malays is not that much conscious 
of their ancestry, but their parents do sometimes remind them of it. My 
grandparents were born in 1832 in Kandy.”  
 It is evident from the above references that ancestry or lineage plays 
little role in defining the Malay ethnicity, especially among the younger 
generation of Sri Lankan Malays, though some parents, sometimes, remind 
them of it. Honeida Packeer, the president of WASLAM observes: 
“Right up to my generation, the element of Malay ancestry played a 
                                                 
286 Vajracharya, “Malay Minority of Sri Lanka: Defending Their Identity,” 03. 
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vital role, and we did trace our lineage to the Malay world, especially 
Indonesia / Java. But, that is not the case with the present generation, 
though they are conscious of their ethnicity and proud of their family 
status.” 
The above view is reaffirmed by some other Malay informants, too, as 
they emphasized that Malay ancestry plays a pivotal role in the ethnic identity 
of Malays, more so among the older generation than it is in the younger 
generation. Tuan Sahabdeen, from Trinco articulates: 
“The older Malays are still reminiscent of their ancestry from 
Southeast Asian Archipelago, while the present generation of Malays - 
the fifth generation - are not very conscious of it.”   
It is evident that though the local Malays have long been naturalized in 
Sri Lanka, the memory of their birth places among the older generation of 
Malays wielded a strong influence in their national identity. That is to say that 
the first and second generation of Malays in Sri Lanka always perceived 
themselves as a part of their original nation, the Malay Nusantara, but as time 
passed the situation changed. There emerged a new generation of Malays, 
nurtured and educated in the local and western traditions and with little 
consciousness of their genesis.287 They are proud of their Sri Lankan Malay 
identity, yet, they fall short of preserving memories of their origin and the 
history of how they came to be domiciled in Sri Lanka. This, however, is not a 
uniform situation among all Malay youth in Sri Lanka, for there are some 
youth who are indeed aware of their lineage, and make it a strong marker in 
                                                 
287 Hussainmiya, “The Malay Identity in Brunei Darussalam and Sri Lanka,” 73, 
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their cenception of their Malay identity. Some examples in support of this 
assertion are discussed below:    
Mona Packeer Ali, the Secretary of Malay Youth Wing of Sri Lanka 
Malay Association argues: 
“We are really conscious of our ancestry or lineage, which is traceable 
to Java. This consciousness was quite high among our Malay youth a 
few years ago when some foreign scholars / researchers were interested 
in tracing our history. The sentiment was: should we not show greater 
interest in our history than these foreigners? But the enthusiasm shown 
by our youth in their history and ancestry seems to have dampened a 
lot now.”   
Mr Jamal’s (president of Mabola Association) daughter notes: 
“While we are really conscious of our ancestry and proud of our Malay 
ethnicity in this land, some of our brothers and sisters in our 
community, honestly, are quite lost and oblivious!” 
TK. Samad, a retired post master from Nawalapitiya, argues: 
“The present generation, though they are beset with a whole lot of 
challenges, are conscious of their identity; they would continue to 
show consciousness of their unique ethnic identity well into the 
future.”   
The above assertions are a clear indication of Malay ancestry playing a 
vital role as a significant identity marker of their ethnicity, even among the 
younger generation. More importantly, Mona attributes the newly aroused 
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enthusiasm to trace their ancestry or heritage to the scholarly works of 
foreigners who were engaged in studying the genre of Malays and their 
language in Sri Lanka. TK Samad also observes that younger generation of Sri 
Lankan Malays are conscious of their ancestry. All these illustrate that the 
Malays, both young and old, do take pride in being able to trace their ancestry 
to the Malay world or the Malay Archipelago.  
It is also pertinent to note the other side of the story with some of the 
Malays affirming that their ancestry is an indispensible feature of their 
ethnicity. Highlighting the Malay ancestry as a key marker of their ethnicity, 
Brigadier Bohran, the vice president of Sri Lanka Malay Association avers: 
“We are proud of our history; we were generally known as a marshall 
race as we were brought from Malay world to the Malay Regiment 
established in Sri Lanka. We have enormously contributed to the 
socio-economic and political spheres of the country.” 
In reaffirming the Malay ancestry, TK. Azoor, the president of 
COSLAM from Colombo notes:  
“Malays came from different parts of Indonesia. Javanese were the 
most predominant race. There are lots of Malay words derived from 
different parts of Indonesia. Tracing the history to pin point the precise 
point of our origin in Indonesia has been almost impossible, but the 
consciousness is there among Malays that they descended from Java 




In tracing his family tree to Indonesia, TJ Packeer Ali, the president of 
Hunupitiya Malay Association points out: 
“My grandfather descended from Sumatra Malay dynasty. He was a 
police inspector. We are so proud of our ancestry and our Malayness!” 
Proud of his ethnicity and ancestry, Nafeel Dulapandan from Champa 
Lane in Trincomalee, notes: 
“We, Malays, are very proud of our ethnicity and ancestry as 
descendants from the Malay world - Southeast Asia.”  
Mr Rahman, an urban business man, could not disguise his pride in his 
ethnicity and ancestry: 
“You know, our Malay ancestors in Sri Lanka have proved their stock; 
they have demonstrated their loyalty and trustworthiness, by 
sacrificing their lives in protecting the integrity and sovereignty of the 
country. We are really proud of having a lineage traceable to Southeast 
Asian archipelago.”  
 The above discussion on Malay ancestry suggests that the Malays in 
Sri Lanka take exceptional pride in their ancestry; their sub-ethnicity or the 
exact places of their origin in Indonesia, which may vary between different 
Malays in Sri Lanka, matters little to them; all they care is that their ancestry 
or lineage is traceable to SEA.  
 To sum up, it becomes very clear from the above discussion that Sri 
Lankan Malays continue to treasure, in their collective memory, their Malay 
heritage of Indonesian and Malaysian origin as they consider themselves as 
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part of the Malay Nusantara. Although the ancestry of Malays has been 
generally considered a key marker of Malay ethnicity in Sri Lanka, it is 
gradually ceasing to be so, particularly among the younger generation of 
Malays. Nevertheless, with older Malays it is still the dominant ethnicity 
marker.  Older Malays, generally, are making an effort to inculcate in the 
minds of the younger generation of Malays the knowledge of their ancestry, 
thus making it a significant marker of their ethnicity.        
 
4.2.4: Malay Culture 
Malay culture has also been considered by some as a primary marker 
of ethnic identity of the Sri Lankan Malays. However, this warrants an 
extensive discussion based on empirical data to examine whether the culture is 
still deemed by the Malays as the primary marker of their ethnicity in the 
country. When discussing the culture of Malays, one must pay attention to 
their cultural elements such as their costumes, culinary practices, dance and 
music, marital practices and so on. The following section sheds light on the 
basis cultural elements of Malays in Sri Lanka.  
4.2.4.1: Malay costumes 
The customary dress of the early Sri Lankan Malays was, for the 
males, the ‘sarong’.288 They wore their hair long, which was tied in a knot and 
set with a circular comb of shell (as did the early Sinhalese male). Outside the 
house, they wore a loose fitting long sleeved shirt without cuffs, which was 
not tucked into the trousers. Over the trouser, they also wore a sarong (usually 
                                                 
288 In Malay too, the word sarong refers to the same item.  
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silken type - very bright and colorful).289 The Songko, which was known as the 
batik sthagnang in the olden days, 290 is a Malay headgear, black in color, was 
worn mainly for ceremonies and special occasions, and did not make up their 
ordinary day to day dress. Batiks are a typical product of Indonesian origin. 
Since the local Malays originated from the Indonesian archipelago, it is natural 
for this art form /Industry too to have arrived in Sri Lanka. Before the batik 
industry became a highly commercialized business, which it is now, making 
batik cloth was the exclusive preserve of the Malays, who produced it as a 
home-made product. 
The older generation of Malays would not be seen outside their homes 
without the Songko cap. A very good example of a well-known figure who 
would not appear in public without his Sthagnang was late Dr. T. B. Jayah, the 
Educationist, Statesman and Diplomat.291 Another prominent Malay 
personality, who has posed with a headgear in all the available photographs of 
him, was Maas Thajudeen Akbar, who was the Solicitor-General of Ceylon 
and later a Judge of the Supreme Court of Ceylon.292 The Songko worn by 
present day Malays is a ready-made black velvet headgear, the variety worn 
by Indonesians and Malaysians, at social functions like weddings, funerals 
religious festivals and so on. Little Malay boys also wore a garment known as 
                                                 
289 Which gave rise to the term ‘redda assa mahataya’. 
 
290 Fazeer Rawdin, “The Malays of Sri Lanka” Terang Commemorative Issue 1987-1996, 
Colombo. 1996, 56. 
 
291 M.S. Jaldeen, T.B. Jayah: A National Hero of Sri Lanka, (Colombo: Law Publishers 
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292 Rawdin, “The Malays of Sri Lanka”, 54. 
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baaju tali, a colorless, short-sleeved robe extending to just above the ankles, 
and sandals with wooden soles and leather straps known as Kumparan293 
Malay women in the olden days wore long-sleeved, white blouses 
known as baaju which extended to the waist, and a lower garment comprised 
of a kaayang with batik designs. They also wore a cloak known as 
Kumbakodam sarong for the head covering.294 This garment is still worn by 
Malay women for special occasions such as wedding.  














                                                 
293 Hussein, Sarandib: An ethnological study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka, 441. 
 
294 Hussein, Sarandib: An ethnological study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka, 443. 
The above figure shows types 
of Malay sarongs worn by 
Malays and others in Sri Lanka.  
 
The above figure shows Sri Lankan Malays, men and women, 
wearing Malay and non-Malay costumes including Baju, Batik shirt, 
Songkho, salwar and skirt and blouse  
 169 
 
Reverend James Cordiner, an evangelist and a confidante of Governor 
North who was the first British Governor in Ceylon, said the following about 
the Malays, their physical features and their dresses:  
“The dress of Malays is graceful in the Turkish or Persian Style. The 
men wear a coloured handkerchief above the head, a close waist coat, 
buttoned round the neck, long wide silk drawers and long open gown, 
and fastened close at the wrists, halfway up the arm with nine gold 
buttons to each sleeve. Sometimes they put on sandals, but more 
frequently walk with their feet bare. The women wear a kind of short 
cotton bodice which binds up their breasts, a long piece of Muslim like 
that of the Malabars, and a loose plaid or mantle thrown over one 
shoulder like a sash” 295 
 The above description of Malay clothes by a Colonialist gives us a 
very clear picture of the Malay garments worn during the colonial period in 
Sri Lanka. Today, however, many of the Malay women prefer to wear Salvar 
Kamiz and hijab or an abaya with hijab, in keeping with the Islamic 
requirement for women to fully cover up when going out. I saw many Malay 
women in Kirinda, Hambantota, Ambalantota and Trincomalee areas wearing 
sarees, resembling the garments of Moors.  A more detailed discussion on the 
Malay costume will be taken up in the next chapter on acculturation.  
                                                 
295 C.H. Mantara, “Malays of Ceylon.” Jubilee Book of the Colombo Malay Cricket Club, 
Colombo, 1924,166.  
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4.2.4.2: Malay culinary fare 
In culinary art, Malay dishes have become household names, and an 
essential part of the Sri Lankan food. Rice and curry has always been the 
staple food of the Malays of Southeast Asia. Rice or nasi is prepared in a 
variety of ways: Nasi booli (ghee rice) is a spicy dish with minced beef, 
chicken or mutton; ‘buriyani’ is perhaps a corruption of ‘booli nasi’ as both 
their recipes are identical; yellow rice (Nasi Kuning) is also known, as also 
tempered rice (nasi tumis) and dillseed rice(nasi uluwarisi). Used in vegetable 
curries are potatoes (ubi), drumstick (klentung), hog-plum (dongdong), bitter 
gourd (papari), fried breadfruit (sukung goring) and so on. Used for meat 
curries are beef (darging), mutton (kambing), chicken (ayang), liver (ati), tripe 
(baabat) and trotters (kaki).296  Vattalappam is a genuine Malay pudding, 
which is indispensable in great feasts. A Biriyaani, if unaccompanied by 
Vattalappam, is incomplete. Vattalappam made of coconut, milk, juggery and 
well-beaten eggs is known in Malay as Srikaya.297 Nasi Goreng is fried rice. A 
typical Malay nasi goreng is always prepared using long rice, and is now 
available in almost all the restaurants and hotels in Sri Lanka. 
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297 Rawdin, “The Malays of Sri Lanka”, 56. 
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Malay pickle is of a distinct flavor, different from the usual achcharu; 
it includes papaw and sometimes carrots, and does not have the sweet 
pungency of regular (Indian) pickle, which is hot and spicy.298 ‘Satay, 
acknowledged as an Indonesian dish, is a standard Malay dish among the Sri 
Lankan Malays. To make satay, meat, usually beef, is kept soaked overnight 
in a thick mixture of spices including chilies.299 The meat is then skewered and 
roasted over smouldering charcoal. E. Reimers, the Government Archivist of 
1924 said about Malay cuisine:  
In modern times we have to appreciate the Malay condiments and his 
cooking, his ‘atjal’, “Sampoolang” (which in Malay means a mixture 
and refers to ‘Sambol’) which are world known by the preparation in 
Holland and elsewhere, his preparation of buttered rice (booli) and 
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The above figures show the Malay sirikaaya available in 





rather intriguing ‘vanit’( jaadi) and last but not the least his delicious 
curry ‘satha’( sathay).300 
Older Sri Lankans might still remember the pittu and babath at the 
Slave Island eating houses. Pittu or Puttu is served with a curry of cooked 
entrails and tripe of the cow. This curry, called baabath is a spiced, hot dish 
which goes so well with pittu.301 








Dodol (not to be mixed up with the Indian Muscat) is sweetmeat, made 
of coconut milk, juggery, wheat or rich flour.302 The mixture of the ingredients 
is cooked over a fire, churning it constantly until it becomes an oily, viscose 
blob, which is put on to a wooden tray and rolled down flat and left to cool. It 
is cut into small pieces and served. It is a bit harder to bite, but the taste of this 
sweetmeat is not easily forgotten.  
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302 Ibid., 447. 
Malay pittu and babath served in some of the houses 
of Malays for breakfast and dinners.  
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4.2.4.3: Matrimonial and other cultural practices of Malays 
Malay weddings in the early days involved an ‘engagement’ and an 
exchange of rings (cincing aratukar); Dua Slaamat, a ritualistic prayer 
involving the recitation of Fathiha Shoora; and paacar ceremony where the 
bride is attired in a colorful sari and her female relatives place henna (paacar) 
on her palms to form little dots.303  The wedding is held at the bridegroom’s 
residence with a feast - usually, a lunch or dinner.304 The groom walks, with 
his retinue following, on pavada, which is a white cloth spread out. One of the 
two sides of the groom, three or four men also dressed in the same manner 
sing “Pantuns”305 to the accompaniment of the hand held drums, and a flutist 
or a violinist or both.306 After this welcome ceremony is over, the youngest 
male member of the bride’s house is allotted the task of removing the shoes or 
whatever footwear the groom is wearing; and the boy or the young man who 
                                                 




305  Pantuns means songs or lullabies.  
 
306 Hussein, Sarandib: An ethnological study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka, 440. 
Malay dodol served during special occasions, to 
visitors to Malay homes in Sri Lanka 
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performs this task is immediately rewarded with a gold ring by the 
bridegroom.  
Thereafter, the groom is taken to the istaal,307which is a ‘throne’on 
which the bride is already seated and the exchange of rings take place, 
followed by the groom placing a necklace round the bride’s neck308(this is 
originally from the Indian custom of the thali ceremony). This Malay wedding 
may sometimes be accompanied with the beat of the rabaana and singing of 
pantungs by the women. The dress of the Malay bride is usually a white bridal 
dress with a face veil; the Malay bride groom would don a long-sleeved shirt 
and trousers, with a batik sarong wrapped around the waist. He would also 
wear a Songko,309  the traditional Malay headgear. 
The above section clearly describes the Malay wedding culture 
prevailing in Sri Lanka.  
4.2.4.4: Malay Music and dance 
The Malay community’s contribution to Sri Lankan culture is 
significant, especially to music and dance. The community has actually 
become an indispensable part of the post-colonial cultural legacy of the nation. 
For instance, names of Malay singers like Harun Lanthra have become 
household names. Malay musician Stanley Omar has, over the years, made a 
substantial contribution to music, leaving unmistakably Malay imprints on Sri 
Lankan music. Stanley Omar has also discovered many Malay talents in the 
                                                 
307 The throne akin to the porewa is called a ‘isthal’. 
 
308 Hussein, Sarandib: An ethnological study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka, 440. 
 
309 Hussein, Sarandib: An ethnological study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka, 440. 
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field of music. Tony CH. Mantra is the latest talent from the Malay 
community. In addition to a number of Malay songs he has also recorded some 
Sinhalese songs.310  
Stanley Omer recreated the music from the ancient opera called 
‘Alladin and the Wonderful Lamp’ by Jumaron Tungku Ousmand, a direct 
descendent of the Sultan of Kedah.311 In earlier times, religious incantations 
were accompanied by the beat of drums. 
Although the Malay Archipelago is home to a variety of traditional 
dance forms, it appears that the ancestors of the present day Malays in Sri 
Lanka did not indulge in this form of entertainment, perhaps in the belief that 
they are un-Islamic. However, dance forms from Indonesia and Malaysia are 
today performed by the younger generation of Malay youth in Sri Lanka. 
Dances like Tari Piring, Tri, Lililin, Joget and Rogent are performed on 
special occasions.312 However, recent years have seen a very large Malaysian 
influence on Sri Lankan Malay music and dance, which underlines the desire 
on the part of a section of the Malay community to trace the roots of the 
contemporary Sri Lankan Malays to Malaysia.  
Malays were also believed to be good in medicine. Writing about the 
herbal cures practiced by the Malays, Robert Percival notes:  
“A skill in medicinal herbs is almost universal among Malays and they 
have a variety of prescriptions for curing diseases by herbal 
                                                 
310 Indeewara Thilakarathne, “Malay artists showcase their talents” Sunday Observer, 
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311 B.D.K. Saldin, “Malays-their cultural identity.”The Island, February 29, 1993, 111.  
 
312 Saldin, “Malays-their cultural identity, 1V.  
 176 
 
applications... This herbal medicinal knowledge is owing to their great 
fondness for gardening and rearing all sorts of plants, a vocation in 
which they engage from their infancy...”313 
 Having given a portrayal of the Malay culture in Sri Lanka, we can 
now examine whether culture is considered as an identity marker of the 
ethnicity of Malays in Sri Lanka. Many of my respondents did not believe that 
their culture is considered as an identity marker since it has been corrupted 
due to heavy influence from other cultures.   
Talking about the culture of Malays, Mr Arfeen, a government servant 
from Enderamulla avers: 
“Presence of Malay costumes and cuisines are not ubiquitous. They are 
only noticed on occasions of weddings and other special occasions. 
Except for some old ladies, Malay women mostly wear Sarees and 
habaya. Hijab and nikab are quite popular among young Malay 
women. This is a direct outcome of the works of Islamic revivalist 
movements amongst the Malays, or parental persuasion. Some of the 
cultural elements and practices that we practice today were borrowed 
from other communities, particularly the Moors. For instance, a lot of 
our weddings are conducted in mosques, while some are held at 
wedding halls. Some conservative Malays still prefer to have Malay 
songs, dances and pantungs. But this is possible only when the 
wedding are conducted in wedding-halls; not when they are conducted 
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in masjids.  So Malay songs, dances and pantungs are quite rare 
today.”    
A few points could be noted from his reference to the culture of 
Malays. The influence of parents and Islamic movements has dramatically 
changed the Malay culture, particularly among the younger generation; and 
other cultures, particularly the Moorish culture, have made inroads into the 
Malay culture and adulterated it. Hence the Malay culture has virtually ceased 
to be a marker of their ethnicity.    
The views of Mr. Azoor, a prominent lawyer and the president of 
COSLAM, are in concordance with the views of Mr. Arifeen on the question 
of culture:  
“Malay cuisine is almost ubiquitous; Satay, Nasi Goring (fried rice), 
Sirikaya (wattalappam) are all there in most restaurants, having 
become regular items on the cuisine of non-Malays. As for the Malay 
costumes, they are fast ‘evolving’ from their original form even in the 
Malay world. Songo, batik and so on, for example, seem to be limited 
to special occasions. We have lost almost 90% of our customs, 
including our traditions associated with Malay weddings. Being 
Muslims, we want to follow the Islamic traditions and laws in matters 
related to wedding, funeral and so on. Since we believe that such 
Islamic traditions are dominant among the Moors, we end up following 
the Moors. So, Malay traditions have become almost extinct. We are 
not really worried about the loss of Malay culture, because it was 
highly influenced by Hindu and Buddhist culture, for the Malays were 
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once Hindus and Buddhists. Whatever culture that we encounter, when 
they do not conform to our Islamic culture, we need to drop them. 
Religion must be first.” 
He acknowledges that elements of Malay culture such as costumes and 
cuisines have been adopted by other ethnic groups. The cuisine particularly is 
available in most restaurants. He is, however, critical of the Malaysian and 
Indonesian culture that originally shaped the Malay culture in Sri Lanka, and 
maintains that any culture deriving from other than the religion of Islam must 
be done away with. He believes that some Malay cultural practices are un-
Islamic. He agrees that most of the Malay cultural elements have already been 
lost. What little that has survived is restricted to special occasions like 
weddings in the present context of Sri Lanka.     
The same sentiment is also expressed by Honieda Packeer, a retired 
government servant and the president of WASLAM (Women Association of 
Sri Lankan Malays):  
“Malay cultural aspects such as the dress and cuisine are distinct from 
others. We have a distinct way of preparing Malay cuisines… it is 
different from how the Moors and other communities make. Sadly, 
many of our cultural elements are dying because of lack of interest by 
the younger generation in perpetuating it.”  
She attributes the loss of Malay culture to the indifference and 
aloofness of the younger Malays. Asiff Hussain also contends that Malay 
costumes and cuisines are, at present, not different from that of Moors, as 
Malay men too wear shirts and sarongs; while Malay women prefer to wear 
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the Salvar Kamiz, often with a scarf to cover their hair, keeping in line with 
the Islamic requirement; and the staple food of the Malays of today consists of 
rice and curry, similar to that of the Moors.314  The same view with regard to 
the Malay culture has also been shared by BDK. Saldin (1993).315 He too 
assents that the Malay costumes of the present generation are not different 
from what the other Sri Lankan communities wear, except on a few special 
occasions. They wear songkho or sarong kebya or baju kurung for ceremonial 
purposes, but these are few and far between. All these indicate that Malay 
culture is fast eroding, and what is left of it is restricted to the older generation 
and special occasions like weddings.  
Due to the influence of other cultures, Malay culture has been diluted 
so much that no Malay considers it as his ethnicity’s identity marker. In terms 
of costumes, cuisine and arts and literature, there has been a lot of give and 
take between Malay and other cultures. Having said that the major challenge 
to the Malay culture is the influence of transnational Islamic movements, as 
well as settlements of Malays being interspersed with the other communities.  
The rejection of culture as an ethnic identity marker by the Sri Lankan 
Malays is in stark contrast to how Malayness in the Malay world, for example 
in Malaysia, is defined. The constitution of these countries have categorically 
listed, as markers of Malay identity, descend-based attributes such as Malay 
language, culture, religion and citizenship.316 However, the case is entirely 
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different in the case of Sri Lankan Malays: Malay culture as one of the 
markers of their ethnicity has not received much welcome.  
Nevertheless, Malays have been taking some strong measures to arrest 
the deterioration of their culture; actions are being undertaken by the Malay 
elites and Malay organizations to revive and revitalize their culture so that 
their ethnicity can be more clearly defined. An extensive discussion on this 




Sri Lankan Malays, being Sunni Muslims of the Shafi School, share 
much in common with their Moorish brethren, not only in fundamental 
religious beliefs but also in religious practices. It is believed that those Malays 
who arrived in the country before and during the Portuguese occupation of Sri 
Lanka were probably Hindus or Buddhists, but those who arrived with the 
Dutch and British were largely, if not exclusively, Muslims. Undoutedly, Sri 
Lankan Moors assert their identity based on religion (Islam), as they have no 
other boundary markers to define their ethnicity. But, the question of what 
role, if any, the religion of Islam plays in defining the identity of the Malays 
calls for a detailed investigation.  (That their language, physical characteristics 
and ancestry all play a significant role is already established)  
Sri Lankan Malays are known to be quite liberal in their interpretation 
of Islam, and their religiosity is frequently contrasted with that of SL Moors, 
 181 
 
who are admittedly more conservative in their practices. When exploring the 
reason why Malays are liberal in their interpretation of Islam, I gathered some 
really interesting responses from various informants participating in the focus 
group discussions that I conducted at the administration office of the Wekanda 
Jumma Mosque. 
Sitheek: “During the Dutch and the British colonial period, a lot of the 
Malays studied in missionary schools and as a result adopted the 
culture of the missionaries. So, religion (of Islam) played a less 
significant role in their lives.”   
Latheef: “As the majority of the Malays served in the armed forces 
during the colonial period, they had to interact with various people 
coming from different backgrounds and cultures, and thus they got 
accustomed to un-Islamic practices like drinking, dancing, partying 
and clubbing.” 
Minna: “During the colonial and post-colonial period, Sri Lankan 
Malays worked in different governmental sectors including the railway 
and plantation, and they got involved in trade union activities; trade 
unionists usually have a lot of parties where alcoholic drinks are 
served, and dancing takes place. This is how they adopted those un-
Islamic practices.”  
Amit:  “Malays lived in Kempongs in the early period (colonial 
period), but began to spread out all over the country in the post-
colonial period, which led to intense interactions with non-Malays and 
as a result adoption of their cultures.”  
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The above responses gathered at the focus group discussion sheds light 
on what led to the Malays becoming less-Islamic in terms of their religious 
practices. These respondents were also skeptical of the Islam practiced by the 
Malays during the early period of the Dutch and the British rule. They deemed 
it as “liberal” and therefore concluded that Islam played a minimal role in the 
lives of the Malays then. However, at no point did they suggest that the 
Malays even then, discounted Islam as integral marker of their ethnicity.  
More importantly, what I noticed in my field work was that the 
majority of Malays living in rural areas, and some parts of urban areas too 
(particularly those living amongst the SL Moors), are quite fervent in their 
faith and are orthodoxical in their interpretation of Islam. In recent times, the 
global resurgence of Islam caught up the Sri Lankan Malays, too, leading to 
their strict adherence to the authentic precepts of Islam. In fact, many of the 
constitutions of Malay organizations give priority to the propagation of Islam 
in accordance with the Shariah. 
Elaborating on the importance of religion for Malays, Azoor, a 
prominent lawyer and the president of COSLAM notes: 
“Religion is first. It is very important for you to be a Muslim first. 
Even the Arabs have come to this position because of Islam, haven’t 
they? If they had remained like the pagans, they would be still stuck in 
ignorance and darkness. Similarly Malays too progressed so much 
because of Islam, just like Arabs in Middle East. You must NOT lose 
sight of that fact. Your current values may not necessarily be Islamic. 
Where clashes appear between your current values and the true Islamic 
 183 
 
values, you must always give up the former and go for the latter. This 
is my personal view, but I don’t think everyone would agree with me; 
they may have their own views. All our programmes are designed by 
our organization to foster a love for Islam, and to prevent 
contravention of the precepts of Islam.”    
Nazeera Amit from Hambantota also shares the same view: 
“Religion is very important for us. Many Malay women attend regular 
religious sermons delivered by Arkam Mowlavi from Sippikkulam. 
Thajweeth classes are conducted for Malays. Many of our Malay 
women wear salwar/habaya and hijab as a result of regular religious 
sermons.”  
What is clear from the above assertions is that there has been a steady 
resurgence of religiosity among the Malays. Their conviction is, as they have 
articulated quite unambiguously, that the stronger one’s religiosity is, the more 
successful he or she would become in his or her life, here in this world and the 
Hereafter. Azoor goes further by emphasizing the fact that one has to always 
conduct himself in compliance with the religious law. It is also pertinent to 
note that many Malay women are taking to abaya and hijab due to an 
awakening in their religious consciousness. Moreover, as Azoor has pointed 
out, Malay organizations such as COSLAM give priority to Islamic 
programmes, which are generally Islamic sermons delivered in the Malay 
language.  
Commenting on the religious practices of the Malays and the Moors, 
Mr. Salley from Ganesa pura (Aandankulam) Trincomalee points out: 
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“There is no much difference between the religious practices of the 
Moors and us. We are all Muslims, and we all follow Islam. From birth 
to death (in rituals starting from birth to death), we share the same 
religious practices.” 
The near-total absence of differences in religious practices between the 
Moors and the Malays witnessed in rural village such as Ganesa Pura. The 
reason for this is that both communities live side by side, and this has 
inevitably led to both sides having almost identical religious beliefs and 
practices.  
 The empirical data of this study shows that a few Malay informants 
feel reluctant to regard religion as their identity marker formally due to their 
political apprehension. However, their firm adherence to the religion is beyond 
reasonable doubt and majority of them deem it as an important marker of their 
ethnicity. Adding to the debates over the question of including religion as a 
marker of Malay identity, Ramola, a researcher from Kelaniya University, 
aptly notes the following:  
“Moors’ presence in Sri Lanka is so vital because it helps to define the 
Malay identity in Sri Lanka. Malay identity is being defined in 
contradiction to Moor identity since both ethnic groups share the 
religion; Malays are not prepared to subscribe to the common religious 
identity along with Moors at the expense of their typical ethnicity.” 
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Hussainmiya also aptly avers:   
“The closer you get to the religious identity along with Moor, the more 
(you will see) that the Malay identity stands out. Identity of Moor is a 
reference point / indicator to the Malay identity. As Sri Lankan politics 
is so much ethicized, people attempt to get some sort of rights over it. 
Labeling them as mere Muslims will lead to ensnaring the Malays 
within the fold of Muslim politicians, and they are simply giving up 
their rights of self-existence. That is why Malays would like to keep 
their identity very stronger on that basis excluding the religion as a 
marker of their ethnicity.  For political, statistical reason, they don’t 
want to be lumped together as Muslims on the basis of religion.” 
There is incontrovertible proof that there is increasing religiosity 
among the Malays; they are very loyal to the religion of Islam. Where consent 
is missing is on the question of whether or not the religion of Islam be used as 
a marker of their identity. The overriding concern of the Malays is the 
possibility of their political and other interests being compromised should they 
be given the generic identity of ‘Muslims’. This would, for example, make it 
extremely hard for them to have separate representation in the parliament, if 
not make it impossible. This fear or concern as a factor must be distinguished 
from the general cultural significance which the Malays attach to Islam as a 
matter of faith, because at no point did these respondents discount Islam as 
their religion. Thus, they Malays are very religious, and Islamic.  
Above responses clearly shows that the religion of Islam does indeed 
play a very important role in the lives of Malays, even though they are 
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reluctant to assert Islam as their identity marker formally, obviously due to 
political reasons.  Thus, it can be concluded that Islam does play an integral 
role as a marker of their ethnicity.  
Malays have, in fact, made enormous contributions to the enrichment 
of Islam in Sri Lanka in the past, which we would be discussing in the section 
below. 
4.2.5.1: Establishment of Mosques by Malays 
In 1783, Malays built their own mosques, and began catering for the 
religious needs of the Malay speaking community. With patronage extended 
by the colonial rulers, mosques were built close to military administration 
centres, and services were conducted in Malay language. There were special 
Malay mosques next to the military cantonments.317 It is probable that these 
mosques greatly helped the survival of Malay traditions. The mosques served 
as places for religious and public meetings, which were all conducted in 
Malay language. This aided the cohesion of the community. Services in the 
Moor mosques could not cater for the needs of the Malays, for their sermons 
were held in Tamil and Arabic. Malays in their mosques had their Khatibs or 
prayer leaders, and their own religious Kitabs (books) and legal texts written 
in Malay language.318  
Malays, though a relatively smaller community in Sri Lanka, have 
founded a number of mosques in Colombo, Hambantota, Kandy, Kurunegala, 
Kinniya, Gantulawa, Galle, Kalpitiya, Badulla and Kirinda and this is 
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indicative of their firm adherence to Islam.319But it must be pointed out that, 
although these places of worships are referred to as Malay mosques, they are 
open for all Muslims, regardless of ethnic differences, as is the case with any 
mosque in any part of the world. A Muslim, irrespective of any other 
differences, has free access to any mosque to perform his religious 
observance. 
The Grand Mosque at the New Moor Street was built by a Javanese 
architect by the name of Mohamed Balankaya, the son of Hooloo Balankaya 
who was a Minister to the King of Goa and exiled to Ceylon in 1723.320  
Wekanda Jummah Mosque is situated in a land donated by a Javanese, 
Pandan Balie, in 1786.321 According to the trust, the descendants of the 
Malays named therein, along with others not so named, are to be trustees of 
the Mosque. The Katheebs (or prayer leaders) in this masjid have always been 
Malays. The mosque, aged 216 years now, was the first Malay mosque to be 
built (in Slave Island) during the British rule. This was done at the request of 
the Malay soldiers, who wanted to have a mosque built closer to where they 
lived. Without this, they would have had great difficulties, for the Moor 
mosques conducted their religious activities only in Tamil and Arabic, and not 
in the tongue of the Malays.    
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Another old mosque is the Masjithul Jamia (Military mosque), situated 
at Java Lane in Slave Island, which was built from funds allotted from the 
pensioners’ fund of the Ceylon Malay Regiment.322 This mosque was used by 
the Ceylon Rifle Regiment.323  
Masjithul Akbar at Kew Road in Slave Island is yet another mosque 
built by Malays. The land on which the Mosque is built was a gift by Thaliph 
Akbar, the grant father of Honorable MT. Akbar who was the Solicitor 
General and later a Judge of the Supreme Court of Ceylon.324   
The Malay mosque, which was the first place of Muslim worship to be 
established in Kurunagala, was built in the second half of the 19th century. In 
1848, a detachment of 30 soldiers and 2 officers of the Malay Regiment were 
posted to Kurunagala to assist the British administrators. Later, Malays from 
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324 Ibid. 
Present appearance of Wekanda Jummah Mosque 
located in Slave Island, Colombo 2.  
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Kandy also settled there. With this arose the need for a place of worship, and 
consequently they built this mosque.325  
In addition, Malays have also built some mosques in other parts of the 
country: 1)Java Palli in Hambantota Town, 2) Katukele Jumma Mosque, 
Kandy, 3) Malay Military Mosque in Bogambara, Kandy, 4) Malay Kotuba 
Mosque, Kinniya, 5) Java Mosque, Mullipothana, Gantulawa in Trinomalee 6) 
Malay Thakkiya, Kalpitiya, and 7) Malay mosque, Chilaw.326 
Thus, Malays had made enormous contributions in the past and 
enriched the Islamic religious life in Sri Lanka. As has been noted before, a 
strong sense of attachment to Islam prevails even among the present day 
Malays. This is despite relectance shown by a few Malays to assert religion as 
their identity marker formally due to political reasons. Thus, it can be safely 
concluded that Islam does play a significant role as a marker of their identity.  
The table below shows the level of importance given to various 
identity markers of Sri Lankan Malays by the participants in the Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs), conducted in the urban Slave Island and rural Kirinda 
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The tables above show that Malays in both in the urban ( Slave Island) 
and rural area (Kirinda) regard that race (physical characteristics), language, 
religion and ancestry are all important markers of their ethnicity and that they 
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discount culture from it, because they feel that their culture has been subjected 
to substitutive acculturation with the dominant cultures in Sri Lanka. Six urban 
Malays (4 Males, 2 Females) and eight rural Malays (5 Males, 3 Females) 
totally discount the role of culture as the marker of their ethnicity, while rest 
of them who participated in the FGD in both the urban and rural areas feel 
either that the culture is less important or partially important. It is noteworthy 
that eleven Malays (7 Males and 4 females) out of the 15 participated in the 
FGD in rural area regard religion as a highly important marker of their 
ethnicity, while a lesser number, that is just five (3 Male and 2 Females), 
deems religion as a highly important marker of their ethnicity. However, 3 
urban Malays (2 Males, 1 Female) and four rural Malays (2 Male and 2 
female) consider religion as a partially important marker of their ethnicity.  
Having said that, it is important to note that 4 urban Malays regard religion as 
a less important marker, while urban 2 Malays consider religion as having no 
role at all in the defining of their identity. Ambivalence or reluctance on the 
part of these urban Malays to include religion as an identity marker can be 
attributed to the effect of modernization, globalization and urbanization upon 
those Malays living in urban areas. A lot of the Malays in the urban area feel 
reluctant to affirm their identity as “Muslim”. But this is only due to the fear 
that this would compromise their political interest. (Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that this conclusion is made based on a small sample of 
responses. There were only 15 participants in the FGD for the urban area. 
Therefore, generalization of this conclusion to include all urban Malays may 
be an error.) By and large, all of these point to the fact that physical 
characteristics (racial traits), language, religion and ancestry all play a pivotal 
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role as markers of the identity of Sri Lanka Malays and that culture plays a 
less significant role.  
Having focused on the boundary markers of Malayness in Sri Lanka, 
let us now examine, in light of the theoretical framework on the ethnic 
identity, how the process of their identity formation takes place. The following 
section deals with primordialism and constructivism as theories of ethnicity in 
relation to Sri Lankan Malay ethnic identity formation. However, the theory of 
situationalism is not discussed here, because it is not relevant to the context of 
Sri Lankan Malays as they are not seen switching their identity for social and 
political gains in different parts of the country.     
 
4.3: Ethnic identity formation of Sri Lankan Malays and theories on 
ethnic identity 
Having comprehensively dealt with the boundary marker of Malay 
identity in Sri Lanka in the previous sections, this section now applies the 
theories, discussed in chapter two, to identity formation of the Malays in Sri 
Lanka.  
4.3.1: Primordial theory on Malay ethnic identity  
This theory explains that the ethnicity of a group or an individual is 
formed based on absolute characteristics and their historical root. Scholars like 
Andrew (2001),327 Gap (1999),328 Dividson (2008),329 Jenkin (2001),330 
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Williams (2001),331and Mackay (1982)332 have noted that ethnicity is 
inherently acquired by birth and is rooted in the ties associated with kinship, 
language, religion, culture and biological heritage. According to 
primordialists, group membership remains fixed over a lifetime and it is 
passed down intact across generations.333 Moreover, primordialsm gives an 
emotional appeal for the human beings to identify with and cling to a certain 
group.334All these facts suggest the ‘given and innate’ characteristics of 
primordial ethnicity.  
In his recent account on Malay identity in Brunei and Sri Lanka, 
Hussainmiya argues that Sri Lankan Malay ethnicity is based on self-identified 
category, and is also of a pragmatically-defined nature.335 In the interview that 
I had with him for this study, too, he emphasized the subjective notion of 
Malay ethnicity in the Sri Lankan context:  
“In Sri Lanka, the definition of Malay identity is very much diffused 
(pudar). In Sri Lanka, Malay women getting married to non-Malays 
(moor) get absorbed into such (Malays), and their second generations 
are categorized under the rubric of Malays. Malay identity in Sri Lanka 
is very much a subjective and social concept (without legal / 
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constitutional prescriptions). If one feels that he or she is Malay, then 
he or she becomes Malay. Self-admittance of belonging to the Malay 
community is a matter of concern.” 
 The above excerpt of Hussainmiya reflects the primoridialist 
perspective of Malayness - the subjective notion of belonging to Malay 
ethnicity becoming a criterion to define Malayness in Sri Lanka.  
The foregoing section on identity markers of Sri Lankan Malays has 
shown that their ethnicity is formed based on boundary markers such as 
physical characteristics, descent/ancestry, religion and language. They exclude 
culture as a marker, and there are ongoing debates over some of those identity 
markers. Malays generally consider that their ethnic identity is primoridial 
based on the markers discussed in detail in the previous section.  
This is the reason why Kanchan Chandra argues that, in 
primoridialism, group membership remains fixed over a lifetime and it is 
passed down intact across generations.336 I have discovered from the empirical 
evidence that the ethnicity of Sri Lankan Malays is primordial, and is based on 
the boundary markers such as physical characteristics, language, religion and 
ancestry. Hussainmiya too maintains that the Malay identity in Sri Lanka is a 
self-identified category; is of a pragmatically-defined nature;337 and that the 
majority of the Malays have the urge to cling on to the vast vestige of their 
racial identity, in order to survive as a separate entity in the plural context of 
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Sri Lanka.338 This is in concordance with Davidson’s argument that 
primordialsm gives an emotional appeal for the human beings to identify with 
or cling to a certain group.339 From all these, we can safely conclude that the 
ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays is primordial.  
Nonetheless, I feel that primordialism alone is insufficient to 
adequately explain the identity formation of Malays in Sri Lanka. Malay elites 
and their organizations are continually attempting to revive and construct their 
identity in the face of the many challenges to the Malay identity. Therefore, 
despite the fact that Malays in general perceive their identity in primordial 
terms, it is my position that Malay identity is constructivist and its 
construction is still underway. This view is supported by an abundance of 
empirical evidence. Primoridialism is less important than constructivism when 
it comes to explaining the identity formation of Malays.  
 As such, the next section has a very detailed discussion on the 
constructivist theory of ethnic identity, in relation to formation of Malay 
ethnicity.      
4.3.2: Constructivist theory on Malay ethnic identity 
As discussed earlier, as primordialism is not sufficient to examine the 
identity formation of Malayness in Sri Lanka, the process of their identity 
formation needs to be explored in the light of the Constructivist theory.  
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J.S Furnival, Clifford Geertz, Benedict Anderson and Barth are 
considered to be the pioneers of the constructivist paradigm of ethnicity. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this theory suggests that ethnicity is not 
innate or a given, but is fluid and constructed based on several factors, which 
are: 1) increasing level of action (rather, reaction to threats to an ethnic 
group’s identity), and interaction between ethnic groups, which would in turn 
reinforce self-ascription and ascription by others, 2) historical, economic and 
socio-political factors, (for it is responses to such socio-economic and political 
challenges or marginalizations of minority ethnic groups by the majority 
groups, which lead to the construction of ethnicity), 3) ethnic categorization, ( 
which are to be found as a by-product of colonial and post-colonial rule. 
Ethnic cleavages between groups were fostered by the colonial rulers as it 
suited them to split the communities for the sake of their own survival in their 
colonies; the Colonialists and post-colonial rulers amply made use of census 
as a crucial instrument in creating/constructing newer ethnicities) and 4) ethnic 
identity can be constructed by the learned and affluent elites in a society.  
Before discussing the construction of Malay identity as they respond to 
the challenges they encounter, it is necessary to examine the process of 
construction of Malay identity as a result of interaction between ethnic groups 
leading to self-ascription and ascription by other groups, and the role of 
colonial and post-colonial states in constructing the identity of Malayness. 
 It has been shown from the available literature and empirical evidence 
that the ethnicity of Malays is (also) constructed, as Sri Lankan Malays are 
identified as a minority by themselves (self-identification) and other 
communities (identification by other communities) based on the primordial 
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markers discussed above. They are called Ja Minissu340  by the Sinhalese, 
Java Manusar341  by the Tamils and Malai karar342 by the Moors.343 The 
interviews I conducted with non-Malays suggest that Malays are recognized or 
identified as a distinct ethnic group by other communities in Sri Lankan.  
Nazeer from Colombo, a Sri Lankan Moor, a custom superintendent by 
profession:  
“Sri Lankan Malays, though they follow religion of Islam, are a 
separate group of people with their own language, culture and physical 
shape.”  
Ummu Hana from Kandy, a Sri Lankan Moor who is a lawyer:  
“We recognize Malays quite easily form their culture and physical 
look. They are a flexible and honest people.”  
Sagara, a Sinhalese from a research institute in Colombo:  
“Malays are a learned, and English speaking people. They have 
contributed a lot to the country. They are physically, linguistically and 
culturally different from others in Sri Lankans.”  
The above views of non-Malays suggest that Sri Lankan Malays are 
easily identified as a separate ethnic group by other communities.  
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The enormous contributions the Malays have made to the country has 
also earned them a very special place in the minds all other communities in Sri 
Lanka. 
 Besides, the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays was also constructed 
by colonial and post-colonial states. Sri Lankan Malays were labeled as 
‘Malays’ by the British colonialists during 19th century, though they consisted 
of a heterogeneous group of Easterners.344 The British referred to these 
‘Easterners’ as Malays, because of their unique language rather than their 
ethnic origin.345 This trend of labeling them as “Malays” continued even in the 
post-independence Sri Lanka where rulers adopted the same categorization, 
labeling them as Malays in the census and other official documents.346 Thus, 
Malays are now distinctly categorized as an ethnic group in government 
census of population and other government publications. This goes to show 
how Malay ethnicity was constructed by the colonial and post-colonial rulers 
in Sri Lanka.  
More importantly, my studies confirm that the construction of Malay 
identity is still underway, for the Malay elites and their organizations are still 
continuing to take various measures (to revive their identity) in response to the 
challenges of acculturation and structural assimilation affecting the 
community. Even though the Malays perceive this process as primordialism, 
my own observation is that it is a construction of identity.  
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The construction of Malay identity that I am discussing here stems 
from a process that takes place in the context of Malays identifying the 
challenges of assimilation and responding to such challenges. In other words, 
my study argues that identifying the challenges and responding to such 
challenges is part of construction of ethnicity. Nagel underlines that not only 
the internal processes, but external processes such as social, economical, 
political aspects too are associated with the construction of ethnic identity.347 
Phinney also emphasizes that ethnic identity is a dynamic construct that 
evolves and changes in response to social, developmental and contextual 
factors.348 In the same manner, constructivism of Sri Lankan Malay identity 
refers to a process that takes place in the context of Malays identifying the 
challenges of assimilation (acculturation and structural assimilation), and 
responding to such challenges with various measures/initiatives.  
Responses of my Malay respondents reflect the measures taken by 
Malay elites and their organizations to revive the Malay language, culture, 
ancestry and religion. The following section deals with each such element 
separately.  
4.3.2.1:Construction of identity through Sri Lankan Malay 
Language (SLM) 
As discussed above in the section on Malay language as a boundary 
marker of Malay identity, Malays are forced to not only choose Sinhala, 
English or Tamil as the medium of instruction at school, but also forced to use 
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one of them as their language for communication, particularly, in urban areas 
due to the predominance of non Malay speakers there, which results in the 
gradual disuse of Malay language. A decrease in the use of Sri Lankan Malay 
language at domestic level has been noted in recent decades.349 This is a major 
challenge. In cosmopolitan cities like Colombo, Malay parents and 
grandparents make a conscious effort to speak to their children in English 
because they want to develop in them the competencies in English language 
skills. English is seen as the key to a good job and a comfortable life.350  
Moreover, Sri Lanka Malay language and Malays suffered a setback as 
a consequence of the ‘Sinhala Only Act’. Until 1956, administrative matters in 
Sri Lanka were conducted in English, and the prospects of finding civil service 
jobs was far greater for Malays due to their excellent command of English 
language. But, the 1956 Act forced them to shift their focus to learning the 
Sinhala, for proficiency in Sinhala language was made compulsory for anyone 
wanting to retain his or her civil service job, as well as for career 
promotions.351 The 1956 Act, therefore, has been seen as being directly 
responsible for the decline of the Sri Lanka Malay language. According to 
Saldin (2001), while English was the medium of instruction in schools, Malay 
was the home-language for Malays. When the medium of instruction became 
Sinhala or Tamil, Malay parents felt they needed to speak to their children in 
English, in order to ensure that the children knew English, which was (and still 
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is) seen as crucial for employment and upward mobility.352 Therefore, in a 
sense, the ‘Sinhala Only’ Act of 1956 is considered to be responsible for 
Malay ceasing to be the language of the home of the urban Malays.353 This 
language policy not only contributed to the forced acculturation of minorities 
including the Malays, but also made them vulnerable in the economic spheres, 
too.  
Furthermore, adoption of Sinhala and Tamil as the primary language 
by the Malays has been facilitated not only by education in the Sinhala and 
Tamil vernacular, but also by a large number intermarriages, and regular 
interaction of Malays with the Sinhalese and Moors. This point is extensively 
discussed, along with all the relevant empirical evidence, in chapter six on 
structural assimilation of Malays. Mr Akbar, a Malay businessman from 
Akbar town notes:  
“I got married to a Moor a long time ago. My brother also got married 
outside the Malay community. While my family speaks Tamil for our 
inter-personal communication, my brother’s family uses Sinhala.” 
Intermarriages of Malays with Moors or Sinhalese are a corollary of 
structural assimilation of Malays with other communities. The above excerpt 
is a clear example of how far intermarriages of Malays with Moors have 
endangered Malay language. Malays marrying non-Malays are compelled to 
use either Tamil or Sinhala language for their inter-personal communication, 
for their partners and in-laws are very unlikely to know Malay. This is 
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obviously very detrimental to Malay language. This trend led to a situation 
where the use of Malay language became largely restricted to the older 
generation of Malays.354 
Thus, both acculturation and structural assimilation pose a grave threat 
to the perpetuation of Sri Lankan Malay language. When the Malay elites and 
their organizations identify the threat assimilation poses to their language and 
then respond to that threat, construction of Malay identity naturally takes 
place.  
Talking about the importance of reviving the language to consolidate 
the Malay identity, TJ Packeer Ali, the president of Hunupitiya Malay 
Association observes: 
“To arrest the deterioration of Malay language and minimize the risk 
of it being lost forever, we have to actively promote our language. The 
more we promote our own language (SLM), the safer or more 
consolidated our ethnic identity becomes.”      
The contention of Mr. Packer Ali is a clear manifestation of how 
Malays identifying the challenges to their language (or identity in general) and 
responding to those challenges, is actually a process of constructivism of 
Malayness in Sri Lanka. This can be compared to how the construction of 
Moor / Muslim identity in Sri Lanka took place, when the Muslim community 
responded to various challenges it had to face. It is important to note that the 
Moorish ethnic identity is based on the religion of Islam. Even though the 
Moors speak Tamil, just like the Tamils of Sri Lanka, Moorish identity is 
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based on the religion of Islam. The fact that the Moors speak Tamil has not 
allowed them to be subsumed under the broader identity of Tamils. Tamils are 
the Tamil-speaking non-Muslims of Sri Lanka, while Moors are the Tamil 
speaking Muslims. What became the catalyst for the construction of Moorish 
Muslim identity in Sri Lanka was Mr. Ramanathan’s thesis, spelled out in his 
speech at Royal Asiatic Society, that Sri Lankan Moors / Muslims were 
“ethnologically Tamils”. (Mr. Ramanathan was a prominent Tamil elite.) 
Moors feared that the Tamils, under the broader Tamil ethnic identity, were 
attempting to subsume their Muslim identity. Subsequently, Moors reacted to 
this threat: on the basis of religion, they differentiated themselves from the 
Tamils who were mainly Hindus. This is what eventually led to the 
construction of Moor / Muslim identity. 355  
The same is also the case with the construction of Malay identity in Sri 
Lanka. Malays, particularly their elites and organizations, identify challenge of 
acculturation and structural assimilation, and then respond to those challenges, 
which consequently sets in motion the process of constructing the Malay 
identity. The endangering of Malay language is a result of acculturation, 
which has been identified as a challenge to Malay identity. In response to such 
challenges, Malays have been taking various measures, which is leading to the 
construction of their unique identity. Nafeel Dulapandan, a Malay from 
Trincomalee notes:  
“We continue to encourage our children to speak our language since it 
reinforces the uniqueness of our identity.” 
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Honeida Packeer:  
“The need of the hour is to encourage our children to speak Malay 
(SLM) at domestic level (home) in order to perpetuate our ethnic 
identity. This is something which some of us are already doing at 
present.” 
The above references suggest the manner in which Malays are trying to 
revive their language among their younger generation in their homes. Having 
identified the need to perpetuate their language and identity in the face of 
challenges of assimilation, Malays are taking action to revive their language.  
Talking about the organizational initiatives to revive the language, Mr. 
Muan Ameen, the vice president of COSLAM (Confederasi of Melayu), 
states: 
“In Colombo, Malays speak English and Sinhala as they are both 
national languages, and are forced to study in either of those 
languages, instead of Malay. So, Malay is an endangered language. 
Therefore, we (COSLAM) are at the initial stages of revival; we are 
giving full freedom for Malay language to be written using Sinhala or 
Tamil or English scripts.  We have our own dictionary and books, too. 
Our grammar is different from Standard Malay grammar, with a lot 
influence from Tamil and Sinhala grammar. SLM is an admixture of 
vernacular languages of Sri Lannka. You can choose whatever the 
script you like to write Malay. This compromise is necessary for the 
preservation of Malay (SLM). We aren’t particular about refining the 
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SLM and making it exactly like the Malay language spoken in the 
Malay world.”  
       The above reference of Muan Ameen highlights the danger Malay 
language faces and the need to revitalize it in the face of such threats. It 
appears from his illustration that younger urban Malay are exposed to 
vernacular languages more than they are to Malay language, since they have to 
pursue their education in the vernacular languages. That the local Malay 
language is endangered is obvious. Therefore, this compromise to permit the 
Malay youth to write using foreign scripts, or converse with words borrowed 
from foreign languages is understandable. Confernsi Melayu Sri Lanka 
(COSLAM) engages in the revitalization process of their language through the 
vernacular languages, which makes the process of learning the Malay 
language somewhat easier. It is also encouraging to see that their organization 
is currently in the process of building a dictionary and a grammar book of their 
own, without attempting to eliminate foreign words or other influences of 
foreign languages (such Sinhala, Tamil and English). This is the response of 
Malays to the dangers Malay language is facing. By and large, it is clear that 
the Malay identity is constructed through identifying the challenges of 
acculturation and structural assimilation to their language and identity, and 




4.3.2.2: Construction of identity through Malay ancestry 
As extensively discussed above, Malays being able to trace their Malay 
heritage to Indonesian and Malaysian origin has been considered by Sri 
Lankan Malays as a significant marker of their ethnic identity. However, this 
aspect seems to be strong only among the older generations of Sri Lankan 
Malays. With the present generation, it seems to be losing significance, 
perhaps due to globalisation.356 Empirical evidences collected for this study 
show that ancestry plays a passive role among the present generation. Talking 
about the ancestry or lineage of Malays, Mowlavi Musni Ameer, the Imam of 
Wekanda Jummah Mosque, from Colombo notes:  
“The younger generation is not conscious of their ancestry descending 
from Java or Malaysia (SEA). Even the parents don’t remind them of 
this.” 
The same view was also expressed by Nazurdeen from Slave Island: 
“The present younger generation of Malays is not that much conscious 
of their ancestry.” 
The above excerpts suggest that the ancestry or lineage wields less 
influence upon the Malay ethnicity, especially among the younger generation 
of Sri Lankan Malays. This is because the present generation of Malays, 
unlike the older generation, are being brought up and educated in the local and 
Western traditions.357 This is one of the challenges facing Sri Lankan Malays 
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when it comes to preserving the collective memory of the Malays of their 
ancestry originating form Malay world / Malay Nushantara. 
Thus, having realized the enormity of challenges threatening the Malay 
identity in terms of their ancestry, particularly among their younger 
generation, Malays have been responding to those challenges in ways that 
would refresh memories of their ancestry. The following empirical evidence is 
a proof of this.  
Mr. Jamal Mohamed, the president Mabola Malay Association, 
illustrates: 
“The youngsters of Malays are conscious of their ancestry as we 
continue to remind them of their past and heritage.” 
The same view is also expressed by Mowlavi Muaath, the principal of 
a ladies Quran Madrasa in Slave Island: 
“Many of the Malays are conscious of Malay ancestry as descending 
from Indonesia and Malaysia from the colonial times. We continue to 
remind our children of their ancestry.”  
The above is a clear representation of the responses of the Malays to 
the challenges threatening their identity in terms of their ancestry/lineage. It is 
obvious that Malay elites are at the forefront of reminding their younger 
generation of their Malay heritage, their historical past and background, in 
order to have them empowered. This is how the identity of Malayness is 
constructed: as a response to various challenges they perceive to be 
threatening their identity. The initiatives or responses of Malay elites 
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undertaken to revitalize their ancestry have brought a positive impact upon the 
Malay younger generation. For instance, Ahamed Fazal, a tertiary level 
student from Colombo observes: 
“We know who we are and where we came from since we were 
constantly reminded by our parents and grandparents about our 
heritage and ancestry. I think this is an important indicator of our 
ethnicity that distinguishes us from others in Sri Lanka.” 
The above remark clearly shows how successful the responses of 
Malay elites have been in refreshing memories of their Malay ancestry among 
the younger generation. Thus, it is notable that Malay identity is constructed in 
identifying the challenge in terms of ancestry and responding to such 
challenges.   
4.3.2.3: Construction of identity through culture  
As discussed in the section of boundary markers of Malay ethnicity, 
Malay culture has been excluded as the key marker of Malay identity by Sri 
Lankan Malays. This is because their original Malay culture has been 
corrupted due to the influence of other ethnic communities in Sri Lanka. This 
is aptly noted by Mr Salley, a retired civil servant from Ganesapura:  
“Our Malay culture has almost died out in our area because of certain 
influences, particularly due to the intense interaction between the 




Mr. Salley, here, attributes the deterioration of Malay culture to the 
influence of Moorish culture. Dominant customs and traditions of the local 
people (the core ethnic groups) have pervaded the cultural practices of Malays, 
and, in turn, eroded the distinct cultural elements of Malays in the island. 
Intense interaction with Moors is one of the factors contributing to the 
acculturation of Malays, which in turn, endangers the identity of Malays. Thus 
has cculturation posed a major challenge to the distinct culture of Sri Lankan 
Malays. The worst affected by it is the younger generation of Malays. BDK. 
Saldin, a well-known writer from Colombo notes:  
“Malay culture such as Sarong and Batik Shirt has died off. Older 
generation might be sticking to their culture, but the younger 
generation are being badly affected by modernization or globalization. 
This is affecting our identity.”   
 The above excerpt demonstrates how the younger generation, exposed 
to modernization and globalization in the contemporary era, are vulnerable to 
acculturation.  
The next chapter of this study on acculturation and ethnicity of Malays 
has identified a number of factors that contribute to the acculturation of 
Malays. Of these, the influence of Moor community sharing the religion of 
Islam with Malays; religious influence of transnational Islamic movements, 
especially Wahhabism and Tabligh Jamath; and the interspersed settlement of 
Malays within the other communities are among the most prominent factors.  
Despite the fact that Malays do not define their identity based on 
Malay culture (which is fast declining), they have a voracious interest in 
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perpetuating their culture. They want it revived for the sake of their future 
generation. Thus, having identified the danger of acculturation on the culture 
of Malays, particularly the substitutive acculturation, they have begun to 
respond by reviving their culture, which has led to their constructing their 
identity. The following responses of Malay elites amply illustrate this point.    
Brigadier Bohran: “We are gradually improving our culture, including 
the dance, which is being promoted by the Malay clubs here. We want 
the Malay culture embedded in the minds of our Malay youngsters so 
that, when they grow up, they would carry these cultures to the next 
generation.”  
Mr. Jamal, the president of Mabola Malay Association: “At the Mabola 
Malay Association, we encourage Malay dances, cuisines and 
costumes to inculcate in the minds of Malay youngsters a sense of 
pride in Malay culture and our ancestry. We are indeed very proud of 
them. We are delighted with the outcome: Malay youngsters today are 
very much interested, and are enthusiastically taking part in all the 
events we organize.”  
The above excerpts of Malay elites representing Malay organizations, 
namely Sri Lankan Malay Association (SLMA) and Mabola Malay 
Association, underline the efforts they are undertaking to revive their culture 
in the light of the challenges of acculturation. These are some of the responses 
of Malay elites and organizations to the challenges of acculturation to the 
Malay identity, resulting in the construction of their identity.   
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The next chapter on acculturation and Malay ethnicity will engage in 
an elaborate discussion on how acculturation poses a potential threat to 
ethnicity of Malayness.   
4.3.2.4: Construction of identity through religion 
Although some Malay respondents feel reluctant to assert religion as 
their identity marker formally, they do consider Islam as an important part of 
being Malay, as discussed in the previous section on identity markers. The 
overriding concern of the Malays is the possibility of their political and other 
interests being compromised should they be given the generic identity of 
‘Muslims’. This would, for example, make it extremely hard for them to have 
separate representation in the parliament, if not make it impossible. This fear 
or concern as a factor must be distinguished from the general cultural 
significance which the Malays attach to Islam as a matter of faith, because at 
no point did these respondents discount Islam as their religion. Thus, they 
Malays are very religious, and Islamic.  
Elaborating on the importance Malays attach to religion, Azoor, a 
prominent lawyer and the president of COSLAM, notes: 
“Religion is first. It is very important for us to be Muslim first. Even 
the Arabs reached their status because of Islam, didn’t they? If they 
had remained like the pagans, they would be still stuck in ignorance 
and darkness. Similarly Malays too progressed so much because of 
Islam, just like Arabs in the Middle East. You must NOT lose sight of 
that fact. Your current values may not necessarily be Islamic. Where 
such clashes appear between your current values and the true Islamic 
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values, you must always give up the former and go for the latter.” 
It is absolutely clear from the above excerpt how much passion Malays 
have for not only the religion of Islam, but also the Arabs who gave them this 
religion. Azoor also emphasizes that one has to give priority to religion over 
everything else. It is their religiosity and passion which led to Malays 
founding a number of mosques in Colombo, Hambantota, Kandy, Kurunegala, 
Kinniya, Gantulawa, Galle, Kalpitiya, Badulla and Kirinda.358  
Nevertheless, as we have noted earlier, not all Malays are conservative 
in their interpretation of Islam. There are liberals too among them. This latter 
fact leads some Moors to making the incorrect generalization that all Malays 
are liberal and hence less Islamic. This causes a lot of concern among the 
Malays, including the youth. Mr. Jamal’s (the president of Mabola Malay 
Association) daughter notes: 
“We are practicing our religion along with our culture. We cover our 
bodies in a colorful Islamic way. Our dances are within the ambit of 
Islam. However, sadly, our Moorish brethren think that we are 
unislamic. They want us to be a carbon copy of them.” 
Roshana, an English Teacher from Nawalapidiya also shares the same 
view:  
“Moors are not coming forward to marry Malay girls because they are 
under the wrong impression that Malay girls are unislamic or do not 
adhere to Islamic principles, and expose their bodies to others without 
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covering them with hijab and abaya. However, it is not the case with 
all Malays. It is only a handful that do not take to abaya and hijab. It is 
wrong to generalize in that manner”  
The above excerpts of Malays underline the stereotyping of Malays by 
the Moor. This incorrect stereotyping and generalization leads to some moors 
looking down upon them. However, as has been noted before, Sri Lankan 
Malays have a very deep level of love for their religion of Islam, and they 
consider it more important than anything else, including their culture. If they 
perceive that a particular aspect of Malay cultures goes against religion, they 
recognize the need to change it so as to comply with Islamic religious 
injunctions. Despite the passion Malays have for their religion, they are 
stereotyped as less Islamic or even unislamic by some Moors. This is one of 
the many challenges Malays are facing.  
Furthermore, the current anti-Muslim campaign in the country, being 
whipped up by Sinhala extremist forces like the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and 
Sinhala Raavaya (SR), with the tacit approval of the present rulers, by 
problematizing the dietary practices of Muslims (Halal food), their dress code, 
slaughtering of cattle for food etc, and then attacking Mosques, have all raised 
an alarm among the Malays.  This has, in a way, led to a heightening of 
religious consciousness among Malays. Talking about the growth of religiosity 
among Malays in the wake of anti-Muslim campaign by extremist groups, Mr. 
Latheef, one of the trustees of Wekanda Jumma Mosque observes:  
“Rhetorics of BBS and SR have agitated the religious consciousness of 
Malays. A numer of the Malays, prior to these Islamophobic 
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campaigns, were ignorant of a lot of Islmaic practices such as the 
prohibition of non-halal food. But as an unintended consequence of 
these hate-campaigns, there is now a greater awareness among Malays 
of the importance of Halal food.  The number of attendees in mosques 
has also increased quite dramatically in many mosques.”     
The above reference explicitly shows that the current anti-Muslim 
rhetoric has heightened the religious consciousness of Malays. This can aptly 
be compared to the realities surrounding the construction of Malay identity in 
Singapore where, Khairudein notes, attempts by Singaporean State to establish 
a single official definition of the Malay identity heightened Singaporean 
Malay’s Islamic religious consciousness. Singaporen state’s attempt, in 
reaction to certain local, regional and global developments, to exclude the 
religion of Islam as a marker for Malay identity failed.  Their newly 
constructed Malay identity in Singapore now has the religion of Islam as one 
of its primary markers.359 Moreover, Sharifah also articulates that Malays in 
Singapore have begun to define their identity based on Islam, in the belief that 
making Islam as a central point of their whole life would lead to solutions 
being found to their problem of social, economical and political 
marginalization in the country360. In the same way, Malays of Sri Lanka 
identifying the challenges to their religion and then responding to those 
challenges heightens their Islamic consciousness. Some of the responses or 
organizational activities seeking to enhance the religiosity of Malays are 
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outlined by Malay elites in the interviews I conducted for this study. 
Azoor, a prominent lawyer and the president of COSLAM, notes: 
“We organize weekly religious sermons and Quran classes for boys 
and girls at Wekanda Jumma Mosques. All our programmes are geared 
to making us conform to Islam, and not contravene any of its 
pricinciples.”    
TJ Packeer Ali, an entrepreneur and the president of Hunupitiya Malay 
Association, notes: 
“All the main Ulema are Malays here. We have more than 15 
prominent Malay Ulema. Our organization also undertakes a lot of 
activities aimed at reviving and preserving Islamic religious practices.” 
It can be observed that Malays do react when they perceive any threat 
to Islam, and such reactions (the organizational responses of Malays) enhance 
their religiosity. The anti-Muslim campaign in the country is becoming a 
catalyst in this respect. The other occasion making them react in a similar 
manner is when the Moors stereotype Malays as un-Islamic.  
It is clear from the above mentioned empirical evidences that 
construction of Malay identity takes place as they identify the challenges of 
acculturation and structural assimilation, and then respond to those challenges.  
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4.3.2.5: Construction of identity in contradiction to Moor identity 
Interestingly, Malay identity is also constructed in response to the 
challenge of Moors attempting to subsume the identity of Malays under the 
religious category of Islam since Islam is the shared religion between them. 
Malay language, ancestry, religion and physical attributes are the markers that 
define Malay identity.  Nevertheless, it is also being constructed when Malays 
respond to challenges posed by the Moor’s attempts to subsume the identity of 
Malays. Adding to the debates surrounding religion as marker for the identity 
of Malays, Ramola, the researcher from Kelaniya University, observes:  
“Moorish presence in Sri Lanka is so vital because it helps to define 
the Malay identity here. Malay identity is being defined in 
contradiction to Moor identity as both ethnic groups share the religion. 
However, Malays are not willing to subscribe to the Islamic religious 
identity along with Moors at the expense of their typical ethnicity.” 
The above excerpt aptly demonstrates how the identity of Malays is 
being constructed in contradiction to Moor identity when they react to Moors 
attempting to subsume their identity under the religious category of Islam. 
Hussainmiya notes that although Malays received cultural nourishment from 
the Moor community, many of the Malays resisted their identity being 
subsumed under the religious identity of Moors.361 To questions regarding the 
identity of Malays being based on religion, Hussainmiya responds:   
“The closer you get to the religious identity, the more strikingly the 
Malay identity stands out from the Moor. Identity of Moor is a 
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reference point / indicator to the Malay identity. As Sri Lankan politics 
is so much ethnicized, people attempt to get some sort of rights over it. 
Labeling them as mere Muslims would lead to ensnaring the Malays 
within the fold of Muslim politicians, and would also amount to simply 
giving up their rights of self-existence. That is why Malays would like 
to keep their identity stronger on a basis that excludes religion as a 
marker of their ethnicity. For political and statistical reasons, they 
don’t want to be lumped together as Muslims on the basis of religion.” 
The response of Hussainmiya clearly indicates how the identity of 
Malays is constructed in reference to the Moor identity. Moorish identity helps 
define the ethnicity of Malays, since it serves as a reference point to the Malay 
ethnicity. Malays believe that adopting religion as marker for their identity just 
as the Moors have done will challenge the Malay identity in the country, and 
upset their social and political visibility. This is a widely prevalent 
apprehension in the Malay community. The following assertion of a Moor also 
shows how Malay identity is constructed. Ziyad, a social worker from Moor 
community in Sri Lanka notes:  
“When Malays begin to realize that they are being marginalized or 
their identity is being subsumed by the Moors through their religion of 
Islam, they assert themselves and begin to define their ethnicity by 
excluding ‘Muslimness’ ” 
The above excerpt of Ziyad also reflects that Malay identity in Sri 
Lanka is constructed as a reaction to attempts by Moors to lump them into the 
umbrella category of Muslims. However, reluctance on the part of Malays, as 
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discussed earlier, to include religion as an identity marker formally is due to 
their political interest, for Malays are strictly Islamic in their beliefs and 
practices.  To counter being subsumed into the Muslim group, Malays also 
demanded separate representation in parliament.362 They denied having any 
links at all with the Moors.363  Emergence of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
(SLMC) as a political party had some negative impact upon the Malays. 
SLMC subsumed Malays under the ethnic group of “Muslims”, and by doing 
that, it made representation of the Malays in parliament highly unlikely, since 
the ethnic group of Muslims, which Malays are now part of, was already 
represented in parliament via the SLMC. Even though Malays are also 
Muslims, the interests of Malays differ from those of Moors greatly. The 
slogan ‘we are all Muslims’ by the Moors irritated the Malays and caused a lot 
of concern among them. This slogan was perceived as declaration of denial of 
political rights to the Malays. Even though, they are also Muslims, they 
believe that Moors cannot speak on their behalf. 364 This shows that the 
Malays have political apprehension in them being labelled as “Muslims” 
instead of Malays. Thus, it is clear that the Malay ethnicity is constructed in 
the context of Malays identifying the challenges of Moors attempting to 
subsume the Malay identity under the religious category of ‘Muslims’ and 
responding to it in order to revive their Malay identity.  
It should be noted that the theory of situationalism in terms of ethnicity 
is not relevant to the context of Sri Lankan Malays, because the empirical 
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evidence of this study does not show that the Sri Lankan Malays are switching 
their identity from place to place for their personal gains and exigencies. The 
responses of the majority of my Malay respondents illustrate very clearly that 
they do not switch their identity for petty gains. Here are a few relevant 
excerpts of Malay respondents.  
Mr. Jamal Mohamed, the president of Mabola Malay Associations 
notes:    
“It is true that we are Muslims by religion, however, we never allow a 
room for it to undermine our Malay ethnicity; and we don’t switch our 
identity as Muslims or Moors for the sake of fulfilling personal gains. 
We affirm our identity as Malays and are proud of it-all the time.” 
TK Samad from Nawalapitiya observes:  
“Wherever we go, we proudly display our Malay identity because our 
forefathers have made us proud: they have contributed a lot to this 
country and, as a consequence, we are held in high esteem by all and 
sundry. So, why should we pretend to be anything other than Malay?”  
The above excerpts reflect that the Sri Lankan Malay identity is not 
situational:  In no circumstance, do the Malays pretend to be anything other 
than Malays.  It can also be noted that despite Malays professing Islam as their 
religion and adhering to its principles, they argue that it cannot undermine 
their Malayness, which they are very much proud of.  Thus, it can be safely 
concluded that the Malay identity in Sri Lanka is both primordial and 
constructed.   
 220 
 
4.3.3: Theoretical discussion on Southeast Asian Malay identity and 
Sri Lankan Malay identity  
Mazreeta Sirat’s (1996)365 study, “Malay Identity in Singapore: 
Perception of Malay Youth Regarding Their Identity,” categorically 
emphasizes that Malays are a minority and at the same time a heterogeneous 
ethnic group in Singapore. Though they come from areas that are as far-flung 
as Java, Sumatra and Bawean in Indonesia, all which have different histories 
and culture, they have all united under the umbrella category of Malays in 
Singapore based on the primordial attributes such as descent, religion, culture, 
and language (self-identification). Thus, she argues that the Malay identity in 
Singapore is primordial.  It is clear that in Singapore and Sri Lanka, primordial 
traits play a significant role in defining Malay identity.   
As for the Malay identity in Singapore, Syed Muhd Khairudin 
Aljunied’s (2010)366 account, “Ethnic Resurgence, Minority Communities and 
State Policies in a Network Society: The Dynamics of Malay Identity 
Formation in Postcolonial Singapore”, Sharifah Alwiyah Aljunied’s (1990)367 
study, “Minority Dilemmas: The Malay Community in Singapore” and 
Nurliza Yusof’s (1986)368 study, “Being Malay in Singapore” emphasize that 
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various events in the local, regional, and global arena have all contributed to 
the construction of Malay identity in Singapore. They argue, in particular, that 
the Islamic resurgence in 1980s, the influence of transnational Islamic 
organizations, and the deprivation policy, which the Singaporean state 
designed with the view to weakening the Malays in the political, educational 
and economical spheres, have all contributed to the construction of Malay. 
These accounts on Malay identity construction in Malaysia and 
Singapore have much relevance to this study too. Shamsul’s thesis on 
“enumerative modality”, a census-tool employed by the colonialists to divide 
the indigenous societies on the basis of race, ethnic groups culture and 
language has greater relevance to the construction of Sri Lankan Malay 
identity. Though the Malays in Sri Lanka came in from different parts of 
Malay Archipelago, the British labeled them as Malays using language as a 
marker.369 The British categorized Malays as a distinct ethnic group in their 
census in 17th and 18th centuries, and the same tradition continues in 
contemporary census and other official documents in this post-colonial period 
in Sri Lanka.  
The aforementioned accounts also argue that various factors such as 
social, political, economic and educational factors have contributed to the 
construction of Malay identity in former European colonies. I too argue, based 
on the empirical evidence which I have already cited in the section on 
Construction of Sri Lankan Malay Identity, that the Malay identity in Sri 
Lanka too has been constructed in the context of identifying the challenge of 
assimilation and then responding to it through various programmes designed 
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to reviving and perpetuating Malay identity in the country. To put it 
differently, Malays seeing the challenges of assimilation and then wanting to 
respond to them is part of the construction process of Malay identity in Sri 
Lanka. Thus, it is clear that the Malay identity construction in Southeast Asia 
is significantly different from Malay identity construction in Sri Lanka: the 
former considers social, economic and political factors as the basis of the 
construction of Malay identity; in Sri Lanka, it is the challenges to the identity 
of Malays, making them react, which sets in motion the construction of Malay 
identity.  
 
4.4: Summary  
    In summary, this chapter has delved into the key identity markers of 
Malay ethnicity and its formation in Sri Lanka. It has revealed that Malays 
have identified their physical features, language, religion and ancestry as their 
boundary markers, excluding culture; they discount culture as one of the 
markers of their identity because they beleive that it has badly deteriorated, if 
not become extinct, due to the influence of Moors and the activities of 
transnational Islamic movements. Nevertheless, it is notable at present that 
Malay elites and their organizations are in the process of reviving their culture, 
and strengthening their religious consciousness in the face of challenges of 
assimilation and other threats, such as those posed by Islamophobic 
movements like BBS.  
This chapter has also made it clear that Malay identity in Sri Lanka is 
both primordial and constructed. Examining the identity of Sri Lankan Malays 
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in terms of primordialism is not sufficient since there is also the construction 
of Malay identity taking place, as the community responds to the challenges of 
acculturation and structural assimilation. Even though Malays view that their 
identity is primordial based on key boundary markers such as ancestry, 
physical characteristics, religion and language, my own view is that there is 
also a process of Malay identity construction taking place as the Malay 
community, particularly its elites and organisations, reacts to the challenge of 
acculturation and structural assimilation by reviving their language, awareness 
of their ancestry, culture and religion.  
Thus, Malays construct their identity by identifying the challenge of 
assimilation and then responding to such challenges in a number of ways, 
revitalizing their boundary markers in the process. It is also interesting to note 
that Malay identity is also constructed in contradiction to the Moorish identity 
as the Malays identify the challenge of Moors attempting to subsume their 
identity under “Muslimness”. Thus it is argued that the apprehension Malays 
have in adopting the religious identity has a lot to do with political expedience. 
This is not be misconstrued as evidence of Malays being less Islamic or un-
Islamic. Their adherence to Islam is as good as Moor’s adherence to it.  In 
addition, it was also discussed in this chapter that the colonial and post-
colonial rulers also played a significant role in constructing the Malay identity 
in the country. It was also noted that the theory of situationalism is not 
relevant in the context of Sri Lankan Malay identity because Malays are not 
seen switching their identity for personal gains depending on situations. It is 
also noted that the construction of Malay identity formation in Southeast Asia 
is different from the Sri Lankan Malay identity formation, because it is the 
 224 
 
social, economic, and political factors contribute to the construction of Malay 
identity in Southeast Asia, whereas, in the case of Sri Lankan Malays, it is the 
reaction to assimilation that leads to the identity construction of Malays in Sri 
Lanka.    
      Besides, the boundary markers of Sri Lankan Malays are increasingly 
blurred in the face of the challenges of assimilation, characterized by both 
acculturation and structural assimilation, more so among the younger 
generation of Malays than it is among the older generation. As discussed 
above in the theoretical section, Malays seeing the challenges of assimilation 
and wanting to respond to them is part of the process of their identity 
construction. In a way, assimilation as a challenge results in the construction 
of Malay identity due to the ensuing revival of identity markers. Thus, next 
three chapters,chapters five (05), six (06), and seven (07)) are about the 
challenges of assimilation to the ethnic identity of Malays and their responses; 
chapter five (05) and six (06) focus upon the challenges of acculturation and 
structural assimilation to Malay ethnicity, while chapter seven (07) deals with 
the responses of Malays to such challenges.     
Thus, the next chapter deals with one such challenge, that is, the 





 CHALLENGE OF ACCULTURATION ON ETHNIC 
IDENTITY OF MALAYS 
 
5.1: Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the ethnic identity formation of 
Sri Lankan Malays is both primordial and constructed. However, as has been 
discussed, the construction of Malay identity must take precedence over 
primoridialism as the latter is inadequate to explain the identity formation of 
Malayness. Naturally, minority ethnic groups in multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural countries are susceptible to the cultural influences of core ethnic 
groups due to interaction or integration with them. The Malays in Sri Lanka 
are no exception; they are susceptible to the influence of core groups such as 
the Sinhalese, Tamils and Moors in the island, due to intense interaction. Such 
interactions have made a tremendous impact upon the culture and identity of 
Sri Lankan Malays. Scholars are of the view that the generational gap, and 
global and local socio-economic developments have significantly contributed 
to the younger generation of Malays becoming assimilated into or naturalized 
with the core groups in Sri Lanka.370 This phenomenon has aroused a lot of 
debates both at the scholarly and popular levels. Particularly, the dynamics of 
assimilation on the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays have received a lot of 
attention. 
This chapter deals with aspects of acculturation and the ethnic identity 
of Sri Lankan Malays. The first section of this chapter examines acculturation 
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and the ethnic identity of the Malays, followed by a discussion on the 
components of acculturation in relation to Sri Lankan Malays, while the 
second section explores factors contributing to the acculturation process 
among the Malays. 
According to Milton Gordon’s (1964)371, assimilation has two 
components:1) acculturation, and 2) structural assimilation (integration). 
While acculturation of Malays is the main focus in this chapter, their structural 
assimilation is extensively examined in the next chapter. 
 As we discussed earlier, smaller ethnic groups, particularly their 
cultural aspects, are likely to be shaped under the cultural influence of the 
dominant groups in a plural society. The theory of acculturation states that 
acculturation involves a complex process of cultural diffusion and changes, 
and produces greater cultural similarity between two or more groups, 
generally the changes among members of smaller and weaker groups being 
more extensive than among stronger groups.372 Yinger (1994)373 articulates 
this more succinctly when he refers to this as a change in the culture of 
minority ethnic groups towards cultural similarity by adopting the culture of 
the host community. Thus, acculturation occurs when a minority ethnic group 
absorbs the culture, belief and behavioral patterns of the host community, 
thereby leading to cultural similarity.  
Acculturation can either be additive or substitutive. While adding 
values, norms and styles to another culture is considered as additive 
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acculturation, giving up some elements of one’s own culture or just replacing 
them with something from another culture is considered a substitutive 
acculturation.374 Members in weaker groups generally learn the culture of 
dominant groups and its various elements, and try to adopt themselves to suit 
both the dominant culture and the ethnic subculture.  
The next section is a discussion of acculturation and ethnicity of Sri 
Lankan Malays based on the findings from the field works.  
 
5.2: Acculturation and Malay ethnicity 
 As discussed in the previous chapter under the section, ‘culture as a 
marker of ethnicity’, many of my informants suggested that Malay culture be 
excluded as a marker of their ethnicity. Nevertheless, there is now a growing 
concern for their culture to be revived as a response to the challenge of 
acculturation. The reason why Malays exclude their culture as their marker is 
because it has deteriorated to large extend due to the influence of dominant 
communities’ cultures in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, they are still clinging onto 
some aspects of their Malay culture, derived from Malay world. However, in 
the day-to-day life of local Malay people, Malay customs and traditions, in the 
exact form they are practiced in the Malay Peninsula, are almost non-existent; 
what little that is left of their culture has significantly changed. One finds that 
the dominant customs and traditions of the local people (the core ethnic 
groups) have pervaded their cultural practices, eroding the uniqueness of their 
cultural practices. The following are some excerpts from certain members of 
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Malay community in Sri Lanka, which shed light on the dynamics of 
acculturation upon the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays.    
Mr Azoor, a prominent lawyer from Colombo: “Malay traditions have 
been almost lost. Malays, being a small community, can’t withstand 
the ravaging onslaught of other cultures.” 
Mr Salley, a retired civil servant from Ganesapura: “Our Malay culture 
has almost died out in our area because of Moorish influence. This is 
so difficult to avoid for the Moors and Malays are following the same 
religion, and interaction between the two communities is so strong.”  
The above excerpts demonstrate the degree of acculturation, 
entrenched among Malays in Sri Lanka, endangering their distinctive ethnic 
identity. Azoor's assertion is that Malay tradition has died because of 
considerable influences from other cultures. Salley’s argument is in line with 
the same argument; he is specific that the reason is integration with the Moor 
community there.  
 The following section on various components of acculturation, shaping 
the Malays in Sri Lanka, sheds more light on the positive and negative 
dimensions of acculturation.   
5.2.1: Additive acculturation 
The substance of acculturation is not to be viewed completely 
negatively; it has a positive dimension too, as the culture of certain ethnic 
groups gets enriched due to additive acculturation. As we discussed above, 
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additive acculturation adds to other cultures, enriching them greatly, and helps 
that maintain their new complex repertoire.  
Malays have contributed immensely to the existing cultural repertoire 
of Sri Lankans. As such, it can be considered as an additive acculturation. The 
numerically smaller but more influential Malay community has contributed 
enoromously to the other cultures in Sri Lanka.  For instance, the sarong, 
lower garment of Sinhalese and Moor men, which is today considered as their 
traditional dress, is in fact an introduction from the Malay world. The 
Sinhalese term for the garment, sarama as well as the Moorish / Tamil term 
for it, sarem, both have their etimological orign in the Malay sarung or 
sarong.375 Most of the people in Sri Lanka, regardless of ethnic, cultural, caste 
and class differences, prefer to wear sarong, mostly at home. Here we see an 
example of not just a Malay contribution of a garment but also a vocabulary to 
the local languages. 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter on the language section, 
Malay language has significantly contributed to the enrichment of local 
vernacular languages, particularly Sinhalese. Here are some 'Sinhalese' words 
that have their etimological origin in the Malay language: pingaana for plate 
(Mal. Pinggan), handa for spoon (Mal. Sendok), giraya for arecanut cutter 
(Mal. girek); oruva for canoe (Mal. Oru-u) and hamban for small seafaring 
crafts (Mal.sampan), the last two of which are related to navigation. There are 
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other words which are related to commerce such as bangasaal for store (Ma. 
bangsal) and gudama for storehouse (Mal. gudang.).376   
Similarly, the Sinhala term karaabu for ear-studs, including the large 
ear-studs worn by the Sinhalese women, has its origins in the Malay Kerabu; 
jaapihiya is knife with a stone-handle and a curve, which is normally worn on 
the waist. This has become part of the traditional Kandyan outfit for male, 
known as mul-anthuma.377  
An important item of Malay cuisine that has become an indispensable 
part of local culinary is the sambola, which is made of grate coconut, onion, 
chilies, lime juice and salt. This is relished by both the Sinhalese and Moors. 
The tamil term sambal for it is a derivation from the Malay sambola. There is 
also the dodol, an oily, dark-brownish and cakish food, which is made of rice 
flour, coconut milk, sugar, jaggery or treacle. Dodol which is widely prepared 
in Sinhalese and Moorish homes likewise has its origins in the Malay 
sweetmeat of the same name. Similarly, vattalappam, which has its root in 
Malay sirikaaya,378 has now become a favorite dish of Sri Lankan Malays.  
While elaborating the role of Malay culture upon the local culture, 
Arfeen, a clerk in the high court in Colombo, observes:  
“Non-Malays have emulated some elements of our culture, so well - 
songs, dances, cuisine, and dresses. However, they are poor imitators 
when it comes to preparing our cuisines.”   
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The same sentiment is also expressed by Honieda Packeer, the 
president of WASLAM (Women Association of Sri Lankan Malays):  
“Malay dress and cuisine are unique and distinct from others. Others 
copy our clothes and cuisine. Yet the Malay cuisine, prepared by non-
Malays, is no match for our own preparation. We are the experts!” 
The above references indicate the additive dimension of acculturation 
of Malay culture. Through the introduction of their cuisine, costume, music 
and so on, they have contributed a lot to the enrichment of local cultural stock. 
However, what is also interesting in the assertions of both Arfeen and Honeida 
is that, although they accept that their culture has been adopted by other 
communities, they contrast this adoption with their (still much refined) own 
way of preparing Malay cuisines and costumes. Other culture have a lot of 
catching up to do to match the Malays in these respects.  
Similarly, a lot of the Malays whom I met during my fieldwork are 
proud of their cultural contribution to the local culture.  
TK. Samad, a retired post office worker from Nawalapitiya notes: 
“Our dishes such as nasi goreng, vattalappam, sambola, dodol, 
sirikaya, pittu are all there in local restaurants, and this makes us very 
proud. Our contribution to the local culture is so great!”  
Talking about the Malay culture, Azoor, a prominent lawyer and the 
president of COSLAM points out:  
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“Satay, Nasi goreng (fried rice) and sirikaya (vattalappam) are there in 
the local non-Malay restaurants. Malay cuisine is still in vogue with a 
lot of non- Malays.” 
Thajudeen Girsy, a business man from Colombo observes: 
 
“Non-Malays prefer to wear batik shirts and are fond of nasi goreng. 
In the weddings of Moors, Malay pickles and sirikaaya (vattalappam) 
are quite common!”  
What is interesting in the above references in terms of the additive 
acculturation of Malays is that Malays are deeply content with and proud of 
the way in which their culture has added to and enriched the local culture. One 
cannot miss the presence of their cuisine in local restaurants. Many of the 
restaurants in Sri Lanka that I have patronized, irrespective of which ethnic 
group the owners belong to, invariably have on their menu nasi goring (fried 
rice) and sirikaya (vattalappam). Thajudeen Girsy also states that non-Malays 
adopt Malay cuisine and costumes. Most importantly, he points out that the 
Moors include the Malay cuisine in their choice of food items in their wedding 
ceremonies. For instance, Moors include vattalappam as a dessert. This goes 
to show the rich dimension of additive acculturation of Sri Lankan Malays.  
To corroborate the argument on the aspect of additive acculturation of 
Malays, we can look at the language skills of Malays. Sri Lankan Malays, 
unlike other ethnic communities in the island, generally speaking, are multi-
lingual. In addition to their hard work, it was due to their multilingual abilities 
that Malays came to occupy important positions in the three armed forces of 
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Sri Lanka, the fire service, plantation sector and civil services. The following 
are some excerpts from both Malays and non-Malays that shed light on the 
multi-lingual abilities of Malays. 
Ramola, a researcher from Kelaniya University: “Unlike others, 
Malays are multi-lingual; more importantly many Malay words are 
used by non-Malays as well.”  
Nafeel Dulapaandan, from Champa Lane, Trincomalee: “Malays are 
multi-lingual as they are able to speak Malay, Sinhala and Tamil.”  
Nazeer, a Moor from Colombo: “Malays are multi-lingual: they are 
conversant in Sinhala, Tamil, English and Malay.”  
Sulfika, a Moor and an employee of a non-governmental organization 
in Colombo: “Malays are a salaried community in Sri Lanka. They are 
ideal candidates for employers because of their multi-lingual ability, 
loyalty and hard-work.”          
The above excerpts are a clear demonstration of the additive 
acculturation of Malays. Apart from Malays being multi-lingual, Ramola 
underlines the fact that the Malay words or language entering the local 
languages is additive acculturation. It should also be noted that Malays have 
enriched their cultural and language stock by mastering the vernacular and 
English languages. Malays and non-Malays, like Sulfika and Nazeer, also 
agree that the Malays are multi-lingual and that is the reason why their 
presence in the government sectors has become quite widespread. This clearly 
underlines the fact that multi-lingual capabilities of Malays certainly elevated 
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them to the top positions in the government sectors. It is not just the urban 
Malays who are multi-lingual, the rural Malays too are a multi-lingual. We 
have empirical evidence to show that Malays in the remote parts of 
Trincomalee and Ampara are good in English and, in recent years, have shown 
a great interest in improving it further. The following are some of their 
remarks of Malays from these areas: 
Yousuf Harith, who had worked for a private company prior to his 
retirement: “You know… Malays in this country can speak Malay, 
Sinhala and English, but not Tamil.” 
Tuan Raheem, a retired government servant: “Malays are multi-lingual 
here… they are only weak in Tamil language. They are particularly 
good in English and Sinhala. Our youth are interested in studying in 
Sinhala and English medium school these days.”   
Malays lacking competency in Tamil is a rare phenomenon. It is 
witnessed only among a few who live in remote areas in the Ampara district, 
and are dominated by Sinhalese. By and large, it is clear that Malays in Sri 
Lanka are multi-lingual, which isn’t generally the case with other 
communities.    
Another interesting fact I have noticed during my field study is that 
there are quite a few non-Malays living in Kirinda - some Sinhalese and 
Tamils - who are using Malay language for their inter-personal 
communication with the Malays. This is a very clear example of additive 
acculturation of Malays, which is a result of intense communal interaction 
having happened for many long years.  
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Alamudeen, the principal of Kirinda Maha vidyalaya, observes: 
“Though a Tamil Catholic, my neighbour speaks Malay language quite 
well; we interact with him in Malay language.”  
The following respondents also share the same view that non-Malays 
in Kirinda and a couple of other areas too are familiar with Malay language.  
TK.Azoor, the president of COSLAM: “In Kirinda, even the Sinhalese 
speak Malay. Instead of becoming influenced by the Sinhalese, the 
Malays have actually influenced the Sinhalese there.” 
Nazeera Amit, a retired teacher from Hambantota: “In this area, 
Sinhalese and some Moors speak Malay language for their day-to-day 
interaction with Malays.”  
Thajudeen Girsy, a business man from Colombo: “Sometimes back, 
when you did your shopping in Slave Island, you could always ask for 
what you want in the Malay language, even though the owners of those 
shops were Tamils or Sinhalese. They all knew some Malay.  
However, this is now fast changing.” 
The above excerpts clearly demonstrate the degree of influence the 
Malay language has had upon the Sinhalese, Moors and others in areas like 
Kirinda and Hambantota. What this goes to show is that if Malays were not as 
thinly dispersed among the core communities as they currently are, the Malay 
influence on core communities would have been far greater. Such was the 
effect of Malays in areas like Hambantota and Slave Island that these towns 
were considered virtual Malay enclaves. Members of core ethnic groups in 
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them were good in the Malay language. However, this situation cannot be 
witnessed anymore there, due to planned colonization and the sudden burst of 
non-Malay people in these places. This is reflected in the assertion of 
Thajudeen Girsy above. It is interesting, however, to note that Nazeera Amit 
mentions that some of the non-Malays are still using Malay language for their 
interpersonal communication with Malays. This is a clear manifestation of the 
additive acculturation of Malays influencing the non-Malays (the core ethnic 
groups) in Sri Lanka. 
Some of the old traditions and rituals of Malays have now been 
emulated by the Sinhalese and Tamils. Talking about this aspect, Muan 
Ameen, the vice president of SLAMAC and a business man, notes: 
“We had a number of traditions and rituals such as the Jawzan festival 
of Indonesia, which we used to commemorate in the olden days in 
Slave Island area for 10 consecutive days during the month of Asura, 
with a procession with dances, songs, china-footing (a form of martial 
art) and so on. These rituals are not practiced by the Malays any more 
due to the realization that they have no Islamic basis, but the Sinhalese 
and Tamils have adopted this festival. Thevadutu perehara of 
Sinhalese, which is celebrated over a period of 7 days, with a big pirith 
ceremony in the temple, and the Aaadi Vel festival of Tamils are 
simply an imitation of the Jawzan festival of Malays. The martial art of 
China-footing, which has its roots in Malaya, is still practiced in 
certain Sinhala villages.”  
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 The Sinhalese and Tamils emulating the rituals and traditions of early 
Malays, even though the Malays have already given them up, is evidence of 
the degree to which the additive acculturation of Malays has impacted the 
local culture. Many practices and festivals, which Malays gave up on the 
realization that they were un-Islamic, have now become part of the culture of 
the core ethnic groups.  
 By and large, the relationship between the Malay and the local cultures 
has been quite reciprocal in Sri Lanka, with each culture giving as well as 
taking from the other culture in terms of language, costumes, cuisine and so 
on.  Acceptance of minority culture by the dominant host cultures can help the 
former in its continued survival. Additive culture does not necessarily lead to 
the deterioration of the ethnic identity of the minorities.  If Malay cultural 
inventory and Malay ethnicity have been affected, it is not due to the additive 
acculturation of Malays. What actually led to the corruption and the virtual 
extinction of Malay culture, however, is the other dimension of acculturation, 
that is, the substitutive acculturation shaping the Malay community in Sri 
Lanka.  
Thus, the following section deals in detail with the substitutive 
acculturation of the Malays in Sri Lanka.    
5.2.2: Substitutive acculturation 
While additive acculturation involves adding norms, values and other 
traditions to, and enriching the existing culture of dominant ethnic groups, the 
substitutive acculturation replaces aspects of the weaker ethnic group’s culture 
with aspects borrowed from others. The dimension of substitutive 
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acculturation compromises the intergrity of the culture and ethnicity of 
minority group. This is what has happened to the Malay culture; it has been 
influenced greatly by substitutive acculturation. The following remarks of 
various respondents accentuate the argument.   
Nazeera Amit, a retired teacher from Hambantota: “Increasing number 
of Malay women have chosen to wear abaya and hijab. This is just 
replacement of Malay costumes with Moors costumes.”   
Arfeen, a government servant from Enderamulla: “Nobody is wearing 
the Malay costumes and eating Malay cuisines here, except for 
wedding ceremonies or some special occasions.” 
Salley, a retired civil servant from Ganesapura: “Our Malay culture has 
almost died out in our area because of certain influences, particularly 
the intense interaction between the Moors and Malays.” 
Azoor, a prominent lawyer from Colombo:  
Malay traditions have become almost extinct. I would say almost 90 percent of our 
old customs have disappeared. Malays, being a small community, could not 
withstand the influences of other cultures. We generally follow the customs and 
traditions of the Moors in the belief that they are Islamic, since we too want to adopt 
authentic Islamic practices with regard to wedding, funeral etc.”  
Nazurdeen from Slave Island, Colombo:  
“Our culture has been mixed up with Moorish and Islamic cultures. 
Malay males have also begun to wear trousers and t-shirt; females 
abaya and salwaar with hijab.” 
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Mr. Alamudeen, the principal of Kirinda Muslim Maha Vidiyalaya: 
“We also follow the cultures of other communities. However, we are 
more conscious of our ethnic identity such as our ancestry.”  
Laxana Faroon, from Matale Malay Association: “Malays are 
following certain elements of Muslim culture. In urban areas, unlike in 
the rural areas, very few Malays wear short-skirts and blouse. Mostly, 
they have adopted the Islamic culture these days.”   
Roshana, an English teacher from Nawalapitiya: “We follow certain 
elements of Moorish and Sinhalese cultures, but at the same time, other 
ethnic groups too copy some of our cultural practices.”  
The above excerpts are from a large representation of Malays from all 
over the country. They all accept the fact that their culture has been influenced 
by other dominant cultures. In other words, substitutive acculturation has 
greatly influenced the Malay costumes and cuisine. Malays enumerate many 
reasons for this substitutive acculturation: Alamudeen from Kirinda notes that 
even though the Malays have adopted the dominant core culture, they are 
conscious of their Malay ancestry; Roshana also believes that the Malay 
culture has influenced other local cultures and, at the same time, Malays too 
have been copying some aspects of the core communities' culture. 
The following two tables highlight responses of the participants in the 
FGDs, conducted in both urban and rural areas. They shed light on the way in 
which the acculturation has challenged the cultural elements of Malays, 














Not at all Remarks 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 10 Male 
participants 




in the FGD 
Language √√√√ √√ √√√√ √ √√ √   
Cuisines √√√√
√√ 
√√ √√√ √ √    
Costumes √√√√
√ 
√√√ √√√√√ √     
Values and 
norms 





√√√ √√√√√ √     
Others √√√√
√√√ 
√√ √√ √√     
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√√√ √√ √√√ √    
Costumes √√√√√
√√√ 










√√√√  √√     
Others √√√√√
√√√√ 
√√√√  √√     
 
The above tables suggests that the Malay participants of FGD, who 
were drawn from urban as well as rural areas, consider that the acculturation 
has greatly impacted on the Malay cultural elements such as language, cuisine, 
costumes, values and norms, and rituals and traditions, endangering their 
ethnic identity. Nevertheless, the situtaiton between the rural and urban Malay 
areas are not the same. The majority of Malay participants from the FGD 
conducted in Slave Island (urban area) believe that acculturation has seriously 
impacted on the Malay language, but Malays in Kirinda (rural area) disagree. 
Eight of the participants from Kirinda believe that the Malay language remains 
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unadulterated. This maybe due to the large presence of Malays in Kirinda, 
regarded as a Malay enclave, which gives them the opportunity to use the 
Malay language as their mother tongue for their interpersonal 
communications. In Kirinda, Malay language, instead of being affected by 
other langauges, has in fact impacted on other langauges. As has been noted 
before, In Kirinda, Malay language is being used not only for intra Malay 
community converstations but also for the inter community communications.  
From the above, it is clear that the acculturation has caused immense 
challenges to the cultural elements of the Malays, as shown in the above table. 
The wide prevalence of sarees among the Malays is a clear example of 
substitutive acculturation.  During my fieldwork in Kirinda, Ambalantota, 
Slave Island and several other villages in Trincomalee, I saw many old Malay 
women wearing them. Malays appear to have borrowed this costume from 
fellow Moorish women, who previously had borrowed it from South Indians. 
A lot of Malay ladies were also wearing salwar, abaya or hijab, the first of 
which is from South India, while the last two are from Arabia. This has been 
explicitly noted in the account of Asiff Hussain (2007)379 who underlines the 
fact that Malay costumes and cuisines are in no way different from that of 
Moors: a lot of Malay men wear shirts and sarongs, while a lot of Malay 
women have taken to wearing the Salvar Kamiz, often with a scarf to cover 
their hair; the staple food of the Malays today consists of rice and curry, 
similar to that of the Moors.  
                                                 
379 Hussein, Sarandib: An ethnological study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka, 441,445. 
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The same view has also been expressed by BDK. Saldin (1993)380 
regarding Malay costumes. He too assents that the present Malay generation 
wear costumes that are similar to what the other Sri Lankan communities 
wear; only on rare occasions are they observed to be wearing songkho or 
sarong kebya or baju kurung. To a large extent, the cultural uniqueness of 
Malays in their dresses has disappeared. Many factors contribute to this 
present tendency of substitutive acculturation, which will be taken up for 
discussion in another section in this chapter. Here, we are making the point 
that the degree of substitutive acculturation affecting the Malays in Sri Lanka 
is quite significant. 
In the above excerpts, Arfeen stresses that Malay culture has been 
limited to weddings and other rare special functions. Commenting further on 
the aspects of substitutive acculturation of Malays, Mr. Arfeen avers:  
“Influence of Moorish culture upon the Malays is widespread: for 
instance, their matrimonial system of presenting gold to the groom 
during weddings has now entered our own culture. Some conservative 
Malays still prefer to have Malay songs, dances and pantungs in the 
wedding halls, but again... this is quite rare.”   
His assertion goes to show that a lot of the customs noticeable in 
Malay weddings are customs borrowed from the Moorish culture. Saldin 
(2003)381 also notes that the Malay culture, as it can be observed today, is 
clearly Sri Lankan: their funeral and wedding customs are almost identical to 
                                                 
380 Saldin, “Malays-their cultural identity,” 01. 
 
381 Saldin, Portrait of a Sri Lankan Malay, 79. 
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that of Moors. The matrimonial system of presenting gifts to the groom by the 
bride’s family reflects the intrusion of dominant Moor’s wedding customs into 
the weddings of Malays. According to Arfeen, this has largely shaped the 
wedding customs of Malays. His assertion further suggests that what little 
Malay culture that is left in the wedding such as songs, dances and pantungs 
also threaten to go extinct - only a few Malays prefer to keep them alive in 
Malay weddings these days. Asiff (2007)382 argues that dowry, which is 
derived from the Indian matrimonial system, is quite pervasive among the Sri 
Lankan Moors today. So is the practice of the groom placing a necklace round 
the bride’s neck. This practice is known as Thali ceremony, which the Moors 
had first borrowed from South Indian Hindus. All of these alien cultural 
practices have become an important part of Malay wedding these days. This 
shows to what extent the Moorish cultural has invaded the Malay culture, the 
weddings in this case, endangering the distinct cultural inventory of Malays. 
All this evidence goes to show that the dimension of substitutive acculturation 
is pervasive among the Malays in Sri Lanka.    
In sharing the same view on the substitutive acculturation of Malays, 
Hussainmiya illustrated in my interview:   
“Original traditional Malay practices have almost disappeared, but the 
older generation keeps only the language and adat. Moorish or Tamil 
customs have made inroads into Malay customs. Malay Satay is there, 
but Sri Lankan Malay Satay is nothing more than a Sri Lankan hot 
Satay. There in the Malay world, Satay will be sweeter as they add 
                                                 
382 Hussein, Sarandib: An ethnological study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka,  440. 
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ground nuts. Malay cuisine such as pastol, though still available in 
some of the Malay houses, is almost like a local pettees with offal.”   
While subscribing to the point of substitutive acculturation of Malays 
resulting from the intrusion of Moorish and Tamils’ cultures, Hussainmiya 
notes that some elements of Malay culture are still prevalent among the older 
Malays. This suggests that it is mainly the younger generation of Malays 
whose culture, in the face of modernization, urbanization and the influence of 
majority communities, has become corrupt. Many young Malays I met and 
talked to, particularly in urban areas such as Colombo, Kandy and 
Hambantota, are showing little interest in learning or speaking Malay 
language. Instead, they give priority to learning and speaking in vernacular 
language such as Sinhala, Tamil or English, since there is a greater 
commercial value in those languages. Young Malays are continuing to adopt 
the culture of majority communities as they intensely interact with them in the 
sphere of education, neighborhood, workplaces and so on. This shows that the 
ethnic Malay identity among the younger generation has become less 
important, as they get submerged in substitutive acculturation. It is also clear 
from his assertion that even those hitherto surviving aspects of Malay culture, 
such as Malay cuisine and so on, have now accrued some kind of indigenous 
Sri Lankan flavor, and are not entirely like those from the Malay world. BDK 
Saldin (2003)383 notes that customs relating to Malay girls attaining puberty 
are imitations of Sinhalese customs in urban areas.  
In addition, elaborating on the urban and rural dimension of 
substitutive acculturation, the well-known writer BDK Saldin, observes that:  
                                                 
383 Saldin, Portrait of a Sri Lankan Malay. Colombo: Nihon printers, 35. 
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“Malay cultures such as Sarong and Batik Shirt have died out. People 
in urban areas don’t even follow the Malay culture so much. 
Westernization that began in 1920s has influenced the lifestyle of 
Malays. But, the rural Malays are still following the customs.”  
The same view is also shared by Ramola Rasool, a researcher of Malay 
community and an academic of Kelaniya University, as she maintains:  
“Cultural practices of urban area Malays, such wedding, costumes and 
so on, are carbon-copy practices of the Westerner and the Moor. Malay 
culture, however, is quite prominently visible in rural areas. If there is 
a wedding in Kirinda for instance, Malays would invite almost 
everyone in the village, and it becomes a communal affair attended by 
the whole community. With the active involvement of extended family 
members, the party would go on for about three days, during which 
they cook a lot of nice food.  It is an expensive affair.” 
The above excerpt illustrates the dimension of substitutive 
acculturation, which is prevalent more among the Malays living in urban areas 
than it is among their rural counterparts, as the former are more exposed to the 
Moorish culture and the ubiquitous Western cultural assault. The influence of 
such Westernization and urbanization is comparatively less noticeable among 
the rural Malays; they are still continuing to perpetuate some aspects of Malay 
culture. This assertion is partially true according to my own observation of 
Malays in rural areas like Kirinda and Ambalantota.  
I observed that Malay language (Sri Lankan Malay) is still the home 
language for the rural Malays, which is a rare phenomenon among the urban 
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Malays. Many of the urban Malays have adopted either Sinhala or English as 
their home language for various reasons, as discussed in the previous chapter 
under the section of Language as a Marker of Ethnic Identity. Among those 
rural Malays, Malay cuisine is still on the table, whereas among the urban 
Malays, it is largely confined to special occasions. During my fieldwork in 
Kirinda, some local Malays accorded me the honor of enjoying a couple of 
meals with them. I tasted some traditional Malay cuisines such as pittu with 
coconut milk and baabath curry, and nasi. Some elements of Malay culture, 
particularly their cuisines, are still alive among the rural Malays, though they 
are not so easily noticeable among the urban Malays.  
 However, this assumption about rural Malays is somewhat 
problematic and invites debate. Kirinda, it can be argued, is just an exception 
among all Malay areas. Except the Malays of Kirinda, those in other rural 
areas have embraced Sinhala, Tamil or English as their home language, to a 
very large extent.  
Talking about the language aspect, Yousuf Harith, a retired private 
company employee from Tissapura, a village in Ampara district, notes:  
“Although we use Malay language to interact with our Malay 
colleagues, it is difficult for us to use it with our children at home 
because they pursue their studies in Sinhala or English. We always use 
Sinhala to talk to them.”  




“We would love to talk to our children in Malay language, but our 
children, for their medium of studies is Sinhala, prefer to speak to us in 
Sinhala. We are able to use Malay only with our older friends and 
relatives.”  
In the above excerpts are an explicit manifestation of the pervasive 
dimension of substitutive acculturation of Malays in the rural areas. It is 
observed that Malays in Ampara district are living mostly in predominantly 
Sinhalese areas like Tissapura, Gemunpura, Vijitha and Jayanthi Pura, to name 
just a few. Their children are pursuing their studies in Sinhala or English 
medium. Hence the present generation of Malays in these rural villages has 
adopted the Sinhala language as their primary language. Malay language is 
largely confined to the older people.  
The same is also the case with the rural Malays in Trincomalee district. 
Despite  Nafeel Dulapandan’s claim that Malay language still remains intact in 
those areas, I noticed him talking to his own son in Sinhala language on a 
number of occasions during the interview. I have even observed some Malays 
in Champa Lane and Ganespura areas, both male and female, using Tamil 
language for their interpersonal communication with others in those areas. 
(Tamil is the mother tongue of Sri Lankan Moors and Tamils). In addition, it 
was also observed that Tuan Sahabdeen from Trincomale was talking to his 
family members in Tamil. Malays living among the core communities, if they 
have not been already, are vulnerable to be shaped by the language of the 
respective communities.  
In the villages of both Trincomale and Ampara, depending on which 
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language speakers they are dominated by, Malays have adopted either Tamil 
or Sinhala as their home language.  This is in contrast to the situation of 
Malays living in Kirinda, which is also a rural village. Unlike their fellow 
brothern in other rural areas, Malays in Kirinda are still perpetuating their 
culture such as the Malay language and cuisine. So Kirinda is an extraordinary 
exception. In other rural areas, except Kirinda, Malay culture is largely 
confined to the older generation. There is no significant difference between the 
young and the old Malays in urban areas, for neither of them are perpetuating 
their culture. This is yet another further proof of the detrimental effect of 
substitutive acculturation on the Malays in rural areas, where it has come to a 
point where Malays are not able to distinguish, even conceptually, between 
aspects of Malay culture and those of the core communities. The following 
excerpt of Tuan Sahabdeen from Trincomalee substantiates the claim: 
“As we are living among the Moors here, there is no difference 
between our cultures; our cuisines, dress etc are all the same.”  
TJ Packeer Ali also observes:  
“Malay women were almost like Burgers those days. Now, 
Alhamdulillah, majority of them wear hijab and abaya due to the 
concerted efforts of Islamic organizations.”  
Generally speaking, the Moorish culture has significantly influenced 
the Malays, relegating it to a situation where the Malays have become 
indistinguishable from fellow Moorish Muslims, in terms of culture. Packeer 
Ali, when I met him for the interview, was dressed in Saudi Arabian cultural 
costumes. There was in him the unmistakable influence of the transnational 
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Islamic movements, which are working in Malay areas. Similarly, in places 
like Kirinda, Ambalantota, Champa lane, Ganesapura, and Trinomalee town, I 
observed that many elderly Malay women too were dressed in sarees, while 
younger Malay women were dressed in abaya and hijab. In the Ampara 
district, I observed that the Malay women there were dressed in short frocks, 
which were very similar to what the Sinhalese women wear. From our 
discussion so far, the effect of substitutive acculturation on the language and 
culture of rural Malays is clearly evident. It endangers the ethnic identity of 
Sri Lankan Malays. As we have already said, substitutive acculturation is 
rampant not only among the urban Malays, but the rural Malays, too.   
 To sum up, the above discussion helps us understand the effect of 
substitutive acculturation on Malay language, costumes and cuisine. We have 
already said that only some elements of culture, such as Malay costumes, are 
being practiced; but that too only on special occasions like weddings and 
festivals. However, some Malays disagree with such claims, arguing that the 
Moorish culture has completely replaced even those aspects of Malay cultures 
associated with weddings these days. They hold Malay culture is completely 
dead. This shows the level of impact substitutive acculturation among the 
Malays has on Malay culture and ethnicity. It has also become clear that some 
elements of Malay culture are confined to the older Malays; among the 
younger Malays, Malay culture tends to be less noticeable as they are more 
intensely affected by the substitutive acculturation of the core groups. The 
substitutive acculturation has not affected the rural and urban Malays evenly. 
While Malays living in the rural Malay enclave of Kirinda continue to 
perpetuate some elements of Malay culture, including Malay language and 
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cuisine, urban Malays as well as those rural Malays living in villages other 
than Kirinda, such as in the rural areas of Trincomalee and Ampara district, 
are not perpetuating the Malay culture, since they have been extensively 
exposed to local culture and been integrated with core ethnic groups. This 
poses a great challenge to the perpetuation of Malay culture and ethnicity of 
Malays in future in Sri Lanka, given that their younger generation is 
submerged in substitutive acculturation. It has been noted that the substitutive 
acculturation that is prevalent among the Malays is the direct outcome of 
many factors.  
Thus, the next section delves into those factors contributing to the 
substitutive acculturation of Malays.    
 
5.3: Causes of substitutive acculturation 
Since the culture and ethnicity of Malays are compromised due to 
substitutive acculturation from the core ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, it is 
important to explore those factors contributing to substitutive acculturation. 
Having examined the trend of assimilation of minority ethnic groups in the 
USA, Gordon (1978)384 and Yinger (1994)385 outlined the following as the 
causes influencing such trend.  
I. Absence of prejudice,  
II. Absence of discrimination, and  
III. Absence of value and power conflicts.  
                                                 
384 Gordon, Human nature, Class and Ethnicity, 69. 
 
385 Yinger, Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict,  53-54. 
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Though acculturation does not necessarily lead to assimilation, 
substitutive acculturation, however, does play a significant role in the 
assimilation of minority ethnic groups into the core groups. As such, the above 
mentioned features have much relevance to the existence of substitutive 
acculturation of the Malays in Sri Lanka.  
5.3.1: Lack of prejudice or discrimination against Malays by others  
Since the Malay community has immensely contributed to the socio-
political development of Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan Malays are considered as an 
integral part of the nation by other communities; they do not suffer any 
prejudice. As discussed in the third chapter, Malays have enormously 
contributed to the safety and security of the country by serving in the security 
establishments (police, army, navy and intelligence services) during colonial 
and post-independence periods. They are so well integrated with every 
dominant community they happen to live with, be it the majority Sinhalese or 
the minority Tamils and Moors. Consequently, this has created in the minds of 
Sri Lankans a positive impression about Malays: they are seen as loyal, 
honest, genuine and patriotic people. Many of the Malays I talked to during 
the interviews and Focus Group Discussions recounted their well known 
contributions to the country: they were warriors not only during the colonial 
period, but also the post-colonial period.  All of them were proud of their 
history in Sri Lanka. Thus, Malays - both young and old - instinctively have a 
sense of strong loyalty to the country and feel very strongly that they are an 
inseparable component of the Sri Lankan nation.  
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Malays also take pride in their exceptionally well-liked qualities such 
as their military prowess - a quality that earned them great respect from the 
British colonial administration as well as Kandyan kings. For instance, 
Reimers (1924)386, a colonial writer, states: “The Ceylon Malay community of 
today are noted for their loyalty and modesty, qualities which they have 
inherited from their virile ancestors, who during their long association with the 
Dutch and later, the British, have always been true to their salt” 
Jamal Mohamed, the president of Mabola Malay Association notes:  
“During the Kandyan War, 150 Malays were shot dead by the British 
for giving protection to King Rajasingham. The Malays could have 
simply surrendered to the British forces. As you know, there were 
some Malays serving with the British too, just like there were Malays 
serving as part of the Sinhalese forces guarding the King Rajasinghe. 
But, Malays never betrayed the King. They chose to lay down their 
lives in defense of their king, Rajasinghe.  The loyalty and bravery of 
our forefathers is so great.” 
This goes to show that loyalty and honesty are an integral part of their 
self-identity in Sri Lanka. Many of the non-Malays I interviewed also hold the 
same view about the Malays.  
Ziyath, a Moor from Colombo observes: 
“Malays are loyal, hardworking and trustworthy people. They have 
enormously contributed to the socio-cultural stock of the country. The 
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Sinhalese extremists, such as Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force) 
hail Malays for their contribution to the country, and spare Malays 
their usual vitriolic hatred.”  
Sagara, a Sinhalese employee of a research institute in Colombo, notes: 
“Malays are honest, loyal and hardworking people. They are 
multilingual, too. Their contribution to the country, especially its 
sovereignty, is invaluable. They have integrated well with other 
communities in Sri Lanka, especially with Sinhalese.” 
Talking about the Malays’ characteristics, Ravi Shanker, a Tamil 
Marketing executive from Colombo, avers:  
“Malays are affable, loyal, honest and multi-skilled people. They know 
how to get along with other people, irrespective of religious, ethnic, 
class or caste differences.”       
The above excerpts are explicit testimonies to the positive impression 
that members of the core ethnic communities such as Sinhalese, Tamils and 
Moors have of Malays. There is no criticism against them whatsoever from 
anyone; everyone credits Malays for their loyalty, honesty, hard work and 
multilingual abilities. This contrasts with the negative stereotyping of Malays 
in Singapore where they are regarded as lazy, dull, and drug addicts.387 This 
‘cultural deficit thesis’ of Malays in the Malay world has significantly been 
subscribed to by a lot of Malays and non-Malays in the Malay world. Tun 
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Mahathir’s (1982)388 account has attributed the economic backwardness of 
Malays in Malaysia to their indolent nature; the dominant Singapore 
discourses too have carried the same narrative about the Malays.389 However, 
this stereotyping of Malays has explicitly been refuted by some Malay 
scholars, particularly by Alatas (1977) in his scholarly work, “Myth of the 
Lazy Natives”, in which he argues that the image of Malays as lazy natives is 
a construct of the colonialists and, in fact, has been reproduced in the post-
colonial period as well; 390 and by Rahim (1998)391 who debunked the cultural 
deficit thesis of Malays in Singapore. It may be true that the negative portrayal 
of Malays in the Malay world has no basis whatsoever, and the negative 
stereotyping they continue to suffer is the work of the unscrupulous 
colonialists who wanted to reduce them into subjects unworthy of self-
governance. Nevertheless, the negative picture we have of the Malays in the 
Malay world in the public discourse, when contrasted with the positive 
impression people have of the local Malays in Sri Lanka, helps us visualize the 
high esteem the local Malays enjoy with the locals in Sri Lanka. This is 
interesting when we bear in mind that the genesis of the local Malays began in 
Malay Archipelago during the colonial period.  
Ziyath emphasizes that the Sinhalese extremists and its cohorts such as 
Bodu Bala Sena (Sinhala Power Force), who are now in the process of 
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whipping up anti-Muslim hatred, arguably with blessings from the rulers, 
exclude the Malays from their vitriolic campaign against the Moorish 
Muslims, even though Malay too are Muslims like the Moors. This is a solid 
evidence of the high esteem Malays enjoy. Thus, this positive impression of 
Malays precludes others (Sinhalese, Tamils and Moors) from pursuing any 
prejudicial or discriminatory acts against the Malays. As such, lack of 
stereotyping and discrimination against them enables them to effectively 
integrate with other communities in the country, thereby resulting in 
substitutive acculturation. The above excerpts also underline the positive 
impression that members of core communities have of Malays. Thus, it can be 
safely concluded that absence of prejudice and discrimination against Malays 
by others in the present Sri Lanka is one of the reasons that contribute to the 
substitutive acculturation of Malay. This has the potential to endanger their 
ethnicity.      
5.3.2: Influence of Thowheeth Jamath (Wahhabi movement), 
Thabligh Jamath, and Other Islamic Renaissance Movements 
When discussing substitutive acculturation among Sri Lankan Malays, 
one’s attention is invariably drawn to the influence of Islamic movements such 
as Thowheeth Jamath392 and Tabligh Jamath393 which were founded in Sri 
Lanka in the 1940s and 1950s respectively; and the effect of the Islamic 
renaissance of the 1970s, which Malays in Sri Lanka were exposed to, 
following the policy of economic liberalization introduced by the then 
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government of Sri Lanka. The government, saddled with a great burden of 
unemployment, saw a prospect for reducing the burden of unemployment in 
exporting the country’s surplus labor to Middle East, and therefore it 
introduced the liberalization policy. This led to hundreds of thousands of 
Muslims, including the Malays, leaving Sri Lanka for Saudi Arabia and other 
Middle Eastern countries. This in turn led to these workers coming directly 
under the influence of a very conservative Wahhabi orientation in Saudi 
Arabia.394  
Consequently, those Malays and Moors who were exposed to Wahhabi 
religious orientation in Saudi Arabia, when they returned back to the country, 
began to perpetuate among their communities those ideals they adopted form 
Saudi Arabia, the end result of which was the substitutive acculturation of 
Malays. In expounding the effects of Islamic movements on Malay culture, 
Prof Hussainmiya illustrates: 
“Because of the media, mainly the electronic media, Malay women 
tend to wear Malay forms of dresses with some kind of mixture of Sri 
Lankan dress; not Baaju Kurang. They tend to wear Javanese or Malay 
dresses for special social functions. Malays should not be copying the 
dress of Tamils or the Moor. Strong influence of da’wa movements, 
especially Wahhabism and Tabligh and the preaching of those 
returning from the Middle East, having worked there as housemaids or 
in other menial category of jobs, result in changes happening to Malay 
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culture; particularly the abaya and hijab has taken the Malay dresses 
completely out of the picture.” 
Sharing the same view as Hussainmiya was Brigadier Bohran, a retired 
army officer from Colombo:  
“The moment Malays started going to Middle East for foreign 
employment, they began bringing in Arabic culture here. In weddings, 
Arab songs are played and people wear white dresses. We have been 
absorbing Indian before. Now we have begun to absorb Arabic culture. 
We were ignorant of Arabic culture those days as many people did not 
go to Middle East. Our culture is now being influenced by the Arabic 
culture. People are willingly embracing it because of the religion being 
common between us. But, it seriously affects culture.”  
In talking about the intrusion of Arabic culture into Malay culture, 
Jamal Mohamed, the president of Mabola Malay Association notes:  
“The effect of the wider Islamic renaissance that began in the 1970s 
affects the culture of Malays: some of the Moors and Malays have got 
the culture and religion mixed up. The two are entirely different things. 
Culture is followed by people based on their particular contexts. For 
instance, Islam prescribes that women cover their bodies from head to 
toe, but it is the culture that tells us what we colour we should wear. 
So, those in the Middle East wear black abaya, based on their social, 
cultural and weather context, while women in the subcontinent and the 
South Asia choose different coloured clothes to cover their bodies. 
Unfortunately, our Malays, being ignorant of the differences between 
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culture and religious prescriptions, are also adopting the black colour 
which is from the Arab culture. This, I think, is sad.” 
 The above excerpts are self-explanatory: they really reinforce the 
argument that the clout of various Islamic movements such as Wahhabists and 
Tableeq Jamath, and the wave of Islamic renaissance have really endangered 
the identity of Malays. A lot of the Malays do not make any distinction 
between Arab culture and Islam; they end up adopting the Arab culture in the 
belief that they are actually adopting practices from the religion of Islam. 
Hence, the exposure the Malays have had to the Saudi Arabian culture is 
leading to a great deal of substitutive acculturation taking place among 
Malays, which obviously is a threat to their culture and ethnicity in the island.  
5.3.3: Interaction of Malays with core ethnic groups 
Many of my respondents strongly concur with the notion that the 
substitutive acculturation of Malays is a by-product of interaction they 
maintain with core ethnic groups such as the Sinhalese and Moors. Such 
interaction mainly affects the mode of dress and cuisine of Malays. For 
example, instead of the traditional Malay Baju, Malay women invariably wear 
Saree,395 the costume of Moor women, and the men wear trousers. Depending 
on their social status or occasions, they wear a coat too. It is just the ordinary 
Malay who still continues to wear the sarong and shirt. Similarly the cuisine of 
the Malays too is more akin to those of any other Sri Lankan dish, like rice 
                                                 





and curry for main meals.396 This indicates the degree of substitutive 
acculturation of Malays as a result of their interaction with the core ethnic 
groups.  
A handful of affluent Malays adopt in their marriages the practice of 
dowry, which is a borrowing from the Indian culture. This practice is also 
pervasive among the Sri Lankan Moors. Dowry is usually given in a box by 
the bride’s parents to the groom, generally on the registration day.397 However, 
a lot of the rural and urban Malays, who I interviewed and talked to, refute this 
claim. They hold that the practice of dowry is non-existent in their marriages. 
So it is safe to conclude that this practice of dowry is not a widespread 
practice among the Malays, but a rarity only among a handful of affluent 
Malays. Arfeen, a civil servant from Enderamulla, illustrates: 
“The influence of Moorish culture upon the Malays is widespread. For 
instance, gifting gold to the groom during wedding is part of the 
Moor’s culture. It has entered our culture too.” 
Brigadier Bohran, a retired army officer from Colombo, shares the 
same point:  
“We have been absorbing from Indian and Arab culture. What we 
witness in our weddings is the influence of Moor culture, which was 
originally derived from India.” 
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Roshana, a teacher from Nawalapitiya: “We follow certain elements of 
Moor and Sinhalese cultures. The other ethnic groups too have copied 
some of our cultural elements. So there is a bit of reciprocity” 
Tuan Sahabdeen, from Trinco says: “As we are living among the 
Moors here, there is no difference between our culture and their 
culture; our cuisines and dress are all the same.”  
The above excerpts underline the fact the Malays, being a small 
minority community, are having to interact with other core ethnic groups; and 
such interaction, in return, is resulting in the substitutive acculturation, 
whereby aspects of Malay culture are being replaced with aspects from other 
cultures. It is obvious that the interaction of Malays with Moors is 
significantly stronger than with other communities, because the Malays and 
Moors share the same religion of Islam. This kind of intense interaction with 
the Moors has led some Malays to believe that there is no distinction between 
the culture of Malays and that of Moors. 
 Only few use the Malay language as their home language; most have 
chosen other languages, either Tamil or Sinhalese, whichever is dominant in 
their environment. Sinhalese influence upon the cultural elements of Malays in 
urban areas like Colombo, Kandy, Gampaha and so on is so immense. Thus, 
the intense interaction Malays have with other core groups is considered as 
one of the key features contributing to the substitutive acculturation of Malays.   
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5.3.4: Forced acculturation at schools and other places 
The substitutive acculturation of minority ethnic group does not occur 
solely as a result of voluntary interaction with the core ethnic groups. There 
can be instances where the majority ethnic groups may pressurize the minority 
groups to adopt the former’s cultural elements. This can, at times, lead to a 
situation where acculturation can be inhibited among the ethnic groups. Being 
a minority within a minority in a predominantly Buddhist country, Malays are 
going through a lot of challenges at the hands of the core ethnic groups in 
preserving their unique culture. As such, Malays at times are coerced to adopt 
the culture of core ethnic groups due to various reasons. Marjaana, a teacher 
from Hambantota town avers: 
“A lot of the Malays are tempted to join Sinhala Medium School due 
to high competition in the job market. If you don’t have a sound 
knowledge of Sinhala language, your chances of finding jobs in the 
government or private sector are quite remote. So, we lose Malay 
language here. Not only that, when Malay kids join such ethnically 
mixed schools, they are under a lot of pressure to conform to the 
culture of other communities in their dresses and so on. They are not 
allowed to attend school in Salvar and hijab; they must wear short-
frocks just like the Sinhalese. Muslim Malay kids are forced to take 
Buddhism, instead of Islam, as a subject, as there is no teacher to teach 
Islam in those schools.”  
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TJ Packeer Ali, the president of Hunupitiya Malay Association, 
observes: 
“Our children are compelled to study in ethnically mixed schools, 
where the chances of our kids acquiring Islamic values is very poor. A 
conducive educational environment for our young Malays to nourish 
their Malay culture is almost nonexistent.”  
Arfeen, a government servant from Enderamulla, states:  
“Our Malays are compelled to study in Sinhala schools as there is no 
Muslim school here in this area. So, our children automatically get 
influenced by the Sinhalese culture. Often times, there are no facilities 
for our kids to learn Islam in those Sinhalese schools. Our kids are 
taught Buddhism. However, some schools have appointed private 
teachers for teaching Islam, for whom the parents paying the salary.” 
It is very clear from the above excerpts that Malays are compelled by 
circumstances to pursue their studies in Sinhala medium schools, and as a 
result are being exposed to Sinhalese culture, language and dress code. This 
situation is the direct outcome of competition for better education and better 
employment opportunities. Due to the non-availability of teachers to teach 
Islam in those Sinhalese schools, such as those in Hambantota district, Malays 
are having to study Buddhism. This is a problem for Malays whose religion is 
Islam. 
Malay girls are compelled to wear short-frocks, a dress similar to that 
of Sinhalese, when attending schools. This is an unfortunate situation, as this 
forces Malays to undergo substitutive acculturation, endangering their culture 
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and ethnicity in the island. Nevertheless, some schools are showing some 
flexibility and have made some special arrangements for Malay children to 
study Islam, by allowing their parents to hire teachers for teaching Islam. This 
is evident in Arfeen’s excerpts. Overall, Malays living Sinhalese dominated 
areas are subject to substitutive acculturation.          
5.3.5: Westernization and urbanization 
The influence of westernization and urbanization affects the urban 
Malays the most as their environments are awash with Western influences. 
This exposure profoundly affects the culture of Malays, specifically the youth.  
Since the early Malays in Sri Lanka were warriors, serving in the colonial 
military, their exposure to western cultures has a long history. This long 
association of Malays with the colonial rulers had led to the Malays adopting a 
more ‘Western’ lifestyle’.398 This still continues today, endangering their 
culture and ethnicity in the island. BDK. Saldin’s perspective on the negative 
role of westernization and urbanization upon the culture of urban Malays is 
relevant here.  
BDK Saldin states:  
“The Malays in urban areas don’t even follow the Malay culture so 
much. Westernization that began in 1920 has influenced the lifestyle of 
Malays. The older generation somewhat jealously sticks to their 
culture, while younger generation is somewhat oblivious to the 
changes taking place in the form of modernization or globalization.” 
                                                 




The same view is also shared by Ramola Rasool. She maintains:  
“Cultural practices of urban Malays in their weddings, costumes and so 
on are just imitations of western and Moor practices.” 
The above excerpts demonstrate the impact westernization and 
urbanization are having on the cultural elements of urban Malays. As Saldin 
illustrates, the urban lifestyle, with its western education system, is a strong 
catalyst for the changing of culture among younger Malays. The older urban 
Malays are somewhat immune to such big changes. They continue to stick to 
their culture and cherish memories of their lineage Malay Archipelago. As 
such, westernization and urbanization has also been a cause of substitutive 
acculturation of Malays living in urban areas.       
5.3.6: Scattered, and living in areas dominated by other 
communities.  
As a much smaller minority community, Malays today are having to 
live amidst the core communities, namely the Sinhalese, Moors and Tamils. 
During colonial times, however, they managed to live in one central place, 
without being dispursed among other communities as they are doday.  Malays 
had their habitations, complete with Mosques, closer to their battalions. Such 
habitations were like virtual Malay enclaves. Nevertheless, during the Post-
independence era Malays began to scatter around various parts of the island: 
this was due to their professional, economic, personal and other reasons. Lack 
of sufficient living space in urban areas to accommodate the growth in the 
number of Malays was another reason why they had to shift to other locations, 
away from urban areas. This is how the Malay community ended up becoming 
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interspersed with the core groups in various parts of the country, which in turn 
led to them being exposed to the cultural elements of the core communities. 
As such, today, it is an arduous task to be able to locate a Malay enclave in Sri 
Lanka; Kirinda in Hambantota district, which has a predominant Malay 
community, is an exception. In this regard, Gafoor, an executive member of 
Kandy Malay Association, states: 
“In the past, Malays used to live just in one place… even in Kandy in 
the central province of Sri Lanka. But the situation began to change 
during the second and third generation of Malays, when their family 
homes were not enough to accommodate the expanding families. This 
led to the community spreading out across the island. So, the third 
generation Malays settled down in predominantly Sinhala areas and 
established a great deal of network with Sinhalese, while the family 
relationship with their older generation, still living in the centers, 
began to wane. So, this network and interaction with other 
communities, particularly with Sinhalese, corrupted our culture, 
language and subsequently our ethnicity.” 
From the above assertion of Gaffor, it becomes clear that the natural 
growth of Malays in terms of number, as time went on, inevitably led to them 
leaving their established communities and living in the midst of other 
communities, to whose cultural influence they were consequently exposed. 
With no older generation around to culture the younger generation according 
to Malay values, it is hardly surprising that the latter was not able to withstand 
disintegration of its culture, language and other values. Alien cultural aspects 
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have come to replace the fast disappearing Malay culture. That is substitutive 
acculturation.   
5.3.7: Disinterest of the younger generation of Malays 
This is another significant factor that contributes to the substitutive 
acculturation of Malays. Younge Malays being busy in their never-ending 
competition for securing employment leaves them with no time and leisure to 
think about reviving their own culture, even if they wanted to.  Similar is 
outcome of the great exposure of younger Malays to modernization and the 
influences of modern education, which has created in their minds a preference 
for western cultures over their own Malay culture. Their only obsession, 
presently, is to empower them educationally and economically so that they can 
compete successfully in the job market. Jaldeen (1996)399 maintains that the 
reasons for the deterioration of Malay culture are the indifference and neglect 
on the part of Malays.  They are overly focused only in gaining education, 
which entailed the learning of Sinhala, the national language of Sri Lanka, 
busy themselves with jobs and other vagaries of everyday life. There seems to 
be among them little to no cultural endeavors. The same view has also been 
shared by other Malay informants. They all highlight the disinterest shown by 
the present generation of Malays in perpetuating their culture and ethnicity. 
Honieda Packeer, the president of WASLAM, notes:  
“Sadly, many of our cultural elements are dying down because of the 
disinterest shown by the younger generation in perpetuating it.”  
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Gafoor, an executive member of Kandy Malay Association observes: 
 
“Sadly, almost 50 percent of our Malay youngsters are not bothered 
about their culture, language and ethnic identity. They feel that they 
don’t even need to be identified as Malays. Of them about 25 percent 
are not even bothered about their religion. What they are highly 
concerned about is education and employment.” 
This is a perfect representation that underlines the indifference shown 
by Malay younger generation in perpetuating their culture, language and 
ethnicity, as they are too preoccupied with their education and search for 
better employment opportunities. Such indifference, quite naturally, results in 
substitutive acculturation gripping the Malay community, particularly the 
younger generation. Thus, it is safer to conclude that the lack of appetite and 
concerted effort on the part of Malay younger generation to perpetuate their 
culture and language significantly challenges their ethnicity in the island.      
Nevertheless there are Malay organizations and Malay elites working 
at the forefront, to revive their culture and language in order to consolidate 
their ethnic identity in the island. An extensive discussion on the measures 
taken by Malay organizations in order to perpetuate the ethnicity of Malays in 
the country will be taken up in the seventh chapter of this study.  
 
5.4: Summary 
 In summary, as discussed in the previous section, acculturation has 
both positive and negative dimensions. The positive dimension of 
acculturation is referred to as Additive Acculturation. We find that while the 
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local culture has enriched the layers of Malay culture in terms of their 
costumes, cuisines and so on, Malay culture has also in return contributed to 
the enrichment of the local culture, traditions, rituals and languages. We find 
non-Malays such as Sinhalese, Moors, and Tamils are using Malay language 
for their interpersonal communication in areas like Kirinda and Slave Island. 
We even find some of them emulating Malay traditions and rituals like jawzan 
festival in their religious ceremonies. This highlights the dimension of additive 
acculturation of Malays, which does not challenge the cultural stock of Sri 
Lankan Malays.  
However, the negative dimension of acculturation which we refer to as 
Substitutive Acculturation has endangered the Malay identity, since aspects of 
Malay culture such as its cuisine, costumes and Malay language are 
significantly influenced by the cultural elements of the core ethnic groups. 
Some argue that the some elements of Malay culture such as Malay costumes 
are still being perpetuated during special occasions such as weddings and 
festivals; but others are of the view that the Moorish culture has completely 
replaced Malay culture in their weddings too. It is also claimed that some 
elements of Malay culture are limited to the older generation of Malays only, 
while the younger generation is increasingly influenced by the cultures of the 
core groups. This suggests that the strength of Malay identity with the older 
generation is stronger while it tends to be a lot weaker among the younger 
generation. Substitutive acculturation, which poses the most serious challenge 
to the Malay culture and ethnicity, is prevalent across both rural and urban 
Malays. This is despite the fact that Malay language still remains intact in 
some rural areas. Thus, it is clear that the substitutive acculturation poses a 
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crucial challenge to the perpetuation of Malay identity in the country, while 
the additive acculturation poses no such challenges, but yields only positive 
outcomes.    
Moreover, the findings also show a number of factors contributing to 
the substitutive acculturation among Malays: 1) the absence of discrimination 
and prejudice against Malays by core groups, 2) the increasing influence of 
transnational Islamic movements upon the Malays, coupled with the 
missionary attempt of those returning from Saudi Arabia to spread Arab 
culture among the Malays, in the belief that they are in fact authentic Islamic 
practices, 3) disinterest of Malay youngsters in perpetuating the culture, 4) 
increasing level of integration into and interaction with the core communities, 
5) interspersed settlement of Malays amidst the core groups throughout the 
country, and 6) the growing degree of influence of westernization and 
urbanization upon the lifestyles and culture of Malay youth.  
Nevertheless, acculturation as one of the components of assimilation 
does not necessarily contribute to the assimilation of a minority ethnic group 
into core groups. It is the structural assimilation that focuses on the socio-
economic, political and personal level of influence upon the minority 
community that significantly endangers the ethnicity of the minority ethnic 
group. Thus, the next chapter deals with the dimension of structural 






 CHALLENGES OF STRUCTURAL ASSIMILATION 
(INTEGRATION) TO ETHNIC IDENITY OF MALAYS  
 
6.1: Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the degree of acculturation currently 
shaping the ethnicity of Malays in Sri Lanka as a result of their integration 
with the core ethnic groups. It also reveals that some elements of Malay 
culture are confined only to the older generation of Malays, while the younger 
generation is increasingly influenced by the cultures of the core groups, which 
endanger the salient features of Malay culture and ethnicity.  
The previous chapter largely dealt with the acculturation of Malays, 
while this chapter focuses on the structural assimilation, also called 
integration, of Malays in Sri Lanka. 
As noted previously, acculturation by itself is not a sufficient condition 
for assimilation. Acculturation alone cannot lead to the assimilation of an 
ethnic group. If homogenization of minority ethnic groups with the core 
groups in a plural society were to take place, there must be structural 
assimilation. In the absence of structural assimilation the relationship between 
the minorities and core groups might not be very cordial. As such, it is 
imperative to explore the level of structural assimilation of the Malay minority 
ethnic group in Sri Lanka. 
The first section of this chapter delves into the aspect of structural 
assimilation, followed by a discussion on the impersonal and personal contacts 
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of structural assimilation between Malays and Moors, and Malays and 
Sinhalese. Special attention is given in this section to the mixed or the 
intermarriages occurring between Malays and core groups, to explore whether 
it endangers the Malay ethnicity in the Island. The second section of this 
chapter traces factors contributing to the dimension of structural assimilation 
of Malays.  
 
6.2: Structural assimilation and Malay ethnicity  
Structural assimilation (integration) was the crux of the matter for 
Gordon (1964).400 Structural assimilation, as an integral part of assimilation, 
occurs when the ethnic minority or immigrants and  their descendants in later 
generations enter and become integrated into the formal social, political, 
economic and cultural institutions of the host country (secondary 
relationships) and develop numerous long lasting personal friendships with the 
members of the majority group (primary relationships).401 The former, 
(secondary relationship), refers to a wide range of key integrative processes, 
including socio-economic and spatial (residential) assimilation. The latter 
(secondary relationships), with its extensive interaction within personal 
networks and intermarriages, is likely to take place under conditions of status 
equality. Thus, it can vary from impersonal contacts within economic and 
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political institutions to personal contacts within neighborhoods, friendship 
circles and marriages.402  
While acculturation refers to the cultural dimensions of the minority 
ethnic group, the structural assimilation refers to an extensive interaction of 
minority ethnic group with dominant groups along the lines of social, political, 
economic and personal dimension such as employment and intermarriages. 
While it is clear that all of these dimensions are interdependent, i.e, 
acculturation, structural assimilation (integration), and intermarriage, the 
linkages between them are historically contingent upon and will vary 
according to a number of factors, particularly the level of reception with which 
different minority groups are received by core groups.403  
The following section explores the nature and dimension of structural 
assimilation of minority Malays in a plural context of Sri Lanka. As a minority 
ethnic group descending from the Malay Archipelago during the colonial 
period, particularly the Dutch occupation of Sri Lanka,  they had domiciled in 
the country as permanent citizens just like others, enjoying all the rights and 
privileges that were accorded to the other communities in the country. The 
minority status and their interspersed settlement amidst the dominant groups 
across the country propelled the Malays to integrate with the core groups in 
personal, social, cultural, political and economic spheres. Malays are 
integrating with core groups in the country as it is inevitable in the present fast 
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shrinking world. Illustrating on the significance of integration of Malays with 
the dominant groups, Mona Packeer Ali and Jamal’s daughter observe: 
Mona Packeer Ali: “Integration with other communities is the most 
important thing. We can’t keep our culture or identity as it is and say 
'we cannot get together with you'. As we are living in a multi-cultural 
and multi-ethnic country, we have the necessity to integrate with other 
communities.”  
Jamal’s daughter said: “I would not say that we have to exclude 
ourselves from the rest of the communities, and limit our interaction to 
only Malays or Moors. As we are living in a multi-cultural and multi-
ethnic country, we have to interact with everyone and integrate.”  
The above remarks of those two youth indicate the need Malays feel 
for the structural assimilation with the core groups as they are a minority 
ethnic group in the country. Their assertions show that being a minority in a 
plural society in Sri Lanka, they feel the importance of not isolating 
themselves from other communities. They feel that it is essential for Malays to 
integrate with the core groups for the sake of their survival and prosperity.  
Furthermore, numerical strength of a community matters a lot in a 
plural context. In the case of Sri Lankan Malays, their numerical strength is 
very weak compared to other minorities and thus they are susceptible. They 
can easily be overwhelmed by the culture and language of core groups. 
Talking about the numerical strength of Malays, Hussainmiya has the 
following to say: 
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“The assimilation of the community depends on the numerical 
strength. If a community is numerically smaller, it is likely that they 
would get absorbed into other communities - (assimilated). The case of 
Malays in Kinniya is a typical example of assimilation. In politics, 
Malays should be represented in one form or another. Their 
representation became controversial with the advent of SLMC as the 
Malays were categorized as Muslims. Politically they want to be 
recognized. Politically they are conscious, but they are marginalized 
due to the proportionate representational system.” 
Hussainmiya’s point about the case of Malays in Kinniya suggests that 
there is every possibility for Malays in various other parts of Sri Lanka too to 
get absorbed into the core groups due to their weaker numerical strength in the 
country, as has indeed happened in Kinniya. Hussainmiya’s assertion also 
underlines the fact that Malays were politically marginalized with the 
emergence of a political party called Sri Lanka Muslim Congress from the 
Moor community.  
The discussion regarding the assimilation of Malays in Kinniya into 
the Moors brings to the fore some intriguing facts. In the case of Malays in 
Kinniya in the Trincomalee district, they appear to have come to Kinniya 
during the Colonial period when the Malay regiment was stationed in 
Trincomalee, and domiciled amidst the Moors;404 due to their smaller number, 
their assimilation into the Moors was relatively faster. Elaborating on their 
history, a retired teacher, Thowfeek from Kinniya observes:  
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“A few Malays from the Trincomalee regiment absconded and came to 
Kinniya during the Dutch occupation of Sri Lanka, and they 
intermarried with Moors due the religion being common between 
them. Some of the Malays married Tamils (Hindus) too after their 
conversion to Islam.” 
From the above excerpt of Thowfeek, we can see how the early Malays 
in Kinniya, being smaller in number, were quickly assimilated into the core 
communities. He says that it was a few Malays, not whole battalions, that 
defected. My field work in Kinniya and Muthur has not unearthed any 
evidence that would delineate identities between the Moors and Malays there. 
The only thing that is discernible among the few who are believed to have 
Malay origin or lineage is their physical features, which have resemblance to 
that of the rest of the Malays living in other parts of the country. Apart from 
that, there is no trace of their Malay language, culture, and other markers of 
Malay identity among them; they are fully assimilated with Moors in Kinniya. 
They and their successive generations have adopted as their mother tongue the 
Tamil language, which is the language of Tamils (Hindus) and Moors 
(Muslims), and intermarried with the Moors. Today they identify themselves 
as Sonakar (Moor), and they feel no affinity whatsoever with the Malay world 
where their ancestry started. The assimilation of Malays there is total. Thus, 
this is a good representation to show how far the structural assimilation has 
compromised the ethnicity of Malays in Kinniya.  
Wanting to learn about their identity and ancestry, I talked to a few 
young ‘Malays’ in Kinniya, whose ancestors were believed to have arrived 
there during the Colonial period. To my astonishment, they hardly knew 
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anything about their Malay ancestors and felt comfortable in defining 
themselves as Sri Lankan Muslims (Sri Lankan Moors), and communicated 
fluently in Tamil language. This is a case of complete assimilation of Malays 
in Kinniya, which has led to the virtual ending of Malay ethnicity. This 
finding is further supported by the existing literature on the subject. Asiff 
Hussein cites that Malays living in Kinniya in the Trincomalee District have 
fully assimilated with Moors through intermarriages over the years and they 
are no more speaking Malay language, but Tamil, which is the mother tongue 
of the Moors.405  Thus, it can be seen clearly that the structural assimilation 
has significantly endangered the ethnicity of Malays in Kinniya. Some Malays 
living in the rest of the country are fearful that the same fate that befell Malays 
in Kinniya may befall them too, if the present trend of assimilation and 
integration of Malays into the core communities continues unabated for some 
more years. However, the degree of structural assimilation evident among the 
few Malays in Kinniya cannot be witnessed among the rest of the Malays 
living throughout the country, because the latter have been consciously 
reviving their culture and identity.  
The following responses of Malay informants from various parts of the 
country highlight the degree of structural assimilation of Malays in the 
country.  
Nafeel Dulapaandan from Champa Lane: “Our relationship with other 
communities such as Tamils, Sinhalese and Moors is very cordial. We 
take part in their funerals, weddings and other special occasions and 
vice versa, with neither of us giving up our identity.”  
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Arfeen from Enderamulla: “Our relationship with Sinhalese, 
Christians, Tamils and Moors is very cordial as we attend their 
funerals, dansala (almsgiving), weddings and other special occasions 
and vice versa. We also join in the community trips organized by the 
Buddhist and Christians here.”  
Laxana Faroon from Matale: “We are integrated socially and 
economically with other communities. We also get along with them 
politically as our leaders, with the exception of a handful in Colombo, 
are not interested in politics.”  
The above excerpts clearly demonstrate the level of structural 
assimilation at secondary relations, that is, the social, cultural, economic and 
political integration of Malays with the core groups in the urban and rural 
areas of the country. Arfeen’s excerpt, informing of Malays in Enderamulla in 
Gampaha district joining with Buddhists and Christians in community trips 
and social gathering, is indicative of the high degree of assimilation taking 
place in urban areas. We glean from the responses of Malay informants from 
both rural and urban parts of Sri Lanka that the phenomenon of structural 
assimilation of Malays cuts across both rural and urban areas. Hence structural 
assimilation is a common feature among Malays in all areas in Sri Lanka. This 
level of structural assimilation in the impersonal contacts also poses a threat to 
the ethnicity of Malays in the urban and rural areas, more importantly among 
the younger generation of Malays. Engagement with core communities 
through their organizational activities is a noticeable feature in the activities of 




“The constitution of the Hunupitiya Malay Organization calls for the 
participation, in the activities of the Organization, of a few members 
from the other ethnic communities. Therefore, we bring them in in a 
few capacities. We have been successful in utilizing their expertise, 
and benifited from their advice in some ways.” 
The above remark of TJ Packeer Ali shows that the Malay organization 
he presides over involves non Malays, to be precise the Sinhalese, in its 
activities. More importantly, provisions for the enlistment of non-Malay are 
articulated in their constitution itself. This is a very positive step taken by the 
Hunupitiya Malay Organization that can help build social harmony and 
reconciliation. At the same time, it also represents the structural assimilation 
of Malays at the organizational level.  
It appears that Malays have assimilated politically, economically and 
socially with other communities. However, this assimilation has also had 
caused an enormous challenge to the ethnic identity of Malays.  
The impersonal and personal relations of Malays with the dominant 
groups such as Moors and Sinhalese are extensively discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
6.2.1: Impersonal contacts of structural assimilation between 
Malays and Moors 
As noted above, structural assimilation takes place in the form of 
impersonal and personal contacts between ethnic groups. While impersonal 
contacts refer to social, economical and political contacts, personal contacts 
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imply contacts with neighborhood relations, friendship circles (cliques) and 
marriages.406  
It is an undeniable fact that Malays in Sri Lanka have very closely 
interacted and integrated with the Tamil-speaking Moorish community. The 
history of Malays in Sri Lanka predates the era when Islam became an official 
religion in the Malaysian and Indonesian region.407 Hence the early 
interactions were between Malays, who were probably non-Muslims, and 
Muslim Moors. In the past, religious differences between these two 
communities do not appear to have impeded interaction and integration. Now 
when the religion is common between these peoples there is further impetus 
for them to have even more intense interaction and integration. Mere 
interspersed settlement of Malays within Moors throughout the country was 
enough for integration to take place between these communities better than 
before. 
If the Malays were Muslims, then they were certainly followers of 
Shafi School of law, for it was this School that is dominant in the Malay 
world. Moors of Sri Lanka too follow the same Shafi School.  This was further 
reason that facilitated development of a close relationship between Malays and 
Moors, for there was uniformity in performance of religious rituals.408 It is 
common for religious bonds, particularly the Islamic bond, to supersede all 
other differences; differences between groups in terms of their ethnicity and 
ancestry fade into insignificance as this religious bond gets stronger. The fact 
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that there was already a presence of Muslim community in Sri Lanka, during 
17th to mid-20th century when Malays were brought in from Malay 
Archipelago by the colonial rulers, was a significant factor that helped 
preserve the religious identity and cultural pursuits of Malays in the country 
over the years. This is in fact highlighted by Hussainmiya (1987) too 409 when 
he illustrates that during the early stages of immigration of Malays to Sri 
Lanka, the religious needs of the Malays were catered for by Moor imams. 
Adelaar and Prentice (1996)410 state: “it is to them [the SL Moors] that the 
Malays owe the maintenance of their religious identity and possibly even their 
identity as a separate ethnic group”. Thus, as far as religious practices are 
concerned the integration between Malays and Moors is so deep and strong 
that it is very difficult to distinguish any difference at all between them.  
Malays, in my interviews with them, never missed a chance to 
emphasize the religious integration between Malays and Moors. TK.Azoor 
puts it as follows:  
“Malays are very close to Moors, for we both share the same religion 
of Islam. Also, where we are living closer to the Moors or engage in 
closer social intercourse with them, we are found to be more religious; 
our religiosity seems to increase in proportion to the closeness we have 
with them. Similarly, the farther the Malays are from Moors, the less 
religious they are.” 
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The above excerpt clearly proves the strong religious integration of 
Malays with Moors. It must be noted here that religiosity of Malays has been 
gauged in proportion to the amount of their religious integration with Moors. 
In other words, it is perceived that the stronger the religious integration of 
Malays with Moors, the more pious and religious the Malays are perceived to 
be. Conversely, the less integrated they are religiously with the Moors, the less 
religious they are perceived to be.  
Illustrating the religious integration between the Malays and the 
Moors, Baby Master from Hambantota, but married to a Moor in 
Sammanthura avers:  
“Our integration with Moors is everlasting because of our religion. We 
do not see Moors as the Other; we always regard them as brothers and 
sisters in the shadow of Islam.”  
More than anything else, this excerpt shows Malays wholeheartedly 
embracing the Moors as their brothers and sisters. This unique Islamic 
brotherhood that permits the admittance of any Muslim into the Muslim 
fraternity, regardless of his or her ethnicity, place of birth, residence or 
language, is common among all Muslims, for this fraternity is something very 
strongly encouraged in Islam.   
Hasan, a Moor professional from Colombo notes:  
“You know… we have been having a very close socio-cultural and 
religious interaction and integration with Malays for a long time. The 
mosques in Slave Island have always been shared by members from 
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both communities. There are many pious Malay Ulema and Tableeq 
workers coming up in the Malay community these days, which is a 
good thing.”  
Nazeer, a customs officer from Colombo also observes:  
“Our neighbor is a Malay. We have a strong relationship with Malays, 
in all spheres of life - social, cultural, religious… you name it! Bonds 
between us is so strong!” 
The socio-cultural and religious integration between Malays and 
Moors is manifested so vividly in the above excerpts of Moors. The strong 
impersonal contacts of structural assimilation between the two communities 
have left among Moors a very positive impression of Malays. As Hasan has 
highlighted above, the three mosques built by Malays in Slave Island - 
Wekanda Jumma Mosque, Akbar Jumma Mosque and Military Mosque - have 
long been shared by the Moor community, in spite of the ethnic and language 
differences between them. Thus, it becomes lucid that the socio-cultural and 
religious integration between these two ethnic groups is deeper and 
entrenched. Hussainmiya (1990)411 also noted that the Malays in South Africa, 
who are referred to as Cape Malays, have completely lost their original 
language and culture. This is attributed to the absence of a co-religionist 
community there such as the Moors in Sri Lanka. The support of the co-
religionist community of Moors to the Malays in Sri Lanka helped them to 
perpetuate their culture, religion and language. Thus, Hussainmiya (1990)412 
                                                 
411
Hussainmiya, Orang Rejimen: The Malays of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, 53. 
  
412
Hussainmiya, Orang Rejimen: The Malays of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, 53. 
 283 
 
concludes that cultural and religious identity of Malays is preserved with the 
help of the Moor Muslim community in the Island. This also supports the 
findings of the study that socio-cultural and religious integration of Malays 
with Moors is very strong.  
It has been noted before that the Colonialists, in their strategy of divide 
and rule, always looked for factors that would differentiate one community 
from another community, instead of those that would unify them.  This may be 
part of the reason why the colonial permitted Malays to have their own 
mosques, so that Malays can stand out differently from their Moorish co-
religionists. With patronage extended by the Dutch colonial rulers the first 
Malay mosques were built in 1783. These mosques conducted religious 
services according to Malay traditions and in the Malay language. Malays had 
their mosques built in Malay majority towns in which they had special Malay 
Khatibs or imams and legal texts written in Malay language.413 Nevertheless, 
these Malay mosques across the country attracted Moor worshipers too, 
resulting in integration between these communities.  
Interestingly, Hussainmiya (1990)414 argues that Sri Lankan Malays 
must have had close contacts with great Moor Islamic scholars in the country, 
for there are evidence of those returning to Indonesia assuming some sort of 
Islamic leadership role on their return home. For instance, a Malay exile 
named Radin Adipati Natakusuma, who was banished to Ceylon in 1743, was 
made chief of the religious officials in Jogyakarta when he returned there in 
1758. Similar was the case of Wirakusuma, who also became the leader of a 
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religious group on his return. It is noted that these exiles became spiritual 
pupils to two Islamic teachers in the 18th Century Sri Lanka, Sayyid Musa 
Ngidrus and Ibrahim Asmara.415 Thus, the religious enrichment that Malay 
exiles gained on their banishment to Sri Lanka can largely be attributed to the 
religious integration with Moor religious scholars in the country. This stands 
as a testimony to the stronger religious integration between Malays with 
Moors.  
Moreover, the ideas put forth by Hussainmiya in the interview I had 
with him reinforce the argument that Malay-Moor integration has become 
stronger in many other aspects as well, as he puts it:   
Malays and Moors used similar scripts – the Arabic script. The Arabic alphabet 
suited to write both Malay in Gundul (Jawi) and Tamil in Arabu-Tamil, with 
additional diacritical and consonant markers... easy transition scripturally. And, of 
course, there had been an organizational affinity between Moors and Malays in the 
late 19th century, during the Islamic revival period under Siddi Lebbe and Orabi 
Pasha. 
The use of similar Arabic alphabet in Gundul and Arabu-Tamil 
brought the Malays and Moors together in terms of literary contribution.  
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Facsimile of an Arabu-Tamil Newspaper 
published by B. O. Saldin- 1880s 
 
This figure shows a lithographed Arabu-
Tamil Sermon printed by Inche Abu Sallay 




According to Hussainmiya, both the Moor and Malay leaders got 
together to revive their communities socially, educationally and religiously in 
order to ensure their survival in the country with dignity and self-respect 
during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Thus, this explains that both the 
Malays and Moors, regardless of their ethnic and language differences, 
worked very closely at organizational levels to ensure the welfare of their 
respective communities in the country. This kind of socio-cultural and 
religious integration of Malays with Moors, which is structural assimilation, 
has been of benefit to the Malay community. However, personal relations of 
Malays with Moors, as in intermarriages, have seriously challenged the 
ethnicity of Malays. The next section sheds light on the aspect of personal 
relations of Malays with Moors. 
6.2.2: Personal contacts of structural assimilation between Malays 
and Moors 
With regard to personal contacts between Malays and Moors, 
intermarriages between these two ethnic groups have become a significant 
factor that compromises the ethnicity of Sri Lankan Malays to a great extent. 
However, it needs to be highlighted at the outset that this study solely relies 
upon secondary sources and data from the fieldwork to deduce the increasing 
phenomenon of intermarriages between the Malays and other communities in 




Indeed, these intermarriages have altered the primordial traits of Malay 
progeny.416 Nevertheless, it has to be noted that during the Dutch occupation 
of Sri Lanka, the Malay migrants, who were mainly soldiers, brought in their 
womenfolk along with them. However, it is not known exactly what 
percentage of women who came along with their husbands were Malays.  
Later, the British authorities too strongly encouraged their foreign Malay 
recruits to bring their families along.417 This indicates that Malays, primarily 
the soldiers, arrived in the Island with their womenfolk. This proposition has 
also been endorsed by the Malay respondents in the interviews.  
Honieda Packeer, the president of WASLAM notes:  
“Malays came with their wives during the Dutch colonial period. A lot 
of the garrison Malays serving during the colonial period had family 
quarters. Even if Malays married non-Malays at that time, they would 
have converted their partners to Islam.” 
The same view has also been shared by TK Samad from Nawalapitiya 
when he says:  
“A lot of the Malays who were brought here during the colonial period 
had come along with their wives and children. Some of them might 
have arrived here without their partners and they may have ended up 
marrying non-Malays, particularly Moors here. If it were not Moorish 
Muslims, they would have converted them to Islam.” 
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The above excerpts imply that the Malays had arrived in the island 
with their wives and families. This certainly would have been the case with 
Malay soldiers who were brought here during the Dutch and British colonial 
rule. However, it is very difficult to generalize this to all the Malays, for 
among the immigrants were exiles, soldiers, slaves and convicts. It is likely 
that Malay exiles and soldiers arrived here with their wives and families, while 
the other segments such as convicts and slaves (who were later conscripted as 
soldiers by colonial rulers) came here without their families and ended up 
marrying the locals, particularly the Moors. Even if those Malays had chosen 
to marry non-Malays like Sinhalese or Hindus, they would have converted 
them prior to marrying them. This is explicitly manifested by the 
aforementioned Malay respondents. This can also be corroborated from the 
accounts of colonial masters, whose correspondence with their superiors 
indicates that such inter-marriages of Malays with the core communities had 
indeed taken place in the island.   
Shortly after the British conquest, the commandant of Kalutara wrote: 
As far as I can learn there is little damage to be apprehended from the 
Malays in this district who by intermarriage with the natives have 
become in some degree naturalized and are indeed much quieter, and 
more industrious than the Sinhalese or Moors.418   
Percival also remarks: 
Although the Malays intermarry with the Moors and other castes 
particularly in Ceylon and by this means acquire a much darker color 
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than is natural to a Malay; still their characteristic features are so 
strikingly predominant, that they cannot be mistaken.419 
The above references of the colonialists indicate that Malays did marry 
the locals. Percival’s assertion on Malays being darker in color than their 
counterparts in the Malay world is a case in point that would indicate that 
Malays became darker because of intermarriages with locals.    
The other important piece of evidence that substantiates the Malay-
Moor intermarriage is a report of a German employee of the VOC (East Indian 
Company), Christopher Schweitzer, from 1680. Thus, he states: 
Their language is Amboinese, but the majority also speak Malay, 
Sinhala, Portuguese and Dutch. [. . . ] The wives, who in part are 
Amboinese, in part Sinhalese and Malabarian may not say anything 
[against the stripping of their ornaments].420 
Here the term the 'Malabarian' denotes the descent of Sri Lankan 
Moors from Malabar in South India; they speak the South Indian language of 
Tamil, which is also the language of Sri Lankan Moors. Thus, the above is a 
clear evidence of the existence of personal contacts of structural assimilation 
of Malays with the Moors, due to both their religions being Islam. Such 
intermarriages have indeed led to the replacement of Malay language and 
culture with Tamil language and Moorish culture, which obviously is a 
challenge to the ethnicity of Malays  
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One of the pertinent pieces of evidence to substantiate the claim of 
intermarriages between Malays and Moors is the Dutch tombos, particularly 
the head tombos available at the Sri Lanka National Archive 1/3758, which 
report a number of intermarriages that took place between Malays and Moors. 
Hussainmiya (1987)421 also cites Sri Lankan marriage registers (Kadutams) 
that are in his possession to prove that intermarriages took place between 
Malays and Moors during the colonial period. This argument of Hussainmiya 
on intermarriages between Malays and Moors has explicitly been critiqued by 
Ansaldo in his account.  
Ansaldo (2008) argues that the photocopies of the Sri Lankan National 
Archive stored in the Dutch National Archive in Hague does not support the 
theory of intermarriage as Hussainmiya highlights in his account, and he goes 
on say that only five of the 238 entries of tombos in the section of mixed 
marriages clearly refer to individuals of Javanese origin. Of these, two records 
refer to Javanese-Moor marriages, one to a Javanese-Javanese marriage, and 
the remaining two are unclear. Ansaldo further debunks the assertion of 
Hussainmiya in the same account:  
In addition to the historical record, clear evidence against Tamil 
influence in the development of the Sri Lankan Malay (SLM) 
community comes from oral history recorded in three different SLM 
communities. Of the approximately 50 families interviewed in Kirinda, 
Colombo and Kandy, only two had information regarding genealogies 
and Moor-Malay intermarriages.  Most families report that marrying 
outside the SLM community was considered a taboo, and only allowed 
                                                 
421
 Hussainmiya, Lost Cousins: The Malays of Sri Lanka, Occasional Paper, 25. 
 291 
 
in extreme cases.  It is only in the present generations that weddings 
outside the community are being allowed.  Moreover, the Moors 
appear to have had a very low status in the eye of the SLM 
communities.422   
The above argument of Ansaldo is absurd. When I met Hussinmiya last 
year in July for my interviews, I witnessed myself some of the copies of 
tombos and marriage registration papers (Kaduthams) in his possession that 
show that intermarriages did take place between Malays and Moors during the 
colonial period.  











Malay-Moor intermarriages have always been taking place. In the post-
independence Sri Lanka the frequency dramatically increased. Malays have 
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never ever considered marrying Moors as a taboo since both communities 
share the same religion. Malays generally, including the most westernized, 
urbanized and educated Malays, would prefer that their children marry withing 
the Malay community. Nevertheless, they do not find anything wrong with 
intermarriages with Moors. However, if intermarriages were to take place they 
prefer that it takes place with the Moor community. If Malays are so broad-
minded today as to permit intermarriages with Moors, we have no reason to 
believe that they would turn out in the future to be narrow-minded as to 
prohibit or look down upon intermarriages with Moors. We have seen 
evidence in literature for the occurance of intermarriages in the past; we know 
they are happening today; and we have every reason to believe that it would 
continue to happen in the future too, because of the shared religion. Nuhman 
(2007)423  reports that in 1956 and 1960 more Malays married outside their 
community than within. Saldin (2003)424 remarks that in the nineties the key 
office bearers of the Malay Club were children of non- Malays or were 
themselves married to non-Malays. Hussainmiya (1987)425 also states that 
these intermarriages have shaped the primordial traits of Malay progeny. If the 
changing features are so noticeable, then it is safe to assume that 
intermarriages have been quite common. Thus, these literatures corroborate 
the findings of this study that intermarriages are so widespread between 
Malays and non-Malays that it can endanger the boundary markers of Malay 
ethnicity of the future generation of Malays.     
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 In the same vein, Mowlavi Musni Ameen, the Imam of Wekanda 
Jummah Mosque in Slave Island, also a marriage registrar of Colombo area, 
confirmed to me that he had conducted a number of intermarriages between 
Malays and Moors, in different parts of Colombo area. The birth certificates of 
the bride and groom had in them details of their ethnicity. It was his belief and 
religious conviction that there is nothing wrong with Malay-Moor 
intermarriages as long as the religion is the same - Islam. Of the 55 Malays I 
interviewed for my field works, almost ten percent of them had married to 
non-Malays, mainly the Moors, and ten percent is no insignificant number. 
Many of Malay informants, they informed me, had relatives who had got 
married to Moors. This goes to prove that intermarriage between Moors and 
Malays is a common feature in the community, and debunks the argument of 
some scholars that such intermarriages are a rare phenomenon in Sri Lanka.    
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This figure shows a Moor-Malay couple with their 
child. The husband is a Moor from Eastern province 
who met his future Malay wife while studying in 
Colombo.  
This figure shows a Malay man from Slave 
Island, who is married to a Moor woman from 
Wellampitiya area, and his child from her.  
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Nordhoff (2009)426 estimates that approximately 10-15% of marriages 
of Malays have taken place with Sri Lankan Moors, but further investigation is 
necessary to verify the truth of this figure. The responses of Malay informants 
suggest, in unequivocal terms, that a fairly large number of intermarriages of 
Malays are with Moors.  Arfeen, a clerk in the high court from Enderamulla 
notes:  
“25% of Malays here are married to Moors. Even, my daughter is 
married to a Moor. If a Malay girl or boy wants to marry a non-
Muslim, he or she converts to Islam prior to the marriage. 
Nevertheless, there are some rare instances where 1 or 2 Malays had 
married non-Muslims, and they did not convert to Islam. If that were to 
happen, the Muslim Malay will be ostracized by the community; more 
often than not, the non-Muslim partner of the Malay is persuaded to 
embrace Islam, by religious scholars or the parents. There are certain 
dedicated people and madrasas engaging in such tasks.” 
Ifran from Slave Island observes:  
“My wife is from the Moor community. Many Malays tend to marry 
Moors, if they could not find suitable partners in their own community. 
There are almost 10 Malay families in Slave Island who had married 
outside the fold of Islam. However, Alhamdulillah, all of them have 
now embraced Islam, and their offspring are growing up as Muslims.” 
This clearly shows that intermarriages between Malays and Moors are 
significantly rising, far exceeding the estimation of 10- 15% by Nordhoff. 
                                                 




Primary reason for this increase is the shared religion. We have also seen 
evidence for non-Muslims marrying Malays, such as Sinhalese and Tamils, 
being persuaded to embrace Islam eventually. Arfeen categorically states that 
in Enderamulla and Akbar Town area, many organizations and individuals are 
working on the task of inviting those non-Muslims, married to Malays, into 
the fold of Islam.  
This categorically explains that the personal contacts of structural 
assimilation of Malays with Moor community endangers the ethnicity of 
Malays in the country, as the boundary markers of Malay identity such as 
Malay language, culture and even their ancestry are being influenced as a 
consequence.  This is evident from the responses of Mr Akbar, a Malay 
businessman from Akbar town:  
I got married a Moor a long time ago; so did my brother. While we speak Tamil for 
our interpersonal communication, my brother’s family uses Sinhala. Malays here 
tend not to marry non-Muslims. Any Malay marrying non-Muslims undoubtedly 
converts them to Islam. 
The above is a clear demonstration of challenges the ethnicity of 
Malays faces due to personal contacts of structural assimilation, an example of 
which is intermarriages with Moors. Following their marriage to non-Malays, 
Akbar and his brothers switched to Tamil and Sinhala language respectively, 
which has terrible consequence for the Malay language. He answered in the 
negative when I asked him whether they still adopt some elements of Malay 
culture at their home. This shows that Malay culture and ancestry have already 
eroded as a result of intermarriages with Moors. Thus, such personal relations 
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do endanger the ethnicity of Malays. He also assents that those non-Muslims 
such as Sinhalese marrying Malays are converted to Islam.  
The same view is also held by Malays living in rural areas. More 
importantly, the point expressed by Alamudueen, the principal of Kirinda 
Maha Vidiyalaya is interesting. He states:  
“Intermarriages with Moors are such a common phenomenon. If 
Sinhalese or Tamils ever married Malays, they end up embracing 
Islam; not the other way around due to social pressure, and the great 
value Malays attach to Islam.” 
What the above excerpts indicate is that it is the personal contacts with 
Moors that affect Malays more, for Malays seem to readily accept Moors into 
their life. This is not the case with non-Muslims, for they are made to revert to 
Islam before they can be fully accepted. In addition, the excerpts also indicate 
an increase in intermarriages.  
 Moreover, integration between Malays and Moors has not always been 
positive; there is also a negative dimension to the integration between these 
ethnic groups. It is true that Malays had received much cultural and religious 
nourishment from Moors. Nevertheless, recent years have seen much debate 
over the ethnicity of Malays, because of Malays’ fear of being subsumed by 
Moors, and their unsurprising reaction to such efforts to subsume their ethnic 
identity under the religious identity of Islam.427 The changing socio-political 
situation in recent times may be the early signs of tension between hitherto 
friendly communities. The tendency to look down upon each other based on 
                                                 
427 Hussainmiya, “The Malay Identity in Brunei Darussalam and Sri Lanka,” 72. 
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certain social and religious factors has also been noted, and may become 
problematic. Expounding on this issue, Ziyad, a member of Moor community 
observes: 
“Malays living among the non-Malays, especially in overcrowded 
areas, are closer to them socially, economically and culturally. Moors 
look down upon the Malays due to a number of reasons. They believe 
that:1) Malays are promiscuous, 2) their culture is more akin to that of 
the majority community as drinking alcohol is quite rampant among 
them, and they dress like the Sinhalese, and 3) Malays are late comers 
to Islam. Moors seem to have the baseless belief that late comers to 
Islam are somewhat low in status.” 
The same view is also reflected in the assertion of Irfan from Slave 
Island, Colombo:  
“I married a Moor. Some Moors have stereotypical views of Malays: 
we are less Islamic or even un-Islamic, which actually is a baseless 
view. I faced a lot of such problems from my in-laws at the beginning. 
Alhamdulilah, they can now see who truly I am - as religious as any 
other Moorish Muslim.” 
The above is an illustration of the misunderstanding that is brewing, 
which also has the potential to get worse, if not addressed. Apart from politics 
and issues related to ethnic identity, the incorrect belief of some Moors that 
the Malays somehow have a lower status because they are latecomer to Islam, 
is cause of concern for the hitherto excellent relations between these 
communities. Such belief is incorrect because the only thing that determines 
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the status of a person in the view of God, according to Islamic theology, is the 
God-consciousness one has, and nothing else.  Another cause of concern is the 
misconstruing by some Moors that Malays, or any Muslim for that matter, 
following a legal interpretation of Islam that is different to what they have 
been following are deviants from true Islam. Malays are not deviants. If some 
of their religious practices were different to the religious practices of Moors, 
who are very orthodox, their practices too still fall within the parameters of 
orthodoxy.  
Interestingly, the view some well-educated Malays living in urban 
areas have of the Moors is not that positive either. Such perceptions from 
some from both sides undermine the social, cultural and religious integration 
between the two communities. Reflected in the following excerpt is the view 
of an educated Malay. Farzan Tuan, a Marketing Executive from Colombo 
had the following to say: 
“We are not conservative like Moors. We are relatively more 
interactive with the Sinhalese; and our interpretation of Islam is 
somewhat unorthodox. Our fashion consciousness has a western flavor 
to it.  Our ideas are modern. In these respects, there is a marked 
difference between the Malays and the Moors.” 
I observe that there is a marked difference between the Malays’ and 
Moors’ way of thinking and behavior: Unlike their Moorish brothern, the 
urban Malays tend to wear western dresses, skip prayers, be less diligent 
towards religious obligations, associate more with non-Muslims (particularly 
the Sinhalese), and have a laisses-faire attitude. However, such a perspective 
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of Malays’ religious orientation cannot be generalized to include all the 
Malays living across the country. This is a phenomenon I noticed only among 
the urban Malays. As for those Malays living in rural and suburban areas, they 
are as religious as any Moor. I saw no significant difference between them in 
terms of religious practices. Malays everywhere have much affinity with 
Moors in terms of socio-cultural and religious aspects. It is increasingly 
evident that Malays and Moors are at the forefront of ironing out these little 
differences, when they jointly engage in religious and social activities. It is as 
if Islam has an in-built mechanism to nip in bud any unhealthy symptoms in 
their relationship.  
To sum up, the above discussion reveals that the interspersed 
settlement of Malays among the Moors throughout the country, their shared 
religion of Islam, their subscription to Shafi School of thought (which is a 
Sunni orthodoxical school of Islamic jurisprudence), and the significant 
presence of Moors in Sri Lanka when the Malays were first brought in from 
the Malay archipelago have all strongly integrated these two communities in 
terms of impersonal contacts of structural assimilation. The presence of the 
Moor Muslim community in the country when the Malays first arrived here 
helped preserve the cultural and religious identity of Malays, their cultural and 
religious integration becoming increasingly stronger ever since. The mosques 
built in Malay cantonments during the colonial periods served as a place of 
religious integration between Malays and Moors. Furthermore, the Malays 
who were exposed to the Moorish religious scholars during their stay in the 
country later became religious scholars themselves and were appointed as 
religious teachers upon their return to Indonesia. This also shows the strong 
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religious integration between the Malays and Moors. In addition to this, they 
have also closely cooperated in literary, educational and organizational 
activities, thereby enhancing the impersonal contacts of structural assimilation 
between them. 
As for personal contacts of structural assimilation, it takes place 
primarily through intermarriages as they share the religion of Islam. Some of 
the Malays, mainly the exiles and soldiers, were accompanied by their families 
when they came to Sri Lanka, but others who did not have a Malay partner had 
to chose partners from the dominant groups, particularly from Moors. In the 
post-independence Sri Lanka, this trend of intermarriages of Malays with core 
groups, mainly with Moors, increased dramatically due to their shared 
religion, thus endangering the boundary markers of Malay identity such as 
Malay language, culture and ancestry. It could be argued that the linguistic 
shape of Sri Lankan Malay (SLM) is the byproduct of the intermarriages 
between the Malays and Moors - SLM derives its uniqueness from the 
tremendous influence the local vernacular languages have had on the original 
Malay language. Moreover, the substitutive acculturation of Malays too can be 
attributed to the intermarriages between the Malays and Moors. Although the 
intermarriages, which were primarily between Malays and Moors, have 
endangered the boundary markers of Malay identity, the Malay community 
does not seem to be bothered by it, for the value they attach to Islam seems to 
be greater than the value they attach to their ethnic identity. However, there is 
a strong sense of antipathy prevailing in the Malay community against mixed 
marriages between the Malays and non-Muslims such as the Sinhalese. The 
findings also show that integration between Malays and Moors did not go 
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without any hitches; a tiny minority from both communities entertains opinion 
about the other community that is not so flattering. However, on a community 
level which cuts across both rural and urban areas, Malays have been enjoying 
a very high degree of structural assimilation in terms of impersonal and 
personal contacts with Moors. 
While the preceding section delves into the integration of Malays with 
Moors, the next section deals with the impersonal contacts between Malays 
and Sinhalese.    
6.2.3: Impersonal contacts of structural assimilation between 
Malays and Sinhalese 
Pre-colonial historical narratives reveal that the Malays have had close 
relations with Sri Lanka. The earliest reference to the Javanese presence in Sri 
Lanka is found in the Chulavansa which describes the invasion of 
Chandrabhanu, who was the Buddhist King of Tambaralinga near the isthmus 
of Kra in the Malay Peninsula during the reign of Parakrama Bahu 11 in Sri 
Lanka in 1247 AD. Two invasions have been recorded and the Malay King 
appears to have become the ruler of Jaffna for a short while.428 This early 
Malay association with this area appears to have been confirmed by 
topographical evidence such as Chavakacheri (Java settlement) and Java Kotte 
(Java fort).  The descendants of Chandrabanu’s army were believed to be 
Buddhists. Therefore, if his army had settled down in Sri Lanka, they are very 
                                                 
428 M.A. Sourjah, “The Sinhalese and Malay connection.” Daily news. Janaury 15, 2001, 24.  
 303 
 
likely to have been assimilated into the indigenous Buddhist population 
leaving no trace.429  
A Pali Chronicle of Siam has recorded that Chandrabanu and the then 
king of Siam sent a joint envoy to Ceylon and obtained a famous Buddha 
image, which is believed to be still preserved in Siam. Parakrama Bahu 
himself sent envoys to the king of Tamabaralinga and persuaded the latter to 
send to Sri Lanka a saintly Thera.430  
Paranavitane (1961)431 claims that the Kalinga Dynasty, which ruled 
from the capital of Polannarwa (1184-1235), had originated from Kalinga in 
the Malay Archipelago. Sinhala names such as Malalagama, Malalagoda, 
Malalasekera and the fact that the facial characteristics of those who bear 
those names are distinctly far-eastern corroborate the argument. 432 
BDK Saldin (2001)433 notes in this account that the medieval trade 
links between Sri Lanka and Malay Archipelago are generally known. What is 
new is the discovery that the Veddahs of Sri Lanka and the senior tribesmen of 
Malaysia belong to the same blood grouping, as mentioned in the Royal 
Anthropological Institute’s report published in 1963, volume 93, pages 117-
125 on the Blood Groups and Hemoglobin. Hemoglobin E in these two ethnic 
groups, located geographically so wide apart, and the total absence of it among 
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the tribes in South India would both indicate that the Veddah received 
contributions from South East Asia and that they did not come via India.   
It would be of interest to linguists and those studying inter-ethnic 
relations to note that there are number of words common, in terms of meaning 
and how they sound when pronounced, to both Sinhala and Malay as we have 
noted in the language section under the fourth chapter. Thus, it becomes clear 
that relations between the early tribes of Sri Lanka and those of the Malay 
world have long existed.  
 Generally speaking, the Malays have always been very loyal subjects, 
be it to the colonial rulers or the Sinhalese rulers.434 Since the Moors were not 
associated with these ruling powers, they were not as highly regarded as the 
Malays. This strong integration of Malays with Sinhalese continued in the 
post-independence era of Sri Lanka, too. Malay respondents who I interviewed 
for this study hail this integration of Malays with Sinhalese. Dada Packeer Ali, 
a retired post master from Akbar Town avers:  
“We never fail to honor a single invitation by the Sinhalese to their 
weddings.  We also take part in their funerals and arms giving 
(dansala), so our link with them is very strong. We also invite them to 
our homes on special occasions. They are like a family to us. We 
always peacefully coexist with the Sinhalese.”  
                                                 
434
 Saldin, The Sri Lankan Malays and Their Language, 48. 
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The same perspective has also been reflected in the responses of Mr. 
Jamal Mohamed, the president of Mabola Malay Association:  
“Although we live in the midst of Buddhists and Christians, we feel 
that we are like brothers and sisters of the same family. We give and 
take Dhaana (alms giving) from Buddhists, and we take part in each 
other’s festivals and other special occasions. They send us food, and 
regularly visit us. We are there for each other, when needs arise. We, 
Malays, are socially and culturally knitted together with other 
communities, as we are educated folks. Politically, we are still lagging 
behind others as our people are not very much interested in politics.” 
What is pertinent here is the level of impersonal relations of structural 
assimilation between Malays and Sinhalese. Participation on special occasions 
of the Sinhalese, sharing of food during festivals and other special days with 
them, and the feeling of brotherhood that Malays feel for the Sinhalese are 
representations of structural assimilation in terms of impersonal relations 
between Malays and Sinhalese. The interspersed settlement of Malays with the 
Sinhalese across the country has facilitated such integration between them. It 
is axiomatic that integration of Malays with Sinhalese is stronger in social, 
cultural and political aspects.    
As we have stated above, Malays engaged with Sinhalese in their 
organizational activities, seeking their expertise and advice for their welfare-
centric programmes. Furthermore, Malays have earned a good reputation 
among the Sinhalese as patriotic, honest and genuine people, which makes the 
Malays really proud. There are many well-known events from the past which 
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prove beyond any doubt the deep level of intergration Malays have had with 
the Moors. For example, the Moors in Hambantota donated to the Sinhalese a 
piece of land from that which belonged to Dhrama Kabeer Jumma Mosque for 
the construction of a Buddhist Vihara (temple) for the benefit of those 
Buddhists living in close proximity to the mosque. Malays also involve the 
Sinhalese in their businesses. In Kirinda, many of the Malays are engaged in 
fishing industry, and they have employed many Sinhalese in their businesses. 
Explaining such economic integration, Riyas, a fisherman from Kirinda notes:  
“It is common for the Sinhalese to be employed in our fishing 
businesses. As these Sinhalese are also good in Malay language, it is 
easy for us to involve them in our businesses. We export a lot of our 
fish to the Sinhalese business men in Colombo. That is how we 
maintain our business relationship with the Sinhalese.” 
The above excerpt clearly shows the way in which the Malays 
maintain the economic integration with Sinhalese in Kirinda, the Southern 
province of Sri Lanka. The same perspective has also been endorsed by Nafeel 
Dulapandan from Champa Lane, Trincomalee.  
“We are a fishing community here. We have an excellent business 
relationship with everyone around here… Tamils and Sinhalese.”  
This goes to show that Malays and Sinhalese are also integrated in the 
fishing industry in Champa Lane in the Trincomalee district. All this proves 
the point of impersonal relations of structural assimilation between the Malays 
and Sinhalese. By contrast, the economic integration of Malays with Moors, 
unlike that which exists between Malays and the Sinhalese, is not well 
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established. The economic integration between Malays and Sinhalese appears 
strong in both rural and urban areas in the country. Moreover, there is also a 
dimension of religious integration between these communities, not in terms of 
religious beliefs, but in its structural and institutional development. Illustrating 
such integration, Nazurdeen of the Military Mosque in Slave Island states:  
“Malays work in the shops of Sinhalese and take part in their funerals 
and weddings. For the New Year functions and their sport events, 
Malays lend them a hand in decorating their places and venues. In turn 
they lend us a hand for decorations for our Mowlood ceremony, flag 
hoisting ceremony and so on.  In politics, majority of our people vote 
for the Sinhalese, though they have not helped us elect a Muslim 
member.” 
This remark of Nazurdeen yields a lot regarding impersonal contacts 
between these two communities. His views reveal that not only are Malays 
economically dependent upon the business sector of Sinhalese for their 
livelihood, but politically too, they are very much dependent on the Sinhalese 
since the prospect for Malays in politics is very slim in the country. Malays 
have neither elected members to represent them, nor do they have a political 
party that seeks to have Malay representatives elected. Their being small in 
number and dispersed thinly across the country makes them politically 
vulnerable, as such conditions are not condusive for communal politics. Hence 
they have to necessarily support the majority Sinhalese political parties in 
order to draw governmental attention to any grievances they may have. More 
importantly, Nazurdeen assents that Malays and Sinhalese take part in 
decorating each other’s places of worship and other such places during special 
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religious and sports events. This is a remarkable indication to the level of 
impersonal relations between these two communities. The same point has also 
been stressed by Mowlavi Musni Ameer from Wekanda Jummah Mosque: 
“Malays are socially, economically and politically integrated with 
other communities while maintaining their identity. We have a mosque 
in Kokilawatta which is adjacent to a Sinhalese area. Sinhalese 
volunteer do Shiramadaana (giving their labor as charity to do some 
cleaning up) in this mosque. The relationship with Sinhalese is 
extremely strong.” 
 While acknowledging the existence of strong social, economic and 
political integration of Malays with other communities, Mowlavi Musni 
Ameer emphasizes that religious institution of Muslims serve as a center for 
fostering peace and harmony between Malays and Sinhalese, for they are a 
welcome place for Sinhalese if they wanted to get involved in a positive way.  
Moreover, integration between Malays and Sinhalese in the country is 
such that Sinhalese have volunteered to extend their helping hand towards 
Malays in times of trouble, be it man-made or natural disasters. The story 
related by Alamudeen, the principal of Kirinda Muslim Maha Vidiyalaya, 
underlines the deep level of integration between these communities.  
 “Malays involve Sinhalese in their fishing industry. Malays also take 
part in the funeral, wedding and New Year functions of Sinhalese. 
Recently a Malay drowned in the sea while fishing; his body was 
recovered only after three days of hard work jointly carried out by 
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Malays and Sinhalese in the area. That is the kind of relationship that 
exists between Sinhalese and Malays in Kirinda.” 
The news of a missing person making the Sinhalese community to 
mobilize itself to work with the Malays to locate the Malay victim is 
indicative of the level of deep integration between the Malays and Sinhalese in 
Kirinda. Such collective efforts by Malays and Sinhalese underline the level of 
integration that holds the communities together in Kirinda. The integration 
between these communities becomes much stronger during natural disasters. 
One such incident is related by Muan Ameen, the vice president of SLAMAC 
and a business man from Colombo:   
“We maintain amity with all the communities. Malays integrate better 
with Sinhalese than with Moors. When you hear them speak in 
Sinhala, you would be amazed; it would be impossible to tell whether 
they are born Sinhalese or non-Sinhalese. Most of the Malays in 
Hambantota were sheltered in the local Buddhist temple following the 
tsunami disaster. Sinhalese have a greater affinity towards Malays than 
the Moors. No complaints are generally made by the Sinhalese when 
the Malays slaughter animals for Ulhiyya435 and sadaka.436 Malays do 
not suffer the vilification which Moors are subjected to by some 
Buddhists, particularly the extremists. The cordial relation that exists 
between Malays and Sinhalese in our workplaces is not affected by 
anything.”  
                                                 
435 Ulhiyya is a religious practice of slaughtering animals, mainly cows, during the Haj festival 
season.The meat is then given in charity in the neighbourhood, including non-Muslims who 
would want to accept it.   
 
436 Sadaka is also such practice of slaughtering cow for accomplishing a task based on the 
intention (niyyath) one held. 
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The above excerpt of Muan Ameen offers lucid evidence for the 
integration of Malays with Sinhalese. In his view, the integration of Malays 
with Sinhalese is far better than what exists with the Moors. He also relates the 
story of Malays being sheltered at the Buddhist Temple in Hambantota during 
the tsunami natural disaster in 2004, causing huge damage to those who lived 
in the coastal belt of Sri Lanka. This is a good point that indicates the level of 
integration Malays have with the Sinhalese. In his view, the Malay integration 
with the Sinhalese is so well established that the latter are willing to overlook 
the slaughtering of cows for Ulhiyaa and Sadaka, whereas the same practice 
by moors has been a sticking point in their relations with Sinhalese. His 
excerpt also underlines the close economic relationship the Malays maintain 
with Sinhalese. In terms of the economic relations of Malays with Sinhalese, 
Iqraam Cuttlian, former president of SLMA from Colombo asserts:  
“We enjoy amity and maintain cordial relationship with all other 
communities. Malays are accepted and embraced by other 
communities, particularly the Sinhalese, because Malays speak Sinhala 
and English better than moors. Malays are also employed in the 
mercantile industry and other entrepreneurships by Sinhalese. Even in 
the shipping industry, where I work, there are one or two Malays 
working with Sinhalese. So, the Malays’ relationship with Sinhalese in 
all spheres of economic activities is plain to see.” 
While emphasizing the point that the social integration of Malays with 
Sinhalese is really entrenched due to the language skills Malays possess, 
Iqraam Cuttlian also recounts that the economic integration of Malays with 
Sinhalese is so satisfactory that the Sinhalese have happily employed a few 
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Malays in their businesses. This goes to show that Malays are socially and 
economically integrated with Sinhalese in the country.  Malays have a very 
strong impersonal relationship of structural assimilation with Sinhalese in the 
country, which unfortunately contributes to the endangerment of ethnicity of 
Malays. This impersonal relationship that Malays have with Sinhalese, in 
some cases, includes intermarriages too. The next section deals with the trend 
of personal contacts between the Sinhalese and Malays. 
6.2.4: Personal contacts of structural assimilation between Malays 
and Sinhalese 
The combination of impersonal and personal relations of structural 
assimilation hugely compromises the intergrity of Malay ethnicity. The 
personal relations of structural assimilation occur through intermarriages of 
Malays with non-Malays. Case of where the non-Malay partner is a non-
Muslim Sinhalese is very rare, and they are detested by Malays.  
Intermarriages with Sinhalese are usually witnessed in urban areas, where 
Malays and Sinhalese are so thoroughly interspersed. As for intermarriages 
with Moors it does not carry any such stigma due to the fact that both the 
communities share the same religion of Islam. Therefore, if a non-Muslim, be 
it a Sinhalese or not, happen to marry a Malay, the former generally is 
persuaded to embrace Islam. This reality is so well reflected in the illustration 
of Jamal Mohamed, the president of Mabola Malay Association:  
“Malays are getting married, outside the Malay community, to Moors 
as well as Sinhalese. But, where the partner happens to be a non-
Muslim, he or she embraces Islam. The cases of non-Muslim partner 
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not embracing Islam are very rare - I would say it is just about ten 
percent.” 
Jamal Mohamed does not give a percentage of marriages between 
Malay and non Malays. He only notes that almost 10% of all the marriages 
happening between Malays and non-Muslims continue to be a marital union 
between Malays and non-Muslims; 90% of such marriages eventually become 
a marital union between Malays and new converts to Islam. So the 10% he 
says remain a marriage between a Malay and a non-Muslim is just 10% of all 
the marriages between Malays and non-Muslims; 90% of non-Muslims 
marrying Malays do eventually revert to Islam. Nordoff (2009)437 articulates 
that only about 5 % of intermarriages within the Malay community is between 
Malays and Sinhalese. When talking about the intermarriages of Malays with 
Sinhalese, Mr. TK Samad from Nawlapidiya observes:  
“Only a handful of intermarriages are taking place between Malays and 
Sinhalese. I had to marry off my daughter to a Sinhalese as they fell in 
love with each other while working together in a company; I had no 
alternative as there was no suitable Malay male proposing to my 
daughter. The Malay guy who was proposed to my daughter earlier 
reneged on his promise, and this led to the dramatic end of her 
marrying a Sinhalese.” 
The same was also shared by Nazurdeen from Slave Island:   
“It is true that intermarriages with Sinhalese do take place, but it is too 
uncommon; one in a thousand in Slave Island, I would say. Such 
                                                 
437 Nordhoff,  A grammar of Upcountry Sri Lanka Malay, 44. 
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intermarriages with Sinhalese, though rare, can still be witnessed in 
Colombo suburbs and other urban areas such as Wattala, Ratmalaana, 
Maharagama and Avissawella.” 
The above reference also indicates that only a few intermarriages are 
taking place between Malays and Sinhalese, which are generally in the urban 
areas. Samad believes that this is an inevitable consequence of Malays free-
mixing at work; whereas Nazurdeen attributes such intermarriages to Malays 
being thinly distributed among the Sinhalese in Colombo suburbs and other 
urban areas. Many of my Malay respondents have stated to me that such 
intermarriages between Malays and Sinhalese are very few, nevertheless their 
concern at such intermarriages was so obvious. This is lucidly reflected in the 
responses of the Malays in the interviews. Baby Master from Hambantota, 
married to a Moor in Sammandura observes:  
“We are not concerned about our Malays marrying Moors, but are very 
concerned about Malays marrying non-Muslims, more so if the non-
Muslim partner does not embrace Islam eventually. When the non-
Muslim partner converts to Islam, we accept such marriages.”      
The above excerpt demonstrates the degree of concern Malays have 
over the intermarriages of Malays with Sinhalese, and the absence of such 
concern if it is with a Moor or when the non-Muslim partner eventually reverts 
to Islam. However, the issue of intermarriages is a matter of serious concern 
for the Malay elites and professionals, and they have been taking several 
measures to arrest this trend in the community. The occurrences of Malays 
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marrying Sinhalese, they say, are significantly reduced in the community now 
due to their deliberate actions.  
Akbar, a businessman from Akbar town notes:  
“Malays here do not generally marry non-Muslims. Any non-Muslim 
marrying a Malay eventually ends up converting to Islam. I personally 
know of a case where a Malay boy married a Sinhalese girl, but 
following a concerted effort by his brothers and relatives, he annulled 
the marriage.”   
The above excerpt clearly demonstrates the serious concern Malays 
marrying Sinhalese causes among the Malays, and the level of intense effort 
they make to ensure that such marriages eventually become a union between a 
Malay and a new Muslim revert. Thus, the intermarriages of Malays with 
Sinhalese, though negligible in terms of number, are considered a taboo and 
always results in a host of remedial actions being taken by the Malay 
community, with the aim of bringing the non-Muslim partner into the fold of 
Islam. Where efforts to convert fail, they attempt to get the marriage annulled. 
This is what is reflected in the story related by Akbar where the Malay boy 
marrying a Sinhalese was coerced to annul the marriage when his partner 
persisted in continuing in her old religion. It perfectly underlines the 
importance Malays give to the religion of Islam.  
Intermarriage with Sinhalese or any other non-Muslims can cause 
considerable ostracism from the community. Below are some examples of the 
nature of ostracism upon those Malays marrying outside of their religion. 
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Articulating such phenomenon, Ramola Rasool from Kelaniya University in 
Sri Lanka asserts:  
“Intermarriages between Malays and Moors are quite common. A few 
Malays marry Sinhalese and others, and these Malays are ostracized 
from the community for doing so. Relationship with their family 
members, at least for a short time, gets distanced.”  
TK.Azoor, the president of COSLAM also notes:  
“Some Malays are marrying non-Malays. Malays marrying Moors is 
OK since the religious injunctions are not violated, and the prospect for 
bringing up the children as Muslims is not endangered. Interracial 
marriages with non-Muslims often times fail. This may be due to 
ostracism by the family, and the intense pressure this places on the 
couple, particularly the Malay partner. The family and the community 
of the non-Muslim who married the Malay too can ostracize them. This 
is a serious dilemma for the young couple, who are generally not 
experienced in life.  Such ostracism by both communities is a powerful 
deterrent for anyone contemplating such intermarriages. Hence they 
are cautious not to get involved with others from outside Malay 
community. As for those Malays who get married to a non-Muslim and 
then eventually leave Islam for the religion of their non-Muslim 
partner, it is extremely rare, perhaps just one or two. They do this for 
very selfish reasons.” 
The above remark clearly underlines the fact that those Malays who 
ventured to marry Sinhalese are susceptible to ostracism by the community. 
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Such ostracism upon Malays marrying Sinhalese is still happening at the 
community level unless the non-Muslim partner reverts to Islam. They believe 
that such ostracism may serve as a deterrent for any Malay contemplating 
deserting the community and the religion. It is clear that Azoor attributes such 
intermarriages of Malays with Sinhalese to their selfish motive or personal 
benefits. However, as noted above, concerted attempts are being made to make 
such marriages islamically valid by bringing the non-Muslim partner into the 
fold of Islam 
As we have noted above, impersonal relations that occur along the 
lines of social, cultural, economic and political aspects, in combination with 
personal relations that occur through intermarriages between Malays and 
Sinhalese, or between Malays and Moors for that matter, endanger the 
ethnicity of Sri Lankan Malays. The language, culture, ancestry or lineages of 
Malays are seriously challenged due to such structural assimilation resulting 
from impersonal and personal relations. Hussainmiya (1987)438 notes that 
these intermarriages have interfered with the primordial traits of Malay 
progeny. It is clear that Malays intermarrying a Sinhalese, or a Moor for that 
matter, compromises the unique primordial markers of Malay ethnicity such as 
their physical characteristics, Malay language, culture, ancestry, and in the 
case of marriage with a Sinhalese, the religion of Islam too.  
The table given below represents the impact of structural assimilation 
on the ethnic identity of Malays, based on the FGDs conducted both in urban 
and rural areas 
                                                 
438 Hussainmiya, Lost Cousins: The Malays of Sri Lanka, Occasional Paper, 19. 
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Table 6.2.4.1: Impact of structural assimilation on the ethnic identity of 
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 The above table suggests that both the secondary and primary contacts 
of structural assimilation have had influence on the ethnic identity of Sri 
Lankan Malays. It shows that more than any other factors, it is the 
intermarriages between Malays and other dominant communities that poses a 
significant challenges to the ethnic identity of Malays. According to the above 
table, 9 participants from the urban area and 10 participants from the rural area 
drawn for the FGDs contend that the intermarriages have highly challenged 
the ethnic identity of the Malays, while 4 participants from rural and urban 
areas respectively also concur the intermarriages have partially challenged 
their ethnicity. More importantly, none of them believe that the intermarriages 
play no role in challenging the ethnic identity of Malays. This is a clear 
manifestation of the effect of intermarriages upon the ethnic identity of 
Malays, since it shapes the Malay language, cuisine, costumes, and other 
Malay rituals and traditions. Thus, the Malays view that intermarriages cause 
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substitutive acculturation and structural assimilation, and is a primary factor in 
it. It is to be noted however that, according to the table, social factors which 
constitute neighborhood, friendship, cliques and educational institutions, 
contribute only a minor challenges to the ethnic identity of Malays. 
Morever, talking about the effects on the identity markers of Malay 
ethnicity, due to intermarriages, Roshana, an English teacher from 
Nawalapitiya, notes: 
“Malay girls used to wear trousers and shirts. Now if we married Moor 
men, we would be asked by the Moor partners to wear abaya and hijab. 
This is a problem that comes up soon after the marriage. There may be 
other issues that arise due to our culture and language causing 
confusion and even misunderstanding with the in-laws. As our 
community is very small, there is a tendency for some of our members 
to go for partners from other communities; finding a partner from 
within the Malay community is at times very difficult. Marriage 
brokers advice us not to speak in Malay language in the presence of 
our would-be in-laws since he has not mentioned our ethnicity to them. 
So a little bit of deception is involved here, as we withhold information 
about our ethnicity. If the father is from Moor, then the Tamil language 
and culture will be perpetuated in the family and there is little prospect 
for retaining Malay culture or language. I think this would lead to 
virtual extinction of Malay ethnicity.” 
As we discussed above, Roshana also illustrates that the Malay 
language and Malay culture are at risk as a result of intermarriages of Malays 
with the members of dominant groups. This is true to a certain extent. When I 
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visited a Moor friend of mine at his home, (he was married to a Malay girl in 
Colombo) I observed that his wife and children were speaking to him in 
Sinhala and English. The meal they served me was quite un-Malay; my 
friend’s Malay wife wore a salvar, the typical dress of Tamil and Moor women 
in Sri Lanka. When I asked her if she would ever speak Malay at home, she 
said she would only speak it with her parents and grandparents as they insist 
upon it. This is a clear evidence of how far intermarriages have compromised 
the primordial markers of Malay ethnicity. Clearly, Sinhala and English 
language have replaced the Malay language, and Malay culture is increasingly 
becoming invisible in their daily lives. This is especially the case in the urban 
areas. Thus, this dimension of personal relations of structural assimilation that 
occurs due to intermarriages significantly challenges the ethnicity of Malays. 
Roshana notes that finding a suitable partner for Malay girls is an arduous task 
since the Malays are a minority within a minority. This forces them to look for 
marriage partners elsewhere, particularly among the Moors because of the 
shared religion. However, this view is challenged by some other Malays in the 
country. Kartini Mohamed, the former president of Sri Lanka Malay 
Association from Colombo, argues:  
“I would argue that such low scale mixed marriages cannot endanger 
the ethnicity of the whole Malay community. I know that one of the 
vice presidents of SLMA married a Sinhalese some time ago, and now 
she is an excellent Muslim compared to a lot of the Malays. My view 
is that a Malay marrying a non-Malay, even if he or she is non-
Muslim, does not disqualify him or her from being a Malay. I don’t 
believe that Malays who are born Muslims would ever convert to other 
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religions for reasons of marriage. All those who were born and bred in 
Malay families will remain as Malays until he or she dies, and nobody 
can remove from them their ethnicity. Needless to say, these type of 
cases are very negligible since many of the non-Muslims marrying 
Malays are largely converting to Islam.”     
The same point is also stressed in the remarks of Mona Packeer Ali, 
the secretary of Sri Lanka Malay Youth Wing as she avers:  
“One would not become a non-Malay if she or he marries outside of 
the religion (interracial marriage). Perhaps she or he can still speak 
better Malay than the rest, and carry the Malay lineage with them 
wherever they go. It is better if they don’t marry outside, but we should 
not force anyone from marrying outside, that is even if we believed 
that this would endanger our culture or religion.”   
The point Karthini Mohamed and Mona Packeer Ali raises here is 
really significant in terms of the structural assimilation affecting ethnicity. In 
their view, a few intermarriages of Malays do not necessarily lead to 
assimilation or erosion of Malay ethnicity as long as the primordial markers of 
Malayness such as language, physical characteristics and ancestry remain 
unchanged. Some of those traits are inherited by birth, and marriage would not 
alter them in those marrying outside.  
However, what is significant to note here is that since the ethnicity is 
essentially fluid and malleable, it may be subjected to certain changes over a 
period of time due to personal relations of structural such as intermarriages 
with non-Malays. In other words, the one who marries a non-Malay may 
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eventually adopt other languages, such as Sinhalese or Tamil; emulate 
Sinhalese or Tamil culture in the long run; and his or her Malay lineage may 
cease to be Malay in later generations. This is what is reflected in the previous 
paragraph where I cite the observation I made in the homes of Malays who 
were married to Moors in Colombo area. Thus, the point of primordial 
characteristics of ethnicity being unharmed, illustrated by Malay respondents - 
Karthini and Mona - can largely be debunked based on the constructivist 
theory, and it can also be challenged on the basis of structural assimilation. 
The point about the story that Karthini relates regarding the SLMA president 
marrying a non-Malay is that he converted his partner to Islam before 
marriage, because he just wanted to make sure that his ethnicity and religion 
were not compromised as a result of his marriage outside. It is important to 
note that she also emphasizes that a lot of non-Malays marrying Malays these 
days are reverting to Islam. This also suggests that intermarriages of Malays 
with non-Malays are on the rise in the country.  
Furthermore, integration of Malays with Hindu Tamils is not 
highlighted by any of the respondents, except one in Trincomalee, where 
Malays and Tamils are living side by side.  
Tuan Sahabdeen, from Trincomalee noted:  
“With Tamils and Sinhalese, we are living more like members of the 
same family - like brothers and sisters. We take part in their funerals, 
weddings and other special occasions. During the civil war, we gave 
shelter to Tamil civilians; we allowed them to sleep in our mosques; 
and we gave them food. However, the rich harmonious relationship 
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that existed between the majority and minority communities has 
dwindled over the years, due to the civil war.” 
The above excerpt shows the level of impersonal relations between 
Malays and Tamils in the district. It is obvious that Malays take part in social 
and special gathering of Tamils and share food with them; the Malays looked 
after the Tamil civilians by letting them into the mosques to take shelter 
during the height of civil war between the government forces and militant 
forces of Tamils. However, he is of the view that the degree of integration that 
prevailed between these two ethnic communities prior to the war has now 
dwindled due to various reasons. Thus, it appears that although integration 
between Malays and Hindus was going well before and during the civil war in 
Trincomale area, at the moment, it is not as good as it was before.         
By and large, the above discussion reveals that relations between the 
Sri Lankans and those from the Malay countries have existed for a long time. 
Traditionally, Malays have been loyal subjects of both the colonial and the 
local Sinhalese rulers. This integration of Malays with Sinhalese continued in 
post-independence Sri Lanka. The interspersed settlement of Malays among 
the Sinhalese across the country has reinforced the social, cultural and political 
integration with them. Southern Sri Lanka (Hambantota) has seen not only an 
economic integration, but also religious integration - not in terms of 
fundamental religious beliefs, but in terms of its structural and institutional 
development. Even in the Western province, the religious institutions of 
Muslims serve as a center for fostering peace and harmony between Malays 
and Sinhalese, with the Sinhalese participating in cleaning programmes in the 
mosques. Moreover, integration between Malays and Sinhalese in the country 
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becomes stronger when natural or man-made disasters happen. The most 
important dimension of personal relations of structural assimilation also 
occurs through intermarriages between Malays and Sinhalese, particularly in 
urban areas. Though such intermarriages are fewer in number, it can 
potentially endanger the primordial traits of Malay ethnicity as highlighted in 
the findings. Hence, the intermarriages of Malays with Sinhalese are 
considered a taboo and they result in remedial action being promptly taken to 
bring into the fold of Islam the non-Muslim partner. The finding also shows 
that the issue of Malays marrying Sinhalese or other non-Muslims can lead to 
ostracism from the community if the non-Muslim partner refused to embrace 
Islam.   
In summary, the preceding section reveals that Malays have been able 
to maintain the structural assimilation with both Moors and Sinhalese, 
resulting from the impersonal relations of social, economic and political 
nature, as well as the personal relations of intermarriages. It shows that such 
structural assimilation challenges the primordial characteristics of Malay 
ethnicity such as their language, culture, ancestry and lineage. As such, 
impersonal and personal relations with non-Malays pose a great challenge to 
the Malay language, its culture and its ancestry, as this leads to the replacing 
of the Malay language with Sinhala or Tamil language, dominance by the core 
cultures, and contamination of Malay lineage and ancestry. Therefore, it is 
important to explore those factors contributing to the structural assimilation of 
Malays which can potentially compromise the ethnicity of Malays, as 
highlighted above.    
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 Thus, the next section sheds light on the causes of the structural 
assimilation of Malays into the core ethnic groups in the country.  
 
6.3: Causes of structural assimilation 
Yinger (1994)439 and Gordon (1978)440 have listed the absence of 
prejudice and discrimination, among many others, as important factors that 
facilitate assimilation. Absence of prejudice and discrimination are indeed 
important factors. But, the context of Sri Lanka is very different to that of the 
West, and therefore, the factors contributing to the structural assimilation of 
the Sri Lankan Malays are somewhat different from what Yinger and Gordon 
have listed as the facilitating causes of assimilation.  
 While Rifai (2008)441 attributes interactions of Malays with Sinhalese 
in their work environment, adoption of Sinhala as a domestic language, a 
growing inclination towards Western culture, and intermarriages and 
acculturation among Malays as factors contributing to Malay’s assimilation; 
Saybhan ( 2001)442considers lack of religiosity among Malays due to lack of 
religious sermons and materials in Malay language,  dominance of Sinhala 
language, and ignorance of the younger Malay generation of the bravery 
exhibited by Malay forefathers, as reasons for the assimilation of the Sri 
Lankan Malays. However, the following discussion on the causes of structural 
                                                 
439 Yinger, Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict, 53-54. 
 
440 Gordon, Human nature, Class and Ethnicity, 69. 
 
441 Rifai, Sulaiman, “The Identity Crisis of Sri Lankan Malay Muslims,” 02-03. 
 
442Samat “Future of Sri Lankan Malays bleak,” 1-2.  
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assimilation of Malays transcends these factors as it covers a whole range of 
issues.  
6.3.1: Mixed educational system and work environments, and closed 
neighborhood with non-Malays 
Malays are so few in number and thinly distributed in areas dominated 
by non-Malays; they intermingle with non-Malays in schools, tuition centers 
and workplaces – all of these lead to a compromise on the part of the Malays. 
It is these reasons that have been considered as key reasons for the structural 
assimilation of Malays. In articulating the same reasons, Nazeera Amit cites:  
“Not all the Malays came here with their wives during the colonial 
period. So, they had to choose local partners from the Moors and 
Sinhalese, and convert them to Islam. The factors that contribute to 
strong interaction and integrationwith non-Malays are: 1) mixed 
schools/tuition classes, 2) mixed neighborhood, 3) mixed work 
environment, 4) lack of religious influence upon the Malay youngsters, 
and 5) keenness of Sinhalese to marry Malays.”  
The above excerpt explains the nature and context that prompted the 
Malays to integrate and choose partners from the core communities. What is 
also pertinent to note here is the fact, according to her, that intermarriages 
between Malays and non-Malays began from the colonial period, since many 
of the Malays did not come here with their wives and families. In addition to 
mixed work / study environments, lack of religious consciousness among 
Malays and the desire of Sinhalese to marry Malays are also listed by her as 
causes leading to structural assimilation.  Mixed education, particularly, brings 
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Malays and Sinhalese closer together particularly in the urban areas, where the 
Malays are thinly distributed. Saldin (2003)443 also reports that it is in 
educational environments that Malays imitate the Sinhalese more than 
anywhere. This shows that Malays and Sinhalese are closely integrated in 
educational environments. TK.Azoor, the president of COSLAM avers:  
“With the closing down of English medium schools in urban areas, 
Malays had and still have no choice but to learn in Sinhala or Tamils 
medium schools; the most preferred of the two being Sinhala medium. 
This is what gets the Malays a lot closer to the Sinhalese. Since 
proficiency in the instruction language at schools is a must for 
academic excellence, parents naturally adopt Sinhala as the home 
language, which eventually leads to the erosion of Malay language.” 
With the introduction of “Sinhala Only Act” by the then government in 
1956, Malays who had been pursuing their education in English medium 
schools until then were forced to switch to Sinhala medium schools. 
Consequently, Sinhala increasingly became their home language. Following 
the introduction of the Sinhala Only Act, parents quickly realized the 
importance of proficiency for their children in Sinhala and English language 
for their academic excellence. Therefore, the Malays, particularly those in the 
urban areas, began to pursue their education in the vernacular languages. Thus, 
it was compulsion that prompted the Malays to shift to Sinhalese medium 
schools in the urban areas, which led to them losing their Malay language, and 
integrating more with the core communities, particularly the Sinhalese. 
Mixing with Sinhalese in study environments then led to Malays marrying 
                                                 
443 Saldin, Portrait of a Sri Lankan Malay, 35. 
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Sinhalese more than ever before. In line with this argument, Rajudeen Salley, 
a social worker from Colombo observes: 
“There are several reasons for integration of Malays with non-Malays, 
mainly Sinhalese: 1) parents not providing suitable environment for 
their children, 2) mixed educational environment at schools and private 
tuition centers, 3) large number of Sinhalese in their cliques and 
neighborhoods, 4) restriction of the youth’s freedom based on incorrect 
interpretation of Islam by Malay parents, and 6) mixed work places. 
Unnecessary restriction of freedom causes an element of antipathy 
towards Islam among the youth, making them prefer to move into a 
relatively more permissive environment of the Sinhalese, which then 
paves the way for them to marry the Sinhalese.” 
The most striking point in the excerpt of Rajudeen Salley, is how 
Malay themselves, by trying to enforce upon their kids a stricter and incorrect 
understanding of Islam, are contributing to the structural assimilation of 
Malays inadvertently. Younger Malays themselves, due to lack of maturity 
and awareness on their part, instead of correcting their parents’ incorrect 
understanding of Islam, choose to altogether leave the Malay Islamic religious 
environment for a relatively lax Sinhalese environment.  Or it can be argued 
that there is a greater agnostic tendency taking root among the Malays, and 
therefore, placing too much emphasis on religion by parents, whether it is 
based on correct understanding of it or not, would alienate the youth.  So the 
point is that placing too much emphasis on religion is causing the Malays to 
structurally assimilate, by making them leave for a more lax Sinhalese 
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environment, where religion does not hold the same level of importance as it 
does within Malay environments.   
6.3.2: Economic factors 
It is also reported that many intermarriages are taking place due to 
avarice; some Malays are reportedly attracted by the strong financial 
capabilities of non-Malays, and hence they get married outside. Dada Packeer 
Ali, a retired post master from Akbar Town notes:  
“Only a handful of intermarriages are taking place here. That, of 
course, is mainly due to economic reasons.”  
The same view is also shared by Salley from Ganesa Pura, 
Trincomalee:  
“Many Malays marry Moors here due to the financial strength of the 
Moors, thinking that their future would be prosperous if they marry 
them”  
It becomes clear that intermarriages due to the attraction of great 
economic strength cut across rural and urban areas, for Dada Packeer Ali and 
Salley are from urban and rural areas respectively.  
Hussainmiya, a prominent scholar in the Malay community in Sri 
Lanka states: 
“There was a taboo for exogamy in the society, but that taboo has now 
lapsed, or just been relaxed as a result of urbanization and 
modernization. Some Malay girls deliberately choose Moorish 
husbands if the latter are found to be established in some sort of 
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business, because then there is a better prospect for future. This is in 
addition to their being a common religion between them. In some 
cases, better economic prospects have actually led to some Malays 
leaving Islam altogether. Recently, a Malay woman married a 
foreigner (British) working in a diplomatic institution in SL. What 
more do you want? She caught a big fish and will end up living in the 
UK soon. Other scenario is that many Malay girls don’t mind getting 
married to a boy following Buddhism or Christianity. For example, in 
my family, 4 out of 5 family members got married to non-Malay men.” 
The reason Hussainmiya brings forth for the occurrence of some of the 
intermarriages is the great economic status of non-Malays. Better prospect in 
terms of wealth is such a strong incentive that some Malays are willing to 
marry despite differences in ethnicity, culture, language and even religion. He 
bases his view on his observation of a Malay girl marrying a British foreigner 
working in a diplomatic mission and some of his relatives (girls) marrying 
Buddhists or Christians. The common denominator in all those marriages 
according to him is economic prosperity. Thus, the economic factors too are 
causes of structural assimilation affecting the Malays.  
6.3.3: Shared religion-Islam 
The most important factor that draws Malays and Moor closer to each 
other is their shared religion of Islam with its Shafi school of jurisprudential 
thought. Wherever Malays and Moors are living side by side throughout the 
country, this has bound them together so closely, naturally resulting in 
intermarriages between them. This is so clearly reflected in the excerpts of the 
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Malay respondents I interviewed. Mr. Tuan Sahabdeen from Trincomalee 
notes:  
“Malays marry Moors in this areas because they are brought so closer 
to each other by religion, and also because the Moors are affluent. So, 
the Malays believe that they would be better off if they marry Moors.”  
Sharing the same view as Tuan Sahabdeen with regard to the 
intermarriages of Malays with non-Malays, Nafeel Dulapaandan, Champa 
Lane states: 
“Malays generally marry within their community, but sometimes with 
Moors too as they share the same religion. Malays marrying Sinhalese 
or Tamils is very rare in our area. If that were to ever happen, it 
happens only after the non-Muslim partner has converted to Islam.”   
The above is a clear portrayal of those Malays living in rural areas with 
regard to intermarriages with non-Malays. It becomes clear that they prefer 
Moors as their partners more than anyone else, on the ground of shared 
religion of Islam, and intermarriages with non-Muslims are very rare. The 
scenario of intermarriages of Malays with non-Malays is the same for both the 
urban as well as rural areas. Thajudeen Girsy, a business man from Colombo 
observes:  
“For quite some time, Malays married Moors not only because they 
were Muslims, but also because they were Sunni Muslims of Shafi 
School, the very same school followed by the Malays both in Sri 
Lanka and the Malay world. As you know, due to the religion being 
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the same, both communities share the same mosque, same burial 
ground and the same rituals in various ceremonies including in nikah 
(weddings). However, Malays do not marry Borahs or Memons, for 
they do not belong to the same Sunni- Shafi category, though they are 
generally accepted as Muslims.” 
Elaborating on the same trend, Irfan from Slave Island, Colombo 
asserts:  
“My wife is also from the Moor community. There is nothing wrong in 
marrying Moors. However, marrying non-Muslims is problematic. 
There are almost ten Malay families of mixed marriages here; but 
Masha Allah, where a partner happened to be a non-Muslim, he or she 
has eventually embraced Islam; and their children are now having a 
purely Islamic upbringing.”  
The above excerpts indicate how serious a factor the common religion 
of Islam is in legitimizing intermarriages between Malays and Moors. As both 
the communities share the same religion, same Shafi school of jurisprudence, 
same Sunni sect, same burial grounds and same weddings customs, they are so 
closely knit as one community. However, what is noticeable in the assertion of 
Thajudeen is that Malays do not marry Borah and Memons, though they also 
share the religion of Islam and are generally very affluent. While the Borah 
community is Shias, Memons are Sunnis. So it cannot be said that it is 
sectarian thinking that is prohibiting the Malays from marrying from these two 
communities. There must be some other reasons for this.       
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6.3.4: Easy going nature with trilingualism and flexible 
interpretation of Islam 
Malays are generally trilingual, easy going and affable, and are 
‘liberal’ in their interpretation of Islam, unlike the Moors in the country whose 
interpretation of Islam is a bit more conservative. As articulated in the 
previous chapters, Malays gained these traits while serving in the armed forces 
during the colonial period and then the post-colonial period. While in military 
service they interacted more closely with Burghers, and engaged in trade 
union activities where partying, drinking and so on were common practices. 
The early close relationships between the Malays and Burghers seem to have 
been facilitated due to both the communities being fluent in English. 
Illustrating such intermarriages and integration with non-Malays, Mr. Jamal 
Mohamed, the president of Mabola Malay Association notes:  
“Intermarriages among Malays were on the rise sometimes ago, but it 
has slowed down to a great extent now because of the concerted efforts 
of various organizations and religious groups. Basically, Malay girls 
and boys are well-liked by everyone, because they are 1) good looking, 
2) very social, 3) trilingual, and 4) liberal in their interpretation of their 
religion. A lot of the Non-Malays marrying Malays are embracing 
Islam, too. We did a lot of Sunnath (circumcision) last month. We are 
increasingly concerned about Malays getting married to Moors now 
because of the cultural differences.” 
Although he cites a lot of factors for such intermarriages of Malays 
with non-Malays, characteristics such as Malays’ sociability, their trilingual 
capabilities, and liberal interpretation of Islam are noted as important. He also 
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asserts that such intermarriages are on the decline currently, and Malays are 
increasingly concerned about the high incidence of such intermarriages with 
Moors because of differences between Malays and Moors in terms of culture 
and language. As for the religious leaders of the Malay community, the reason 
they cite for intermarriages outside Islam is lack of religiosity. Mowlavi 
Minhaj from Wekanda Jumma Mosque, Slave Island states:   
“Intermarriages of Malays with other (non-Muslim) communities are 
on the rise due to lack of attachment to the religion-Islam. I have heard 
that not all the early Malay immigrants to the country were Muslims. I 
think Malays have a tendency to go to extremes: they are either 
extremely religious or extremely irreligious. As the present younger 
generation of Malays is unfamiliar with Malay language, they are 
prone to intermarriages with non-Malays, especially non-Muslims.”  
Mowlavi Muaath from Colombo also shares the same view as above:  
“Yes, intermarriages do take place, but to be frank, it is a sorry state of 
affairs. Those who have a sound knowledge in religion have a stronger 
attachment to religion, and they don’t marry non-Malay girls or boys; 
but those who are ignorant of the religion and therefore quite remote 
from the religion do so. There are two families here where a partner 
continues to be non-Muslim. Hence the whole family’s religious 
orientations are questionable. Their children carry Muslim names, but 
names alone do not mean much.” 
The above remarks of the two religious personalities demonstrate that 
Malays tend to marry non-Malays, especially Sinhalese, due to lack of 
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religiosity or just ignorance of religion. It further explicates that those Malays 
who are more religious would never be tempted to marry non-Malays. The 
story related by Mowlavi Muaath indicates the level of irreligiousness of the 
Malays who married the Sinhalese in his area. Thus, they attribute lack of 
religiosity as reason for Malays intermarriages and strong integration with 
non-Malays.     
6.3.5: Freedom to choose their partners 
One of the glaring features that Malay boys and girls have with regard 
to marriage is their freedom to choose their partners as they wish, unlike 
Moors. Malays in that respect are more lenient than Moors. They exert very 
little, if any, pressure on their children when it comes to choosing their 
partners. The leniency and lack of pressure from Malay parents do facilitate 
the continuance of Malays getting married to non-Malays beyond their 
boundaries of ethnicity, language, religion and class. This has aptly been noted 
by Muan Ameen, the vice president of SLAMAC.  
“The Moor community would not hesitate to marry off their daughters 
to professionally qualified boys from Malay community, but not vice 
versa.  We are short of professionally qualified men to marry off our 
daughters to, since our most eligible bachelors are taken away by other 
communities. Malays also permit dating.” 
This point is also endorsed by a Malay youth, Mona Packeer Ali from 
Akbar Town: 
“We have the freedom to choose our partners, though we are 
dependent on our parents. Unlike the more conservative Moors, Malay 
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parents know that the best way for their children to choose the most 
suitable partner is by permitting them to date.”  
The above excerpts explicitly underline the freedom Malay youth 
enjoy in choosing their husbands or wives. The freedom Malays enjoy in this 
regard is unlike what prevails among the Moor community. With such 
freedom, Malays end up finding their partners outside of their religion, 
language and ethnicity. Subsequently, such intermarriages compromise the 
ethnicity of Malays.   
 6.3.6: Lack of proper socialization 
It is noted that Malay parents are faulted for bringing up their children 
at an unhealthy environment that paves the way for intermarriages and for 
showing negligence in preventing dating. Brigadier Boharan from Colombo 
observes:   
“Lack of family bond and parental negligence is the reason for 
intermarriages with non-Malays. Dating is generally tolerated within 
the community. We don’t mind intermarriages with Moors, but we are 
worried about such intermarriages with non-Muslims. We warn 
parents. Where intermarriages with non-Muslims take place, contrary 
parental wish, we strongly insist on getting the non-Malay partner 
converted to Islam. Head-strong children, whose family bond is not 
strong, are likely to go out of religion. This has something to do with 
the lack of bond between parents and children. Such intermarriages 
will obviously lead to problems and there will be obstacles from both 
sides - both Sinhalese and Malays.”  
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The above remark of Brigadier Bohran blames the intermarriages of 
Malays on parents being negligent, having no strong bond with their kids, and 
permitting dating. Malays marrying Moors or converting non-Muslims to 
Islam as a last resort can, in his view, be excused. However, intermarriages are 
not generally healthy for the couple, for such inter religious marriages are a 
taboo not only among the Malays, but contrary to the popular perception, 
among the Sinhalese too.  
In criticizing the role of parents, Rajudeen Salley from Colombo also 
notes: 
“Parents are at fault for the permissive environment that they allow 
their children to grow up in.” 
Thus, he also attributes improper upbringing of Malay children in such 
a bad environment to intermarriages.  
6.3.7: Thinly distributed settlement or interspersed settlement 
among the core groups 
Not all Malays enjoy the privilege of living in Malay Kampong or 
Malay enclaves. A lot of them are thinly distributed in areas in Sinhalese and 
Moors dominated areas. Thus, Malays are most likely to be integrated with 
Moors and Sinhalese. Gaffoor from Kandy Malay Association observes:  
“In the past, Malays used to live just in one central place. That used to 
be the case even in Kandy. But the situation began to change during 
the second and third generation of Malays, when their family homes 
were not enough to accommodate the expanding families. This led to 
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the community spreading out across the island. So, the third generation 
Malays settled down in predominantly Sinhala areas and established a 
great deal of network with Sinhalese, while the family relationship 
with their older generation, still living in the centers, began to wane. 
So, this network and interaction with other communities, particularly 
with Sinhalese, corrupted our culture, language and subsequently our 
ethnicity.” 
Natural growth in the size of Malay families, and the non-availability 
of affordable housing to cater for their increasing need led to the Malays 
looking for cheaper housing elsewhere. Hence a lot of the younger Malays 
moved to areas away from their parents and grandparents; and these places 
were non-Malay areas. The consequence of this was the weakening of the 
familial bond between the older generation in the centre and the new 
generation now in the peripheries; intermarriages of Malays with the core 
communities began to increase compromising their culture and language. The 
same perspective is also shared by Shereen, a Teacher from Gampola:  
“Situations compel Malays to marry non-Malays as they live in mixed 
neighborhoods, like in Gampola. If a suitable marriage partner is not 
found, we conveniently look for them in the non-Malay communities, 
thus integrating with them.” 
This excerpt also attributes the integration and intermarriages of 
Malays to their dispersed settlement across the country. Malay Kempong 
(enclave) is a rare phenomenon in the Sri Lankan context. Malays are 
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vulnerable to such integration with non-Malays as they are thinly distributed 
among other communities.  
6.3.8: Conspiracy of conversion 
Here is another very interesting finding on the cause of structural 
assimilation: conversion of Malays to Christianity by missionaries. Some 
believe that there is a conspiracy to convert the beleaguered Malays to other 
religions under the guise of intermarriages. In explaining this, Mowlavi Musni 
Ameer from Wekanda Jummah Mosque notes:   
“It is sad that intermarriages of Malays with other communities do take 
place, which endangers the distinct identity of Malays in Sri Lanka. 
Intermarriages here are very rare, perhaps below one percent. 
Christians are at the forefront of converting the gullible Malays, 
especially in Athuragiriya area; they are so zealous in their mission 
that they take the trouble to learn and use Malay language for their 
proselytization purposes.”  
Mowlavi Musni accepts that some intermarriages do take place among 
the Malays, eroding their identity. The reason for this, according to him, is the 
proselytization attempt of the Christian missionaries, seeking to exploit the 
ignorance of Malays in certain suburban areas around Colombo. It shows that 
Malays are vulnerable to missionary onslaught. By contrast, in rural areas such 
as Kirinda where Malays are highly concentrated, there are no attempts of 
conversion. Thus, this cannot be generalized as a common phenomenon 
among the Malays living across the country. Nevertheless, the dynamics of 
afore-mentioned factors of structural assimilation was highlighted by the 
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Malay participants in the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted in rural 
and urban areas.  
The causes of structural assimilation of Malays highlighted by the 
participants in the FGDs conducted in Slave Island (urban area) and Kirinda 
(rural area) are shown in diagrams below. 
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Diagram 6.3.1: The causes of structural assimilation of Malays in urban 
area (Slave Island) 
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Diagram 6.3.2: The causes of structural assimilation of Malays in rural 
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The above diagrams show the dynamics on the causes of structural 
assimilation of Malays both in urban (Slave Island) and rural areas (Kirinda). 
The size of the circles in the diagram is proportionate to the significance each 
factor has in terms of structural assimilation.  While most of the participants in 
the FGD from urban areas identify mixed schools and mixed working 
environments as the number one factor contributing to the structural 
assimilation in urban areas, majority of the FGD participants in Kirinda, 
however, regard the shared religion of Islam as the number one factor. 
However, it is noted that FGD participants in both Slave Island and Kirinda 
find that mixed schools, mixed working environment, interspersed settlement 
of Malays, and the shared religion of Islam are the leading factors contributing 
to the structural assimilation of Malays.  
 Diagram 6.3.1 shows that the other factors such as flexibility, lack of 
proper socialization, freedom to choose their partners, and conspiracy of other 
religions played a minimal role in the structural assimilation of Malays in 
urban area. Moreover, despite the fact that there are few other factors 
contributing to the structural assimilation of Malays in rural area, it shows that 
the lack of prejudice and discrimination of Malays by the dominant 
communities also contributed to the structural assimilation of Malays in rural 
area. This is primarily because the Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors and Malays are 
all living side by side in rural areas like Kirinda with no apparent hatred, 
prejudice and discrimination. According to the diagram 6.3.2, the structural 
assimilation of Malays with dominant communities in rural area is also 
attributed to the shared livelihood of Malays with the dominant communities. 
As discussed in the previous section, Malays have either involved other 
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communities in their livelihood or collaborated with them in various 
livelihood sectors, particularly in the fishing and business sectors. These 
helped them shed their differences, and bound them together, leading to strong 
structural assimilation.  
 
6.4: Summary 
In summary, the above section unpacks the impersonal and personal 
contacts of structural assimilation of Malays with non-Malays in the country, 
which challenges the boundary markers of Malay identity. More importantly, 
Malay language, culture and ancestry have largely been at stake due to 
personal contacts of structural assimilation, especially among the younger 
generation of Malays, who are more vulnerable to structural assimilation. The 
factors discussed in the preceding sections are the ones that significantly 
contribute to the structural assimilation of Malays in Sri Lanka. It is clear from 
the previous chapter on acculturation and this chapter on structural 
assimilation that the substitutive dimension of acculturation and the personal 
contacts of structural assimilation have all been playing a crucial role in 
endangering the boundary markers of Malay identity. This leads to the 
construction of Malay identity, for they identify the challenges of substitutive 
dimension of acculturation and personal contacts of structural assimilation 
upon their identity, and then take various measures to revive it. 
Thus, Malays have actively been responding to the present challenges 
of assimilation, taking measures to perpetuate their ethnicity in the country. 
The following chapter deals with responses undertaken by the Malays to 
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address the challenges of assimilation. More specifically, it delves into the 




 RESPONSES OF MALAYS TO THE CHALLENGE OF 




In the previous chapters, having focused on the challenges of 
assimilation to the Malay identity, characterized by both acculturation and 
structural assimilation, this chapter deals with the responses undertaken by 
Malays to confront those challenges, and their outcome.     
The first section of this chapter focuses on the responses to the 
challenges of assimilation by Malay elites, their associations or organizations. 
Specific focus is placed on the organizational responses of certain active 
Malay organizations such as Sri Lanka Malay Association (SLMA), 
Conferensi Melayu Sri Lanka (COSLAM), Sri Lanka United Malay 
Organization (SLUMO), Mabola Malay Association and Women’s 
Association of Sri Lankan Malays (WASLAM). The next section of this 
chapter deals with the consequence on Malays of their assimilation into other 
communities in the country, giving special focus to pluralism and hybridity as 
outcomes of assimilation.    
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7.2: Measures taken by Malays and their organizations in response 
to the challenge of assimilation  
Despite the fact that the Malay community is a minority within the 
minority ethnic groups in the country amounting to only about 55000 persons, 
it is reported that they are represented by almost 24 Malay organizations 
throughout the country.444 Of these 24, those in urban areas, like the Western 
province, are the most active. They are spearheading programmes that are 
designed to perpetuate the boundary markers of Malay ethnic identity. They 
include welfare, socio-cultural, religious, and language programmes. The 
following discussions deal with some of the active Malay organizations in 
urban areas, particularly in the Western province of Sri Lanka . 
7.2.1: Sri Lanka Malay Association (SLMA)  
All Ceylon Malay Association (SLMA) was formed in January, 1922 
with members of Colombo Malay Cricket, the Muslim Progressive Union and 
other Malays. The name of the association was later changed to Sri Lanka 
Malay Association (SLMA). Some of the key activities of the SLMA are : 1) 
annual recital of Rasool Mowlood, at the end of which many Malays from 
Slave Island get together for a grand feast, usually lunch, 2) free circumcision 
to poor Muslim boys, 3) cultural programmes such as Malay dance, songs and 
Angklung orchestra, 4) conducting food stalls to promote Malay food, and 
                                                 
444 The details of Malay organizations are available in the Souvenier on Sri Lanka Malay Rally 
published by Sri Lanka Malay Association and Colombo Malay Cricket Club in August, 2008. 
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fashion shows to promote Malay dresses, 5) conducting Malay language 
classes, and 6) several social service projects that help residents in the area.445  
In 1953, the Social Service Committee of the Sri Lanka Malay 
Association launched a fund called SLMA Rupee Fund to help the 
underprivileged. The aim of this fund was to assist students who had entered 
universities. In addition, it has also been conducting a pre-school for children, 
free English classes, vocational training classes, and various other projects to 
benefit the underprivileged of the area.446 During the year 2012/2013, the 
SLMA organized a host of events to preserve and promote Sri Lankan Malay 
traditions, culture, language and identity. It also compiled a DVD containing 
clips of Sri Lanka Malay language lessons, highlights of culture and traditions 
of Malays, and an explanation of their contribution to the nation.447 These 
initiatives are considered as strong responses of Malay organizations in 
confronting the challenges of assimilation. These are also examples of how 
Malay elites and their organizations are generally attempting to construct the 
Malay identity in the country by taking various measures.   
The figures below, showing the number of programmes organized by 
Sri Lankan Malay Association, sheds light on how active this organization is 
in perpetuating the ethnicity of Malays in the country.  
                                                 
445 Cuttilan “Sri Lankan Malay Association: 90 years of continued service” commemorative 
issue, January 20, 2012. 
 
446 The details are noted in the Commemorative Souvenir of the Padang Golden Jubilee-1960 
to 2010, Colombo Malay Cricket Club and Sri Lanka Malay Association.  
 
447 Cuttilan  “Sri Lankan Malay Association: 90 years of continued service”, 10. 
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The above flyer advertises basar malam (a mega food fiesta) organized by 
SLMA recently to promote the Malay cuisine among the Malays.   
 
 
Malay youth performing Malay cultural dance, which SLMA teaches and 
promotes. This picture was taken when Malaysian students from Mari Banting 
College-Selangor visited Malay Padang complex located in Slave Island, 
Colombo on 27th May, 2013.   
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This suggests how active the Sri Lanka Malay Association is in 
perpetuating Malay ethnicity in the country in the face of assimilation. I was 
fortunate enough to be in attendance in one of their programmes conducted in 
December, 2012 to promote Malay entrepreneurship and provide career 
guidance for Malay youth, invited from various parts of the country. It was a 
successful event. I was able to interact with many Malay youth who were 
actively involved in those programmes. They were also very keen to maintain 
and promote their relationship with fellow Malays who had gathered there 
from various part of the country. Though the programmes were conducted in 
English, I noticed that many rural Malays were chatting in Malay language, 
unlike their urban brethren who were chatting either in English or Sinhala. 
This shows that Malay language still remains intact in rural areas, while 
structural assimilation has compromised the Malay language in urban areas. 
Talking about the effectiveness of such programs organized by SLMA, Rinosa 
from Hambantota notes:  
“This is a great initiative of Malay Association. A lot of our brethren 
coming from rural areas benefit a lot from this career guidance 
programmes. This one was organized by SLMA for those who had just 
sat for their A/L exams. Apart from this, some of the cultural 
programmes and sports events organized by SLMA also reinforce our 
Malayness, giving us hope that we can preserve our uniqueness.”    
The above is a clear example of how effective the programmes, 
organized by SLMA, are in reinforcing the Malay identity among the younger 
generation. The SLMA also provides transportation and accommodation to 
rural Malays in order to help them come to Colombo for the programmes. This 
 350 
 
certainly helps maintain and establish contacts with fellow Malays from 
different parts of the country, which in turn help heighten the sense of Malay 
consciousness among the younger Malays. These initiatives of Malay 
organizations are considered as a process of construction of Malay identity in 
response to the challenges of assimilation.     
SLMA as a pioneer Malay organization in Sri Lanka is at the forefront 
of revitalizing Malay ethnicity in the country. This has aptly been noted by 
some of its active members. Iqram Cuttilian, the former president of SLMA 
observes:  
“Formed in 1950s, the Sri Lanka Malay Association, which I was part 
of, organizes cultural, religious and language programmes to 
perpetuate our identity in this country.” 
Illustrating the activeness of SLMA, Brigadier Bohran, a retired army 
and vice president of Sri Lankan Malay Association, notes:  
“We are gradually improving our culture. There is now Malay dance in 
Malay clubs here. All my three children are good cultural dancers, 
which is something we could have never imagined in the past. Our 
younger generation is so dynamic. They want to see the Malay culture 
taking roots in them, so that when they grow up they can teach their 
children the same.” 
It can be clearly seen that Sri Lanka Malay Association focuses on 
socio-cultural as well as economic needs of the Malays. It could also be 
observed from the above excerpts that the Association has had significant 
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engagement in activities aimed at perpetuating the cultural and ethnic identity 
of younger Malay generation in the country, in the face of challenges of 
assimilation. As Brigadier Bohran indicates, the SLMA is at the forefront of 
organizing programmes, specifically Malay cultural dances, to perpetuate their 
cultural repertoire among their younger generation. These initiatives of Malay 
organizations are considered as a process of construction of Malay identity in 
response to the challenge of assimilation. However, despite its great 
initiatives, SLMA has also drawn some criticisms from the members of Malay 
community. SBC Thassim from Colombo states:  
“SLMA is an elitist organization, whose members speak English not 
only in their programmes, but also at home. Middle class Malays never 
get a chance to get positions in the organization.”  
These critiques, in fact, led to the establishment of some other 
alternative Malay organizations in the urban areas. Nevertheless, SLMA is at 
the forefront of organizing programmes to perpetuate the Malay identity in 
response to the challenges of assimilation and the attempt of Moors to dilute 
the Malay identity.  
7.2.2: Conferensi Melayu Sri Lanka (COSLAM) 
This organization was founded on 30th January 2000 with the aim of 
empowering Malays to become self-sustainable and to enable them to find 
their rightful place in Sri Lankan society. Unlike the SLMA, COSLAM 
prioritizes religion (Islam) in all its activities. Having realized the significance 
of the Malay language in the perpetuation of the ethnicity of Malays in Sri 
Lanka, COSLAM embarked on the great task of teaching Bahasa Melayu with 
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the help of the High Commission of Malaysia and the Literature Institute of 
the government of Malaysia, in 2002. Many Malay students benefited greatly 
from these classes. Nevertheless, despite the very high level of initial 
enthusiasm, it began to wane later, making the organizers feel discouraged. 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka established an International Council for the 
Malay Language (Majlis Antharabangsa Bahasa Melayu) in 2000 and it 
appointed the president of COSLAM as the country’s representative.448  
With the disbandment of Majlis Antharabangsa Bahasa Melayu, 
COSLAM came up with the idea of developing Sri Lankan Malay, declaring a 
day in the year as Hari Bahasa Melayu (Malay Language Day). This day was 
dedicated to the preservation and development of the Malay language. On this 
day, competitions were held in various age groups in Essay writing and 
oratory - in writing essays, competitors were given the freedom to use the 
Roman, Sinhala or Tamil alphabets. Winners were awarded cash prices. Over 
the years, from 2006 when this was first launched, this initiative of Hari 
Bahasa Melayu competition has become so popular with so many Malays 
living in various parts of the country. This contributed in no small way 
towards perpetuating Malay language and ethnicity in Sri Lanka. Following 
this, many Malay Associations began to show a keen interest in the Hari 
Bahasa Melayu competition conducted by COSLAM.449 Birth of COSLAM, 
which has provoked such enormous interest in Malay language,both among 
                                                 
448 The details are available at the Souvenier published at the Hari Bahasa Melayu organized 
by confernsi  Melayu Sri Lanka in Colombo 10, 2012.  
 
449 The details are available at the Souvenir published at the Hari Bahasa Melayu organized by 
confernsi  Melayu Sri Lanka in Colombo 10, 2012. 
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ordinary Malays and many Malay organizations, is an important milestone in 
the history of Malays in Sri Lanka. 








Talking about such initiatives, TK Azoor, the president of Konfrensi 
Melayu Sri Lanka (COSLAM) from Colombo notes: 
“Since the Malay youth were losing their competency in Malay 
language because they were studying in Sinhala or English medium, 
COSLAM started promoting Sri Lankan Malay Language (SLM), 
which is an admixture of original Malay and vernacular languages of 
Sri Lanka such as Sinhala and Tamil. We permitted the writing of 
Malay using whatever alphabets one was comfortable in using. That is 
how the Hari Bahasa Melayu (Malay language day) came about. It is 
as if Malay was given a new lifeline.  It makes us really happy to be 
involved in the preservation of our language and identity.” 
This figure shows the annual Hari Bahasa Melayu event held at 
Zahira College Colombo in 2012, in which Al Haj Dr TB Jaya was 
commemorated. TK Azoor, the president of COSLAM, is seen 
delivering a speech wearing the traditional Malay dress.    
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As Azoor has clearly highlighted above, the language and ethnicity of 
the Malays are perpetuated through the works of COSLAM.  Hari Bahasu 
Melayu competition conducted by COSLAM has made an enormous impact 
upon the Malays living across the country.  Illustrating on the effectiveness of 
their programmes, Nazeera Amit observes:  
“Hari Bahasu Melayu competition organised annually by COSLAM 
has been very effective. It is a great leap forward in revitalizing our 
language. Among the Malay youth, there is great enthusiasm for these 
competitions. We are indebted to COSLAM for being at the forefront 
in revitalizing our language and by extension the Malay identity in the 
country.” 
The above excerpt vividly captures the immense popularity COSLAM 
enjoys among the Malays across the country because of its language 
competition programmes. When I went to the Southern part of Sri Lanka, I 
saw students preparing for this competition in Sinhala and Tamil languages. 
So there is clear evidence that Malay language, following the initiatives 
undertaken by COSLAM, is being revived; this by extension does reinforce 
and perpetuate Malay identity in Sri Lanka.   
The initiative of COSLAM is also lauded by religious leaders. 
Mowlavi Muan Ameen from Slave Island states:  
“COSLAM, in association with Sri Lanka Ulema Association, 
organizes religious sermons and Quran classes at Wekanda Mosque. 
We are happy that COSLAM prioritizes Islam in its programmes. 
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Their contribution to the revival of religious consciousness among the 
Malays in this area is great.” 
All of these go to show that the programmes organized by COSLAM, 
in response to the challenges of assimilation or attempts by Moors to subsume 
their identity, contribute to the construction of Malay identity and are well 
received by Malays. Thus, it is notable that Malay identity is constructed via 
various programmes organized by Malay organizations, in response to the 
challenges of assimilation.       
7.2.3: Sri Lanka United Malay Organization (SLUMO)  
Formed in April 1984, SLUMO is dedicated to moulding the younger 
generation according to Islamic values, while also fostering Malay culture and 
tradition. The organization conducts monthly Television programmes, called 
SELAMAT on the national TV channels. These programmes include Malay 
music, Malay drama, Malay traditional weddings and rituals, Islamic religious 
observations and panel discussions by religious dignitaries and so on. This 
programme was introduced by SLUMO with a view to perpetuating the 
ethnicity of Malays in the country. SLUMO is also engaged in charitable, 
social and educational activities, among which is a crash course on Islam, 
conducted annually for GCE O/L students studying in Non-Islamic schools 
where Islam is not taught as a subject. It was SLUMO which persuaded the 
then Prime Minister Hon. DB. Wijethunga to include the subject of Malay 
language in the GCE Ordinary Level Examination in 1993.450  
                                                 
450 The details are available in the SLUMO souvenir published on  Nyanyi Ronggeng( Malay 
cultural and Musical Evening) in Colombo in 2004.  
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Talking about the effectiveness of SLUMO and its programmes, Dada 
Packeer Ali notes:  
“It is SLUMO that introduced Malay programmes to the viewers on 
the national television channels. Unfortunately their programmes have 
now stopped due to various problems. It conducts quite a lot of 
educational and religious programmes, which are very effective and 
well received by the Malays. It has also succeeded in introducing the 
Malay language in O/L examination. In short SLUMO plays a 
significant role in the perpetuation of Malay identity in the country.”   
 This shows that SLUMO does various programmes to perpetuate the 
Malay identity. SLUMO is at the forefront of revitalizing the Malay ethnicity 
in Sri Lanka by organizing various social, cultural and charitable programmes. 
Their activities do contribute to the cultural richness and preservation of 
ethnicity of Malays. SLUMO plays no small role in the construction of Malay 
identity.  
7.2.4: Mabole Malay Association 
Founded in 1984, Mabole Malay Association is committed to 
preserving the cultural, religious and other aspects of Malay identity in the 
community in the local area. It mainly focuses on: 1) social and cultural 
programmes, 2) sports events to uplift sports and culture among Malays, 
especially dance and music, 3) women’s affairs, and 4) religious affairs, such 
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as organizing circumcision for free for the poor, ifthar in Ramadan and 
religious sermons in Malay and English.451  
This organization is as active in rural Mabole as SLMA and COSLAM 
are in urban areas, like the Western province of Sri Lanka. The following are 
some of the views of my Malay informants on the programmes conducted by 
Mabole Malay Association.    
Jamal, the president of Mabola Malay Association: 
“Mabola Malay Association encourages Malay dance, cuisine and 
costume, and develops in the minds of Malay youngsters a love for 
Malay culture. The responses of Malay youngsters in this regard are 
very impressive; they are showing utmost interest in all the events we 
organize.” 
Dada Packeer Ali, a retired Post Master from Akbar Town:  
“I am aware that Mabola Malay Association conducts seminars, 
religious programmes and sports activities; their efforts to revive the 
Malay culture as well as to keep alive our historical memories among 
our youth are praiseworthy.”     
The above excerpts of Malay respondents go to show how much the 
works of Mabole Malay Association is appreciated by Malays; their works are 
seen as crucial to reviving the ethnicity of Malays. It is very interesting to 
notice, in the response of Jamal Mohamed, that Malay youth are showing an 
increasing interest and great enthusiasm in cultural dances, songs, and other 
                                                 
451 Gathered some details about Mabole Malay Associations in www.mabolemalays.com, 
(accessed August 10, 2011). 
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programmes conducted by them. The desire to perpetuate their ethnicity is 
reignited in the minds of the Malays. This also shows the effectiveness of their 
programmes in reaching out to the Malays in order to revitalize their Malay 
identity and its markers such as language, culture and religion, all of which 
leads to the Malay identity being constructed. 
Although there are a few other Malay organizations representing the 
urban Malays, these four Malay associations mentioned above are playing a 
vital role in perpetuating the Malay ethnicity. These Malay organizations have 
recently set up their youth wings too to cater to the needs of the Malay youth. 
Such youth wings organize so many events to perpetuate the Malay ethnicity 
among the Malay youth in the country. Apart from these four, there are other 
Malay organizations, too, which represent urban areas. But their works are 
largely confined to their geographical locations. For instance, Matale Malay 
Association and Nawalapitiya Malay Association are active in Matale and 
Nawalpitiya areas respectively in the central province of Sri Lanka. More 
importantly, many of the regional Malay Associations have become dormant 
these days due to financial and administrative challenges.  
In a related and latest development, two new Malay organizations have 
recently been formed with the same objective of perpetuating the ethnicity of 
Malays. The following sub-section deals with them.  
7.2.5: Women’s Association of Sri Lankan Malays (WASLAM) 
 WASLAM was founded in 2010 with the aim of mainly addressing the 
needs of Malay women. Some of the areas covered by the activities of 
WASLAM are: 1) education and vocational training, 2) Islam and Malay 
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language, 3) social and cultural events, and 4) finance and fundraising. 
Recently, WASLAM embarked on an outreach programme to help out Malay 
families at grassroot level, particularly those thinly dispersed among other 
communities. Some of their charity works were carried out in collaboration 
with others Malay associations like Mabole Malay Association.  
 In line with their general work to perpetuate Malay ethnicity, 
WASLAM jointly conducted with COSLAM a symposium on Sri Lankan 
Malay Language.452 A lot of the Malay associations are male-centric. 
WASLAM, in which women play some prominent roles, is seen as a unique 
development among the Malays. Since women are the pillars in propagating 
the ethnicity of Malays among the children, especially their language and 
culture, WASLAM specifically focuses on the Malay women. Elaborating on 
the functions of WASLAM, Honeida Packeer, the president of the WASLAM 
observes:   
“Apart from language programmes, WASLAM also conducts quite a 
lot of religious awareness programmes (Thajweeth and Thafseer 
classes) among the youth.  As a consequence, intermarriages and 
conversions are declining.”  
  This excerpt makes it clear that WASLAM also has been playing a 
vital role in the perpetuation of the Malay ethnicity in the country. There is no 
denying the fact that such programmes would bring significantly positive 
outcomes for the community. It would minimize the chances for the 
                                                 
452 From the profile of WASLAM provided by Honeida Packeer, the president of WASLAM 
from Nawala, Colombo. 
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deterioration of Malay ethnicity by preventing the total integration of Malays 
with non-Malays in the country.  
 It is also notable that WASLAM’s social works are well received by 
the Malays at grass root levels. Faimin Jailabdeen from Colombo states: 
“I know that WASLAM engaged in worthwhile social works. 
Recently, it built some toilets for the poor in sub-urban areas. It also 
gives vocational training, such as tailoring courses for Malay women, 
so that they could be empowered to be able to support their families 
better, and independently. Social works of WASLAM are really 
commendable.” 
The above excerpt underlines the effectiveness WASLAM’s 
programmes and how well they are received by Malays. WASLAM is unique 
in that its main focus is the Malay women.   
7.2.6: Sri Lanka Malay Ulema Association 
 Another recent development is the establishment of Malay Ulema 
Association, which is based in Colombo. It consists of 20 to 25 Ulema 
representing different part of the country. The president of the association is 
Arkam Mowlavi, who pursued his studies in South Africa. He is actively 
involved in creating religious awareness among the Muslims, particularly the 
Malays in the country. The main objective of the association is to propagate 
the religion of Islam, using Malay language as the medium, among the Malays 
in the country.      
 361 
 
 Recently, they have begun delivering regular bayans or religious 
sermon in Malay language in Wekanda Jumma Mosque. These are conducted 
on Wednesday evenings, separately for Malay girls and boys. Mowlavi Musni 
Ameer, the Chief Katheeb of Wekanda Jumma notes:  
“We will be expanding our activities and services to other areas like 
Trincomalee and Ampara soon, where Malays live interspersed with 
others from other communities.” 
The above excerpt shows how they want to target their next 
programme at newer audiences. The intention here is to perpetuate the 
ethnicity of Malays, while focusing to arrest or slow down the trend of 
integration. 
The above discussion is an explicit demonstration of how Malay 
organizations are now in the process of revitalizing their language and cultural 
elements, such as Malay dance and cuisine, among the younger generation of 
Malays in the face of challenges of assimilation.   
Some Malays have articulated how the challenge of assimilation, 
facilitated via intermarriages, could be arrested by means of facilitating 
interaction among Malay boys and girls. Rajudeen Salley, a social worker 
from Colombo states:  
“When we get the Malay youth together for whatever reason, it 
provides them with an opportunity to meet others from other areas. 
This may actually result in them meeting their future life partners.”  
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Jamal Mohamed, the president of Mabole Malay Association proposes 
a different strategy:  
“All twenty four Malay organizations should work to facilitate 
marriages between Malay boys and Malay girls. If each of them would 
succeed in organizing at least four such marriages each year, we would 
have in a year ninety-six pure Malay couples. This is certainly 
possible, and the success rate can actually be increased in the future, 
doubling or even tripling it. That is a surer way to increase the number 
of Malays, and perpetuate our ethnicity in the country.” 
These are some of the suggestions from Malay members on how to 
arrest the trend of intermarriages and revitalize the ethnicity of the community.  
This is a case of Malay identity being constructed when the community 
responds to the challenge of personal contact of structural assimilation that 
takes place through intermarriages. In fact, these types of gatherings, as 
suggested by the Malay respondents, are already being organized by SLMA 
under the banner of Malay Rally and other functions, which continues to bring 
some fruitful results. These programmes have facilitated great interaction 
among the Malay youth.   
Sri Lanka Malay Confederation (SLAMAC), which is an umbrella 
organization of twenty-four associations serving the Malay Community, was 
established in 1985, to coordinate all the Malay associations in Sri Lanka. This 
was a profound move by the Malays. This umbrella organization does not 
interfere with the activities or progarammes conducted by member 
organizations. SLAMAC was meant to work as a unified institution upon 
programmes and projects that are unanimously agreed upon by each member 
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organization. Each association nominates two representatives to SLAMAC 
which has seven co-presidents. Nevertheless, SLAMAC failed miserably in its 
task of designing programmes that are agreeable to all the members. It also 
could not pool all the resources available to individual member organizations 
so that they can use them more effectively for the betterment of community. 
The main reason for the failure of SLAMAC in this task is that it consists of 
incompatible organizations, each with its own ideology that considerably 
varies from the others. There are among the Malays those who criticize the 
ineffectiveness of SLAMAC, claiming that it has been hijacked by the SLMA 
and Colombo Cricket Malay Club, in order to promote their own agendas. 
Others claimed that there was no transparency and accountability in its affairs 
as it was under the influence of SLMA and Colombo Malay Cricket Malay 
Club. Malay organizations are mired in various challenges and problems, 
though their objective of perpetuating their ethnicity has overwhelming 
support.  
The overall effectiveness of the initiatives taken by Malays in response 
to the challenge of assimilation to their identity among the Malays is quite 
positive as highlighted above under each Malay organization. However, it is 
important to note that the most effective of the Malay organizations, whose 
programmes have yielded the best outcome, are those among the upper and 
middle class Malays in the urban areas  who are financially sounder and better 
educated. The influence of these Malay organizations among the grass root 
level Malays is quite poor. The following empirical evidence from the field 




Irfan from Slave Island states:  
“Malay organizations are there only for the educated and the elites. 
They never reach out to the grass root levels. They never approach us. 
There is a huge gap between the Malay organizations and lay Malays.” 
Nafeel Dulapaandan from Champa Lane:  
“Malays in Trincomalee, particularly in areas like Champa Lane and 
Ganesa Pura, are eager to interact and maintain their relationship with 
their brethren and other Malay organizations in urban areas. However, 
this wish of the rural Malays continues to be only an unfulfilled wish.” 
The above excerpt makes it clear that Malay organizations, according 
to the grass root level Malays, represent only the middle and upper class 
Malays; they have not reached out to the grass root level Malays. It also 
highlights the poor visibility of those rural Malays to the urban, literate and 
arguably richer Malays and their Malay organisations in the urban areas. 
Needless to say that this kind of negative perceptions among rural Malays 
would only make the efforts of urban Malay organizations to respond to the 
challenges of assimilation, and other challenges to their identity less effective. 
Thus, there is an urgent and desperate need for these Malay organizations to 
reach out to the grass root level Malays in the rural areas, and to bridge the 
gap between the rural Malays, who are living in Trincomalee, Ampara and 
Puttalam districts and urban the Malays in the country, at least through 
organizational engagements as a first step. Without close coordination 
between urban and rural Malays, there is the frightening possibility of both of 
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them becoming extinct, unable to resist the full force of assimilation currently 
unfolding.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the above mentioned Malay 
organizations have been taking some serious measures in response to the 
challenge of assimilation and the Moors' attempt to submerge the Malay 
identity under the religious category. The responses of Malay organizations in 
the face of such challenges of assimilation, as discussed above, took the form 
of Malay language and cultural revitalization programmes; and other social, 
economical, educational, religious and welfare-oriented programmes. This is 
the process in which Malay identity is constructed: in the context of 
identifying the challenge of assimilation to their identity and then responding 
to such challenges. As for the theoretical perspective of constructivism, 
Phinney (2001) argues that ethnic identity is a dynamic construct that evolves 
and changes in response to developmental and contextual factors and he 
further illustrates that it changes in response to social and contextual factors.453 
There are evidences, which have been discussed before, that the Malay 
identity is also constructed as their developmental and contextual factors 
change.  
 To sum up, although Malays are represented by twenty-four Malay 
organizations throughout the country, only a few of them, mainly those in 
urban areas, are actively functioning; while the rest are becoming defunct or 
dormant due to various reasons. However, those that are actively functioning 
in the urban areas, such as SLMA, COSLAM, SLUMO and Sri Lanka Mabole 
                                                 
453 Phinney, J.S,  Horenzyk, G, Liebkind, K, & Vedder, P. 2001. Ethnic Identity, Immigration 
and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective. Journal of Social Sciences, Vol 57( 3), 496. 
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Malay Association, do give priority programmes that seek to revitalize the 
Malay ethnicity in the country. Programmes by these organizations to 
revitalize the Malay language, cultural dances, music, Malay cuisines and 
costumes are really significant. These measures by Malay elites and their 
organizations eventually lead to the construction of the Malay identity. The 
birth of the female-centred WASLAM and the Sri Lanka Malay Ulema 
Association have both given new impetus to efforts to revitalize Malay ethnic 
identity. SLAMAC, which was formed as an umbrella organization to 
coordinate various Malay organizations, has been subjected to some criticism 
recently. Some view it as a failure since it was unable to achieve what it 
originally set out to achieve: bringing together various Malay organisations. 
This was not surprising given that the ideologies of these organizations differ 
from each other considerably.   
As far as the effectiveness of Malay organizations, in facing the 
challenges to the identity of Malays, the empirical evidence shows that they 
have been very successful. Their programmes have been well-received by the 
community, too. It should also be mentioned that these organizations only 
represent mostly the middle and upper class Malays; Malays at grassroots 
level appear to be sidelined; and the presence of rural Malays in prominent 
positions within those organizations are almost invisible. Hence they are seen 
as elitist, representing only the urban, educated and richer Malays. For this 
reason, the effectiveness of the Malay organizations, in responding to the 
challenge of assimilation and other such challenges to the Malay identity, is 
somewhat weakened. Thus, there is an urgent and desperate need for these 
organizations to reach out to the grassroots level Malays in the urban areas and 
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to bridge the gaps between the rural Malays, who are living in Trincomalee 
and Ampara districts, and urban Malays. Otherwise, there is a great chance 
that the rural Malays, just like those in Kinniya, would become extinct.  
 Some say that Malays have largely assimilated into the core 
communities, endangering their ethnicity in the country, while others claim 
that such assimilation, however, has also yielded positive outcomes such as 
pluralism and hybridity among the Malays. Thus, the next section deals with 
such outcomes of assimilation  
 
7.3: The outcomes of assimilation  
As discussed in the theoretical chapter of this study, Gordon (1964)454 
identifies that there are three possible outcomes of assimilation. They are: 1) 
Melting Pot ideal - when different ethnic groups come together, and out of this 
interaction comes a new culture that incorporates elements from all groups, 2) 
Anglo Conformity - when the minority group is taught that the norm, values 
and institution of majority groups are superior and that they should adopt them 
in order to be accepted, 3) Cultural Pluralism – when different ethnic groups 
keep their unique culture and behavior while still sharing common national 
value and goals.   
The empirical evidence of this study suggests that the assimilation 
brings about two outcomes, namely pluralism and hybridity.  
                                                 
454 Gordon, Assimilation in American life, 71-73. 
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Thus, the next section deals with cultural pluralism in relation to the 
Sri Lankan Malays.  
7.3.1: Cultural pluralism    
Gordon (1964)455 illustrates that one of the outcomes of assimilation of 
minority ethnic groups into host community is cultural pluralism, which is all 
about different ethnic groups perpetuating their unique culture and behavior, 
while still sharing common national values and goals. A well-known 
anthropologist J.S Furnival’s suggestion on cultural pluralism assents the same 
view as Gordon. Furnival aptly notes that different ethnic groups ‘mix but 
don’t combine’.456 Furnival (1946) argued that Southeast Asia, towards the 
end of colonial rule, had “three social orders: the native, the Chinese and the 
Europeans, living side by side, but separately.” To Furnivall, a plural society 
would “comprise two or more elements of social orders which live side by 
side, yet mingling in one political unit.”  
Thus, the theory on plural society serves to describe the condition of 
different ethnic compartments of a society living together within an 
overarching political unity.  
Sri Lanka has long been cherished as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, 
multi-langual and multi-religious country in South Asia, and thus this theory 
has a great significance to the study of Malays, the sub-ethnic minority 
community in the country. Despite the fact that previous studies on Sri Lankan 
Malays do not specifically discuss the theory of cultural pluralism, a few 
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studies suggest that the Malays are conscious of their ethnic or racial identity 
and are passionately clinging on to the last vestiges of it, while sharing the 
national culture and values with the host communities in Sri Lanka.457   
As discussed above in the preceding section on personal contacts of 
structural assimilation and the discussion on substitutive acculturation in the 
previous chapter, it appears that Malays are increasingly assimilated with the 
core ethnic groups in the country. Furthermore, Malays are also considered as 
loyal, honest, hard working and more integrative, as noted in the previous 
chapter. They continue to peacefully coexist with Moor, Sinhala and Tamil 
communities in the country. They stood shoulder to shoulder with other local 
communities fighting for freedom from occupiers, and made sacrifices to 
safeguard the country they were born in, whenever they were required to do 
so.458  
Structural assimilation of Malays in terms of personal and impersonal 
relations with core communities has also enhanced their consciousness of 
Malayness and brought about the positive outcome of pluralism among them.   
The responses of Many Malay informants from urban and rural areas 
suggest that they strongly integrate with non-Malays while being fully 
conscious of their own ethnicity. The following are some of the responses that 
substantiate the argument on pluralism of Malays:  
Nafeel Dulapaandan, Champa Lane:  “Our relationship with other 
communities such as Tamils, Sinhalese and Moors is very cordial. We 
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458 Vajracharya, “ Malay Minority of Sri Lanka: Defending Their Identity,” 03. 
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take part in their funerals, weddings, and other special occasions and 
vice versa, without giving up our identity.” 
Marjana, a teacher from Hambantota town: “You are bound to follow 
some elements of other cultures, but you should not give up your own. 
While continuing to cling on to your own culture, you can adopt some 
elements from other cultures too, provided that they are good. That is 
the key.” 
Anees, from Kirinda: “Malays in Sri Lanka are integrated well 
socially, culturally and economically with other communities. At the 
same, they have also been able to perpetuate their own distinct ethnic 
identity along the lines of language and some other traditions.” 
The above excerpts of Malay respondents underline the fact that 
Malays, particularly in rural areas like Kirinda and Champa Lane, are 
conscious of their identity; and at the same time, socially, economically and 
culturally well-assimilated with non-Malays; and continue to perpetuate their 
identity. This shows that Malays are significantly assimilated with core 
communities in those areas, but such assimilation yields the positive outcome 
of pluralism among Malays. While continuing to use Malay language for 
interpersonal communications within the community, Malays in those areas 
also master other vernacular languages such as Tamil and Sinhala and become 
very fluent in them. This leads to plurality in the society. This is aptly noted 
by Ramola, an academic from Keleniya University. She observed in my 
interview with her:  
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“Being Sri Lankan is increasingly important to young Malays as they 
are trilingual apart from speaking Malay language”  
Furthermore, while adopting some cultural practices of core 
communities, they continue to preserve their own culture too. An example of 
this is the guaranteed presence of Malay cuisines at home and on special 
occasions, in the rural areas. This stands as evidence to the presence of 
pluralism among the Malays in the rural areas of Sri Lanka.  
Similarly, the discussion of pluralism among the Malays in urban areas 
yields the same results as in rural areas. The following Malay respondents note 
that the Malay community is a typical and living example of pluralism in Sri 
Lanka.      
BDK. Saldin, from Colombo: “Malays have not dissipated into Moors, 
Sinhalese or Hindus. They have been maintaining their ethnicity 
despite some degree of integration with other communities. So, we 
subscribe to the slogan of 'unity in diversity'. It is like a rainbow: 
different colors are so vividly visible, yet these individual colors come 
together to make the rainbow.”  
Rajudeen Salley, from Colombo: “When we moved to Pannipitiya, our 
neighbors, primarily Sinhalese, looked at us with suspicion. Then, after 
a great deal of interaction, they realized that we were good people. We 
take part in their Dhaana (alms giving) and we also exchange presents 
with them on special occasions. It is easy to fit in with them. But, at the 
same time, we are also very conscious of our ethnicity and culture.”    
 372 
 
What is important in the above remarks of the Malay respondents in 
urban areas is that they accept the fact that although they are socially, 
culturally and politically assimilated with the core ethnic groups, such 
assimilation does not erode their ethnicity; rather such assimilation only 
reinforces their ethnicity and brings about the outcome of pluralism in them, 
as noted by the respondents. The point of Rajudeen Salley shows clearly that 
non-Malays were suspicious at the beginning when they first moved to a new 
place in Western province, but the suspicion disappeared later when Malays 
were seen to be pluralistic and affable. This goes to prove the dimension of 
pluralism that exists in the Malay community in urban areas, as a result of 
their assimilation with the core ethnic groups in the country. This has aptly 
been pointed out by Thajudeen Girsy, from Colombo. 
“Mixing does not mean losing the culture. Malays keep their unique 
identity and at the same time interact with others, thus forming a 
pluralistic society. Sri Lanka is a pluralistic society which is like a 
bouquet made of flowers of different colors; the Malays are a one type 
of flower that makes the bouquet. Or it is like the meeting of fresh 
water with sea water at a certain point? Both waters become 
indistinguishable at that meeting point. Nevertheless both of them keep 
their distinct nature at other places.” 
His view also suggests that Malays are considered as part of a plural 
society in Sri Lanka, tirelessly espousing their ethnicity while also being 
intergrated with the core communities. His analogy to waters emphasizes so 
beautifully that assimilation does not lead to the erasure of their ethnicity. 
Moreover, the way in which Malays show their pluralism in Sri Lanka is 
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reflected in the illustration of Ramola Rasool, an academic from Kelaniya 
University. 
“Malays mixing with majority communities has been going on for a 
long time, but without endangering the identity of Malays. Being Sri 
Lankan is increasingly important to young Malays. They fit in well 
with anyone as they are trilingual. They have friends from other 
communities. Malays feel that they are Sri Lankan, though they are 
racially Malays. That trend is in complete contrast to that among the 
older generation.” 
The above reference represents the dimension of pluralism exhibiting 
itself in the character of Malays in urban areas. From her view, it becomes 
crystal clear that Malays assimilating with non-Malays does not necessarily 
mean that it has endangered their ethnicity. Instead, such assimilation has 
spawned pluralism in the country as Malays become fluent in the vernacular 
languages, and familiar with all the cultural practices. Regardless of ethnicity 
or religion, they have won over the hearts and minds of all segments of the 
people, and earned the accolade as honest, brave, and easy-going people. This 
also explains that the phenomenon of pluralism of Malays in urban areas is as 
common as it is in rural areas.  
The other significant characteristic that appears in the excerpt of 
Ramola is the phenomenon of hybridity of Malayness in Sri Lanka. Malays 
perceive themselves as patriotic nationals - as Sri Lankans - while at the same 
distinguishing themselves as Malays racially or ethnically. This draws us to 
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the discussion of hybridity of Malays, which is a result of assimilation with 
core ethnic groups in Sri Lanka.  
7.3.2: Hybridity of Malays 
Pluralism as an outcome of assimilation has brought the aspect of 
hybridity within the Malay community. Hybridity is essentially regarded as 
something of a mixture. In relation to Malays, it essentially refers to Malays’ 
perception of two identities - one as a Sri Lankan nationally or culturally, and 
another as Malay racially or ethnically, as a result of their integration with 
core communities in the country. This is precisely what Ramola Rasool brings 
forth in her illustration. Her point implies that Malay youth feel that they are 
Sri Lankans, having earned a great deal of trust nationally, and at the same 
time, are perceiving themselves as Malays racially or ethnically. This is also 
reflected in the responses of some other Malays who I interviewed.  
Bohran, from Colombo: “We are Sri Lankans and Malays at the same 
time. Some people think that we are Malaysians. A citizen can be 
Chinese, Muslim or Hindu. We are Sri Lankan first within Sri Lanka, 
and at the same time, we are Malays too as we have our own ethnic 
identity.” 
TK.Azoor, from Colombo: “We are basically Sri Lankans while not 
compromising our own ethnic identity. I would say that we are Sri 
Lankan by nationality, Malay by ethnicity, and Muslim by religion.”  
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Hussainmiya: “As a minority, Malays have more chances of being 
assailed than other bigger communities. However, Malays feel as Sri 
Lankan first and Malay next.” 
The above excerpts aptly demonstrate the dimension of 
hybridity of Malays in the country as they consider themselves both as 
Sri Lankans nationally or culturally, and at the same time, as Malays 
ethnically or racially. This can be compared with the context of 
Chinese in the Philippines. Tong argues that the Chinese identity in 
Philippine is racially primordial based on racial categories such as 
blood and descent, but culturally and nationally they are Filipinos. 
Thus, most of the Chinese in the Philippines, especially the younger 
generation, claim that they are both Chinese based on ethnic identity 
and Filipinos based on nationality.459 Malay identity in Sri Lanka is the 
same as that of Chinese in the Philippines.    
This phenomenon of hybridity is resultant to the pluralism among the 
Malays, which is an outcome of assimilation into the core ethnic groups in the 
country. This proves the fact that assimilation of Malays brings some positive 
outcome for them such as pluralism and hybridity. These positive features that 
Malays possess are hardly seen among the other ethnic groups in the country, 
due to the facts that the majority Sinhalese community is mired in a 
majoritarian mindset,460 and that the minority ethnic groups such as Tamils 
and Moors are afflicted with racial or regional inferiority complex. A very 
important point drawn from the illustration of Azoor is that Malays are Sri 
                                                 
459 Tong, Identity and ethnic relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chinese, 210-112 
 
460 Ismail, “Critiquing the President's Victory Speech,” 1-2. 
 376 
 
Lankans nationally and culturally, Malays racially and ethnically, and 
Muslims in terms of religion. It also indicates the mutliple-identity of Malays 
in the country. This is a significantly rare phenomenon, hardly present among 
the other communities in the country.     
 
7.4: Summary 
In summary, the preceding sections reveal that Malays have 
maintained their structural assimilation under both circumstances: one 
resulting from the impersonal relations of social, economic and political 
aspects; and the other resulting from personal relations of intermarriages with 
both the Moors and Sinhalese in the country. The structural assimilation of 
Malays into core ethnic groups occurs due to : 1) mixed educational system 
and work environments; and closed neighborhood with non-Malays, 2) 
economic reasons, 3) Islam being shared religion, 4) the easy-going nature of 
Malays with their unique trilingualism, and a relatively more liberal 
interpretation of Islam, 5) the freedom they have to free-mix and choose their 
own partners, 6) Improper socialization, 7) being thinly distributed among the 
core groups, and 8) religious conversion. 
It shows that the personal contact of structural assimilation, as a result 
of which Malay language is replaced with Sinhala or Tamil languages; Malay 
culture is replaced with the dominant core cultures; and Malay lineage is 
adulterated, poses the biggest challenge to the key boundary markers of Malay 
ethnicity such as their language, culture, ancestry and lineage - more so among 
the younger Malays than among the older generation. The case of Malays in 
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Kinniya is a case in point in this regard, where structural assimilation resulting 
from personal contact has caused them to be fully assimilated with Moors, and 
their lineage to disappear due to them adopting Tamil language and Moor 
culture.   
However, recent years have seen Sri Lankan Malays responding to the 
challenges of structural assimilation and acculturation by undertaking a 
number of organizational initiatives. This was discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter. In particular, Sri Lanka Malay Association (SLMA), 
Confrernsi Melayu (COSLAM), Sri Lanka United Malay Organization 
(SLUMO), Mabole Malay Association, Women’s Association of Sri Lanka 
Malays (WASLAM), and Sri Lanka Malay Ulema Association  in the urban 
areas, and other regional Malay associations have been actively organizing 
language revitalization programmes, cultural events (such as Malay dance, 
music, exhibition of Malay cuisines and costumes), and other events in 
response to the challenges of assimilation. This is the process by which the 
identity of Sri Lankan Malays is being constructed by Malay elites and their 
organizations; Malays identify the challenge of assimilation to their identity 
and then respond to such challenges with various programmes, designed to 
perpetuate Malayness in the country.   
As for the effectiveness of their responses, it is clear from the 
empirical evidence that these responses have been very effective and well-
received by Malays in the country. However, since these organizations only 
represent the middle and upper class Malays, there is a feeling among the 
grassroots of being ignored. This feeling is exacerbated by lack of visibility 
for rural Malays in these organizations. As a consequence, the effectiveness of 
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Malay organizations in responding to the challenge of assimilation and other 
challenges to the Malay identity is likely to suffer. Hence, there is an urgent 
need for these organizations to reach out to the grassroots Malays, and to 
bridge the gaps between the rural Malays, living in Trincomalee and Ampara 
districts, and urban Malays in the country. Should they continue to feel that 
they are being ignored by their urban brethren, there is a real danger of rural 
Malays reacting in a manner that would further aggravate the already existing 
ill-feeling, which may eventually lead to them becoming fully assimilated and 
extinct, as has already happened to Malays in Kinniya.   
On the other hand, the findings also show that Malays assimilating 
with non-Malays yield positive outcomes such as pluralism and hybridity. 
Malays have become fluent in all the vernacular languages, are familiar with 
all the cultural practices, and hence have found them in the good books of all 
segments of the people in the country, and are receiving full accolade for 
being honest, brave, and more integrative. As for the dimension of hybridity, 
they consider themselves as Sri Lankans nationally and culturally, and at the 






8.1: Introduction:  
The primary aim of this study was to examine the ethnic identity 
formation of minority Malays and the challenges to their ethnic identity due to 
their assimilation into the core ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. This was followed 
by a number of research questions seeking to explore: 1) the ethnic identity 
formation of the Sri Lankan Malays, 2) the challenges of assimilation to the 
ethnicity of Sri Lankan Malays, 3) their responses to such challenges, and 3) 
the outcomes of the assimilation upon the Malays in the country. 
 
8.2: Summary of the findings of the study 
The finding shows that Malays have identified as their boundary 
markers their physical features, language, religion and ancestry, excluding 
their culture; they discount culture as a marker of their identity because it has 
been subjected to the challenge of substitutive acculturation and structural 
assimilation due to the influence of Moors, being interspersed amongst the 
dominant communities, and the activities of transnational Islamic movements. 
However, it is shown that although they discount culture as markers of their 
ethnicity, Malay elites and their organizations are now in the process of 
reviving their culture.  
Moreover, the study reveals that Malay identity is both primordial and 
constructed in the Sri Lankan context: it appears to be primordial based on 
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boundary markers such as physical characteristics, Malay language, religion 
ancestry, and their self-identification. However, it is argued that examining the 
identity of Sri Lankan Malays in terms of primordialism is not sufficient since 
there is an ongoing process of construction of Malay identity, due to Malay 
elites and their organizations responding to the challenges of assimilation with 
various programmes, designed to perpetuate the Malay identity in the country. 
Therefore, despite the views of the Malays that their identity is purely 
primordial, (based on boundary markers such as the language, race, religion 
and ancestry) I find that it is also a construction of identity as a result of the 
initiatives of Malays in response to the challenges of assimilation. Malays are 
now in the process of revitalizing their language, particularly the Sri Lankan 
Malay Language. They continue to remind their younger generation of their 
Malay ancestry and their roots descending from the Malay world in Southeast 
Asia. They revive their culture through reviving Malay dances, music, attires 
and cuisines. They also organize various religious programmes to ensure that 
the Malay younger generation adheres to the religious values. Thus, the 
finding shows that Malay identity is constructed in the context of identifying 
the challenge of assimilation to their identity and responding to such 
challenges in a number of ways.  
It also shows that the Malay identity is also constructed in 
contradiction to the Moorish identity as they resist Moorish attempts to 
subsume their identity under the broader religious category of Islam. In 
addition, the finding also reveals that self-ascription of Malays and ascription 
of them by other communities as ‘Malays’ play a role in the construction of 
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Malay identity. The colonial and post-colonial rulers also played a significant 
role in constructing the Malay identity in the country. 
More importantly, the study shows that assimilation - characterized by 
both the acculturation and structural assimilation - poses a crucial challenge to 
the Malay identity. It shows that the substitutive acculturation and personal 
contact of structural assimilation, both, pose the biggest challenge to the key 
boundary markers of Malay identity such as their language, culture, religion, 
and ancestry. More vulnerable in this respect is the younger generation of 
Malays: among them Malay language is replaced with Sinhala or Tamil 
languages; aspects of core cultures become dominant over Malay culture; and 
intermarriages with Moors and Sinhalese become more prevalent. Malays in 
Kinniya are a case in point. They have now become largely indistinguishable 
from the Moors in that region: they have completely forgotten their Malay 
language and speak in Tamil, their culture is the same as that of Moors, and 
their physical features too largely resemble any other Moor's.  
The findings also reveal that the assimilation of Malays into core 
ethnic groups occurs due to following factors: 1) absence of discrimination 
and prejudice against Malays by the core ethnic groups, 2) the increasing 
influence of transnational Islamic movements, coupled with the attempt of 
those returning from Saudi Arabia to replace the Malay culture with Arab 
culture, 3) mixed educational and work environments, and closed 
neighborhood with non-Malays, 4) disinterest of Malay youngsters in 
perpetuating their culture, 5) increasing level of integration and interaction 
with core communities, 6) economic reasons, 7) shared religion of Islam, 8) 
their easy-going nature with their trilingual skills and a liberal interpretation of 
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Islam, 9) freedom to choose their partners, 10) Improper socialization, 11) 
being thinly distributed among the core groups, and 12) conversion of religion. 
The study also reveals that recent years have seen Sri Lankan Malays 
responding to the challenges of assimilation through various organizational 
initiatives that are intended to revive their identity and perpetuate it in the 
country. In particular, Sri Lanka Malay Association (SLMA), Confrernsi 
Melayu (COSLAM), Sri Lanka United Malay Organization (SLUMO), Sri 
Lanka Mabole Malay Association, Women’s Association of Sri Lanka Malays 
(WASLAM), Sri Lanka Malay Ulema Association in the urban areas, and 
other regional Malay associations have been at the fore front, organizing and  
promoting language revitalization programmes and cultural events (such as 
Malay dance, music, exhibition of Malay cuisines and costumes), in response 
to the challenge of assimilation. This is how the process of identity 
construction of Malays takes place in the country: Malay elites and their 
organizations, on identifying the challenge of assimilation to their identity, 
respond to such challenges with various programmes, which in turn result in 
their identity being constructed.   
The findings also show that Malays’ assimilation into non-Malays 
yields some positive outcomes too, such as pluralism and hybridity. Malays 
have become fluent in all the vernacular languages, are familiar with all the 
cultural practices, have entered the good books of all segments of the people in 
the country, and won full accolade for being honest, brave, and integrative. As 
for the dimension of hybridity of Malays, they consider themselves both as Sri 




Overall, it was found that the vast majority of Malays are showing 
voracious interest to preserve their Malayness despite so many challenges. It 
also shows that there is lack of visibility for rural Malays in the (urban) Malay 
organizations. These Malay organizations have ignored the Malays at the 
grassroots level, and appear to represent only the middle and upper class 
Malays. This renders ineffective the efforts of Malay organizations in 
responding to the challenge of assimilation and other challenges to the Malay 
identity. There is a pressing need for these organizations to reach out to the 
Malays at grassroots level in the urban and rural areas, and to bridge the gap 
between the rural Malays living in areas like Trincomalee and Ampara 
districts and urban Malays in the country. Continued negligence of these rural 
Malays, or even permitting such negative perceptions to continue to exist, 
would inevitably result in the full and wholesale assimilation of rural Malays, 
as has already happened to the Malays in Kinniya.  
To accomplish this task, the Malays could seek the support of the High 
Commission of Malaysia and Indonesia in Sri Lanka, and other benevolent 
Malays, including politicians, in the Malay world who are sympathetic 
towards their brethren in Sri Lanka. 
 
8.3: Significance of the findings of the study 
Malay ethnicity in Sri Lanka is both primordial and constructed. My 
Malay respondents view their identity to be primordial. However, I argue that 
primordialism is not sufficient to explain the identity formation of Malay 
ethnicity in Sri Lanka, and the constructivist theory needs to be employed to 
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elucidate the identity formation of Malay ethnicity. In other words, primordial 
markers are less important than the constructed formation of Malay ethnic 
identity. It is pertinent to note that in some societies primordialism is indeed 
more significant, while in other societies it is constructivism that is more 
significant. However, what is interesting here in the Sri Lankan context is that 
primordialism and constructivism, as theories of ethnic identity, are both 
relevant to their identity formation; the situational theory of identity is 
irrelevant since Sri Lankan Malays are not seen to be switching their identity 
for the purpose of political and social benefits.    
In the Malay World, Culture has also been a decisive marker of ethnic 
identity of Malays.461 According to Shamsul, it has been a significant marker 
of Malay identity in Malaysia.462 However, in the case of Malays in Sri Lanka, 
the majority of the Malay respondents exclude culture as the key marker of 
their ethnicity, because they believe that it has deteriorated or lost its 
uniqueness, due to the influence of other dominant cultures, and transnational 
Islamic movements working in the country. This is a significant finding of the 
study. However, it is pertinent to note that Malay organizations and elites are 
now at the forefront of revitalizing the cultural elements of Malays, having 
realized that it is a significant marker to establish their distinctiveness. 
Nuhman’s (2004)463 account on Understanding Sri Lankan Muslim 
Identity claims that Sri Lankan Muslim (Moor) identity on the basis of religion 
was constructed in reaction to Sinhala and Tamil nationalism in the late 19th 
                                                 
461 The Federal constitution of Malaysia’s definition of Malay in its article 160 (2). 
 
462 Shamsul A History of an Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea and Practice of 
‘Malayness’ in Malaysia Reconsidered.355. 
 
463 Nuhman, Understanding Sri Lankan Muslim Identity, 156. 
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century, which took the form of a unique political and cultural ideology. In a 
way, it argues that Moor identity is constructed in response to social, 
economic and political challenges that the Muslims faced from both Sinhala 
and Tamil nationalisms in the country. This is much more relevant to the 
present study since Malays are also now in the process of constructing their 
identity as they respond to the challenges of their assimilation into the other 
cultures and communities. What is of greater significance in this study is that, 
while Nuhman’s account deals with a wide spectrum of issues from social, 
economic and political factors that are connected to Sinhala and Tamil 
nationalism and Moorish reaction, my study specifically focuses on 
assimilation as the primary cause leading to the identity construction of 
Malays in Sri Lanka.    
Shamsul, Khairudin Aljunied, Alwiyah Aljunied and Nurliza Yusof on 
identity construction of Malays in Malaysia and Singapore (Southeast Asia) 
argue that various factors (such as social, political and economic and 
educational factors) have contributed to the construction of Malay identity in 
those countries. This study on Malay identity in Sri Lanka, however, asserts 
that the Malay identity in Sri Lanka has been constructed in the context of 
identifying the challenge of assimilation and responding to them through 
various programmes designed to reviving and perpetuating the Malay identity. 
To put it differently, Malays seeing the challenges of assimilation and then 
responding to them is part of the construction process of Malay identity in Sri 
Lanka. Thus, it is clear that that the construction of Malay identity in 
Southeast Asia is different from that of the Sri Lankan Malay identity. 
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Constructivist theorists like J.S Furnival, Clifford Geertz, Benedict 
Anderson and Fredrick Barth, Nagel, Phinney, Chandra, etc. are of the view 
that identity of an ethnic group is constructed due to a number of factors: 1) 
interaction between ethnic groups, self-ascription and ascription by others, 2) 
responding to socio-economic and political challenges, or marginalization of 
minority ethnic groups at the hands of majority groups, 3) as a by-product of 
colonial and post-colonial rulers, and 4) the concerted efforts of the learned 
and affluent elites in the ethnic groups. Despite the fact that the constructivist 
theorists illustrate how socio-economic and political challenges give rise to the 
identity construction of an ethnic group, they have not touched upon the 
specific issue - the challenges of assimilation to the identity construction of 
ethnic groups. However, my study provides an alternative by bringing in the 
issue of how assimilation, characterized by both acculturation and structural 
assimilation, becomes a part of the process of identity construction of Malays 
in Sri Lanka. This is a theoretically significant contribution of this study. 
Although main constructivist theorists have not dealt with the 
challenges of assimilation in the process of identity construction, there are 
some empirical studies available on the construction of identity in the face of 
challenges of assimilation. For example, Orsolya Koloszvari’s (2013)464 study, 
Cultivating a Symbolic Ethnicity and Resisting Assimilation: Identity Work 
among Hungarian Immigrants explores how a particular group of European 
immigrants, notably Hungarians, construct their identity in the face of the 
challenges of assimilation in the United States. Her findings suggest that by 
rejecting the national identity of the host country, the USA, the Hungarian 
                                                 
464 Orsolya Koloszvari, “Cultivating a Symbolic Ethnicity and Resisting Assimilation:  
Identity Work Among Hungarian Immigrants.” Sociation Today  11, no., 2(2013). 
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immigrants emphasize the salient points in their ethnic and pan-ethnic 
Hungarian identity. Similarly, empirical studies on ethnic identity and 
assimilation such as Chavivun’s, (1982)465  Ethnic Relations among Thai, Thai 
Muslim, and Chinese in South Thailand, Mattew Hoddie’s (2006)466 Ethnic 
Realignments: A comparative Study of Government Influences on Identity, 
Tan Hui, Sen.’s(1989)467 short essay, Chinese Muslims in Singapore: The 
Negotiation of Identity and Yuvi Thangarajah’s (1995)468 Narratives of 
Victimhood, all have focused on the ethnic identity of the respective ethnic 
groups in their respective country in the face of the challenges of assimilation. 
It is possible that there are many more such empirical studies available in 
relation to ethnicity and assimilation. My empirical study contributes to the 
existing literature, exploring how the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays is 
constructed in the face of the challenges of assimilation.   
As has been discussed before, acculturation can be additive or 
substitutive. In the case of Sri Lankan Malays, the study proves that their 
acculturation is both additive and substitutive. The theory of additive 
acculturation only emphasizes the minority ethnicity adding aspects of its 
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culture to the dominant culture and enriching it.469 This study, nevertheless, 
shows that the dominant culture too enriched the Sri Lankan Malay culture in 
terms of the language, costumes and cuisine.  
    The previous chapter shows that the outcomes of assimilation can take 
various forms such as melting pot, Anglo conformity or pluralism.470 Much of 
the literature on Sri Lankan society has hardly paid any attention to the aspect 
of assimilation and its outcomes. However, this study focused on assimilation 
as a challenge to Malay identity, and the responses of the Malay community to 
such challenges. More importantly, this study shows that plurality and 
hybridity are the outcomes of the assimilation - a new conclusion.   
Another significant finding of the study is that it has brought out the 
fact that the non-Malays in Sri Lanka hold Malays in high esteem; they give 
them the highest accolade for being genuine, loyal, hard working, multi-
lingual and patriotic people. This is in view of their enormous contribution to 
the defense and security of Sri Lanka and the preservation of its sovereignity, 
in both the colonial and post-colonial periods. This is an interesting 
phenomenon because this is in contrast to the situation of Malays in South 
East Asia where the Malays are looked down upon as lazy, dull and addicted 
to drugs.471 The positive impression Sri Lankan Malays enjoy among all other 
dominant groups in the country is really compelling and noteworthy in 
comparison to the situation of Malays in the Malay world. 
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Apart from the Sinhala Only Act of 1956, which gave rise to forced 
acculturation of Malays, they have had no major problems from the State. The 
Sinhala Only Act of 1956 was resisted by some Malays as it fostered forced 
acculturation and caused brain drain of Malays.472 The State, for the Malays, is 
not as significant as it is for other ethnic groups. The State is profoundly 
significant to the Tamils and Moors for a number of reasons: it colonizes with 
Sinhalese people the Tamil and Muslim dominant North and East; has a very 
controversial language policy; has introduced standardization in the university 
admission policy; marginalizes and discriminates against them in employment 
and housing; 473 and promotes the Sinhala Buddhist Supermacism in all walks 
of life, subjugating the minorities and vandalizing their places of worships.   
Another significant finding of this study is the role or responses of 
Malay organizations in the face of challenges of assimilation. No empirical 
studies on Sri Lankan Malays have ever focused on the challenges of 
assimilation and their organizational responses to such challenges. This is the 
first such academic attempt.   
Apart from these findings, the Sri Lankan Malays are also 
encountering many socio-economic and political challenges in the present 
context of Sri Lanka. Most importantly, Malays and Moors, living in Slave 
Island in Colombo, have been given evacuation orders by the Supreme Court 
under the pretext of redeveloping the Slave Island area. It is said that houses 
belonging primarily to Malays and Moors in Malay Street, Justice Akbar 
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Mawatha, Java Place and Masjidul Jamiah Mawatha would be demolished, 
and the Malay inhabitants who have been living there for generations would 
be resettled in different places, or given some sort of compensation by the 
government. The Malays in my field work told me that it was a strategic move 
aimed at dispersing and displacing the Malay voters perceived to be 
unsympathetic to the current regime. They also believed that the government 
wanted to lease out their land, which is situated in the heart of Colombo, to 
foreign companies for profit. Malays are increasingly concerned about their 
livelihood and educational opportunities for their children in the new places; 
this planned expulsion of them from areas where they have been living for 
generation would have grave consequences for them. The legal documents in 
their possession such as deeds have been of no use in defending their rights.  
 Another area of serious concern for Malays is their lack of political 
representation in Parliament. As we discussed in the third chapter, the last time 
they had parliamentary representation in parliament was in 1970s. Thereafter, 
no one from the Malay has ever been appointed as parliamentary 
representatives for Malays. The emergence of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
(SLMC), a major political party of Sri Lankan Moors, did not offer them any 
hope either. There is no Malay electorate in Sri Lanka for Malays, for they are 
widely scattered throughout the country. Therefore it is extremely difficult for 
a Malay to become an elected representative of Malays. Even the SLMC has 
not conceded the demands of Malays to appoint one of their members to 
parliament through their National List. Malays are alarmed over the 
impossibility of representation in parliament, particularly in the face of 
deterioration of their culture and their assimilation into the core communities 
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at present. They perceive that these issues can be sorted out only if there was a 
political representation at the center.   
 Malays are also extremely concerned over the current wave of 
stridently virulent anti-Muslim campaign by the extremist Buddhist fringe 
groups like Bodu Bala Sena and Sinhala Ravaya, who are problematizing the 
mundane dietary practices of Muslims, their clothing, and their places of their 
worship. It is said that over 25 mosques across the country have been 
vandalized by these extremist forces operating with total impunity. Though 
these extremist groups seem to have spared Malays from their vilification and 
brutality, Malays are really frightened by these. The intense and baseless 
Islamophobia being manufactured by the Buddhist extremists for consumption 
by the ignorant of the Sinhalese, and the resultant physical violence, which has 
already been carried out against the Moors in various places, threaten to take 
the country back to the dark and painful thirty years during which there was a 
civil war between the government and Tamil militant movements. If the much 
feared whole sale violence against Moors were to happen, the Malays may not 
be spared in that madness.  
 Furthermore, marriages at a very young age due to their poverty and 
unemployment, particularly in rural village areas like Kirinda, are also causes 
of serious concern for the Malays living in the country. Perhaps these issues 
may be explored in future scholarly studies on Malays in Sri Lanka.   
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8.4: Limitation of the study 
One of the limitations of this study is that this study was carried out 
based on the qualitative methodology, employing in-depth interviews, focus 
group discussion and observations as a data collection techniques, coupled 
with the literature review. However, there is a possibility of undertaking 
further studies employing the quantitative methodology on the same topic, 
such as surveys in various places in Sri Lanka where the Malays are 
concentrated.  
This study was mainly confined to Western, Central, Southern and 
Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Further studies can be undertaken in other 
areas such as Uva, Sabargamuwa and North Central Provinces in the country, 
where Malays live in some significant numbers.        
The findings of the study could have been analyzed using Qualitative 
Software Package, but having considered the quality and subtleties of the data 
as well as the time constraint, I used the manual descriptive analysis method.    
This study did not investigate the effects of tsunami upon the Malays 
living in the Southern and other provinces. The main focus of this study was 
also not about the social, economical and political contribution of Malays; nor 
was it about Malays' contribution to the security and sovereignty of Sri Lanka, 
even though their contribution in these respects is unparalleled in Sri Lankan 
history.    
This study was confined to the exploration of inter-ethnic relationship 
of Malays with non-Malays in the country, to the exclusion of intra-group 
relationship of Malays.  
 393 
 
During my field work, I noticed that my Moor ethnicity aroused a bit 
of suspicion among Malays regarding my motive for doing a research upon 
them. This suspicion I believe was aroused due to some of the social, political 
and ideological differences they have with Moors. When I explained to them 
that this was a pure academic exercise as part of my post-graduate degree 
(PhD studies), they became convinced, and subsequently supported me well 
throughout my filed works.    
 
8.5: Recommendation for future works 
 Since this study was limited to the inter-ethnic relationship of Malays 
with non-Malays, a further research is needed to explore the intra-group 
network or relationship of Malays with fellow Malays living throughout the 
country.  
 Current socio-economic and political issues confronting the Malays; 
and gender and social stratification issues affecting them are some of the other 
possible areas for future research works on Malay community in Sri Lanka.  
 Another excellent research topic for future researchers dealing with 
issues pertaining to Malay community in Sri Lanka would be the effects of 
tsunami disaster upon the Malay community in Sri Lanka; this area suffers a 
serious academic lacuna. 
 Future researchers can also focus upon the religious contribution of 
Malays to the enrichment and propagation of Islam in Sri Lanka, and the 
influence of Islamic movements upon the Malays in the present context.  
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Another topic of great interest would be the social, economical and 
political contribution of Malays to the security and sovereignty of Sri Lanka, 
as this is considered an important realm of Malays’ in Sri Lanka.    
Another research on my very thesis topic could be undertaken 
employing the quantitative methods covering the Malays living in other parts 
of the country such as Uva, Sabargamuwa, and North Central Provinces, 
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APPENDIX 1: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS GUIDE WITH 
MALAYS 
 
ETHNIC IDENTITY OF MINORITY MALAYS IN SRI LANKA: 
CHALLENGES OF ASSIMILATION AND THEIR RESPONSES  
           
QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS WITH MALAYS 
 
1. Personal  information  
- Name:              
- Male/female:    
- Profession:    
 
2. Ethnic identity of Sri Lankan Malays and their identity formation 
 
What does, being a Sri Lankan, mean to you or how would you define 
your ethnic identity? 
 
What language do you use at your home and outside for your 
interpersonal communication? 
 
Are you proud of being Malay origin from the Malay world, Southeast 
Asia?   
 
Could you please tell me about your dress, cuisine, and other cultural 
stock a bit? Is it still being adopted in day today activities in Sri 
Lanka?   
 
Do the Malays adopt different type of culture in rural and urban 
contexts?  
 
What are the roles of Malay professionals and other agencies in 
reinforcing the Sri Lankan Malay identity? 
 
How did the Malays contribute to the socio-economic development of 
Sri Lanka in the past and how do they contribute to the same now?  
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3. Malays in Southeast Asia and their influences upon local Malays in 
Sri Lanka 
 
To what extent do the Sri Lankan Malays maintain a relationship with 
Malays in Southeast Asia? 
 
How far the Malays in SEA have been influential in shaping the 
identity of Sri Lankan Malays?  
 
What is the present state of relationship and what do you want or 
expect them to do in the future as they are your forefathers? 
 
 
4. Intra and inter relationship of Malays 
 
What kinds of intra networks or organizations do the Malays have 
across the country?  
 
How is that network or organization functioning for the betterment of 
your community at large?  
 
Can you please elucidate on the inter relationship of Malays with host 
communities in Sri Lanka, especially with Sinhalese and Sri Lankan 
Moors?  
 
How do you find the inter relationship? Has it been positive or 
negative? 
 
Have you been prejudiced or discriminated by them so far?   
 
Do you or the younger generation tend to adopt the culture of host 
communities? Has your culture been enhanced or otherwise because of 
the inter relationship?  
 
Can you explain the social, economic and political integration 
(relationship) of Malays with the host communities?  
 
 
5. Challenges of assimilation to the Malay identity and responses of 
Malays  
 
It has been noted that the younger generation of Malays became 




In what ways, they have become assimilated and what are primary 
elements of it influencing upon Malays (acculturation, socio-economic 
integration and intermarriages etc…)? 
  
How does it challenge your ethnic identity? 
 
If the assimilation challenges to Malay identity, what 
responses/measures are the Malay elites and organizations taking to 
arrest the trend?  
 
In your opinion, how do you think these challenges can best be 
addressed?  
 




6. The social, economic, and political challenges of Malays 
 
What are the social, economic, and political challenges facing the 
Malays at present context in Sri Lanka? Can you please elaborate it? 
 





APPENDIX 1I: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS GUIDE WITH NO-
MALAYS 
 
ETHNIC IDENTITY OF MINORITY MALAYS IN SRI LANKA: 
CHALLENGES OF ASSIMILATION AND THEIR RESPONSES  
           
QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS WITH NON-
MALAYS 
 
1. Personal  information  
- Name:              
- Male/female:    
- Profession: 
 
2. How would you describe Sri Lankan Malays? How do you identify 
them and label them? What do you think of Malays?  
 
3. Do you know that they were brought to Sri Lanka from Malay 
Archipelago (Indonesia and Malaysia) by the Colonial rulers during 
the period in the mid-17th century to mid-20th century?   
 
4. Do you maintain any socio-economic, educational and political 
relationship or integration with Sri Lankan Malays? How do you find 
them in their dealings (positive or negative)?  
 
5. Are you aware of the socio-economic contribution of Malays to Sri 
Lanka in the past and now?  
 
6. Do you think that Malays are being helped or shaped by Malay world 
like Malaysia and Indonesia? Do you think that they have a link with 
Malaysia and Indonesia? In what way?  
 
7. What do you know about the network or organizations working for the 
betterment or welfare of Malays in Sri Lanka?  
 
8. Have you ever witnessed any sports event or cultural show of Malays 
in any parts of the country? 
 
9. It has been said that younger generation of Malays have assimilated 
(become naturalized) with host communities in Sri Lanka. Have you 
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ever come across such assimilation, especially in the form of 
intermarriages or conversion or others? Do you think that the Malays 
are delegate or flexible in this aspects, especially in terms of their 
identity? What are the reasons for it?  
 
10. How do the Malays respond to the challenge of assimilation to their 
identity? Do you believe that Malays have become a society with 
plural culture in outlook?  
 
11. Are you aware of the social, economic, and political challenges facing 
the Malays in Sri Lanka? What are they?  
 
12. How did they or do they counter these challenges as a minority? 
 
13. In your opinion, how do you think these challenges can best be 
addressed?  
 
14. Do you think that there is a prospect of future prosperity to the 





APPENDIX 1I1: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE WITH 
MALAYS 
 
ETHNIC IDENTITY OF MINORITY MALAYS IN SRI LANKA: 
CHALLENGES OF ASSIMILATION AND THEIR RESPONSES 
 
The following major themes were discussed in the Focus Group 
Discussions. 
 
 Profile of the community.  
 Population dynamics of Malays in the country.  
 Social network/ Institutional capacity of Malays in the country. 
 Identity markers of Malays such as Malay language, physical 
characteristics culture, ancestry, and religion. 
 Malay identity formation.  
 Challenges of acculturation and structural assimilation to their 
ethnicity. 
 Factors contributing to the process of assimilation. 
 Malay organizations and their responses to the challenge of 
assimilation. 
 Other activities of Malay organizations. 
 Outcomes of assimilation: pluralism and hybridity of Malays. 
 Other social, economic and political challenges confronting the 
society.   
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APPENDIX 1V: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET AND 
CONSENT FORM (IRB) 
 




1. Project title: ETHNIC IDENTITY OF MINORITY MALAYS IN 
SRI LANKA: CHALLENGES OF ASSIMILATION TO THEIR 
IDENITY AND RESPONSES OF MALAYS 
 
2. Principal Investigator and co-investigator: 
Principal investigator  
Aboobacker Rameez 
Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS) 




Associate Professor Syed Farid Alatas 
Department of Malay Studies, NUS  
Phone: +065 6516 3707 
Email: mlshead@nus.edu.sg 
 
3. What is the purpose of this research?  
This study examines the ethnic identity of minority Malays in Sri 
Lanka, specifically focusing on how this has been affected by the 
process of their assimilation into host communities. It also focuses on 
the dynamics of identity formation of Sri Lankan Malays in a plural 
society and attempts to explore the social, economic and political 
challenges facing the community.  
You are invited to participate in a research. This information sheet 
provides you with information about the research. The Principal 
Investigator (person in charge of this research) will also describe this 
research to you and answer all your questions. Read the information 
below and ask questions about anything you don’t understand before 
deciding whether or not to take part. 
 415 
 
4. Who can participate in the research? What is the expected 
duration of my participation? What is the duration of this 
research? 
The interviews will be conducted with 50 informants from the Malay 
community aged 21 years old and above living in different parts of the 
Sri Lanka, who may be 1) religious leaders, 2) professionals, 3) 
businessmen, 4) retired soldiers, 5) community workers or activists, 6) 
Malay adults (men and women above 21 years), 7) elderly Malays, or 
8) other blue-collar workers.  
In addition, 15 interviews will be conducted with the host (other) 
communities in Sri Lanka to understand their perception of Malays.  
Interviews that take about 1 to 2 hours will be conducted at a place, 
time and date convenient for you. Interviews will be audio-taped and 
recorded with your permission. If you are uncomfortable with your 
interview being audio-recorded, I will take written notes instead. To 
protect your confidentiality, your personal details will be noted on a 
separate sheet from your responses in the interview and kept in 
separate files.  
Your consent to be re-contacted will be sought, e.g., if the need for 
clarification arises. I will re-contact you by email or the phone only if 
you agree. Please indicate on the Consent Form whether you agree to 
be re-contacted.    
 
5. What is the approximate number of participants involved? 
65 interviews to be conducted (50 interviews with Malays and 15 with 
host (other) community members). 
 
6. What will be done if I take part in this research? 
You will be interviewed if you agree to participate in this research. 
Your views will be regarded as your personal opinions. The interview 
will be audio-tapped with your permission and transcribed in order to 
obtain precise and relevant information for this study. Your permission 
will be sought for your views to be quoted with or without identifying 
you in any publication arising from this research. Your photograph(s) 
may be taken only if you agree. Your consent will also be sought for 
your photographs to be published with or without identifying you. 
According to the University’s policies, the data collected, including the 
audio files and transcripts, will be kept up to 10 years after which it 




7. How will my privacy and the confidentiality of my research 
records be protected? 
Only the principal investigator has the access to your identifiable 
information (e.g., name and contact information, etc) and this will not 
be released or handed over to any other person. Identifiable 
information will never be used in a publication or presentation. All 
your identifiable information and research data will be coded (i.e. only 
identified with a code number) at the earliest possible stage of the 
studies. Your personal information will be discarded after coding and 
when the research is completed.    
 
8. What are the possible discomforts and risks for participants? 
The interview will not likely to cause any inconveniences or adverse 
risk to participants arising from this research. If you feel comfortable 
answering any questions, you are free not to do. 
 
9. What is the compensation for any injury? 
No harm or risks are expected. You do not have to answer any question 
that makes you feel uncomfortable. 
 
10. Will there be reimbursement for participation? 
There is no reimbursement for participation in this research  
 
11. What are the possible benefits to me and to others?  
There is no direct benefit to you for participating in this research as 
this is purely an academic research. However, this research or study 
will contribute to shedding insights into the process and dynamics of 
identity formation of the minority Malays in Sri Lanka. 
      
12. Can I refuse to participate in this research? 
Yes, you can. Your decision to participate in this research is voluntary 
and completely up to you. You can also withdraw from the research at 
any time without giving any reasons, by informing the principal 





13. Whom should I call if I have any questions or problems? 
Please contact the Principal Investigator,Aboobacker Rameez at 
telephone (Singapore) number +65 81072748, Sri Lankan number 
+94 718035340 and email a0066477@nus.edu.sg or 
aramees2001@gmail.com for all research-related matters and in the 
event of research-related injuries. 
 
For an independent opinion regarding the research and the rights of 
research participants, you may contact a staff member of the National 
University of Singapore Institutional Review Board (Attn: Mr Chan 





Project title: ETHNIC IDENTITY OF MINORITY MALAYS IN SRI 
LANKA: CHALLENGES OF ASSIMILTION TO THEIR IDENTITY 
AND THE RESPONSES OF MALAYS 
Principal Investigator with the contact number and organization: 
Aboobacker Rameez 
Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore 
Mobile: +065 81072748 
E-mail: a0066477@nus.edu.sg 
 
I hereby acknowledge that: 
1. My signature is my acknowledgement that I have agreed to take part in the 
above research.  
2. I have received a copy of this information sheet that explains the use of my 
data in this research. I understand its contents and agree to donate my data 
for the use of this research. 
3. I can withdraw from the research at any point of time by informing the 
Principal Investigator and all my data will be discarded. 
4. I agree to have the interview audio taped. 
5. I agree / do not agree* to be re-contacted. 
6. I agree/ do not agree* for the comments to be quoted in any subsequent 
publications resulting from the research. 
 
7. I agree/ do not agree* for the following personal identifiers to be disclosed in the 
PI’s academic publication, if any.  
  Surname   First name   Organization Name   Position   
Disagree (I wish to remain anonymous and only agree to be known as 
___________________). 
 
8. I agree/ do not agree* for my photograph(s) to be published with/ without* 
revealing my personal information with the photograph(s) in any subsequent 
publications/ presentations resulting from the research. I understand that even if 
my name were not associated with the photograph(s), I may still be identified.   
*please indicate as appropriate. 
      ___________________                                        _____________________ 
Name and Signature (Participant)                                               Date 
 
       ______________________                                  ____________________ 













Male 68 Hunupitiya Retired Post Master 
2.  Gaffoor  Male 50 Kandy Private Company 




Male 55 Matale Private Company 




Female 22 Matale Student 
7.  Muan Ameen Male 60 Colombo Enterprenuer  
8.  TK.Azoor Male 58 Colombo Lawyer 
9.  Umar Jaya Male 57 Colombo 
Private 
company(Retired) 
10.  Alamudeen Male 55 Kirinda Principal 
11.  Anees Male 45 Kirinda Teacher 
12.  Riyasath Male 28 Kirinda Fishing 
13.  Farook Male 36 Kirinda Business 








Male 55 Colombo Religious Scholar 
17.  Iqram Cuttlian Male 45 Colombo Private Company 
18.  Rozana Female 32 Nawalapitiya Teacher 
19.  TK.Samad Male 64 Nawalapitiya Retired Post Master 








Female 45 Colombo 
Senior Lecturer in 
English Language 
23.  TY.Raheem Male 47 Colombo Private Company 










Male 60 Colombo Enterprenuer 










Male 62 Trincomalee 
Military 
Service(Retired) 
30.  Thowfeek Male 62 Kinniya Teacher(Retired) 
31.  Juman Razeen Male 40 Kinniya Teacher 




Male 60 Trincomalee Enterprenuer 















37.  Arfeen Male 56 Akbar Town Clerk 
38.  TJ Packeer Ali Male 55 Enderamulla Enterprenuer 
39.  Rahuman Male 54 Colombo Enterprenuer 
40.  Nazeera Amit Female 58 Hambantota House wife 
41.  Marjuna  Female 61 Hambantota Teacher 








Female 25 Hunupitiya Student 








47.  Ahamed Fazal Male 29 Colombo 
Tertiary Level 
Student 




Male 48 Ampara Private Sector 
50.  Tuan Raheem Male 45 Ampara Teacher 
51.  Aameena Female 37 Ampara Housewife 




Female 37 Colombo Housewife 
54.  Rinosa Farwin Female 29 Hambantota Student 











Names Ethnicity Sex Age Village/Town Profession 
1.  Nazeer Moor Male 67 Colombo Customs 
Officer 
2.  Salfiya Moor Femal
e 
40 Hambantota Teacher 
3.  Jumana Moor Femal
e 
38 Hambantota Housewife 
4.  Hasan Moor Male 55 Ampara Business 
5.  Sagara  Buddhist Male 38 Colombo Non-
Governmental 
Organization 
6.  Ziyad Moor Male 22 Matale Social Worker 




39 Kandy Lawyer 
8.  Sulfika Moor Male 58 Nawalapitiya Housewife 
9.  Ravi 
Sankar 




Hindu Male 43 Colombo Teacher 
11.  Sarath 
Aananda 
Buddhist Male 45 Kandy Gov.Servant 
12.  Razeen Moor Male 28 Matale Business 




36 Gampola Teacher 
14.  Karunarath
na 
Buddhist Male 42 Colombo Private Sector 
15.  Musthafa 
Mohamed 
Borah Male 40 Colombo Gov.Servant 
 
 
